Secretary DANIELS. In the past the enlistment has been from 5,000 to 10,000 short and there has been need of men. Whenever you need more men you will naturally persuade them to come in more than when you do not need them. I hope it will be so that we will not have to persuade men to enlist. I regard the educational policy, which we are putting into operation, as an inducement to young men who wish education and travel to come into the Navy. I do not think that any man should come into the Navy and not find everything that he is promised.

If we advertise that if a man comes into the Navy he can get an education, he is going to get it; if we advertise that the man can learn a trade, we are going to see that he can learn it. It has been true always that a very bright young man, very ambitious, who came into the Navy, could always learn to be a machinist or electrician but he had to have in himself the stimulus and ambition and earnestness. The avearge man was not given it unless he pressed for it. Under the present plan every man who goes into the Navy must go to school for two years, he must go to school every day, and then he must elect which trade he will take up, whether he will go into gunnery or electricity or any of the 20-odd trades on a ship.

Of course, when he elects which one to take that does not necessarily mean that his selection settles it, because the authorities on the ship examine him and if he wants to take electricity and has no talent, of course he is not allowed to do so, because it would destroy the efficiency; but he must learn some trade. My theory about it is that in a little while, as soon as you have turned out the product under the new system, you will find that hundreds of young fellows, whose parents are not able to send them to college or to technical schools, will go into the Navy for instruction. Then, when their enlistment expires, they will go back home with a fair education and a trade, so that they will be useful citizens and can go into the civil occupations qualified to make a good living, if they decide not to reenlist.

Mr. ROBERTS. Has not that been one of the difficulties in the past— to get men to reenlist a second time, because we have given them so many advantages in their first enlistment, taught them a trade which will bring them greater remuneration outside than in at the end of their enlistment?

Secretary DANIELS. I would not call that a trouble. I would call it a blessing.

Mr. ROBERTS. It is a blessing in one sense, but it has been a trouble in keeping the enlistment to its full strength.

Secretary Daniels. It is my recollection that 57 per cent of the men reenlist.

Mr. ROBERTS. How long a period, on the average?

Secretary DANIELS. Three years. They reenlist, and our theory is that this educational policy, when it has fully developed, will offer promotions for these young men. They will see a better chance to get to the top, which will keep them in. We have provided an examination for the men who want to become petty officers.

Mr. TALBOTT. Is navigation one of the subjects?

Secretary DANIELS. Yes; they all have to take navigation and everything that makes a good all-around man. Admiral Vreeland was a seaman apprentice. I would like to recommend that a certain

number of young men who enlist in the Navy, upon examination, be appointed to Annapolis every year.

The CHAIRMAN. I was discussing that question with Admiral Blue a few days ago, and I asked him if he had discussed it with you. Secretary DANIELS. We have discussed it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please place in the hearings a statement of the reasons for that and the number that you would suggest at first?

Secretary DANIELS. Yes.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Secretary, do you know how many more midshipmen we could accommodate at Annapolis ?

Secretary DANIELS. The law you passed last Congress increased the number.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not increase the number, but just continued the existing law for six years. There was an increase the year before that for the reason that the membership in Congress increased from 391 to 435.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The point I wanted to get at is different altogether from that. There is a limit to the number of men you can educate at Annapolis, and I want to know if you have looked into that, and how many additional we could accommodate there?

Secretary DANIELS. I think, probably, 200 more; but I will put the exact number in the hearings.

The maximum capacity of the Naval Academy is 865 with comfort, or 945 with crowding.

The number of midshipmen now at the Naval Academy is 820. Mr. ROBERTS. Is it your idea that these apprentices should be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy?

Secretary DANIELS. My idea is that we should appoint at least 25 a year, if they could stand the examinations. We would have a board to examine them, and the 25 who stood the best examinations, physically and mentally, should be appointed; not that they should be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. HOBSON. You do not think that 25 would be all you would recommend?

Secretary DANIELS. My idea is that you would not probably find more than 25 the first year who would stand the examinations. My idea is, say, 25 the first year and 50 the second year, and leave the ultimate number for future consideration.

Mr. ROBERTS. Would they have to stand the same examinations that the senatorial, congressional and presidential appointees have to stand?

Secretary DANIELS. I should say so.

