secs. 239, 244, 250, 252-256; Episcopal Society v. Episcopal Church, 1 Pick. 372; Corning v. Southland, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 552, 556; Moss v. Rossie Lead Mining Co., 5 Id. 137; Clark v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153; Willinks v. Hollingsworth, 6 Wheat. 241; Lawrence v. Taylor, supra. But it may be said that this principle is scarcely broad enough to answer the plaintiff's purpose. If a person ratifies the act of one who has assumed to be his agent, the effect of the transaction, according to the books, is the same as if he had actually given him direct authority in the premises to the extent to which such act reaches. Here the objection is that the defendant could not bind himself in his representative character by any agent, however fully authorized. If, therefore, the acts of ratification which are proved in this case are no more than an equivalent to a power of attorney executed by the defendant before the contract was signed by his agents, the objection that the defendant could not delegate his own delegated authority is not answered. The reason of the maxim, Delegatus non potest delegare, however, is, that in the cases to which it applies the first constituent has a right to the personal judgment, care, and skill of his agent.

Assuming that Ogden & Jones in this case acted without authority from the defendant, the latter had a right, when the contract came to his knowledge, either to repudiate or to confirm it. In determining upon one or the other course, he brought into exercise those personal qualifications on account of which he is presumed to have been selected by the testator. The law does not allow him to commit the power with which he is intrusted to another, for perhaps that other would bind the estate to a transaction which the former might not have considered advantageous and safe if he had acted directly upon it. The reason fails where the person actually intrusted with the authority has, with a full knowledge of the facts, ratified the act of one who has assumed to act as his agent. But if the acts of ratification rested wholly in parol, there would still remain a formal difficulty. The plaintiff (aside from the equitable doctrine arising out of a part performance) must show a contract in writing, subscribed by the defendant or his lawful agent. The execution of the contract by Ogden & Jones, in the name of the plaintiff, goes for nothing, not because they had no power to execute, for that is remedied by the ratification, but because the act was ong which could not be done by attorney; and though the defendant, with a full knowledge of the terms of the contract, elected to abide by it, that election would not answer the exigency of

the statute, which requires the contract or some note or memorandum of it to be in writing, and subscribed by the party or his agent lawfully authorized. The ratification in such a case must be authenticated in the same manner as though it were an original contract made by the defendant. But the plaintiff is relieved from the embarrassment presented by this view of the case by the letters of the defendant which were given in evidence. The one dated June, 1850, refers to the contract by its date, and the name of the vendee, and it contains a description of the premises intended to be conveyed. The rule is well established in the English courts, that where a contract in writing or note exists which binds one party, any subsequent note in writing signed by the other is sufficient to bind him, provided it contains in itself the terms of the contract, or refers to some writing which contains them: Sugd. Vend., c. 3, sec. 3; Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 Ad. & El. 355; Jackson v. Lowe, 1 Bing. 377. It is a reasonable rule, and not liable to the objection that it lets in the frauds and perjuries which the statute was intended to guard against. It was never required that the vendor and vendee should sign at the same time, or upon the same identical paper. The revisors proposed that the security to be given for the purchase money should be executed at the same time with the agreement to convey, to avoid what they considered an evil, namely, the doctrine "that a letter or other writing, though written subsequently to the making of the agreement," would take a case out of the statute: 3 R. S., 2d ed., 655. The legislature, however, did not adopt this view; but instead of the section proposed, re-enacted the provision in the language of the act of 29 Car. II., c. 3, and of our former act, only changing the word "signed" to "subscribed," and requiring the consideration to be expressed: 1 R. S. 135, secs. 8, 9. In this case the agreement was subscribed within the full meaning of the word, for it was written at the bottom of the writing intended to be authenticated. The mischief which it was intended to prevent by using the word "subscribed" was a course of decisions which held that the name of the party written in any part of thé agreement, though in a manner not intended to authenticate the paper, was held a sufficient signing: Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484; Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. 341. This was not a case of that kind. The signature to which I propose to give effect was a subscription.

I am in favor of affirming the judgment of the supreme court.

The other judges concurred in the above opinion, with the exception of T. A. JOHNSON and MITCHELL, JJ., who dissented. Judgment affirmed.

