county of New York, and that the court of general sessions have no jurisdiction to review a judgment of special sessions under the powers conferred by the act of 1859, or courts of sessions of the counties. 6. Q. Does the list of courts mentioned under this section comprise all the courts in the state! A. It does not. The city court of Brooklyn and the superior court of the city of Buffalo are omitted, probably through inadvertence, as these are important and able courts, of many years standing in those cities. 1. A misnomer of the court, by calling it "court of general sessions of the peace," instead of "court of sessions," as designated by the Code of 1849, does not affeet any proceedings in the court. The unnecessary additions to its title may be treated as surplusage. 2. The act of 1859, authorizing the courts of sessions of the several counties to grant new trials on certiorari, does not apply to the court of general sessions of the peace for the city and county of New York. 3. The city court of Brooklyn and the superior court of the city of Buffalo, although, through inadvertence probably, not named under this section, are governed by the provisions of the Code, as far as applicable, the same as if they had been properly noticed. 10. Their jurisdiction generally. These courts shall continue to exercise the jurisdiction now vested in them respectively, except as otherwise prescribed by this act. 1. Question. Has this section been changed since its passage in 1848? A. It has not. Questions. 2. Q. What is the general jurisdiction of the supreme court as now organized? 3. Q. What reference has been made to the court of appeals? 4. Q. What reference has been made to the circuit court? 5. Q. What reference has been made to the New York Superior Court? 6. Q. When should the court that first acquires jurisdiction dispose of the whole matter? 7. Q. Has the City Court of Brooklyn, jurisdiction of an action of tort committed in the Brooklyn navy yard? 8. Q. Can foreign governments sue in our courts? And can sovereign states be sued in our courts ? 9. Q. Have the United States Courts exclusive jurisdiction of all questions arising under patent laws? 10. 9. Does a state of the Union or a citizen of such state, while engaged in war with the United States, have the right to sue in our courts? 11. Q. Are foreign executors and administrators liable to be sued in our courts ? 12. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction of actions of trespass, trover and replevin against officers of the federal government claiming to act officially? 13. Q. Can the suprem court, where it has jurisdiction of the parties, compel them to convey, assign or otherwise dispose of their lands situated out of the state? 14. Q. Have the state courts power and authority to discharge a prisoner or detained pcrson, enlisted under the laws of the United States, on habeas corpus 15 Q. Can bonds or other instruments given for duties, &c., due to the United States, be prosecuted in the state courts? 16. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction of actions brought for torts committed on board a foreign vessel on the high seas, where both parties are foreigners? And in cases of marine torts merely? 17. Q. Do our courts take notice of the revenue laws of foreign countries? 18. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction of all actions against foreign corporations, where they arise here? 19. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction of actions against foreign consuls? 20. Q. When will the courts of this state act in declaring void the proceedings of the courts of another state? 21. Q. Have the courts of this state power to render judgment upon contract against an Indian? 22. Q. Have the courts of this state jurisdiction of actions for personal injuries done beyond the territorial limits of the state? 23. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction to enforce the penal laws of another state or of the United States; or of foreign bankrupt proceedings? 24. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction to determine questions of salvage? 25. Q. What is the legal liability of, and remedy against the corporation of the city of New York under the statute of 1860 ? 26. Q. Under what titles will the decisions be found relating to the jurisdiction of the several courts? See, also, section 17 for further questions of jurisdiction of the supreme court. 2. Q. What is the general jurisdiction of the supreme court, as now organized? A. There shall be a supreme court having general jurisdiction in law and equity (Const. 1846, art. 6, § 3). The supreme court as now organized, has the same jurisdiction as the late supreme court possessed, with the addition of the equity jurisdiction of the late court of chancery (Const. art. 6, §§ 3, 5, and art. 14, § 5; Stat. 1847, p. 323, § 16). The statute (2 R. L. p. 409, § 178), confers the jurisdiction and authority to review the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment for opening a street in the city of New York upon the supreme court; and the powers conferred are exercised by it as such court and not as a tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, created by the statute or by its justices as commissioners appointed by the legislature. 