Mr. BRITTEN. You probably would not get 25.

Mr. ROBERTS. The average high-school graduate can not pass the examination?

Secretary DANIELS. Yes; he can.

Mr. ROBERTS. In certain sections of the country the high school course does not include world's history, so that a high-school graduate in that part of the country is not at all familiar with world's history.

The CHAIRMAN. They have eliminated that from the examinations. Mr. HOBSON. My conception of it is that this would become popular and effective if you have the entrance into the Academy and the commissioned corps of the Navy outside of any political consideration?

Secretary DANIELS. That is what I want it to be.

Mr. TALBOTT. Why not have the law say that you can appoint not to exceed a certain number?

Secretary DANIELS. That would be all right.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Secretary, do you know how many men have been leaving the service after graduating at Annapolis?

Secretary DANIELS. I have not the figures. I am glad you asked the question, and I will put the number in the hearings. I have accepted but one resignation. I do not think that a man who has been educated at Annapolis and has been trained for this service at a large expense ought to go out and accept employment in private life at a higher salary.

The following table shows the number of resignations which have taken place since 1902 from among Naval Academy graduates. Of this total two have been by request "for the good of the service."

The large number of resignations during the last few years has been attributed in part to the poor prospect of promotion ahead of the younger officers.

The column headed "Midshipmen" refers only to those who have been graduated from the Academy and were making their two years' cruise. This grade was abolished early in 1912 and no longer exists.

Mr. ROBERTS. Is not that the same argument in regard to the enlisted personnel, that we do not want men in the service who are not satisfied?

Secretary DANIELS. It does not cost us anything like as much to get an enlisted man.

Mr. ROBERTS. It costs something to educate and outfit him? Secretary DANIELS. Except the first five months when he is at the training station it does not cost us anything. When you send a man to Annapolis it costs you, I do not know what the figures are, about $18,000.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been estimated from $16,000 to twenty-odd thousand dollars.

Secretary DANIELS. Of course, I would not say that you could make a hard-and-fast rule that they should never go out, but they should have to show that there was a compelling reason. As a rule, the man who goes out and wants to come back, ought not to come back.

Mr. Chairman, in the matter of aeronautics, we have not done a great deal in the Navy. A few months ago I appointed a board to

look into the matter and make a comprehensive report, which they have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you desire to insert that in the hearings? Secretary DANIELS. Yes; I should like to insert the report in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

There was a recommendation which you made, I believe, in your report about the old ship Constellation. I would like to ask what you have to say and to give us any reasons for that recommendation.

REPORT OF A BOARD ON NAVAL AERONAUTICS CONVENED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 2309-89, OCTOBER 9, 1913.

A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR AN ADEQUATE AERONAUTIC SERVICE FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

OCTOBER 9, 1913. To: Capt. Washington I. Chambers, United States Navy, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. (chief of bureau).

Subject: Senior member of board on naval aeronautic service.

1. The following board is hereby appointed to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., for the purpose of drawing up a comprehensive plan for the organization of a naval aeronautic service:

Capt. Washington I. Chambers, senior member.
Commander Carlo B. Brittain, member.
Commander Samuel S. Robison, member.
Lieut. Manley H. Simons, member.

Naval Constructor Holden C. Richardson, member.
Lieut. John H. Towers, member and recorder.

First Lieut. Alfred A. Cunningham, M. C., member.

2. The board will be subject to the call of the senior member and will carefully consider, without delay, the subject of providing an adequate aeronautic service for the use of the United States Navy, to include dirigible balloons and aeroplanes, with the necessary stations, mobile equipment and appliances, and also the necessary personnel and schools of instruction, together with an estimate of the requisite appropriations under each bureau.

3. The members and recorder have been directed to report to you for this duty. 4. This is in addition to your present duties.

5. The Bureau of Navigation will furnish such clerical assistance as may be neces sary to record the proceedings and prepare the report.

F. D. ROOSEVELT, Acting.

REPORT OF A BOARD ON NAVAL AERONAUTICS.

After considering the subject of providing an adequate aeronautic service for the use of the United States Navy, including dirigible balloons and aeroplanes, the necessary stations, mobile equipment and appliances, the personnel, the schools of instruction, and the requisite appropriations for the fiscal year, the board submits the following comprehensive plan for the organization of a naval aeronautic service, the establishment of which it recommends at the earliest possible date.