POWER OF COURT TO COMPEL PARTY TO CONVEY LANDS OR DELIVER PROPERTY, OR TO SURRENDER OR BRING BEFORE COURT CHILDREN OR OTHER PERSONS WITHIN HIS CONTROL BUT SITUATE IN ANOTHER STATE.The courts of a state or nation have no jurisdiction beyond the limits of the sovereignty of the state or nation whose laws it is their duty to interpret and enforce. The jurisdiction of the state courts is confined within the state lines, and beyond these limits their process has no effect: Freeman on Judg. ments, sec. 564; Story's Confl. L., sec. 539; Lovejoy v. Alber, 54 Am. Dec. 630; Ewer v. Coffin, 48 Id. 587; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pacific Tel. Co., 49 Ill. 90; note to Myers v. Myers, 58 Am. Dec. 692. "It seems to be generally, and perhaps universally, conceded that by no means can a citizen of one state be compelled to go into another state to litigate a civil action by means of process served in his own state; and that even though process from the courts of any state be personally served beyond the limits of the state whence it issued, no personal liability against the defendant can result therefrom which will be recognized beyond the state in which the action originated:" Freeman on Judgments, sec. 564. So in the case of land or other property situated without the jurisdiction of the court. It can be affected, generally speaking, only by a judgment or decree of a court within the jurisdiction of which it is situated; and the judgments of other courts are of no avail in transferring the title to property thus situated, or in otherwise affecting it.

Courts of equity, however, as they act upon the person primarily, or, as the old authorities have it, deal "with the consciences" of persons within their jurisdiction, have not been confined to subject-matter situate within the boundary lines of their jurisdiction. Equitas agit in personam; and by means of its power over the person of a party it may compel him to perform acts relative to subject-matter within foreign jurisdiction, on penalty of being subjected to the process of equity attachment and sequestration. Personal jurisdiction is the primary jurisdiction, though it may not be the only proper jurisdiction, of equity, and there may be no essential or fundamental reason why it should not act directly in rem: Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sec. 135. But it is in consequence of its power over the person that equity is enabled to effectuate justice with respect to subject-matter situate in a foreign sovereignty; for, per se, its decrees could have no validity or force over such property.

JURISDICTION OF EQUITY OVER LAND AND PROPERTY IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION.-Upon the grounds just stated, equity has long exercised this kind of jurisdiction. One of the earliest cases was between historical personages: William Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. sen. 444; and the court therein decreed the specific performance of articles executed in England and concerning the boundaries of the then colonies of Maryland and Pennsylvania. In Derby v. Athol, Id. 202, the court held that it might consider the right and title to the Isle of Man, where the equitable rights of the parties thereto were involved. A plea to the jurisdiction of a bill praying relief from a grant of an annuity or rent-charge upon lands in Ireland, alleged to have been fraudulently obtained, was overruled in Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75; S. C., Id. 135; though Ireland, like the Isle of Man, was not within the

jurisdiction of the court. The lord chancellor was apparently much chagrined at question being made of his jurisdiction, and his language is often cited. "This is surely a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the common lawyers; for when you go about to bind the lands and grant a sequestration to execute a decree, then they readily tell you that the authority of this court is only to regulate a man's conscience, and ought not to affect the estate, but that this court must agere in personam only; and when, as in this case, you prosecute the person for a fraud, they tell you you must not intermeddle here, because the fraud, though committed here, concerns lands that lie in Ireland, which makes the jurisdiction local; so would wholly elude the jurisdiction of this court." And he overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, and ordered the defendant to pay costs for endeavoring to oust the court of its jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of equity, acting in personam over subject-matter beyond the jurisdiction of the court, is now established beyond cavil, when it once properly acquires jurisdiction of the equities involved. Therefore, when the court has acquired jurisdiction of the parties in a matter of proper equitable cognizance, it may, by acting in personam, compel the conveyance of interests in real property, the assignment of choses in action, or the bringing of personal property within the jurisdiction, or may administer other relief in the furtherance of justice, notwithstanding the property or interest involved may be situated without the state: Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 Myl. & K. 104, 108; Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 589; Archer v. Preston, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 133, c. 3, cited 1 Vern. 75, 77; Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 404; Toller v. Carteret, 2 Id. 494; Cranstown v. Johnson, 3 Ves. jun. 170; Jackson v. Petrie, 10 Id. 164; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 669; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203; Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Gray, 304; Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill & J. 504; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 350; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N. H. 462 (injunction); Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327; Meade v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 382; Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516, 520; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 57; McDowell v. Read, 3 La. Ann. 391. In Louisiana the power of equity to compel a conveyance of land in Texas was denied: Mussina v. Alling, 11 Id. 568. But the case was based rather upon the ground that courts of equity in that state did not possess the full powers of the English chancery courts than upon the ground that equity did not, in general, possess such a power: See also, upon the power of equity in this respect, the note to Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1823 et seq.

