not utter all we feel, and if it were not that our feelings are in a way stunned by the very violence of the catastrophe, as physical nerves are to some extent numbed by great blows, the human heart could not bear up and live under the trial of this war.

Great must be the effect of all this; greater after, even, than during the war, on the working of men's minds and on human nature itself, but this is not what I intend to urge here.

I will urge only one point, and one that is for the head rather than the heart. We are now in the fourth year of the war. The application of scientific knowledge and the inventions of science during the war have made it more terrible and destructive each year. The Germans have abrogated all previously-accepted rules of warfare. The use of poisonous gas, the firing from the sea upon open, undefended towns, and the indiscriminate bombing of big cities from the air were all introduced into the war by Germany.

It was long before the Allies adopted any of these practices even as reprisals, but the Germans have forced a ruthless, unlimited application of scientific discovery to the destruction of human life, combatant and noncombatant. They have shown the world that now and henceforth war means this, and nothing less than this.

If there is to be another war in twenty or thirty years' time, what will it be like? If there is to be concentrated preparation for more war, the researches of science will be

devoted henceforth to discovering methods by which the human race can be destroyed. These discoveries cannot be confined to one nation, and their object of wholesale destruction will be much more completely achieved hereafter even than in this war. The Germans are not blind to this, but, as far as I can see, their rulers propose to avoid future wars by establishing domination by Germany forever.

Peace can never be secured by the domination of one country, securing its power and prosperity by submission and disadvantage to others; and the German idea of a world peace secured by the power of German militarism is impracticable as well as unfair and abhorrent to other nations. It is as intolerable and impossible in the world as despotism would be here or in the United States.

In opposition to this idea of Germany, the Allies should set forth, as President Wilson has already set forth, an idea of peace secured by mutual regard between States for the rights of each, and the determination to stamp out any attempt at war as they would a plague that threatened the destruction of all. When those who accept this idea and this sort of peace can in word and deed speak for Germany we shall be within sight of a good peace.

The establishment and maintenance of a league of nations such as President Wilson has advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude

the war. It will transcend them all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of States are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in any State.

"Learn by experience or suffer" is the rule of life. We have all of us seen individuals becoming more and more a misery to themselves and others because they cannot understand or will not accept this rule. Is it not applicable to nations as well? And, if so, have not nations

come to the great crisis in which for them the rule "Learn or perish” will prove inexorable? All must learn the lesson of this war. The United States and the Allies cannot save the world from militarism unless Germany learns her lesson thoroughly and completely, and they will not save the world or even themselves by a complete victory over Germany until they, too, have learned and can apply the lesson that militarism has become the deadly enemy of mankind.

TH

HE Single Front as a military doctrine was only accepted after many hard lessons. Successive reverses, combined with the unfruitful results of un-coordinated offensives, at last compelled the Allies to accept the inevitable and to place their whole military resources under one controlling mind. We shall have to wait for some time yet before measuring the full advantages of the single command; and we may say in passing that General Foch entered upon his gigantic duties at a moment when the situation had been seriously prejudiced, partly by the defection of Russia and partly by the faulty military policy-or policies-pursued in those unhappy days when the Allies fought as single detached units. It is not our purpose to reopen the debate upon the single command in its military sense, but rather to in

vite the Governments of the Entente to apply to politics what they have now found essential in the military sphere. If unity in design and in execution is essential to success in active warfare, it is no less essential to good politics. But in order to realize this unity it is not necessary to supersede the sovereign political power of each individual Government, but rather to provide a common clearing-house and council chamber for their political ideas. Unlike those executive functions of the supreme Commander-in-Chief, which cannot be faithfully discharged except by a single untrammelled mind acting rapidly on well-founded principles, the political task of the Allies is to find the highest common measure of their different policies and on the basis of a general agreement founded thereon to build up the whole struc

The present method is profoundly unsatisfactory. It consists in hurried meetings between the heads of the British, French, and Italian Governments, usually called together in moments of military crisis when the necessary leisure and proper temper for serious political discussion are wanting, and when, therefore, the largest decisions are made with the least political preparation. The result is that in the intervals between these hurried consultations, divergencies of opinion easily arise between one Government and another, and may develop into a dissension which would place serious difficulties in the way of common action. We do not minimize all that is being done, both

in London and in Paris-both unofficially and semi-officially-to evolve a general policy, expressed in the specific terms of territorial and economic conditions, out of the resounding declarations made from time to time by the spokesmen of the Allies. Indeed, we may point out here that the Allied Governments have shown themselves ready to welcome with alacrity any positive policy which bears upon the face of

it evidence alike of the care which has been taken in its preparation and of the personal authority of its authors. The attitude of the three Entente Governments-and for this purpose we believe we may add the Government of Washington towards the new Adriatic agreement is a most promising sign; for it shows that, while these Governments

upon sound principle and contributes to the general purpose of the Entente, they are prepared to accept the assistance of unofficial diplomacy. But we must point out that the very alacrity of their welcome to this movement, for instance, shows that they were glad to be rid of the em

barrassment of the old secret undertime or that the inclination was wantstanding, and that either they had no ing to reconstruct the problem of the Adriatic on the only permanent basis on which it can rest, namely, that of an understanding between the Italians and the Southern Slavs. We take this instance, partly because we are thoroughly familiar with every detail and every step in the prolonged negotiations which have led to so happy a result, and partly because being a fait accompli we cannot be accused of embarrassing any Government by using it as an illustration. The Adriatic question, however, is only one of many outstanding problems; and, while we are heartily glad to recognize that it has ripened with unexpected rapidity and is now almost assured of a proper solution, other questions still lag far behind.