3. Q. What reference has been made to the court of appeals? A. In the case of Butler agt. Miller, 3 How., 339 S. C., 1 Com., 428, in the court of appeals, September, 1848, BRONSON, J., said: "This appeal was taken prior to the first day of July last, and we still have jurisdiction to hear it (Code, § 10.) The act of December, 1847, when applied to appeals depending on the first of July, is not so inconsistent with anything in the Code as to come within the repealing section (388). The Code makers did not intend to take away any right which had already attached under the old law; but only to change the law for the future." In Doty agt. Brown, 4 How., 429, June, 1850, which was a case where the court of appeals had dismissed an appeal with costs, and remitted the proceedings to the supreme court to be proceeded upon, &c. And on motion in the latter court for judgment upon the remittitur, it was objected that the former court never acquired any jurisdiction over the cause, because the bill of exceptions was alone returned by the clerk to the court of appeals, without the record, consequently had no authority to dismiss the appeal, and award the general costs on the appeal; MASON, J., said: When a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide any question which may arise in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment until reversed is regarded as binding in every other court; but if it act without authority its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not merely voidable but absolutely void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them. And the jurisdiction of any court exercising auth ority over a subject may be inquired into in every other court, when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of guch judgments or proceedings. (Elliott agt. Piersoll, 1 Piters, 328; Wilcox agt. Jack son, 13 Id. 571, 2 How. U. S. Rep. 43; 3 Id. 750; 762, 763; Borden agt. Fitch, 15 John. 141: Mills agt. Martin, 19 Id. 33; Sutton agt. Edgerton, 9 Cow. 227; Adkins agt. Bonner, 3 Id. 206; 1 Hill 130, and 5 Id. 285.) 4. Q. What reference has been made to the circuit court? A. In Mann agt. Tyler, 6 How., 236, Special Term, October, 1851, HAND, J., said: "And where an issue of fact is tried at the circuit the supreme, court in which the action is in fact pending, and not the circuit court is 'the court intended by the statute (§ 308, and see § 401.) Hardly any step, except to try or refer, can be taken at the circuit in a cause pending in the supreme court (2 R. S. 201; 13, 383 § 41; Const. of 1821, art. 5, §5; Const. of 1846, art. 6, § 6, 9; Jud. Act. § 22; Code, § 9, 10, 255.) And except to grant a new trial on the judge's minutes (Code, § 264). The judgment to be entered on the verdict (§ 261, 265), is entered in the supreme court. A judgment roll containing an entry of judgment in the circuit court would be an anomaly. Where the motion for an extra allowance of costs, cannot for any cause, be made before the judge trying the cause, it may, no doubt, be made at a proper term held by another judge. 5. Q. What reference has been made to the N. Y. Superior Court? A. In Matter of Brown, 4 Duer, 618, December, 1854, which was an application for a commission de lunatico inquirendo, HOFFMAN, J., said: "The Code of April, 1818, provides, first, that the courts enumerated (among them this court) shall continue to exercise the jurisdiction now vested in them respectively, except as otherwise prescribed by this act (title 1, § 10). The result of my examination is that at least the point of jurisdiction is, even as to the person, so doubtful as to warrant our refusal to attempt its exercise in a matter where questions of title, as well as other serious consequences, may depend upon its existence, and when the most ample and sure relief is open in other tribunals. Application denied.” 6. Q. When should the court that first acquires jurisdiction dispose of the whole matter! A. In McCarthy agt. Peake, 18 How., 139, Special Term, September, 1859, INGRAHAM, J., said: The parties to this question were partners. In consequence of difference between them, each party commenced proceedings to close up the partnership, and to enjoin his partner from interfering with the partnership effects. Peake commenced proceedings in the superior court, and McCarthy in this court. The subject of the action, viz., the partnership effects, and the parties, viz., the two partners, are the same in both actions, and, under the decisions which have repeatedly been made in this court and the superior court, the court which first acquires jurisdiction of the case should dispose of the whole matter. 7. Q. Has the city court of Brooklyn jurisdiction of an action of tort committed in the Brooklyn navy yard! A. In Armstrong agt. Foote, 11 Abb., 384, Brooklyn City Court, General Term, December, 1860. This was an action to recover damages for an assault and battery and false imprisonment committed within the Brooklyn navy yard, which has been ceded by the state to the United States. CULVER, J., said: "I am satisfied, on a full review of the evidence, exceptions and rulings in this case. that the action can be sustained in the courts of this state, though the injury was committed in the navy yard." (Ocerruling S. C., 19 How., 237.) 8. Q. Can foreign governments sue in our courts? And can sovereign states be sued in our courts? A. In Delafield agt. State of Illinois, 26 Wend., 193, Court of Errors, 1841, it was held that concurrent jurisdiction is possessed by the state courts and the supreme court of the United States, in all controversies between a state and citizens of another state. In The Republic of Mexico agt. Arrangois and others, 11 How., 5, Special Term N. Y. Superior Court, February, 1855, HOFFMAN, J., said: "We must, then, admit these recognized governments to sue in our courts under their federative title, and adapt our forms of proceedings, if possible, so as to do justice to all parties; or we must allow an individual representative, clothed with competent authority from his government, to act ou its behalf, and thus have a party on the record who can be subjected to those forms. In my opinion, the action can be maintained in the name of the republic as an aggregate body; and the modes of proceeding in cases of foreign corporations, and of other states of the union, may be resorted to for the regulations of the practice." In Manning agt. The State of Nicaragua and The Accessory Transit Company, 14 How., 517, Special Term, 1857, it was decided, CLERKE, J., that although a sovereign, or a sovereign state, in their political capacity, cannot be sued in the courts of another state or nation, for