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How far is the politician, who professes to be a Christian, to be guided by Christian principles in the discharge of his public duty? Is an expediency admissible by which such principles are compromised? Is it lawful to seek the attainment of the ends of human government, without strictly respecting the laws and the maxims which belong to the divine? These are questions which forcibly press themselves upon the attention of the British legislator, now that the spirit of innovation is abroad, and that restless agitators are busied upon projects by which the foundations of our ancient monarchy may be subverted.

To afford a solution of them, is the object of the little work before us--a duodecimo of 143 pages, within which are discussed and unfolded the principles which lead to the establishment of regular government, and which should never be lost sight of by the legislator or the politician, when it becomes their duty to consider how any particular form of constituted rule may best be ordered or modified, so as to produce the greatest amount of security, happiness, and improvement, in any given state or nation.

The following elementary remarks will afford our readers some notion of the clearness and caution with which Mr. Morier proceeds to lay a foundation for his reasonings upon this important subject:

"We begin, then, by asserting, that as the first links of society are formed of the domestic ties which bind the members of the same family one with another, and family with family, so the first beginning of the moral influence which any governmeut has ever possessed over its subjects, must originally have taken its rise in the same natural fact, or rather fundamental, invariable law of our social nature, which serves as the basis of the natural domestic affections, and of the family relations resulting therefrom-namely, the fact of a native personal inequality or difference,

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existing among the individuals composing the great community of mankind.

"The meaning here attached to the term of native personal inequality' has found its explanation in the remarks already made on the formation of national character. That such inequality must result from the infinite variety discernible in the degrees of the physical, moral, and intellectual qualities with which every human being is endowed by the Creator at the moment of his birth, is self-evident, and we affix to it the epithet native and personal, to distinguish it from the inequality of conditions and classes superinduced by social institutions, and by the thousand accidents and chances which are variously ascribed to fortune, fatality, or Providence, according to the creed of each speculator on such topics."

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"The necessity of government is the result of the same fact of natural inequality which occupied your attention in the last letter: for is it not equally manifest that were it not for the exist ence of such inequality among men, one of the principal motives which first induced them to congregate in towns, and to submit to the restraints of civil government, and so also one of the most important elements of civilization, would never have existed-namely, the want and desire of protection against the invasion of those whose natural predomi nance must always give them the power, if unrestrained by the force of an acknowledged common rule upheld by sufficient authority, to injure and oppress the rest."

"What has Religion to do with Politics? The question considered in letters to his son." By David R. Morier. London: J. W. Parker, West-Strand. 1848.

We would add, that a perception of this necessity, as a deduction of the reason, from the fact of the observed inequality, must precede any measures for the correction of those abuses, to which, in a state of nature, such inequality must give rise; and that society is the result of a conviction that, by combination, under some regular system, the personal security of individuals could alone be guaranteed against the force or the fraud by which they might otherwise be made subservient to individual caprice or convenience.

But the very constitution of society itself engenders another species of inequality, which, for distinction's sake, our author terms "social," and "which is as necessary to the continuance and stability of government, as the first or native species has been proved necessary to render its first institution possible at all." High and low, rich and poor, are denominations expressive of this species of inequality, which is, Mr. Morier contends, in the first instance, "quite independent of, and, in fact, precedes all possible conventional distinctions; for it is found in every state of society, and under every form of government; and it is as natural that is, as inherent-in the constitution of all society, as the inequality, emphatically called natural or personal, is inherent in the human race." Is it not, in fact, a result of the natural inequality, which remains after men have been combined under any settled rule, and with which government only so far interferes as to prevent or counteract its abuses?

Such, undoubtedly, is the case; and it is no less true, that government itself creates such inequality, whenever the good of the governed is made subordinate to the power or the privileges of those who govern; and this, which our author terms conventional, may be called a vicious or an artificial inequality, because it is not necessarily inherent either in the constitution of society, or the nature of man; and as it could not exist if society were well constituted, so it is a proper subject for remedial legislation.