It is inconceivable that we can have any fruitful policy in Russia

unless it is the result of mature de

liberation in a consultative body which represents the political unity of the Alliance. Without such frank and cordial cooperation there will be discrepancies and divergencies in policy which may end in fatal con

flict. In the case of the Ukraine, for instance, during the past year the Governments of London and Paris have pursued different lines and, while Paris burnt her fingers over her Ukraine loan, London is perhaps now beginning to realize the embarrassment of having half-a-dozen divergent lines of official or semiofficial diplomacy in Russia and elsewhere. The case of Poland, too, is even more critical. Severe pressure is now being brought to bear upon the Poles to accept a solution of the Polish problem which would bind the country firmly to the chariot wheels of Mittel-Europa and, if the Allies merely pursue a policy of waiting for something to turn up, they will lose the good-will of Poland and with it perhaps all chance of re-establishing Eastern Europe on foundations of liberty and justice.

A glance over the map will reveal many other territorial problems on which the Entente must ultimately speak with one clear voice. There will be nothing but discord and confusion over the whole African problem, for instance, at the Peace Conference unless the Allies devise beforehand their own well-considered plan of an African settlement, and, since such a settlement is inseparable from the whole economic policy of the Entente nations, there ought to be summoned without delay a new economic conference, including representatives of the United States, at which the whole problem should be reviewed in the light of changed conditions and better knowledge so that the precise and most effective use of

the economic weapon may be properly defined. If such discussion were inaugurated at a political Versailles we believe that they would lead the Governments concerned straight to the conclusion that behind and above all the outstanding military, economic and territorial problems, which hang like gigantic storm-clouds over the landscape of the war, there is the even vaster question of the international framework in which the world must live hereafter. Indeed, many of the problems with which we are face to face to-day are actually insoluble unless the conditions which prevailed before the war are radically changed. The relation between the Colonial empires and the supply of raw materials to the industrial nations of the temperate zone, for instance, cannot be measured simply in terms of the German ill-treatment of the native races, and the statesman who takes a long view will realize that to shut Germany out of Africa without giving her reasonable means for satisfying her economic requirements would be the surest way to provoke a new conflict. In using this illustration we do not suggest the restoration of German colonies, but we do insist that if and when war ends in the

triumph of our principles, colonial territory, especially in Africa, should be held on such a tenure by the occupying power as to forbid its exploitation for purely selfish national purposes. The extreme protectionism which has characterized the colonial policy of certain European Powers is not only economically unfruitful but internationally unjust, and if the

world is to be freed from the evil effects of its operation the whole basis upon which European Powers have administered African territories in the past must be radically altered. The attempt to find a suitable framework for this new conception will lead to the formulation, as a practical political expedient, of a League of Nations. This is the supreme issue on which it is desirable that the Governments of the Entente should open discussion in order that they may explore the ground at their leisure and lay out the best avenue of approach towards a new international order.

Fortunately the obstacles to be overcome before a political Rapallo may lead to a political Versailles are not so great as those which lay in the path of the precedent military form by which ultimately General Foch became Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France. The crea

tion of this supreme political council of the Alliance does not entail anything like the same immediate and visible surrender of national sovereignty as in the case of the military council at Versailles: but, unless the political chiefs of the Allied nations enter upon their task of creating an unassailable political unity as their body armour for the peace conference, firmly realizing that the old days of undisputed national sovereignty in foreign affairs are gone for ever, they may find their task too hard for them. But if they have understood and digested the cogent argument presented in these pages by our distinguished French collaborator, Professor Seignobos, they will realize that the statesman's mission in the 20th century is to make our sense of European citizenship a reality, and thus to provide a spacious arena in which the nations may cooperate in peace and progress.

"Because the British speak the same language as we, read the same masterpieces and inherit a few common political traditions, we look to them for our closest national friendship, forgetting that the British are insular, imperial and industrial, whereas we are continental, federal and agricultural. Ought we not rather discern in the many similarities between the Russian people and the American people the natural foundation for our firmest friendship? In both, agriculture leads and rural life predominates, although, of course, Russia is far more rural than the United States. Both peoples are accustomed to grapple with rude Nature, have a frontier and have had to contend with wild animals and savage races. Both are subject to a continental climate and the sharpest contrasts they ex

perience are in seasons rather than in scenery. In both countries land is cheap, streets and roads are wide and little improved and towns sprawl. Both Americans and Russians are used to space and vast horizons, think in large units and overlook fine distinctions. Both are easy-going, democratic and familiar. Neither has known feudalism and the caste sense it inspires. Neither has grown up amid historical buildings and monuments nor feels much reverence for the past. Individual Americans and individual Russians' have always found themselves drawn toward one another, and now that such stumbling blocks as autocracy, a state church and a landed nobility are removed, why should not the two people feel the pull of sympathy and become like brothers?"-Prof. Edward Alsworth Ross.