the purpose of enforcing any remedy against them, yet a state may be made a defendant in an action, for the purpose of giving it an opportunity to appear, and thus to enable a court to determine more intelligently and equitably in relation to demands which are sought to be enforced against other defendants. States may properly be left to their own sovereign option to determine whether they shall take part or not in any judicial controversy. * * * In The People of the State of Michigan agt. The Phoenix 3ank of New York, 4 Bosw., 382, General Term, March, 1859, BOSWORTH, J., said: "Though generally both public and private wrongs are redressed through judicial action, there are more summary, extra judicial remedies for both." "It is competent for the United States" (or a state government) "to sue any of its debtors in a court of law. It is equally clear that the United States" (or a state government) "may consent to be sued, and may yield this consent upon such terms as it may think just" (18 How. U. S. R. 283). In Garr agt. Bright, 1 Barb. Ch. R., 163, October, 1845, the CHANCELLOR decided that there is nothing in the constitution of the United States to deprive the courts of one of the states of the jurisdiction which they previously possessed as to suits against a state, brought by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state. The courts of the United States have not even concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts of chancery, in suits brought by individuals against a state. The principle upon which the court of chancery assumes jurisdiction, in a suit to which a sovereign state is a party defendant, is not for the purpose of compelling such state to perform any decree which may be made against it, but to enable the state to appear and protect its rights, if it has any, in the suit. In Kiersted agt. The People of The State of New York, 1 Abb., 386, General Term, April, 1855, MITCHELL, J.. said: "For nearly eighty years the people of the state of New York have been independent, and if liable to be sued in their own courts, might have been sued within that time; yet no other instance is known in which a suit was ever before commenced against them in their own tribunals, urless when they had specially authorized the suit, or they or their attorney general were made parties in an equity suit with other defendants, on account of some lien or claim held by the state, avowedly subject to the prior claim of another. In our state no general power * * has ever been given to any court to entertain a suit against the state, but the legislature has, by special legislation, pointed out in the cases and manner in which it would allow the title to property held by it to be contested; and as it has thus given the permission in a few special cases only, it shows that it was not intended that the permission should extend to other cases." 9. Q. Have the United States courts exclusive jurisdiction of all questions arising under the patent laws i 4. In Burrall agt. Jewett, 2 Paige, 144, April, 1830, the CHANCELLOR, said: "An objection has been made to the jurisdiction of this court, on the ground that the federal courts alone have the power to pronounce upon the validity of a patent. Where a suit is brought to recover damages for the infringement of a patent right, the defendant is entitled to set up the invalidity of the patent as a defense to the action; and if he succeeds in establishing such defense, the court is to give judgment for the defendant, and to declare the patent void. An action of this description must, therefore, be brought in the circuit court of the United States, which alone has jurisdiction to give the proper remedy to either party." (7 John. R. 144.) In Gibson agt. Woodworth, 8 Paige, 133, March, 1840, the CHANCELLOR decided, that under the patent law of July 4, 1836, the courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of suits in equity relative to interfering patents, in cases where the court under that law is authorized to declare a patent inoperative and void, either wholly or in part, or as to any particular portion of the United States. But whether the court of chancery has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases in which rights, under the patent laws, come in question collaterally, or in suits in which the nature of the relief asked for would not have the effect to invalidate the patent; Quere? In Dudley agt. Mayhew, 3 Com., 18, December, 1819, which was a bill filed in the court of chancery to restrain the defendant from infringing a patent right, S. B. STRONG, J., said: "Certainly the right of the patentee springs wholly from the general government, and therefore could not have been the subject of state jurisdiction antecedently to the adoption of the constitution of the United States. * Upon the whole, I am satisfied that the court of chancery before which this suit was instituted, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; that the vice chancellor erred in awarding an injunction, and that the supreme court was right in reversing his decree." * In Tomlinson agt. Battel, 4 Abb, 268, New York Superior Court, Special Term, March, 1857, was an action to restrain defendants from using the word "Ambrotype," as applicable to photographic pictures, DUER, J., said: “As I understand the constitution and laws of the United States, questions concerning the validity and construction of a patent belong to that class which the courts of the United States are alone competent to determine. The act of congress "to promote the progress of useful arts," passed in 1836 (U. S. Stat. of 1836, 244, § 17), has put an end to any doubts which may formerly have existed on this subject, since, by its necessary interpretation, it gives to the courts of the United States exclusive cognizance of all cases arising under the patent laws; and in iny opinion the case before me falls within these general words." 