To a neglect of these considerations Mr. Morier traces much of the unsoundness which, at the present day, may be said to characterise the theories of many active and able politicians, who, by their speeches or their

writings, exercise no small influence on public affairs.

"Let the test be applied to the two extreme opinions which now so fearfully divide society in respect to the legitimate source of government, of which one asserts the absolute monarchical principle, the other the sovereignty of the people, each in terms equally abstract and uncompromising; and the unsoundness of both will be found to consist essentially in their defective apprehension or neglect of one or other of those two laws respectively. And this their defective apprehension or neglect will be traced to a selfish regard for the exclusive interests which are involved in the maintenance of either opinion. Thus, the advocates of the monarchical principle, intent only on providing against the invasion of the sovereign's prerogative by the subject, would fain render permanently insurmountable the barriers which separate the various classes of society from each other, and all from the sovereign; heedless that this cannot be done but by laying a fatal constraint on the natural tendency of the human soul, to exert its faculties in an upward and enlarged progression. Misguided by this narrow, because selfish view, they exaggerate the conventional derivation of the law of natural inequality, and resist that of progressive improvement, which was providentially intended to counteract its abuse. the other hand, the partisans of the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the multitude, in their anxiety to secure the liberties of all against the encroachments of the governing power, deny altogether in theory the palpable fact of personal and social inequality. They exaggerate the rights of the mass, in contempt of those of individuals, efface all notions of duty, unless it be that of submitting to the so-called popular will; and while they assert the indefinite progress of the human mind to a state of perfectibility, which they lay claim to as a positive right (as if its attainment were dependent on merely human regulations), they would effectually put a stop to the possibility of all progress, by forbidding the elevation of any one individual above the common level, in order, at all hazards, to preserve intact their favourite principle of equality, quite forgetting that it can be enforced under no system but that of a pure despotism, such as is met with only in combination with the absolute rule of a sultan or a mob."

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On

The popular distinction between liberty" and "power," Mr. Morier

considers to be both false in itself, and to have contributed not a little to a confusion of ideas on the subject of government. "The terms," he observes, are universally taken to signify two qualities, or modes of action, totally diverse. Yet, what is absolute liberty but the power to do wrong as well as right? And in what does it differ from absolute power, which is only liberty to do precisely the same thing?"

"Yet such is the natural proneness of party spirit to be deluded by names and forms, that where the question is as to the exercise of sovereign power by the ministers of a monarch, or by the delegates of the people, it seems to be taken for granted, with respect to the latter, that the mere circumstance of the popular form under which they govern, necessarily ensures a wise, temperate, and moral government; whilst, on the contrary, the possession of the same degree of power by an autocrat as necessarily implies the reverse."

Mr. Morier, like all other sensible writers, regards absolute power, whether in the hands of an individual or of a multitude, as liable to great abuses, and therefore justly to be regarded as a great evil; but that, in the latter case, it is likely to be greater than in the former; as the absence of personal responsibility, which the autocrat, be he never so despotic, must feel, leaves the multitude at liberty to riot in every imaginable excess. What is everybody's crime, is nobody's crime. Public opinion, to which the despot is amenable, can here have no place as a restraining power; inasmuch as it is but the expression of the sovereign's own despotic will.

How, then, are we to attain the golden mean, by which justice and truth may be established; by which wisdom may pass "from one end unto the other" of a political system, and "sweetly order all things?" How is liberty to be separated from licentiousness? How is tyranny to be mitigated into freedom? Manifestly in one way only by acting upon public opinion. "Vox populi, vox Dei," is a maxim that has been much abused, and which is only true when the converse may be aflirmed, and when what is "vox Dei" becomes "vox populi ;" that is, when men recognize the ascendancy of true religion, and refer all their

actions to a higher and purer than any merely human standard; suffering what concerns them, as accountable and immortal beings, to exercise a predominant influence over them, in the things relating to this present world.

