ACCORD AND SATISFACTION COMING FROM STRANGER having no pecuniary interest in the subject-matter is, if accepted, in discharge of the debt, a perfect defense to a subsequent action against the debtor. Leavitt v. Morrow, 334.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
See DEEDS, 5, 7; MARRIED WOMEN, 6, 7.
See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
1. ADVERSE POSSESSION MAY BE NOTICE TO PURCHASER, BUT POSSESSION TO HAVE THAT EFFECT must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal. Martin v. Jackson, 489.
2. NOTICE TO PURCHASER AT SHERIFF'S SALE ON MORTGAGE of an existing adverse claim comes too late if the mortgagee had no notice when the mortgage was executed. Id.
3. ADVERSE POSSESSION WITH CONSENT AND CONNIVANCE OF MORTGAGOR, unless so open as to be notice, cannot affect the mortgagee. Id.
4. POSSESSION OF DISSEISOR, TO GIVE TITLE UNDER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS must be actual, visible, notorious, distinct, hostile, and of twenty-one years continued duration. Id.
5. POSSESSION UNDER ENTRY ORIGINALLY MADE IN FIDUCIARY CAPACITY, to become adverse, must be evidenced by some decisive act or declaration. Id.
6. TENANT ENTERING UNDER TITLE OF MORTGAGEE IS PRESUMED TO CONTINUE IN POSSESSION in fidelity to the tenure; but when the mortgagee has notice of his adverse claim he may maintain ejectment. Id. 7. ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR TWENTY-ONE YEARS, though commenced before installments were due on a mortgage, would bar the mortgagee. Id.
1. ACCEPTANCE BY TWO JOINT OWNERS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THEIR SHARE OF PROCEEDS OF SALE is sufficient to constitute third joint owner agent to sell. Davis v. Burnett, 263.
2. AGENT TO SELL PERSONAL PROPERTY HAS POWER TO BIND HIS PRINCIPAL by warranty of soundness. Id.
3. AGENT IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE WHO AT TIME OF MAKING CONTRACT
DISCLOSES HIS PRINCIPAL; but where he binds himself, he is answerable,
and if made to suffer in damages arising out of the contract, he is entitled
to compensation from his principal. Id.
4. CORPORATION IS LIABLE FOR AGENT'S ACTS, DECLARATIONS, AND FALSE
REPRESENTATIONS to the same extent as natural persons. Henderson v.
San Antonio etc. R. R. Co., 675.
5. AGENT'S FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATIONS WITHOUT PRINCIPAL'S KNOWL-
EDGE or consent nevertheless invalidate a contract entered into on behalf
of the principal by the agent within the scope of his authority; or even
where the contract is beyond the agent's authority if the principal rati-
fies it, for he cannot ratify it without assuming responsibility for the
fraud entering into it. Id.
6. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS BY COMPANY'S AGENT AS TO TIME OF COMPLET-
ING RAILROAD and as to its probable cost, forming the inducement for
a contract with it, vitiate such contract, and the company cannot be held
excused on the ground that the parties had equal opportunities for know-
ing the facts. Id.
See COMMON CARRIERS, 9, 10; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 5; STATUTE
OF FRAUDS, 7-9.
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 1, 3,
IT IS NO DEFENSE TO ACTION FOR INJURY FROM BITE OF VICIOUS DOG
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS TRESPASSER at the time upon the land, if the
owner of the dog, knowing of the propensities of the dog, permits it to
run at large. Sherfey v. Bartley, 597.
OFFICER OR PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL MAY JUSTIFY ARREST, WITHOUT WARRANT,
of a person suspected of having committed a felony, for the purpose of
bringing him before a committing magistrate, when such arrest is made
without malice and upon probable cause. Brockway v. Crawford, 250.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
See DAMAGES, 1, 2.
ASSIGNMENTS.
See BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, 7.
DEFENDANT MAY SHOW IN ABATEMENT OF ATTACHMENT, in Tennessee, that
the property on which the attachment was levied is not his, or he may
traverse and disprove the truth of the cause stated as the ground of
attachment. Harris v. Taylor, 576.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1.
1. KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY ATTORNEY IN ANOTHER TRANSACTION BETWEEN
OTHER PARTIES does not affect one who subsequently employs him, and
is not notice to the latter. Martin v. Jackson, 489.
2. PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS.-WHERE PERSON HAS GENERAL CON-
VERSATION WITH ATTORNEY about a question of law, where no retainer
is paid, and there is nothing to show that the person sought the alvice
with any view to regulate his future conduct in regard to a pending or
expected litigation, his communications are not privileged, as being made
between counsel and client. Thompson v. Kilborne, 742.
3. PRACTICE OF GIVING ADVICE UPON LEGAL SUBJECTS WITHOUT STUDY and
examination, and without corresponding pay and a distinct retainer, is
a vicious one, which this court strongly disapprove of. Id.
