1854. The QUEEN v. DERBYSHIRE, in law for a satisfaction, and for avoiding of infiniteness there should be but one valuable execution or executions with satisfaction at the common law." Blumfield's &c. Railway. Case (a). And the same principle appears from Crawley v. Lydgeat (b), Foster v. Jackson (c), 3 Bac. Abr. 393 (7th ed.), tit. Execution (D), note (1), to Underhill v. Devereux (d). Crawley v. Lydgeat (b) is a very strong case: there was no actual satisfaction: the lands of one of two joint and several obligors had been delivered on elegit upon an action against one; then an action was brought against the other, judgment recovered, and a ca. sa. issued; and the Court relieved the defendant in the second action upon auditâ querelâ, apparently in analogy to the law which prevails in case of a release to one of two joint and several obligors (e). In order to apply sect. 36, it must be shewn what sum is owing: but that cannot be done where lands have been delivered on elegit, because they may be held till the whole debt is received. If a fi. fa. had been levied, and the sheriff had returned that he had taken goods which remained in his hands for want of buyers, it could not be said that execution had not been levied. Under stat. 7 G. 4. c. 46. s. 13., the question is whether a party applying for scire facias against shareholders has done all in his power to obtain satisfaction, but ineffectually; Harvey v. Scott (g), Field v. Mackenzie (h), Dodgson v. Scott (i). An elegit would not be necessary to shew this where the lands were worthless: 1854. The QUEEN V. and a similar reasoning would apply here: so that the creditor has himself only to blame for the difficulty in which he is placed. No stress can be fairly laid on the words "such execution," in sect. 36 of The Companies &c. Railway. Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. G. Hayes, contrà. The elegit issued in consequence of a doubt which has been suggested, in the Court of Exchequer (a), whether a creditor of a Company could be entitled to the benefit of sect. 36, before taking out elegit against any land which the Company might have. Here the debt will clearly not be satisfied, either principal or interest, from the lands. [Erle J. We can hardly decide this question upon the ground of what may seem reasonable or not. Suppose 10,000l. is owing from a man, and he is taken under a ca. sa.; that satisfies all in law.] The question under sect. 36 is, Whether there can "be found sufficient whereon to levy such execution." The remedy is entirely under the statute of course, without the statute, the elegit would preclude any other execution. [Crompton J. Even according to Mr. Hill's argument, the statutable remedy is not entirely gone. The judgment still stands; and an elegit might therefore go against fresh lands.] (G. Hayes was then stopped by the Court.) Lord CAMPBELL C. J. I am of opinion that the prosecutor is entitled to the remedy which he seeks. There are two conditions to be fulfiled before a creditor proceeds against the individual shareholders: first, that execution" shall have issued against the property any (a) The reference is probably to Rastrick v. Derbyshire, Staffordshire, and Worcestershire Junction Railway Company, Exch. 149. DERBYSHIRE, 1854. V. of the Company; secondly, that "there cannot be found The QUEEN sufficient whereon to levy such execution." Now, the DERBYSHIRE, elegit having issued, can there be found sufficient &c. Railway. whereon to levy? The proceeds of the elegit clearly are not sufficient. Both conditions, therefore, are fulfilled; and the prosecutor is entitled under the express words of the statute. ERLE J. I also am of opinion that we ought to give judgment for the prosecutor. That clearly furthers the intention of the statute, which is, that the attempt should first be made to obtain satisfaction from the property of the company, and, that failing, satisfaction should be had from such shareholders as have not paid up for their shares. There is therefore to be a thorough examination whether the company has any funds to satisfy the judgment; and that has been done here. I am glad that no technical objection intervenes to prevent us from giving effect to the intention of the Legislature. Another elegit might issue; the prosecutor is therefore a "person entitled to any such execution." CROMPTON J. I think we ought to import no technicalities into the operation of the statute. The provision is new. The creditor is first to see what he can get from the Company; if he cannot get enough to satisfy his debt, a fresh remedy is given; but it is not a fresh exccution. I see no reason for applying the old technical rules to such a case. (No fourth Judge was present.) Judgment for the Crown. 1854. The Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor Wednesday, May 31st. of the Parish of St. ANNE, WESTMINSTER, against The LINNEAN SOCIETY of LONDON. ΟΝ N 24th March, 1853, a rate for the relief of the poor was made and allowed by a magistrate acting for the Liberty of Westminster for the above parish, in which the Linnean Society was assessed for the house No. 32, Soho Square, as below. The Linnean Society of London was incorporated by Royal charcultivation of ter for the the science of natural history in all its branches, and more especially of the natural history of and Ireland. 60. Robert Brown. The Linnean Society having objected to this rate, a 13 Great Britain own fellows, who entered case was submitted to this Court, under stat. 12 & Vict. c. 45. s. 11., which, in substance, was as follows. The Society claims exemption from rate, on the make the pay ground that it comes within stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36. into an engagement to ments, and were liable to ejection for non-payment. The fellows were entitled to receive copies of the published transactions. Held, that the Society was exempt from rate, in respect of premises occupied for their business, under stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36. s. 1., as being instituted for purposes of science exclusively, and supported by annual voluntary contributions; Crompton J. hesitating as to the question whether the payments were voluntary. The Society let off some rooms of the house in which they transacted their business to B., the occupier of the adjacent house, granting him also free use of the hall and staircase and passages of their house. Held, that this did not make the Society rateable for the rooms which they occupied for the purposes of the institution. The librarian and porter, whose attendance in the house was necessary for the purposes of the institution, occupied rooms in the part of the house retained by the Society, and, in consideration thereof, received less salary. Held, that the Society were occupiers of these rooms, for the purposes of the institution, and that no rate could be laid in respect of such rooms. 1854. Churchwardens of ST. ANNE V. LINNEAN The Society was incorporated by a Royal charter, dated 26th March 1802, for the purposes therein mentioned, and has been conducted in conformity with the provisions of that charter unless the facts stated in this case are inconsistent with such purposes. A printed copy of this charter, together with all its by-laws, accompanied the case, and was to be taken as part of it. The charter recited that several of the King's subjects "are desirous of forming a society for the cultivation of the science of natural history in all its branches, and more especially of the natural history of Great Britain and Ireland, and, having subscribed considerable sums of money for that purpose, have humbly besought Us to grant unto them, and such other persons as shall be approved and elected, as hereinafter is mentioned, Our Royal charter of incorporation for the purposes aforesaid." The charter then incorporated certain persons (named) by the name of The Linnean Society of London, with an indefinite number of fellows (the first fellows were named), with a council of fifteen of the fellows, and with officers designated in the charter. Power for appointing fresh officers and electing and removing fellows and members were given: "and that the council hereby appointed, and the council of the said Society for the time being, or any five or more of them, all the members thereof having been first duly summoned to attend the meetings thereof, shall and may have power, according to the best of their judgment and discretion, to make and establish such by-laws as they shall deem useful and necessary for the regulation of the said Society, and of the estate, goods, and business |