apply to the case of incorporated companies. They are subject to the same liabilities and responsibilities for their acts and contracts as individuals. We know of no principle upon which they and their agents are to be deemed exempt in their dealings with others from the ordinary obligations of morality and honesty.

Again: it is said it can hardly be predicated that an agent of so extensive a public enterprise could deceive anybody by his opinions as to its completion and cost; that these are matters about which every one is presumed to be equally capable of judging. And the conclusion to be deduced, of course, is that the plaintiff was as capable as the defendants, or their agents, of judging of the truth of the representations; consequently he ought not to have been deceived by them; and if so deceived, it was his own folly, for which he is remediless.

If the defendants or their agent had communicated truly and fully all the facts respecting the cost and character of the work, and their means of accomplishing their undertaking, and left him to judge for himself of the probability of its completion within the time stipulated, instead of making positive statements as to what they could and would do, the argument would be entitled to more weight. But it is certainly reasonable to suppose they best knew the extent of their own means and resources, and when they undertook to give positive assurances upon their own responsibility, we know of no reason why third persons might not trust them; or, if deceived by them to their own injury, why redress should be denied. We cannot assent to the doctrine that no one ought to be deceived by them, because no one ought to trust to their representations; nor are we prepared to hold them irresponsible on any such ground as that their opinions, professions, and assurances cught not to be relied on by third persons with whom they contract.

Again: it is insisted that their representations cannot be deemed fraudulent, for that they had relation to things in the future. But it is not necessary, in order to render the representations and assurances of a party, on which others have acted, binding upon him, that they should have relation to facts which had previously transpired. The representations as to what the defendants would do, when used as inducements to others to contract with them, became assurances and undertakings which they were bound to fulfill. They were obligatory upon them, and must be so held, or the contract would be void for the want of mutuality. If such assurances were not bind

ing, there could be no binding promise to perform an act in future.

None of the considerations suggested in argument impair the claim and right of the plaintiff to the redress he seeks. They do not obviate the effect of the errors in the charge of the court, or authorize us to consider them as immaterial. The charge was pertinent and material, and must have had a controlling effect in its application to the facts of the case. It appeared in evidence that since the making of the contract the land had appreciated more than fourfold in value. The time specified for having the road completed to the several points indicated (crossings of the Guadalupe and Cibolo) had elapsed, and no part of it had been built; nor had there even been a beginning. There was an attempt to prove a beginning, and it was in evidence that, on the day before the charter would expire, when, as a witness stated, a demonstration had to be made to save the charter, some trifling amount of work had been commenced; there was some brush cut, and some grubbing, and perhaps a furrow or two plowed, estimated to be worth ten dollars; and this, instead of being at the place of beginning, was near San Antonio. But if it had been at the right place, it was not of sufficient importance to be called a beginning of such an undertaking. The defendants are in the enjoyment of the plaintiff's property without having verified any of the professions by which they induced him to part with it; without having rendered any equivalent or consideration whatever. The plaintiff has derived none of the promised benefits to himself from the defendant's undertaking. The contract has operated as a gross imposition and fraud upon him. Such is the state of case which the record exhibits, and it would be difficult to conceive of a stronger case for the rescission of a contract. To hold that a man may be thus deceived, imposed upon, and deprived of his property by false hopes held out to him by another, and that he shall be wholly without redress for the injury done him, would be shocking to common sense and the sense of justice. In fine, to deny the plaintiff's right to redress upon the case which the record presents would be, in effect, to maintain an exemption from legal responsibility on the part of the defendants, which nobody, corporate or politic, not even the state itself, can claim in any country where private rights are respected, and law and justice administered. If the record truly presents the facts of the case, it cannot be denied that the contract has operated a surprise, imposition,

and manifest fraud on the plaintiff, which well entitle him to the redress he seeks; that is, to have the contract rescinded and the property conveyed under it restored to him.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT TO SUE CORPORATION: See Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 22 Am. Dec. 785; Hersey v. Veazie, 41 Id. 364; Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 53 Id. 624, and notes thereto.

LIABILITY OF CORPORATION FOR AGENT'S FRAUD OR TORT: See Van Hook v. Somerville Mfg. Co., 45 Am. Dec. 401; Vanderbilt v. Richmond T. Co., 55 Id. 315; Lowell v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 34 Id. 33; Ware v. Barataria etc. Canal Co., 35 Id. 189, and notes thereto.

PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S FRAUDS AND TORTS, GENERALLY: See Locke v. Stearns, 35 Am. Dec. 382; Johnson v. Barber, 50 Id. 416; Barber v. Hall, 60 Id. 301, and notes referring to other cases. To the point that where the agent is acting within the scope of his authority, and behaves so negligently or recklessly as to cause injury to another, the principal is liable, the principal case is cited in Echols v. Dodge, 20 Tex. 195.

PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR FRAUD OR TORT COMMITTED WITHOUT HIS CONSENT or participation: See Johnson v. Barber, 50 Am. Dec. 416. That the principal is liable for a fraud committed by his-agent without his knowledge in making a purchase pursuant to the authority given, the principal case is cited in Wright v. Calhoun, 19 Tex. 420.