4. ATTORNEY DOES NOT MAKE HIMSELF LIABLE AS TRESPASSER by communi-
cating to the sheriff on behalf of his client instructions to levy an execu-
tion upon specified property afterwards proved not to be the property of
the execution debtor; nor by executing, in his client's name and by his
authority, a bond of indemnity to the sheriff. Ford v. Williams, 83.
5. BOND OF INDEMNITY UNDER SEAL, EXECUTED BY ATTORNEY WHOSE AU-
THORITY WAS BY PAROL, is valid against his client as a simple contract,
without regard to the seal. Id.
6. FACT THAT ATTORNEY EXECUTES FOR HIS CLIENT BOND OF INDEMNITY
UNDER SEAL, when his authority is by parol, does not make him person-
ally liable for the wrongful taking of goods by the sheriff, since the
specialty is binding upon his client as a simple contract. Id.
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.
1. EXPRESS PROMISE IS NECESSARY TO REVIVE DEBT BARRED BY BANK-
RUPTCY DISCHARGE, and such promise must refer to the debt, though it
need not be made to the holder thereof. It need not be in any particular
form of words, but may be made by any words, or perhaps by signifying
a present willingness to pay. Bennett v. Everett, 498.
2. BARE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT BARRED BY BANKRUPTCY, and of its
justice and non-payment, is not sufficient to revive it. Id.
3. JURY ARE JUDGES WHETHER PROMISE TO PAY DEBT BARRED BY BANK-
RUPTCY was imported or intended by the language used by the debtor
and the surrounding circumstances. Id.
1. BANKING CORPORATION ISSUING TIME PAPER IN VIOLATION OF STATUTE,
IN FULFILLMENT OF CONTRACT OTHERWISE VALID, is alone the offender;
the penalty does not attach to the other party to the transaction. Tracy
v. Talmage, 132.
2. FREE BANKING ASSOCIATIONS, formed under the New York free banking
law of 1838 (Laws 1838, p. 245), have power to carry on business only
in the manner and to the extent authorized by the act; they cannot
purchase stocks for the purpose of selling thein again at a profit. Id.
1. BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF LAND FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION WITHOUT
NOTICE of prior unrecorded deeds who records his deed first is protected,
though his grantor purchased with notice thereof. Wood v. Chapin, 62.
2. PURCHASER WITH NOTICE OF PRIOR UNRECORDED DEEDS IS PROTECTED
by the recording act nevertheless, if he purchased from one who was so
protected. Id.
3. PURCHASER OF LAND UNDER JUDICIAL PROCEEDING INSTITUTED BY HIM-
SELF for the recovery of his debt is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable
consideration, within the recording acts, though the whole purchase price
is applied upon the debt, and no new consideration is paid except the
expenses of the proceedings. Id.
4. ALL CONVEYANCES IN CHAIN OF TITLE FROM FORMER OWNER need not
be recorded in order to protect bona fide purchaser whose deed is first
recorded against prior unrecorded conveyances from such owner. Id.
5. TO CONSTITUTE BONA FIDE PURCHASER WITHIN MEANING OF RECORDING
ACT, the purchaser must, before he receives notice of the prior unrecorded
deed, have advanced some new consideration, or relinquished some se-
curity for a pre-existing debt due to him; and the mere receiving a con-
veyance in payment of a pre-existing debt is not enough. Id.
6. PURCHASER OF EQUITABLE TITLE TAKES IT SUBJECT TO ALL EQUITIES,
though he purchases bona fide, for a valuable consideration, and without
notice thereof. York v. McNutt, 607.
7. ASSIGNEE OF BOND FOR TITLE TAKES IT SUBJECT TO DEFENSES available
against the original vendee, notwithstanding he purchased for a valuable
consideration, and without notice of such defenses. Id.
See DEEDS, 9; PARTNERSHIP, 17.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 4-6; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 1-6; OFFICE AND
OFFICERS, 1; SHERIFFS, 5; SURETYSHIP.
1. PRESUMPTION IS THAT OWNERS OF LAND ON EACH SIDE OF STREET, ROAD,
OR HIGHWAY GO TO CENTER of such boundary, and they have the exclu
sive right to the soil, subject to the right of passage in the public. Paul
v. Carver, 413.
2. CONVEYANCE OF LAND BOUNDED BY PUBLIC STREET, DITCH, FRESH-WATER
RIVER, OR HIGHWAY PASSES TITLE TO CENTER of such boundary; as it
is regarded as a single line, and the thread of such boundary is the monu-
ment or abuttal. Monuments control measurements. Id.
3. IT WILL NEVER BE PRESUMED THAT GRANTOR, after parting with all his
right and title to the adjoining land, intended to withhold his interest in
a street, road, or highway, to the center of it. Id.
4. GRANTEE'S TITLE CANNOT BE LIMITED TO EDGE OF PUBLIC STREET, DITCH,
HIGHWAY, OR FRESH-WATER RIVER, unless there is an express exception
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