10. Q. Does a state of the Union or a citizen of such state, while engaged in a war with the United States, have the right to sue in our courts? A. In The United States agt. Vietor, 16 Abb., 153, At. Chambers, May, 1863, LEONARD, J., held: “That although a state of the Union has adopted an ordinance of secess ion, and is under insurrectionary control, it is still entitled to bring suit in our courts. But in Sanderson agt. Morgan, 25 How., 144, General Term, March, 1863, an order overruling demurrer was affirmed, on the ground that a citizen of Florida, who is (averred to be) engaged in war against the United States, though not an alien enemy, is an enemy; and his rights to sue in our courts are suspended during the continuance of the war. (This is Judge GOULD'S memorandum; and it was so decided by the concurrence of the three judges in the third judicial district). 11. Q. Are foreign executors and administrators liable to be sued in our courts? A. In Sere agt. Coit, 5 Abb., 482, Special Term, December, 1857, RoOSEVELT, J., said: "It is undoubtedly the general rule, that debts due in this state, to deceased residents of other states and countries, can only be sued by executors and administrators appointed within this state, and subject, as such, to its authority and control; but where, as in this case, a legacy has been given of specific securities, the legatee himself may sue for their possession, if he have first obtained the assent of the executor, whether that executor be of foreign or of domestic origin. And such assent, where no debts remain unpaid, is a matter not of choice, but of positive obligation. If not given freely, it can be compelled; and if not given expressly, it can be implied. (See the authorities collected in Jacob's Law Dictionary, tit. Executor; also Dayton's Surrogate; Smith agt. Webb, 1 Barb. 230). In Montalvan agt. Clover, 32 Barb., 191, Special Term, April, 1860, it was decided, LEONARD, J.: "That a court of equity has jurisdiction over foreign executors, where they are sued, not for any liability of their testator, or his estate, but on their own liability for the wrongful use or misapplication of the trust funds which have come to their hands. Where it appears that all the debts of the deceased have been paid, and the executors have a large sum of money in hand belonging to the estate, which they are appropriating to their own use, and that the estate is in jeopardy, the court will, on application of the legatee, order the executors to invest his share of the estate at interest, in the manner directed by the will." In Gulick agt. Gulick, 21 How., 33, General Term, December, 1860, BONNEY, J., in speaking of the case of Campbell, administrator, &c., agt. Tousey, executor, &c. (7 Cow. 61), where it was held that, if a foreign executor is liable to be sued here, of which there could be no question, he must, from the very nature of the case, prima facie, be responsible for the assets, which are shown to have been in his possession within this state, no matter where they may have been received; and in the opinion, it is said this is the only way in which an executor, under such circumstances, can be reached: This decision. and the reasons given for it, apply emphatically to the principal case now before us, and are decisive of it, unless they have been overruled, or the law has been since changed by statutory enactment. The case of McNamara agt. Denyer (7 Paige, 239), expressly approves the doctrine of the case in Cowen, and was decided in conformity therewith; and the case of Brown agt. Brown (1 Barb. Ch. R. 189), recognizes the same doctrine as settled law. We have been referred to no case in our own courts which overrules or questions the decisions above mentioned; and the cases cited from the reports of other states, or of the Engrish courts, even if directly conflicting (which we do not understand them to be), are not authority for disregarding those decisions, in conformity with which the demurrer of the principal defendant was overruled. 12. Q. Have the state courts jurisdiction of actions of trespass, trover and replevin against officers of the federal government claiming to act officially? A. In Wilson agt. McKenzie, 7 Hill, 95, General Term, January, 1845, NELSON, J., held that trespass might be maintained in the courts of this state against an officer of the navy, for illegally assaulting and imprisoning one of his subordinates, though the act was done upon the high seas and under color of naval discipline. In Teal agt. Felton, 1 Com., 543, December, 1848, WRIGHT, J., said: "The first point taken by the plaintiff in error is, that if any action could be maintained against him, the defendant in error had not the choice of a forum, as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in a case of this character (viz., trover against a post master of the United States) is exclusive. If this proposition be true, it is quite unnecessary for the plaintiff in error to come here to ask us to reverse the judgment, for it is utterly void. This is undoubtedly a question of grave importance; for if the plaintiff in error be right, the state courts have been wrong ever since the adoption of the constitution of the United States, as the cases are almost without number in which such courts, in the exercise of their ordinary, original and rightful jurisdiction, have incidentally taken cognizance of cases arising under the constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States (1 Kent's Com. 395). In our own courts, officers of the government of the United States have been impleaded in actions of assumpsit, debt, trespass, &c., in which the defense set up was that they were acting officially under the laws of the Union. (Ripley agt. Geleston, 9 John. 201; In the Matter of Stacy, 19 Id. 328; Hoyt agt. Geleston and Schenck, 13 Id. 141; Wilson agt. McKenzie, 7 Hill, 95.) And in at least one case the supreme court of this state held that they had jurisdiction, and sustained a suit on a bond for duties given to a collector of the |