Devlin's Account.

This fee of Mr. Devlin stands in singular contrast with that of Mr. Emmons, of Detroit, Michigan. Mr. Emmons aided in the prosecution, and seems, besides, from his bill rendered, to have been active in the preparation of the cases. He left his home, and was for months gone to Montreal and other places in the discharge of his duty. Mr. Devlin was at his home, and could not, in the regular discharge of his professional duties, refuse a proper retainer in the cases. Mr. Emmons charges $1,500 "for his professional services in examination, preparation, and management of the said case, and auditing and examining accounts," &c. He charges another fee of $3,000, but that is for professional services in the rendition cases and the prosecution of the conspirators in Canada. From the account of Mr. Devlin as rendered, I do not understand that he had a retainer in the rendition and conspiracy Unless the lawyers of Canada charge customarily very much higher fees than in the United States, Mr. Emmons's charge is preposterously low, or Mr. Devlin's enormously high.

The Government is willing and ever ready to pay a just and full compensation for services rendered, but I could not advise the payment of Mr. Devlin's charge without a full investigation.

As to the claim of Mr. Emmons, it is chiefly made up of moneys expended for the use, and at the request of, the United States. Upon that part of the account you cannot desire that I should say anything. If any error or inaccuracies exist in that, doubtless, they can and will be promptly corrected.

Being furnished with no process of any kind, other than the account as rendered, and knowing nothing of the services, except in a very general way, it may possibly be wrong for me even to express an opinion at all; but thinking it likely that you desire nothing more from me than an opinion founded upon my own professional experience, I would take occasion to say that neither of the two charges, the one of $1,500 for the St. Alban's raiders, and

Steinberger's Claim.

the other of $3,000 for the rendition and conspiracy cases, seems to me out of the way.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Hon. Wм. H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State.

JAMES SPEED.

STEINBERGER'S CLAIM.

Property which was sold to the rebel authorities and captured by the United States cannot be restored to the former owner on payment to the Secretary of the Treasury of the consideration received from the rebel government.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

October 3, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th September, 1865, in which you send me a statement of facts made by Miss Ellen Steinberger, relative to the two hundred and sixty-three bales of cotton, in regard to which I gave an opinion on the day of September, 1865. You also call my attention to an endorsement upon the affidavit of Mr. Beirne, which I had not observed. The endorsement is by Mr. Johnson, Treasury agent in Mississippi.

From the statement of the Treasury agent, it appears that the two hundred and sixty-three bales of cotton are entered upon the books of the late insurgents as their property.

Miss Steinberger says, that about the 1st of July, Mr. Johnson, the Treasury agent, demanded the two hundred. and sixty-three bales of cotton, and she refused to let it go. It was taken by military force. She presumes that the cotton is in Mr. Johnson's possession as Treasury agent.

Steinberger's Claim.

From these facts, in addition to the affidavit of Mr. Beirne, it seems to me that this cotton was as certainly captured from the insurgents as were their guns and other warlike implements. With the consent of its lawful owner, it had been thrown into the common stock of the insurgents, and constituted in part the basis upon which means were raised with which to sustain the rebellion. Rather than destroy it himself, or have it destroyed by others, he gave to the insurgents absolute dominion over it, thereby strengthening their hands in their treasonable efforts. If this cotton does not belong to the Government by capture, it has no owner, the former owner having sold it, and received payment. Now, that what was taken in payment turns out to be worthless, and offer is made to return the consideration and take back the cotton. This offer is made upon the idea that the United States takes, as the successors of the late so-called confederate government. Even if the United States did take as such successors, the offer comes too late. But the United States are not the successors of the late rebel government, and take nothing as such. As captors, they take all the property, of every kind, that the insurgents had accumulated and used as a common fund. To seize, take, or destroy such property, was a part of the duty of the army under the laws of war. This cotton cannot be regarded as private property.

Conceiving such to be the law, I do not think that there is power in the Executive Department of the Government to give it back.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Hon. Wм. E. CHANDLER,

JAMES SPEED.

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Bounty to Colored Troops.

BOUNTY TO COLORED TROOPS.

The classes of colored persons enfranchised after April 19, 1861, by operation of acts of Congress and the emancipation proclamation, and enlisted into the military service, who are entitled to bounty, indicated.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

October 17, 1865.

SIR: I have considered the questions propounded by the Second Comptroller of the Treasury, in his letter of the 20th ultimo, which you have referred to me, relative to the amount of bounty payable by law to colored troops received into the national military service.

These questions are four in number. They relate to the legal rights, in regard to bounty, of persons of color enlisted and mustered into the military service of the United States, who though slaves on the 19th of April, 1861, afterwards may have become freemen by operation of the statutes of Congress or the President's proclamation of emancipation.

The rights of persons of color, free on the 19th of April, 1861, who were enlisted into our military service as soldiers prior to the passage of the act of June 15, 1864, in regard to bounty, were fully discussed and determined by my learned predecessor, Mr. Bates. The question was presented to him in consequence of the provision of the 4th section of the statute of 1864, which required the Secretary of War to make payment to colored soldiers who were free men on the 19th day of April, 1861, of any amounts of pay and other emoluments to which the Attorney General might be of opinion they were entitled, under the laws existing at the dates of their enlistment, in addition to the amounts they had already received. The question referred to the Attorney General by the President was specifically the one on which depended the due execution of the act of 1864. He was not requested, because the requirements of the statute did not render it necessary that he should be, to give any opinion touching the legal rights in regard to

Bounty to Colored Troops.

pay and bounty of colored soldiers mustered into the service prior to the act of 1864, who were not free on the 19th of April, 1861.

The learned Attorney General had no difficulty in determining the point submitted to him. He gave his opinion unhesitatingly, that persons of color who were free on the day that has been mentioned, and who were mustered into the military service before the passage of the statute of 1864, were entitled, by the laws in force at the times of their enlistment, to receive the same pay and other emoluments, as, under those laws, were received by other soldiers of the same branch and of like arms of the service. In the reasoning and in the conclusion contained in the opinion of Mr. Bates, I fully concur.

But that opinion does not embrace, as has been seen, the cases of many classes of colored persons who have become soldiers of the United States.

By far the larger number of our colored troops, I believe, is composed of men who were in the condition of slaves on the day of the massacre of Union volunteers in Baltimore, (the 19th of April, 1861,) and the legal rights of certain classes of these soldiers in regard to bounty, I am requested by you to consider and define. It is with pride and satisfaction that I recall the legislation which gave freedom to many of these colored soldiers of the Republic. The title of some of them to liberty is derived under the provisions of the 9th and 10th sections of the act of June 17, 1862, commonly styled the "Confiscation act." (12 Stats., 591.) By the 9th section of that statute, every slave of a disloyal man escaping from his master and taking refuge within the lines of our army; every slave deserted by such owner and coming under the control of this Government; and, finally, every slave of a treasonable master being within. any place occupied by rebel forces, and afterwards occupied by Union troops, was declared "forever free" of his servitude. And the word of the nation was pledged that he should not be again held as a slave. By the 10th section of that statute, no fugitive escaping from slavery