RATIFICATION BY PRINCIPAL OF AGENT'S UNAUTHORIZED ACT OR CONTRACT: See Despatch Line v. Bellamy Mfg. Co., 37 Am. Dec. 203; Bryant v. Moore, 45 Id. 96; Wood v. McCain, 42 Id. 612; Lee v. Fontaine, 44 Id. 505; Juzan v. Toulmin, Id. 448; Clealand v. Walker, 46 Id. 238; Spofford v. Hobbs, 48 Id. 521; Mason v. Caldwell, Id. 330; Violett v. Powell, 52 Id. 548; McMahan v. McMahan, 53 Id. 481; Dord v. Bonnaffee, 54 Id. 573, and notes thereto. As to ratification by a corporation of unauthorized acts of its agents, see Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 43 Id. 470; Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 35 Id. 395; Merchants' Bank v. Central Bank, 44 Id. 665; Bank of Alabama v. Comegys, 46 Id. 278, and rotes. That a principal ratifying a sale by his agent makes the contract his own, and must perform it as if he had personally made it, the principal case is cited in Haldeman v. Chambers, 19 Tex. 40.

WHETHER MISREPRESENTATION MUST BE WILLFULLY MADE with intent to deceive in order to render a party liable, sec Miller v. Howell, 32 Am. Dec. 36; Tryon v. Whitmarsh, 35 Id. 339; Lobdell v. Baker, Id. 358; Tyson v. Passmore, 44 Id. 181; Munroe v. Prichett, 50 Id. 203; Mitchell v. Zimmerman, 51 Id. 717, and notes. To the point that if a party innocently and through mistake misrepresents a material fact in dealing with another, it is equally as conclusive upon him as if done intentionally, because it operates as a surprise and imposition upon the other party, the principal case is cited in Haldeman v. Chambers, 19 Tex. 50.

MISREPRESENTATIONS AS TO MATTER EQUALLY OPEN TO BOTH PARTIES: See Anderson v. Burnett, 35 Am. Dec. 425; Juzan v. Toulmin, 44 Id. 448; Mitchell v. Zimmerman, 51 Id. 717, and notes.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS CITED to the point that it is competent to prove fraudulent representations affecting a written contract, though the contract is silent on the subject to which the representations relate, in Ranger v. Hearne, 41 Tex. 260. The case is distinguished, on grounds very obscurely stated, in San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Id. 414.

CHEEK V. BELLOWS.

[17 TEXAS, 613.]

WIFE, IN HUSBAND'S ABSENCE, HAS IMPLIED AUTHORITY to take care of the community property, and to make contracts respecting it for her own support, where no one else is left in charge of the property.

LEASE BY WIFE OF FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE who has fled the state, of a hotel which is the joint property of the husband and wife, given for one year for a full consideration, is valid and binding, especially where she is destitute of means, and the rent is necessary for her support.

APPEAL from a judgment for the plaintiffs in an action of forcible entry and detainer. The case is stated in the opinion.

J. W. Harris, for the appellant.

W. T. Rogers, for the appellees.

By Court, LIPSCOMB, J. This was an action brought by appellees against the appellant for a forcible entry and detainer. There were a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs in the justice's court, and the case was taken by a certiorari to the district court, where it was tried, and a like verdict and judgment, from which an appeal was taken to this court.

It appears from the bill of exceptions and statement of facts that the appellees, husband and wife, were the joint owners of a house and appurtenances in the town of Hallettsville, known as the Hicks house, held by them by deed to them jointly; that the husband, being committed to the jail of the county, under a charge of an assault with an intent to commit murder, had broken the jail and made an escape, and it was not known where he had fled; that his wife was unable to keep the tavern, and unable to support herself and children, and was in a condition of great destitution; that under such circumstances she made and executed a lease to the appellant, of the premises, for one year, for a full, valuable, and fair consideration. On the trial, the appellant admitted that he was in possession; and attempted to prove that he was in under the lease of the wife, before described, which was rejected by the court below, on the ground that the wife had no authority to make the lease, to which opinion of the

court the appellant excepted; and this is the only ground of error we propose considering-whether the wife, under such circumstances, could make a valid contract.

As a general rule, the husband has the control and management of both the separate property of the wife and the community property; this will not be controverted; but that this rule is subject to exceptions has been heretofore declared by this court; that there should be exceptions seems to be the result of necessity. In the absence of the husband, leaving no one else authorized to take care of the property, the wife has the implied authority to do so. This was ruled in the case of Blanchet v. Dugat, 5 Tex. 507. In that case trespass was brought for removing some of the separate property of the wife, in the absence of the husband, under the direction of the wife; and it was held that the desertion of the wife was a defense to the action. And the doctrine was more fully discussed and emphatically laid down in the subsequent case of Wright v. Hays, 10 Id. 130 [60 Am. Dec. 200]. It cannot be doubted that much hardship would result if the wife could in no case make a valid contract in relation to her separate property, or the community property in the absence of her husband. She and her children are entitled to a support from the property; and if the husband is absent, there is no reason nor rule of law that would prohibit the wife from making a contract to meet the necessities of the It would be a strong case that would permit her to go further. In this case it cannot be pretended that the contract of the wife went beyond the emergency of her condition. The lease was for only one year, and amply provided for the necessities of herself and her children, and it cannot be permitted to her to repudiate the contract by using her husband's name, and appealing to his rights for him and herself under such circumstances. We believe, therefore, the court erred in rejecting the evidence offered, and for this error the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

case.

Reversed and remanded.

POWER OF FEME COVERT TO CONTRACT AS FEME SOLE WHEN ABANDONED BY HUSBAND, or compelled by him to live apart: See Arthur v. Broadnax, 37 Am. Dec. 707; Wright v. Hays, 60 Id. 200; Love v. Moynehan, 63 Id. 306, and notes thereto citing other cases and discussing the subject. In Sorrel v. Clayton, 42 Tex. 192, it was held that where a husband was absent in the confederate army, leaving his wife in charge of the plantation, she was not to be deemed "abandoned” by him so as to be personally liable on her contract made in managing the plantation, distinguishing the principal case.