in the conviction the variance not being material to the merits, and the Court not being able to go behind the return and commitment which was set forth.

(2) Nor that the commitment charged that the prisoner "was the keeper of," and the conviction that "she did keep," both differing from the statute which designates the offence as "keeping any disorderly house," etc.; for it would seem the Court could not go behind the commitment, and all these expressions conveyed but one idea.

(3) Nor that the commitment did not show that the offence was committed within the " police limits" of the city, the words used in the Act; for the limits of the City of Toronto were assigned by a public statute and the Municipal Institutions Act, creating the Police Court and Magistrate, and the whole body of police, contained nothing to show that there were any police limits differing from the ordinary city limits.

(4) Nor that the commitment did not follow the form of conviction given in the statute, in showing that the party was charged before the convicting magistrate,i.e., charged as the statute required, namely, put upon her trial and asked whether she was guilty or not guilty, nor whether she pleaded to the charge or confessed it. It might, and probably would be, a defect in the conviction, if it did not pursue the statutory form in shewing that the party was charged, more especially as by the second section of the Act the jurisdiction is made to depend upon the fact of the party being charged before the convicting Justice. That point, however, was not decided; the Court merely intimating that it might or might not be a defect in the conviction. Unless the commitment must contain all that the conviction does or ought to contain, it is unnecessary to state the information in it; and more especially as by the form given by the statute it does not appear necessary that the information should be set out in the conviction.

(5) Nor that the conviction was not sustained by the information, the latter being that defendant was the keeper of a well-known disorderly house; and the former that the prisoner did keep a common, disorderly bawdy-house, for the commitment would not be void on the face of it because of a variance between the original

information and the conviction made after hearing evidence. But if the prisoner had been charged with the information, and on being called on to answer had confessed the information, and then had been convicted of matter not contained in the information, no doubt the conviction could be quashed; but even in that case while it stood unreversed it would warrant a commitment following its terms.

(6) Nor that no notice had been put up as required by s. 26 of the same Act, to show that the Court was that of a Police Magistrate, not of an ordinary Justice of the Peace; for the jurisdiction, in the absence of express enactment, could not be made to depend on the omission of the Clerk to post up such notice.

(7) Nor that the evidence was unsatisfactory and insufficieut to warrant the conviction; for when a proper commitment is returned to a Habeas Corpus, and there was evidence, the Court will never enter into the question whether the magistrate has drawn the right conclusion from it.

(8) Nor that the offence of "keeping a common disorderly bawdy-house," was not sufficiently certain; for the legal meaning of the last two words is clear, and a house will not be less a public nuisance because it is found to be disorderly as well as bawdy; and if keeping a disorderly house be no offence the term becomes mere surplusage, and would not vitiate an otherwise sufficient statement. But the statute does give jurisdiction over persons charged with keeping any disorderly house, house of ill-fame, or bawdy-house. R v. Munro, 24 Q.B. (Ont.), 44.

It is to be observed that the jurisdiction of the magistrate in cases of this kind is absolute, and does not depend on the consent of the party charged to be tried by such magistrate. See section 15.

A conviction under this statute for keeping a house of ill fame, or being an inmate of such a house, adjudicating that the accused should pay a fine of $50 forthwith, and be imprisoned for three months unless the fine be sooner paid, is not warranted by section 17 of the statute, for imprisonment is only authorized by the Act when it has been awarded as a substantive punishment. Re Slater, 9 U. C., L. J., 21.

It would seem that though a magistrate may have a general

jurisdiction to hear any complaint against a disorderly inn or house, he has no right to issue a warrant to arrest a casual guest visiting a licensed tavern as a guest at a time subsequent to the charge, and in no way present at or assisting in any disturbance or disorder. Cleland v. Robinson, 11 C. P. (Ont.), 421.

The owner of a house letting it to several young women for the purpose of prostitution cannot be indicted for keeping a disorderly house. R. v. Stannard, 9 Cox. C. C., 405; R. v. Barrett, (ib.), 255.

It is not necessary that the disorderly conduct should be visible from the exterior of the house. R. v. Rice, L. R., 1 C. C. R., 21. See also vagrancy, post.

In case any person is charged in Ontario before a Police Magistrate or before a Stipendiary Magistrate, in any County, District or Provisional County in Ontario, with having committed any offence for which he may be tried at a Court of General Sessions of the Peace, or in case any person is committed to a gaol in the County, District or Provisional County, under the the warrant of any Justice of the Peace for trial on a charge of being guilty of any such offence, such person may, with his own consent, be tried before such magistrate, and may, if found guilty, be sentenced by the magistrate to the same punishment as he would have been liable to if he had been tried before the Court of General Sessions. 38 Vic., chap. 47, s. 1.

