[No. 15.] COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Lemuel P. Padgett (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Gentlemen, there were several Members of the House that at different times have expressed to the chairman a desire to appear before the committee to present matters in which they were severally interested, and I have said to them that after the committee had completed the hearings of the officers of the department we would notify them so that they could be here, and I have appointed this morning for the purpose, and gave notice to them. There are several here. There are two that notified me that on account of other engagements they could not attend this morning. We have with us this morning Mr. Hardy, Mr. Vare, and Mr. Holland. Mr. Hardy, the committee will be pleased to hear such suggestions as you wish to make. STATEMENT OF HON. RUFUS HARDY, REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM TEXAS. Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, first I want to tender my apologies on the ground that I am not capable of giving any information to this committee that they do not already have, and with that brief apology I want to give the reasoning that influences me and submit some data that may be of interest. My whole idea is this, that whether a man goes armed as he goes about the streets or not, it is probably advisable to keep a good shotgun in his house as a protection against burglars, and therefore I have been rather impressed with the idea that submarines, if they are what I understand they are, namely, practically defensive weapons in warfare and not very expensive either, would be an excellent investment for some of the war expenditures of our Nation. I would like to submit along that line The CHAIRMAN. I will state that if there are any matters that you have that you do not care to take up the time to read you can insert them with your remarks and they will be printed with the hearings. Mr. HARDY. I wanted to call your attention to an article from The Navy of April, 1913, a brief statement which I have marked, which will include all that I care about that, giving the British naval program, in which I wish to call particular attention to one paragraph, the last: In addition to these it is proposed to build a certain number of small submarines for the purpose of coast defense. They will be of about the size of the A class, but will embody numerous improvements in offensive power. This is a part of the British naval program. I believe I have stated that the bill I introduced was a bill authorizing the building of a number of submarines for the Gulf coast. My understanding is that there have been submarines already authorized for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, but none for the Gulf. I want to call attention also very briefly to an article of July 15, 1912, from the New York Times. It reads this way-I will just leave this article and it may be incorporated in the printed proceedings. The article referred to is as follows: [New York Times, July 19, 1912.] CAN NOT ESCAPE SUBMARINES-ADMIRAL WARD SAYS THEY CAN DESTROY BATTLESHIPS AT WILL. [Special to the New York Times.] NEWPORT, R. I., July 18. The officers of the Atlantic Fleet are satisfied there is no protection from submarines under present conditions, because of the successful attacks made by the destroyers and submarines last Thursday and Friday nights in the vicinity of Block Island in the war games against the battleships. The first and second divisions, with the flags of Rear Admiral Aaron Ward on the Florida and of Rear Admiral Cameron McRae Winslow on the Louisiana, with two groups of destroyers and two of the submarines were "destroyed" at will. Admiral Ward said after the battle: "The submarines picked us up whenever they chose to, but we could do nothing with them. Yet the screening of our destroyers was well timed and perfect." "What will be the future plan of defense against submarines?" "Admiral Ward was asked. "We will have to run away from them," replied the commander. Mr. STEPHENS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt the gentleman? Mr. HARDY. Certainly. Mr. STEPHENS. In providing for submarines we do not appropriate for submarines for any particular location, do we? In other words, we do not appropriate for submarines for the Atlantic or for the Pacific or for the Gulf. The CHAIRMAN. We have not as yet, except in one bill there was a designation, I think, for submarines for the Gulf coast. Mr. STEPHENS. Has that bill been passed? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. HARDY. My understanding was that there were some bills designating them for the Pacific coast and some for the Atlantic coast, and we thought that the Gulf coast ought to be in a like situation. In that connection, my attention has been called to the fact that Admiral Farragut very successfully handled the situation on the Mississippi River and captured that whole section during the Civil War, and very easily; and the whole Gulf coast, without submarine protection, would be subject of easy attack. Possibly our friend over there at Santiago, the Spanish admiral-what was his name? The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Cevera. Mr. HARDY. Admiral Cevera might have performed the same feat. I call attention also to a copy from the Berliner Tageblatt of March 13, 1913. This is quite an article, discussing the relative merits of the submarines and torpedo-boat destroyers. Among other things, he says: In addition to these large submarines, small submarine boats are also to be built merely for purposes of coast defense. It is said that the new large submarine boat will be superior in size to the boats of classes E and F now in course of construction. Class F has a displacement of 1,200 tons, with a speed of from 18 to 20 knots and an artillery armament consisting of two 7.6 centimeter guns. The most recently built British torpedo-boat destroyers have a displacement of from 700 to 950 tons and an armament of two 10.2 and two 7.6 centimeter guns. The German destroyers built during the last budget year have a displacement of 700 tons. I think that article probably is worth incorporating in your hearings. The CHAIRMAN. Just put it in with your remarks. (The paper referred to is as follows:) [From the Berliner Tageblatt, Mar. 13, 1913. Translation. German.] THE SUBSTITUTION OF SUBMARINE BOATS FOR TORPEDO BOATS. When the Matin reported three years ago that the French minister of marine, Admiral Boue de Lapeyere, had stated in the French Parliament that his department intended to eliminate torpedo boats completely from the service and to confine itself in future to the construction of submarine boats, the report was given very little credit in our country. In its issue of April 9, 1910, the Berliner Tageblatt declared that it would only have reference to the elimination of the small type torpedo boats provided for coast defense, adding that although the latter could