THE GUIDING POLICY.

1. The policy in aeronautics which is being manifested by all powers that consider adequate sea power necessary for national protection may be briefly summarized as follows:

Superiority must be maintained in all matters of aerial equipment and must not be confined to aeroplanes alone. Adequate sea power can not be maintained by force of arms unless adequate superiority is maintained over the whole sphere of aerial development.

2. Other nations have started earlier, but England is determined to take the lead. The genius of France and the perseverance of Germany have produced results which at present we can not equal, but which many other powers are striving to reach. All

are striving to attain that perfection in aerial warfare which will be an indisputable element in naval strength and security.

3. The adequacy of our naval aeronautic service, therefore, should be measured by its capacity for service to the fleet and will depend, primarily, upon the characteristics of the fleet and our naval policy. These indicate that our sphere of operations is away from our coast, that our expeditionary forces must be prepared to operate at a distance, and it is safe to assume that our aeronautic service will be adequate if based upon efficient service for and with the fleet when operating at a distance from home bases. Economy and the best interests of the service demand, therefore, that our comprehensive plan be confined to those measures that will best serve the fleet and that our efforts be not wasted upon the maintenance of superfluous establishments.

SUPERFLUOUS ESTABLISHMENTS.

4. Certain foreign powers, separated by a distance less than the radius of airship operations, have planned air services, apparently, upon the same theory of coast defense that led many astray in their shipbuilding policies before Mahan discovered the meaning of "sea power.' In a war between two such powers, say A and B, in which A preponderates in air power and B preponderates in sea power, the former, to assume the offensive, must first destroy the preponderating units and damage the resources of B. To prevent this, B prepares to checkmate, not by seeking A's aircraft, his aircraft shelters, and other resources on which they depend, at their known localities, their starting points, but by awaiting the arrival of A's aircraft at coastal stations or scattered "centers," which A would surely avoid during the night.

5. Such a policy we should avoid as involving superfluous expenditure, and we conclude, therefore, that a concentration of efforts is desirable in the matter of aeronautic centers or stations, the main usefulness of which, after all, is limited to instruction and experimentation.

6. If A can damage B's fleet and its resources by the air route, it should be possible for B to damage A in the same way. Sooner or later those principles of the art of war that are everlasting will induce B to watch A with air craft in the struggle for air power, regardless of the relative status with respect to sea power. It is inevitable that the air service of B will become developed for operating offensively and at a distance with expeditionary forces, and this plan will be adopted, copied, or possibly anticipated by all other great powers.

7. This discussion has seemed necessary to show why the board, in its recommendations as to stations, equipment, and schools, has confined its attention principally to one suitable aeronautic center as the best plan to prepare an aeronautic personnel, equipment, and appliances in the most effective manner to serve with the fleet in its offensive operations and for the fleet in protecting it from hostile air craft.

8. However, nothing should be neglected that will be required to insure the production, maintenance, and progressive improvement of all that pertains to the efficient aeronautical equipment of the fleet, and although concentration of effort upon one aeronautic center simplifies our home organization, there are a few other estab→ lishments, to be mentioned later, which will be required to maintain the complete efficiency of the whole aeronautic organization.

THE MAIN ELEMENTS.

9. The main elements of an adequate mobile equipment are, (1) aeroplanes, (2) dirigibles, (3) kites, and (4) captive balloons. The details of all the impedimenta required for their effective use with the fleet require such complete technical consideration that the labors of this board would have been unnecessarily prolonged should it have studied them fully, and the completion of the details has been left to those who are to be held responsible for carrying out the plan as a whole.

AEROPLANES.

10. There are two methods of making use of these. (1) From the fleet units, the fighting ships, and scouts. (2) From auxiliaries, either special or existing. The board recommends that measures be adopted to employ both methods.

11. At least one aeroplane, with a spare motor, a few spare parts, and a box of special tools should be available eventually on each fighting unit, to obtain the necessary experience, training, and familiarity with their requirements under service conditions. Furthermore, a scout, battleship, or any groups of ships will need their services on detached duty during which the auxiliaries would not be available, and it is doubtful if the auxiliaries alone could handle the number that will be required eventually.

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