JURISDICTION OF PERSON MUST BE OBTAINED. This is, of course, indispensable. The basis of the power of equity to affect at all subject-matter beyond the limits of its jurisdiction is its power to act in personam. There fore it must have obtained jurisdiction of the person of the party who is to be compelled to act concerning such subject-matter, either by personal service of process upon the party while he is within the jurisdiction, or by his voluntary appearance and submission to the jurisdiction: Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327; Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill & J. 504; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 350; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 669; Stephenson v. Davis, 56 Me. 75; Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md. 530; Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516, 520; Hawley v. James, 32 Am. Dec. 623; Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 120; Blount v. Blount, 1 Hawks, 635; Baldwin v. Talmadge, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 400; Shattuck v. Cassidy, 3 Edw. Ch. 152; Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280; Cleveland v. Burrill, 25 Barb. 532; Penn v. Hayward, 14 Ohio St. 302.

EFFECT OF DECREE.-IT HAS NO EFFECT PER SE UPON REAL PROPERTY BEYOND JURISDICTION. From the very nature of the property, land must be governed by the lex loci rei sitæ. No judgment of a court of another jurisdiction can have any effect upon the title to the property. And the power of equity in decreeing the conveyance of land is effectual only upon the person, not upon the land. The decree does not change the title to the land. It remains the same as before until the person in whom the title resides either voluntarily or perforce obeys the decree of the court and divests himself of the title by a conveyance valid under the lex loci. The decree of chancery, then, with respect to realty beyond its jurisdiction, can have no direct operation upon the property, and per se in no way affect the legal or equitable title thereto: Carrington v. Brents, 1 McLean, 167; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Hawley v. James, 32 Am. Dec. 623; Proctor v. Ferebee, 1 Ired. Eq. 146. A decree of the United States circuit court directing a conveyance of lands in Ohio does not operate as a conveyance per se: Shephard v. Ross County, 7 Ohio, 271. And if the party ordered to convey had no title, none would pass, even if he obeyed the decree and executed a conveyance: Proctor v. Ferebee, 1 Ired. Eq. 146. The decree itself cannot transfer title, nor can the deed of a master in chancery, executed under the direction of the court: Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474. As equity has no power over the land itself, a demurrer will lie to a bill brought for the delivery of possession of land' out of the jurisdiction, though a sale of the land might be decreed: Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543. So equity cannot decree a sale of lands in another state upon a petition of the heirs, on the ground that it would not admit of advantageous division. This would be an act in rem, and the court could not enforce its decree or authorize its own trustee to go into the other state and sell property: White v. White, 7 Gill & J. 208. A judgment of a court of another state, that a deed given for lands is void, is a judgment as to the title to lands which that court has no jurisdiction to make, nor could it decree a conveyance or delivery of possession founded on that decree: Daris v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 129. Still a decree concerning a conveyance is not without its effect per se. Thus a decree directing a conveyance may be pleaded as a cause of action or defense in the courts of the state where the land is situated, and it is entitled in such a court to the force and effect of record evidence of the equities therein determined, unless it be impeached for fraud. And the parties are concluded by the decree as to the matters adjudged, though no conveyance is made: Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474. CASES OF CONTRACT, FRAUD, OR TRUST GIVE EQUITY JURISDICTION TO DECREE CONVEYANCE OF FOREIGN REALTY, ETC. A suit in which a conveyance of realty without the jurisdiction, or a decree affecting property or subject-matter without the jurisdiction of the court, is sought, must itself be within the jurisdiction of the court. The decree is but the final decision of the court in determining the proper relation between the parties before it, and in administering justice between them. After the court has obtained jurisdiction of the parties in a suit of which it is rightly cognizant, it will proceed to order a conveyance of foreign land, or decree the performance of some similar act with regard to foreign subject-matter. But the matter in which equity will exercise this power must be a matter of equitable cognizance. And it is not every case that may be presented to the court that will warrant such a decree as this. Thus we have seen its decree cannot per se affect the land, and therefore it will not entertain a suit for the delivery of possession of land without the jurisdiction: Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543; and see supra. If the cause be considered as involving a naked question of title, the cause would be

AM. DEC. VOL. LXVII—7