safely be intrusted to submarine boats, it would not as yet be possible to do without the torpedo-boat destroyer for service in the high seas, inasmuch as the art of submarineboat construction was at that time not sufficiently far advanced to allow of such elimination. This opinion was subsequently confirmed. The submarine boat was at that time incapable of navigating the high seas under all conditions, and it could not, therefore, be substituted by the destroyer, at least for the time being. However, conditions are different now, when the first reports in British publications devoted to naval matters, disclosing the new program of naval construction, state that the impending discontinuation of the building of torpedo-boat destroyers, by reason of their being no longer required in view of the progress made in submarine-boat construction, must be considered as one of its most important factors. It is said that torpedo-boat destroyers will disappear and that they will be replaced with submarine boats which will far outstrip in size the most recently built submarines of classes E and F. The new type is to be a boat equal in size to the present destroyers and capable of submersion. It will be available for day and night attacks. Although the details for this new type of construction have not as yet become known, there is nevertheless reason to expect that the surface navigation speed will approach that of the torpedoboat destroyers, that the artillery armament will be abundant, and that the radius of action will be larger than that of the torpedo-boat destroyers. It is said that the new large submarine boat will be superior in size to the boats of classes E and F, now in course of construction. Class F has a displacement of 1,200 tons, with a speed of from 18 to 20 knots and an artillery armament consisting of two 7.6 centimeter guns. The most recently built British torpedo-boat destroyers have a displacement of from 700 to 950 tons and an armament of two 10.2 and two 7.6 centi meter guns. The German destroyers built during the last budget year have a displacement of 700 tons. In addition to these large submarines, small submarine boats are also to be built merely for purposes of coast defense. Submarine vessels of the size and surface navigation speed of about 25 knots, now provided for in England, are certainly fit to enter into competition against the torpedo-boat destroyers available at the present time. The superior speed of the destroyers, which now, in fact, exceeds 30 knots, is counterbalanced by the capacity of submarine boats to disappear from view. It appears highly probable, therefore, that we shall in the very near future witness the disappearance of the torpedo boat, and that the submarine boat will become its sole successor in the same field of usefulness, The Navy, which has hitherto most energetically applied itself to the development of the most modern means of warfare, the submarine boat, regardless of financial sacrifices and loss of life, will be the one to derive the greatest advantages from the changed conditions which will result from the appearance of these new submarine fighting units, available for battle on the high seas. In the Reichstag we have heard representatives Dr. Paasche and Erzberger make some laudatory comments on our torpedo and submarine boats. The last-mentioned gentleman stated that we are not behind any other country in submarine boat construction. The honorable member has undoubtedly made a close study of the subject in reference to all the different navies. Did he obtain his information from an 32598 14 56 unquestionable source? Did he make his inquiries regarding the displacement of our boats and that of foreign navies and in reference to the consequent fighting qualities, such as speed, etc.? Mr. HARDY. I do not want to take up the time of the committee in reading extensively. In fact, gentlemen, I just wish to submit this matter to your good judgment with a few observations. While I am very much opposed to a great navy and all that, nevertheless I think fortifications are all well enough, and I believe that the submarine boats, which disappear from sight, are weapons that strike the enemy when he least expects it and against which an attacking fleet on our coast would be as helpless, and even more helpless, than it would be against harbor defenses, because the enemy might find out where those flanks are, and could not find out where a submarine boat was. Mr. BROWNING. Mr. Chairman, I understand the Secretary's recommendation to be for 16 torpedo-boat destroyers and only three submarines. Mr. HARDY. Along that line, it seems to me that you ought to reverse the proposition. Mr. BROWNING. I was only reading the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy to the committee of Congress. Mr. TALBOTT. He recommends 16 torpedo-boat destroyers. Mr. HARDY. From the Washington Evening Star of November 11, 1913, I find this article: [Washington Evening Star, Nov. 11, 1913.] The first step toward the development of the naval defense of the Panama Canal is about to be taken in the dispatch of the first division of the submarine flotilla from Guantanamo, Cuba, to Cristobal, Canal Zone. Part of the scheme of defense of the canal as planned by the Navy general board over a year ago was the use of submarines at each entrance to the canal. In the narrow channels of smooth water few battleships would dare run the gantlet of the five submarines which may be darting around below the surface in Panama Bay and in the approaches to Cristobal. Gentlemen, I do not want to detain the committee, but it seems to me that there is an arm of national defense that ought to be in proportion to its costliness the most useful of all our equipment. A submarine, as I understand it, one of the class suited for coast defense more particularly rather than offensive measures, can be built for from $250,000 to $300,000. Its maintenance, for equipment and everything, from the statistics that I have been shown, amounts to about $25,000 a year. I believe my bill proposes appropriating not to exceed $500,000, but I think $300,000, from all the statistics, is what they would cost. Five submarines such as I have spoken of would cost $1,500,000, and the maintenance of them per annum would be about $125,000. That is about a fifth of the cost of one battleship. Those five submarines would add to the defense enormously, and if they were placed as I have contemplated in the bill I have introduced, in the Gulf of Mexico, they would add to the strength inestimably of our Navy, and no navy could enter the Mississippi River if these five submarines were cruising, but hidden, under the waters, absolutely destructive when they reach the vessel, the vessel not knowing when it would reach it. Considering the inexpensiveness of them it seems to me, if we want to defend ourselves and do not want to exploit our vast military power, that such a weapon as the submarine is the weapon that we ought to be amply supplied with, |