WHA

HAT are the reasons that have moved past and present generations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to demand union with Serbia, and to fight ceaselessly for this goal at the cost of many strenuous efforts and sacrifices?

(1) Bosnia and Herzegovina are inhabited by the same nation as that which lives in Serbia and Montenegro. And national traditions, social customs, the nature of the country, similar economic conditions, and the adoption of the principle of nationality, all demand that the union should at last be translated into reality. Already in 1908 the well-known Geographer and University Professor Yovan Cvijitch has very ably set forth all these reasons in the following words:

"But it must be admitted as an incontestable minimum of the principle of nationality, that one cannot give to a foreign State the central region and the heart, as it were, of a nation. Now, Bosnia-Herzegovina is the very heart of the Serbian nation. It is for Serbia and the Serbian people not only what Alsace and Lorraine are for the French, what the Trentino and Trieste are for the Italians, or even the Austrian Alpine provinces for Germany. Bosnia-Herzegovina possesses the same importance for Serbia which the region of Moscow possesses for Russia, and which the purest regions of Germany and France possess for the Germans and the French, I mean those regions in which the French and German races are best represented. "The earliest literary monument of the Serbian language saw the light in Bosnia

in 1189; it is the well-known letter of Ban Kulin. It is the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina which, by the wealth and beauty of its folk-lore, occupies the chief place in the Serbian world. It is the dialect of Herze

govina which was adopted by Vuk Karadjitch, the founder of modern Serbian literature. A great number of the most notable and most illustrious men of the Serbian race have been natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Every scientific enterprise in Belgrade finds its most active collaborators in Bosnia and in Herzegovina. Touching the unity of the Serbian people and its national aspirations, the entire Serbian press is animated by the same sentiments and, in this respect, the Serbian press of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is, so to say, at the head of the movement.

"The commerce, not only of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also that of the adjoining regions, and even that of western Serbia, is chiefly in the hands of Herzegovinians. Nowhere are devotion and the spirit of

sacrifice for the interests of civilization and the education of the people so highly developed as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is more, the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians have, in very great numbers, taken part in all the wars which Serbia has waged during the course of the nineteenth century for her independence and for the deliverance of the neighboring countries."

During the Balkan wars and especially during the European war, this spirit of self-sacrifice has been in evidence and could not have been manifested more clearly. Although martial law was declared in Bosnia and Herzegovina at once on June 28, 1914, and the population was deprived of all liberty of movement, and although Austria-Hungary has shot

These words afford the best explanation of our ethnological reasons for the adoption of the right of nationality.

(2) Let us now pass on to general political reasons. . . . Right up till June, 1878, it was clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina desired autonomy which, as in the case of all Balkan States liberated from Turkey, would by natural development have led to complete freedom and union with Serbia and Montenegro. But fate decreed that, in compliance with the wishes of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the mistaken political principles which dictated the majority of the decisions of the Berlin Congress, should be applied to those regions.

Starting from the point of view that small Balkan States have no right to exist and that it is imperative to prevent the formation of a relatively strong Southern Slav State, the Congress of Berlin laid it down as a fundamental axiom that it was necessary to have two spheres of interest in the Balkans, the AustroHungarian in the west and the Russian in the east. The wish of the European powers to preserve European Turkey, and especially to keep Constantinople in Turkish hands, was the reason why Austria-Hungary succeeded at that moment in posing as the defender of the interests and culture of western Europe against Russian and Balkan "barbarism." Thus it happened that, contrary to the principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples," contrary to the wish of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, contrary to the wish of the whole Serbian nation, the Russians and the Italians, Austria-Hungary was given the mandate to create order in the Balkans. This implied, as we to-day clearly see, ignorance of Balkan affairs and of the incompetence of the Austro-Hungarian State for that great task.

During Austria-Hungary's administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1878 to 1914 it appeared very clearly that Austria-Hungary only looked upon these regions as a base for penetration towards Salonica,— and that in agreement with the intentions of Berlin. If it is true-as it is said that when Count Andrassy communicated to Francis Joseph the decision of the Berlin Congress, he

Idid so with the words: "Your majesty, I bring you the keys of the Balkans," then for the sake of completing and further defining the idea, we ought to add "so that you may be the keeper of the keys" for the King of Prussia.

This was clearly borne out by Austria-Hungary's policy, both cultural and economic. Bosnia and Herzogovina were perforce considered an Austro-Hungarian colony. The dissatisfaction of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina with such an administration is easy to understand. And when one knows something of the spirit of resistance in the Bosnians and Herzegovinians it is still easier to understand that they never allowed themselves to be induced to ask for union with Austria-Hungary, that they openly and emphatically protested when the annexation was carried through against their will, and that-apart from numerous protests -they never, even after the annexation, either directly or indirectly signified their approval of that illegal and arbitrary step.