The proceedings upon and subsequent to such trial, shall be as nearly as may be the same as upon a trial under the Act of the Parliament of Canada, passed in the Session held in the thirty-second and thirty-third years of Her Majesty's reign, intituled, "An Act respecting the prompt and summary Administration of Criminal Justice in certain cases,' Ib. s. 2,

Every conviction under this Act shall have the same effect as a conviction upon indictment for the same offence would have had, save that no conviction under this Act shall be attended with forfeiture beyond the penalty (if any) imposed in the case. Ib. s. 3.

Every person who obtains a certificate of dismissal, or is convicted under this Act, shall be released from all further or other criminal proceedings for the same cause. Ib. s. 4.

No conviction, sentence, or proceeding under this Act shall be quashed for want of form; and no warrant of commitment upon a conviction shall be held void by reason of any defect therein, if it be therein alleged that the offender has been convicted, and there be a good and valid conviction to sus tain the same. Ib. s, 5.

If any person has under this Act or under the said Act passed in the session held in the thirty-second and thirty-third years of Her Majesty's reign, chaptered thirty-two, or under any otherAct giving such election, been asked to elect whether he should be tried by the magistrate or before a jury, and has elected to be tried before a jury, then in case such election is stated in the warrant of committal for trial, or upon the depositions, the Sheriff or the County Judge or junior or Deputy Judge, shall not be required to take the proceedings directed by the Act passed in the said session, and chaptered thirty-five, intituled, "An Act for the more speedy trial in certain cases of persons charged with Felonies and Misdemeanors in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec," and in all such cases it shall be the duty of the committing magistrate to state in the warrant the fact of such election having been made. Ib. s. 6.

If the magistrate is of opinion from any circumstances appearing in the case that the charge cannot be properly disposed of before him, he may at any time before the person charged has made his defence, decide not to adjudicate summarily thereon, and may thereupon deal with the same as if this Act had not been passed; and in such case such prisoner may be afterwards tried summarily by his own consent at the County Judge's Criminal Court. Ib. s. 7.

3. Whenever the magistrate before whom any person is charged as aforesaid, proposes to dispose of the case summarily under the provisions of this Act, such magistrate, after ascertaining the nature and extent of the charge, but before the formal examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, and before calling on the party charged for any statement which he may wish to make, shall state to such person the substance of the charge against him, and (if the charge is not one that can be tried summarily without the consent of the accused) shall then say to him, these words, or words to the like effect : "Do you consent that the charge against you shall be tried by me, or do you desire that it shall be sent for trial by a jury at the (naming the Court at which it could soonest be tried); " and if the person charged consents to the charge being summarily tried and determined as aforesaid, or if the power of the magistrate to try it does not depend on the consent of the accused, the magistrate shall reduce the charge into writing, and read the same to such person, and shall then ask him whether he is guilty or not of such charge.

See sections 15 and 16 as to the cases in which consent is not necessary.

4. If the person charged confesses the charge, the magistrate shall then proceed to pass such sentence upon him as may by law be passed (subject to the provisions of this Act,) in respect to such offence; but if the person charged says that he is not guilty, the magistrate shall then examine the

witnesses for the prosecution, and when the examination has been completed, the magistrate shall inquire of the person charged whether he has any defence to make to such charge, and if he states that he has a defence, the magistrate shall hear such defence, and shall then proceed to dispose of the case summarily.

Under this Act, the magistrate may, before any formal examination of witnesses, ascertain the nature and extent of the charge, and if the party consents to be tried summarily, may reduce it into writing. It would seem that the magistrate may then (that is when a person is charged before him prior to the formal examination of witnesses) reduce the charge into writing, and try the party upon the charge thus reduced to writing, and if this is the meaning of the statute, it would not signify whether the original information and warrant to apprehend did or did not state a charge in the precise language of the Act. But the magistrate must either, by the original information, or by the charge which he makes when the party is before him, have the charge in writing, and must read it to the prisoner, and ask him whether he is guilty or not. It appeared on an application for a habeas corpus, that the information laid before a police magistrate, and warrant to apprehend, were for an assault and beating, but it was disputed whether upon the examination and trial this was all the charge made, or whether he was not then charged with an aggravated assault under Con. Stat. Can., chap. 105, s. 1, s.-s. 4, and whether when he pleaded guilty, he did so under the former or latter charge. The information seemed to be laid under Con. Stat. Can., chap. 91, ss. 37, 38, for an assault and beating, while the conviction purported to be under Con. Stat. Can., chap. 105, and imposed the punishment prescribed by the latter statute.

Numerous contradictory affidavits were filed, the Justice alleging that the defendant was charged with an aggravated assault, and, with full knowledge of the fact, consented to the charge being summarily disposed of by the Justice according to the statute, while the defendant contradicted this and alleged that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known the charge was of aggravated assault. Four several warrants of commitment were in the gaoler's hands, upon one at least of which the prisoner was detained