own resources; to make that kingdom completely subservient to the opulence and interests of this country, without suffering them to share in the bounties of nature, in the industry of her citizens, or making them contribute to the general interests or strength of the empire."

The proposed treaty, however, excited the most lively opposition in the new England of the industrial revolution. Ireland was believed to be a place of incredibly low wages, incredibly cheap productiveness, incredibly dangerous rivalry. Pitt yielded to the protests of the manufacturers and the attacks of the Whigs. He changed his whole policy. He sought to compel Ireland to play the ape to the British parliament in return for some minor advantages. This new attempt at subordination the Anglo-Irish parliament shelved. It turned instead to home legislation. This, and the feeling of national confidence, helped Ireland toward an industrial revival. "The woolen manufacture showed some signs of reattaining its old prosperity; the cotton manufacture grew at a very rapid pace, and in a few years attained considerable dimensions; the progress of the linen manufacture was uninterrupted; the brewing industry was reëstablished in Ireland, without, however, in any way injuring its

flourishing rivals, the distilleries; the glass manufacture became a serious rival to that of England; and, in spite of the greatly increased export of corn, the provision trade did not suffer, but, on the contrary, continued to expand." In his excellent "Economic History" Mr. O'Brien further shows that rents went up, wages increased, and the population rose from about 3,000,000 in 1782 to almost 5,000,000 in 1800.

But this manifestation of Irish strength, with the French menace, was the very thing to alarm Britain. It was decided by Pitt as early as 1792 that the simplest solution for Britain would be to take away the Anglo-Irish parliament. He could do this all the better because he believed that the Union would safeguard "the British interest."

Some concession to the Catholic majority, Pitt believed, was absolutely necessary. In 1791 the plebeian elements had come to dominate the Catholic Committee. Under the secretaryship of Wolfe Tone, the democratic program of the French Revolution seemed to these native Irish the most inspiring doctrine in the world, and among the dissenters of Belfast the Catholics found their warmest supporters.

The Anglo-Irish parliament, needless to say, was not Jacobin. It was thoroughly frightened by the

prospect of any "democratic" advance in Ireland. In 1792 Pitt was of the same mind. But believing he could achieve the Union he felt that the admission of

the Catholics to a share of suffrage could not then be dangerous. "The Protestant interest, in point of power, property, and church establishment," he said in 1792 in a private letter, "would be secure, because the decided majority of the Supreme Legislature would

necessarily be Protestant; and the great ground of argument on the part of the Catholics would be done away; as compared with the rest of the empire, they would be a minority."

There was, besides, the conservative formula for Catholics. As against the Jacobins he thought that the ignorant, downtrodden Irish peasant would be a social bulwark. George III smiled on a delegation of loyal Catholics. "In the great struggle that had broken out Catholicism appeared the most powerful moral influence opposed to the Revolution."

It was this sort of reasoning which led Pitt's henchmen to enfranchise the Catholic peasant in 1793. So long as the peasant voted as his landlord dictated (which he did), this enfranchisement really meant nothing. The gesture had only one disadvantage: Pitt could not explain to the Anglo-Irish parliament how little this liberalism meant without divulging his plan as to the Union.

Not possessing the indispensable clue to Pitt's behavior, the Anglo-Irish resented enormously his concession to the Catholics. Their own policy was different. They aimed to resist the democratic influence of the French Revolution, to drive a wedge in between the lower order of Catholics and the Presbyterians of

Belfast, and to keep property on top by giving a place in parliament to the conservative, propertied Catholics.

The United Irishmen, founded in Belfast in 1791, were not placated by Pitt's concession to the Catholic voter. They had a national as well as a democratic program, and they began an agitation for the uniting of the dissenters and the Catholics. Theirs was, at

its start, a natural secession of the younger radicals— lawyers and writers-from the non-popular AngloIrish parliament, and at first their program was a broad civil and religious liberty. But with the FrancoEnglish war of 1793 the leaders-Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Arthur O'Connor, Thomas Addis Emmet, Oliver Bond, W. J. McNevin, and above all Wolfe Tonemade up their minds to follow America's example, invoke French aid, declare war, and go republican.

6

This development of policy was gradual. Before it was mature Pitt agreed that the appearance of virtue was desirable. He sent an honest liberal to Ireland as viceroy, Lord Fitzwilliam.

To Grattan, who now realized that the Catholics must be placated and "emancipated," Fitzwilliam's was a splendid appointment. All the decent forces in