Montano's Case. MONTANO'S CASE. An award under the convention with Peru, "payable in current money of the United States," may legally be paid either in Treasury notes or in specie. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, July 12, 1864. SIR: Some days ago, I had the honor to receive your note of June 30, conveying to me a translation of the cer tificate of the arbiter in the case of Steven G. Montano, a claimant on the United States under the convention with Peru. It appears that the sum awarded to the claimant "is payable in current money of the United States." It also appears that the claimant requests "that the payment may be made in specie." And, upon this state of the case, you ask my opinion upon the question "Whether this request can lawfully be complied with, pursuant to the terms of the certificate adverted to, in connection with the first section of the act of Congress of the 25th of February, 1862, and with similar provisions of subsequent acts, making the Treasury notes a legal tender in the payment of debts?" This form of the interrogatory embarrasses me somewhat. If the question had been, can the said debt be lawfully paid in Treasury notes? there would have been no difficulty in answering, promptly, in the affirmative. For the act referred to makes the Treasury notes "lawful moncy, and a legal tender, in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports, and interest, as aforesaid," (i. e. on bonds and notes.) But that is not the point propounded to me. It is, on the contrary: Can the said debt be lawfully paid in specie, "pursuant to the terms of the certificate" of the arbiter? Now, the terms of the certificate are, that the debt is "payable in the current money of the United States." And so, if specie be current money, there can be no doubt that Pay of Colored Soldiers. it is within the terms of the certificate, and that payment made in specie will be a lawful payment. And I think there can be no doubt that specie (by which term I understand coined metal) is current money. Current money, whether of metal or paper, is made such by law, and not by the mere fact of popular use, whether partial or general. There are divers acts of Congress which do, in express terms, make coins current money; an example of which may be found in the act of March 3, 1843, (5 Stats., 496.) I say nothing about the policy, prudence, or economy of paying in specie rather than in Treasury notes, both being current money, for that is not referred to me. And I conclude that the debtor, following the terms of his obligation, has the option to pay in Treasury notes or in specie, for both are "current money of the United States," and payment in either kind will be lawful. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, Hon. Wм. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. EDWARD BATES. PAY OF COLORED SOLDIERS. The same pay, bounty, and clothing, are allowed by law to persons of color who were free on the 19th of April, 1861, and were enlisted and mustered into the military service of the United States between December, 1862, and the 16th of June, 1864, as are, by the laws existing at the time of the enlistment of such persons, authorized and provided for and allowed to soldiers in our volunteer forces of like arms of the service. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: By your communication of the 24th ultimo, you require my opinion in writing as to what amounts of pay, bounty, and clothing are allowed by law to persons of color who were free on the 19th day of April, 1861, and who Pay of Colored Soldiers. were enlisted and mustered into the military service of the United States between the month of December, 1862, and the 16th of June, 1864 ? I suppose that whatever doubt or difficulty may exist with regard to the amount of pay and allowances to which the soldiers to whom you refer are entitled, has mainly its origin in the several provisions of the act of July 17, 1862, chap. 201, (12 Stats., 599,) relative to the employment and enrolment of persons of African descent in the service of the United States. The 12th section of that statute provides "that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to receive into the service of the United States for the purpose of constructing intrenchments, or performing camp service, or any other labor, or any military or naval service for which they may be found competent, persons of African descent, and such persons shall be enrolled and organized under such regulations, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws, as the President may prescribe." The 15th section of the same statute enacts that "persons of African descent, who under this law shall be employed, shall receive ten dollars per month and one ration, three dollars of which monthly pay may be in clothing." The first and main question, therefore, is, whether the persons of color referred to in your letter, who were mus tered into the military service of the United States during the period of time you indicate, are "persons of African descent" employed under the statute of July 17, 1862, chap. 201. If they are not thus employed, their compensation should not be governed and is not regulated by the words of the 15th section of that statute, which I have just quoted. Now, I think it is clear-too clear, indeed, to admit of doubt or discussion-that those persons of color who have voluntarily enlisted and have been mustered into our military service-who have been organized with appropriate officers into companies, regiments, and brigades of soldiers, and who have done and are doing, in the field and in garrison, the duty and service of soldiers of the Pay of Colored Soldiers. United States-are not persons of African descent employed under the statute to which I have referred. I do not find, indeed, in the act any authority to enlist persons of African descent into the service as soldiers. It will be observed that the 12th section enumerates two kinds of employment for which those persons are authorized to be enrolled, namely, constructing entrenchments and performing camp service. The section then contains a more general authority-authority to receive such persons into the service for the purpose of performing "any other labor, or any military or naval service for which they may be found competent." I am bound, however, by every rule of law respecting the construction of statutes, to construe these words of more general authority with reference to the character, nature, and quality of the particular kinds of labor and service which are, in the first instance, specifically enumerated in the statute, as those for the performance of which persons of African descent are authorized to be received into the service; and therefore I must suppose that Congress, when it conferred authority upon the President to receive into the service of the United States persons of African descent for the pose of performing any other labor or any military service for which they may be found competent, meant and intended that that other labor and that other military service should be of the same general character, nature, and quality as those which it had previously in the statute specially named and designated "Always in statutes," says Coke, "relation shall be made according to the matter precedent." Dwarris says: "Sometimes words and sections are governed and explained by conjoined words and clauses-nocitur a socio."-(Dwarris on Stat., 604.) pur Applying these rules of construction, then, to the act before me, I am constrained to hold that, if the authority to enlist and muster into the military service soldiers of African descent depended upou this statute, (as it does not,) it would furnish no foundation for such authority. It is manifest that the labor and service that United States Pay of Colored Soldiers. soldiers are enlisted to perform are of an essentially different character from, and are essentially of a higher nature, order, and quality than, those kinds of labor and service specifically named in the statutes, and for the performance of which the President is specially authorized to employ "persons of African descent." In my late opinion in the case of the claim of Rev. Samuel Harrison for full pay as chaplain of the 54th regiment of Massachusetts volunteers, I expressed the same view when I said that the act of July 17, 1862, chapter 201, "was not intended either to authorize the employment or to fix the pay of any persons of African descent, except those who might be needed to perform the humbler offices of labor and service for which they might be found competent." This view finds confirmation in a statute that received the approval of the President on the same day as the act before me-the statute of July 17, 1862, chap. 195, (12 Stats. 592) which conferred on the President the authority to employ as many persons of African descent as he might deem necessary and proper for the suppression of the rebellion, and gave him power to organize and use them in such manner as he might deem best for the public welfare. In these words we may find clear and ample authority for the enlistment of persons of African descent as United States soldiers. It is under this act, if under either of the acts of July 17, 1862, that colored volunteer soldiers may be said to have been employed. There is no need to resort, therefore, to the statute of July 17, 1862, chap. 201, for any authority with respect to their employment, or for any rule in regard to their compensation. Persons of African descent, employed as soldiers, are not embraced at all, as I have shown, by the act of July 17, 1862, chap. 201, as objects or subjects of legislation; and we must, therefore, look to some other law for the measure of their compensation. I find the law for the compensation of the persons of color, referred to in your letter to me, in the acts of Congress in force at the dates of the enlistments of those per |