To an engrossing selfishness, acting irrespectively of all moral obligation, Mr. Morier ascribes both the excesses of the despot, and the equally unendurable and more capricious tyranny of the mob; and adds, that—

"To the Christian principle alone is reserved the power of establishing harmony amid the conflict produced by the rival pretensions of the two self-seeking doctrines and herein may surely be traced one of the least doubtful marks of its divine origin, that it alone commands and promotes the utmost progress of the soul of man towards a perfection undreamt of by the grovelling earthly instigations of the sordid morality of mere worldly politicians, without infringing the natural laws and constitution of human society. It alone excites and assists the utmost emulation and zeal to promote all that truly constitutes the greatness of man and the welfare of society, at the same time that it commands to high and low, to rich and poor, to kings and people, the most scrupulous respect for the limits and frontiers of each other's rights and priviliberty but for those whom the truth leges; teaching all that there is no real hath set free, and no absolute equality among men, but as of sinners equally condemned by the justice, and saved by the mercy, of their common God and Redeemer."

How, then, may this great end be best attained? That is, by what means may Christian motives and Christian principles be so brought to bear upon the characters of the rulers and the ruled, that just laws may be made, and equitable government, having a due regard to the progressive improvement of the people, may meet with prompt and cheerful obedience? It is to the solution of this problem Mr. Morier particularly addresses himself. The time is, undoubtedly, unfavourable for such disquisitions as those upon which he enters. But, although their importance may not be felt by the multitude, who, like Tittlebat Titmouse, are too impatient to enter upon the possession of their fancied rights, to look very narrowly into the foundation upon which they rest, it will be felt and

acknowledged by all just thinkers, whose judgment may be of weight, when popular delusions are forgotten or unheeded. " Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat."

How, then, Mr. Morier asks, may a government best proceed to increase the happiness and the security, by promoting the Christian morality of a people? With a view to the solution of this question, he bestows a chapter upon national wealth; and is, we think, unnecessarily at issue with the economists, as to the most judicious regulations respecting its diffusion and accumulation. The science of political economy contemplates nothing beyond the productive powers of human labour. Man, as a moneymaking animal, and the fertility of the soil, are its subject; and an increase of the material comforts and necessaries of life, which are the outward and visible signs of national prosperity, are its object. The science of government is another and a different thing. That contemplates the moral and social well-being of the human race; and its aim is, or should be, such a state of society as may best combine private with public security, and provide most effectually for the development and expansion of those powers and qualities which exalt humanity, and ensure, in the scale of social and moral well-being, a wise and progressive advancement. The former science should, therefore, be regarded as subordinate to, not as governing, the latter; and the statesman should bear to the political economist, the relation which the architect bears to the working mason; and only use his services so far as the accomplishment of his own plans required them.

We would not, therefore, interfere with what is, at present, a judicious division of intellectual labour; and, instead of calling upon the economist to qualify his conclusions by moral and Christian considerations, we would call upon the Christian statesman to disregard them, whenever they are incompatible with the higher aims by which he should be directed in the conduct of affairs.

Property or capital may be regarded as the material exponent of prudence and industry; and the best justification of the sanction by which the rights of property are guarded, will be found in the wisdom of providing that prudence and industry should be duly

protected against violence and wrong. But this is quite compatible with such encouragement to the humbler classes, as may help to raise them to a higher condition, so that they, too, may, by prudence and industry, come to be reckoned amongst the wealthier classes, and arrive at that consideration and distinction, which must be regarded as an object of their ambi tion.

The economist may tell the statesman how the greatest amount of material wealth may be accumulated; but there his office ends. The statesman will provide for its security, and, at the same time, contrive the facilities for its increase and its distribution; suffering no unjust or selfish obstruction to interfere with its gradual and natural progress through the whole community; recognising and reverencing the law which has ordained that in the sweat of his brow shali man eat bread, while he encourages the capitalist to aid the honest and the industrious, whom he protects against the demands of the improvident and the idle.

And this brings us at once to the consideration of rights and duties. No just man will ever separate his material prosperity from his moral responsibility. And what every just man would do of his own accord, the Christian legislator is bound, as far as human regulations can effect it, to see done by all.

