Case of Steamboat Minnesota. contractors for moneys due them, by reason of the satisfactory completion of the contract to which they were parties, on the ground that one of the contracting parties is individually liable under an unfulfilled contract for the amount of the forfeiture specified and stipulated therein. The Department cannot assert, on behalf of the United States, a right which would not be sustainable at law. I am of opinion, therefore, in reply to your second question, that the Department is not authorized to deduct the amount of the forfeiture from moneys due to the same contractor, jointly with others, under a contract which has been satisfactorily fulfilled. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. EDWARD BATES. CASE OF STEAMBOAT MINNESOTA. 1. The Secretary of the Treasury, and not the President, has power to remit the forfeiture of a vessel incurred by violation of the 2d section of the act of July 7, 1838, chap. 191, for the better security of the lives of passengers on steam vessels. 2. A judgment entered on a bond given in place of a vessel seized for a violation of that act, is incapable of being affected by any action of the President, who cannot invalidate such judgment, or, in any way, impair its force and effect against the stipulators. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, October 27, 1864. SIR: I beg pardon for my delay in rendering you my opinion, as requested, upon the question which arises in the matter of the application for relief presented to you by one Ephraim Morrison, owner of the steamboat "Minnesota," a vessel proceeded against in the United States. district court for the eastern district of Missouri, for a violation of the 2d section of the act of July 7, 1838. (5 Stats. at Large, 304.) Case of Steamboat Minnesota. This case has been before me on other occasions, and I am, therefore, somewhat familiar with its legal aspects. I was, and am, clearly of opinion that the penalty or forfeiture incurred in this case, is one within the remitting power of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the 1st section of the act of March 3, 1797--and that he alone has authority, under the law, to mitigate the same. Of course, I do not undertake to say whether the case is or is not one proper for the exercise of this power by the Secretary; but that he has jurisdiction to grant the relief I entertain no doubt, if he should be of opinion that the penalty was incurred, in the language of the act of 1797, "without willful negligence, or any intention of fraud in the person or persons incurring the same." I had occasion to say, in an opinion given to your excellency, of date February 9, 1863, that the grant of power in the Constitution to the President to pardon "offences against the United States," is, in its terms, and in its obvious sense, limited to offences, to crimes and misdemeanors against the United States, and does not embrace any case of forfeiture, loss, or condemnation, not imposed by law as a punishment for an offence. There is nothing in the Constitution which confers on the President the "power of remission" of penalties and forfeitures, unless it is found in the general grant of power to pardon offences, to which I have referred. In the present case, the party has not been proceeded against personally and criminally for any offence or crime against the United States. His vessel was seized and proceeded against, under the act of 1838, for a violation of the provisions of that statute. That was the form of remedy adopted by the United States, and the informers, under the authority of the statute, for the recovery of the penalty or forfeiture in question. The proceeding was in rem, and not against the person of the owner of the vessel. In that proceeding, under the principles just stated, the President has no constitutional or statutory authority to exercise any "power of remission." The present condition of the case is not as clearly stated McCracken's Case. in the affidavit of Mr. Morrison as was perhaps desirable; but I infer, from what is said in the affidavit, that judgment has been entered against Mr. Morrison and his sureties upon the bond or stipulation which was entered, according to familiar practice, in place of the vessel. The judgment, if the case has proceeded to that stage, is for the amount of the penalty imposed by the act-five hundred dollars; and, like any other judgment obtained in a court of law by the United States, against a citizen, is incapable of being affected by any action of the Executive. The President cannot invalidate it, or in any way impair its force and effect against the parties defendant. I am of opinion, therefore, that the President has power neither to remit the penalty or forfeiture incurred by Mr. Morrison under the act of 1838, nor to afford him relief against the judgment which may have been entered upon the bond accepted by the district court of Missouri as a substitute for the vessel seized under the authority of the statute. I am, sir, very respectfully, The PRESIDENT. Your obedient servant, EDWARD BATES. MCCRACKEN'S CASE. 1. The President has no general constitutional or statutory power to remit judgments obtained against sureties in recognizances taken in criminal proceedings before the Courts of the United States. 2. The act of June 17, 1812, authorizes the President to remit the forfeiture of recognizances taken in such proceedings in the District of Columbia. 3. There is no statute under which the President may forgive, discharge, or reduce generally, debts due to the United States. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 21, 1864. SIR: I have considered the petition, herewith returned, addressed to you by H. B. McCracken, of Jefferson county, McCracken's Case. Pennsylvania. It appears that Mr. McCracken became surety for the appearance, at the May sessions, 1864, of the United States district court for the western district of Pennsylvania, of one Charles Randall, indicted in that court for the offence of passing an altered United States Treasury note; that the said defendant, Randall, having failed to appear, according to the condition of the obligation, the recognizance executed by Mr. McCracken was forfeited, and that an action, in the usual form, was accordingly brought upon the recognizance in the said court, in which action judgment for $3,000 was obtained by the United States against Mr. McCracken on the 15th of August, 1864. Mr. McCracken appealing "to the Executive clemency," now prays "that upon the payment of costs, and the sum of thirty dollars for the benefit of the party or parties who have been defrauded, the said judgment may be remitted." He represents to your excellency that "he is a young man, just starting in life, and cannot pay the said amount of three thousand dollars, for which judgment has been entered against him, without utter ruin to himself and his small family." The question, I presume, which you desired me to answer when you referred this application to me, is, whether you have any constitutional or statutory power to grant the relief which is prayed? I am of opinion that you have none. You have no constitutional power, because the authority conferred upon the President by the Constitution, "to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States," does not, in my judgment, embrace or include within it power to discharge or reduce debts that are due to the United States in consequence of such a liability as was incurred by the party who presents this application. His liability arose and was incurred under a contract with the United States, by which he obliged himself to pay the sum for which judgment has been rendered against him, in the event of the indicted party failing to appear and take his trial on McCracken's Case. the day that has been named. The defendant failing to appear, Mr. McCracken became prima facie bound to pay the money to the United States. If Randall had been pardoned by the President, that fact might have constituted a good plea in bar of the action upon the recog nizance; but neither that nor any other defence was interposed by the petitioner-and judgment, in due course of law, was rendered against him, not as a criminal, but as a public debtor. I am of opinion that the President, under the constitutional provision to which I have referred, has no power to remit this judgment. Nor am I aware of any statute of the United States under which such a power is derivable. The President, in the cases of recognizances taken in criminal proceedings before the courts, judges, and justices of the District of Columbia, may grant remissions of the forfeitures of such recognizances, by the provision of the act of June 17, 1812; but I am not aware that any subsequent act has extended this power to cases beyond the District of Columbia. I am not acquainted, either, with any law of Congress, by authority of which the President may forgive, discharge, or reduce generally, debts that are due to the United States, or particular debts belonging to the same class as the present. If such legislation exist, it is of very recent date, and my search has failed to discover it. Being thus clearly of opinion that you have no power in the premises, I deem it unnecessary to make any remarks upon the merits of the present application. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, EDWARD BATES. The PRESIDENT. |