The general political conceptions, by which the European Powers were guided when they decided to authorize the occupation, have long ceased to exist. An Austro-Hungarian footing in the Balkans is no longer necessary to counterbalance the "Russian sphere," as Bulgaria and Roumelia were designated at that time. To merely abandon their footing would mean to leave the problem of the Balkans and the Adriatic unsolved, to the direct disadvantage of both Serbs and Italians; and to leave open the

way to the East for the Germans, enabling them to link up the German and Mahommedan worlds would-especially in Southeastern Europe serve to show that the Quadruple Entente had been militarily defeated in this great military conflict. It is well remembered in the Balkans that the Central Powers scored their first diplomatic victory over the Quadruple Entente over the Question of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the occasion of the annexation, which was a precursor of the present German peril. To leave Bosnia and Herzegovina in statu quo, would mean to abandon the whole of the Balkans to Germany and thereby to render the Berlin-Bagdad plan feasible.

(3) The human and democratic reasons are easy to state quite briefly. From June, 1914, to this hour, Bosnia and Herzegovina have been subjected to a rule more terribly oppressive than that of any other belligerent state. The Austro-Hungarian authorities have perpetrated so many outrages and illegalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that neither there nor in Austria-Hungary will the Serbian population ever again feel the necessary confidence and reliance which alone can render a real and useful administration possible. Serbia, who is linked to that part of her people with many ties, could never remain indifferent as to its fate, and would therefore be exposed to constant fear for her own independence. The Balkan wars and the European War have given ample proof of this.

Legal and ethical considerations

likewise determine that it is not possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain further under the administration of Austria-Hungary. When the Austro-Hungarian Government embarked upon the partial and illegal transgression of the Treaty of Berlin, the Great Powers, the signatories to that Treaty, merely gave their approval to the cancellation of Art. 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, the article in fact whereby the immediate question was solved. By this action the fact of the annexation was recognized, but not its legality. At present there is actually no state or international treaty in existence, whereby the sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina is definitely established. What is even more to the point is that neither in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, nor in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the annexation ever given a legal form.

As the Austro-Hun

garian Monarchy includes only Austrian and Hungarian territory, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as belonging to neither Austria nor Hungary, occupy a separate territory and a separate status. They form a separate administrative district, although their administration is dependent upon the Austro-Hungarian authorities. This in itself is ample proof that Bosnia and Herzegovina occupy no place in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with which they have been forcibly incorporated.

These are reasons in support of our view, which hold good equally for the Allied Powers and for Serbia. Serbia as a State has many further

reasons besides these, to support the argument.

(a) During the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary, recognizing Serbia's right to an outlet on the sea, offered her a "corridor" through Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the most natural access. At the Conference of London and during the Balkan wars, Serbia's right to an outlet on the sea was recognized by all the European States, and she was awarded the Albanian coast. The Austro-Hungarian problem had not yet been raised at that time, and so this solution is comprehensible. In the meantime, what is there more natural than that Serbia should obtain her access to the sea by the Dalmatian coast through Bosnia and Herzegovina, where dwell her kinsmen, who impatiently await their liberation, their spiritual and economic progress from such an arrangement?

(b) A successful military defence of Serbia is not possible without the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This war has proved that Serbia's frontiers are too extensive. That shortening of her front which would result from her possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Dalmatia, and would at the same time mean the increase of her mili

tary strength and power of resistance, would ensure to Serbia and her present Allies the impossibility of a penetration of the East on the part of Germany and her present agents. By conducting her first two offensives against Serbia from Bosnia, AustriaHungary has sufficiently demon

strated the importance of that terrain for the defense of Serbia.

(c) A steady and rapid development of Serbian culture is not possible without Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rest of the adjoining countries. Without a union of these countries Serbia cannot with the needful rapidity develop into a sufficientlystrong market for intellectual and national products. The national morale of Serbia, which has proved so strong a factor in all the misery of this war, would, on the contrary, be exposed to the risk of becoming lowered, or of fusing with another morale less clean and less tenacious.

After giving the above reasons, we fancy that the following deductions must be clear to any impartial and educated person:—

(1) That Austria-Hungary, who by cunning and force entered Bosnia and Herzegovina, maintained herself there by force, carried out the annexation of these provinces by a violation of international law and in defiance of the will of the nation and perpetrated so many barbarities upon her subjects, cannot remain mistress of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(2) That it is right and expedient for Europe and humanity that Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single and individual unit should be united with the Kingdom of Serbia, and

(3) That Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Serbia form a component part of the future single State of all Southern Slavs, which must be formed under the leadership of Serbia.

ods, it is good to see a ray of light penetrating the general gloom. Let us cultivate it; let us open a way to it until its effulgence shall spread over the face of the earth and expose all the dark places where evil lurks.

"Nearly all thinking men agree that something radical must be done if we are to save civilization. We must find some way to end war and to prevent its recurrence. We must reverse the practices of statesmen and rulers. And it is an encouraging fact that nearly all ready thoughtful people who give any considera