If the materialist doctrine prevail in the science of government, and wealth be regarded as the end of social existence, it is clear that the selfish and engrossing passion, which is characteristic of humanity wherever it is spiritually unenlightened, must prevail, and that sordid accumulation will be the rule-wise and equitable distribution the exception.

But, on the other hand, as Mr. Morier justly observes

"Supposing a government to act systematically from motives and on principles in accordance with the Christian rule, what an impulse would not be given to the sense of those duties and responsibilities, on the due discharge of

which, simultaneously with the exercise of their rights, depends the welfare of society.

"The owner of land, the master of the factory, instead of considering the

labourer and the artisan as mere instruments for raising corn or spinning cotton at the least possible chargeinstead of doling them out their daily wages only as oil to make the machinery work, would take an interest in their welfare, provide for their comforts and recreation, and, above all, would bestow on them the most precious of all gifts, occasional leisure to attend to those higher and more enduring interests, which are equally the patrimony of the poor and the rich, and of which the abridgment of manual labour, resulting from the progress of mechanical inventions, would appear providentially designed to promote the cultivation.

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This, in Christian countries, is no doubt already realized in many a farm and many a loom, where the landlord and the manufacturer pursue their calling, under a due sense of their responsibility as the stewards of God, which it is undoubtedly intended that those who have more should be to those who have less.

"But if, in addition to this beneficial influence, thus individually, yet partially exercised, that of the public authorities of the state were to be brought into action, who can say to what a pitch of prosperity a land thus governed might not attain? These general considerations may suffice to show in what manner the national character may be affected by the doctrines acted upon by governments in respect to the 'material' interests of a nation, and how intimately the welfare of the labouring classes is connected with the religious sense entertained, by their rich employers, of the responsibility attached to the possession of wealth; that is, how deep an interest the people have in the Christianity of their rulers."

It is obvious that, in proportion as men rise in the scale of moral and social existence, they become fitted to participate in the concerns of government, and a provision should be made for admitting them to the possession of privileges, which become a sort of natural right according as they are qualified to exercise them with advan. tage. Where such a provision is not made, there society is liable to shocks and accidents, arising from tendencies which cannot be wholly repressed, and which, being obstructed in their natural course, take some irregular direction. They become, instead of salutary ingredients in the conduct of government, the pent-up elements of future earthquakes, by which its society

is convulsed. It is, therefore, a matter of the first importance to provide wisely for the law of progress, and to see that, while every justice is done to the individual who, by his pru dence, and industry, and moral character, has entitled himself to the possession of civil and constitutional privileges, these should not be carried to a greater extent than is perfectly compatible with the end of all legitimate government-namely, the well-being of the whole community; for so to carry them would be an injury to the individual himself, who should always be more interested in the general security, than in anything which merely concerned his personal advantage. We are therefore quite agreed with our author that

"It becomes, then, the first duty of rulers, as it is also their chief interest, to watch, and it will task all their abili ties to comprehend, the symptoms of the change which continually threatens to alter the above proportions.

"And as all the dispensations of Providence with respect to our race, as known to us both by historical experience and Divine revelation, are in perfect harmony with that aspiration towards a higher and better state, which distinguishes the cultivated Christian from the ignorant savage, it is evident that there must be ever at work in the mass of any society, that has reached a certain degree of mental culture, a general tendency onwards, analogous to such aspiration, which, being overlooked, inisunderstood, or resisted, by those who rule, must ultimately produce those social perturbations which compel the reconstruction of the community on a new basis.

"But if the governing powers are sagacious enough to perceive the growing disproportion, and wise and virtuous enough to act accordingly, they will be the first to admit, by law, to a partici pation of the rights and responsibilities of government, the classes whose ascent in the social scale has increased their stake in the country, and with it their disposition, if excluded, to disturb the existing order of things.

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But as the proportion of these, with respect to the multitude who live by their daily labour, must always be so small as to make it necessary that the actual business of legislation and government be still carried on by the comparatively few, the welfare of the majority will ever yet greatly depend on the manner in which those few exercise their power."

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