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their priz <t»ken from her citizens, were admitted and protected in the ports of the United States. It was insisted by France, that the 25th article of the British treaty was a direct infraction of ours with bet, and that the proviso, whatever its intent, had no practics effect in her favor. The coalition against France had agreed to enforce the extraordinary principle, that articles or ordinary susten uce might become contraband of war. To this coali tion, formed by the treaties of Pavi and Pilnitz, in 1791, Great Britain was, though not an ostensible, a real party. It was after wards extended to embrare other powers, and the stipulations were to prohibit the -- xportation of provisions to France, shut their ports against her; employ all means in their power to injure her com merce, and to unite all their efforts to prevent neutral powers from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, to the commerce or property of the French, on the sea, or in the ports

of France.

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Britain, by an order in council, or “additional instructions" to the
officers of her navy, revived this rule against our trade, with the
French colonies..
It would seem that the admission of a neutral into French co
lonies, on favorable terms, was an act of which her enemy had no
right to complain. To interrupt it was an aggression, perhaps,
which, in ordinary cases, the neutral ought to resist or counteract.
France, therefore, might very justly complain, that to submit to
it was a concession to her enemy at her expense. If a neutral na
tion submits to an nolawful interruption by one belligerent of
its commerce with the other, this other may have good reason, to
complain, provided such neutral possesses the means of resis

tance.

Other claims were pressed upon us by France for injuries of which she complained; such as our prohibiting the sale of her prizes in our ports; detentions by embargo; our refusal to permit her to fit out and commission privateers; denying these privateers an asylum in our ports, and restoring their prizes to her enemy; permitting Brtisih ships of war, generally, to enter our ports after having made prize of French vessels, and to repair and refit; refusing to reclaim French prizes taken in, or brought into our waters by British ships, granting facilities to Great Britain is the reduction of the French colonies in the West Indies; permit. ting the seizur, and detention of French national vessels; submitting to the impressment of our seamen to strengthen the maritime power of her enemy; aiding the insurgents of St. Domingo, and many others, not necessary to be nained.

Pursuant to this combination, not only against France, but against all neutral commerce, Great Britain, early in 1793, captured our vessels bound to French ports. In retaliation, the French republic, by the decree of 9th May, 1793, authorized the capture of neutral merchant vessels, bound to British ports. In each case a limited and very inadequate compensation was to be awarded for cargo, freight and detention. The decree of the 23d May excepted our vess les from that of the 9th; that of the 28th of May included us; that of the 1st July exempted us, and that of the 27th July comprised us within its provisions. The reason or ra ther excus, for this, given by the French minister to Mr. Morris, in his letter of the 14th October, 1793, is, "the extreme rigour with These complaints were for supposed infractions of the treaty of which the English and other bellig rents treat all neutrals des tined for France. To which he adds, "the difficulty of distincommerce-many of them were undoubtedly groundless, some in guishing our ali strom our enemies has often been the cause of their character, equivocal, and others, perhaps, valid and just. offences committed on board your vessels, all that the adminis If any of the seizures and detention of the property of our cititration could do is to ord r indemnification to those who have Zens, can be justified by France, on the ground that the right re suffered, and to punish the guilty." Pressed by this formidable suited to her in consequence of concessions made to her enemys coalition, and distracted by the events and atrocities of the revolution to remunerat our citizens for these losses. They, it would still this would not discharge our government from their obliga tion, France was constantly vibrating between a retaliation upon seem, ought to be protected in a commerce carried on conforma her enemies on the one hand, and a wish to conciliate us on the bly to the laws of nations and existing treaties, as expounded by This extraordinary attempt to reduce by famine, such a nation as France, as wild and extravagant, as it was unjust to neu- United States were in the wrong, yet we can see much reason the government of the United States If in this exposition the trals, was justly condemned as a direct contravention of the laws why citizens who adventure under the faith of their own govern of neutrality. But. by the 18th article of our treaty with Great Britain of ment. should be compensated for losses thus sustained. If an in1794, it was in eff et conceded, that provisions and other articles terpatio al tribunal should determine, that, in some points of the bound to the ports of her enemies might become contraband, that controversy, France was right, and that the seizures under her authe vessel might be carried into a British port, and the cargo disthority, of the property of our citizens was conformable to the posed of, paying the valu, and an ordinary mercantile profit. It laws of nations and existing treaties, still the American sufferer might well demand of bis government, compensation for injuries is easily perceived that this humitisting concession was little rearisig from its own error. lished in the United States, and much less in France. Be this as it may, it is most certain that wrested or plundered from them by authority of the French gofrom 1792 to 800. property of our citizens to a large amount, was venment, without color of right, and even without the formality of a judication. For these palpable injuries, the United States were most unquestionably bound to demand indemnity in behalf of the sufferers. Franc arising under the treaty of alliance. Your committee will now proceed to examine the claims of

other

The se

cond article of the treaty of commerce of 1778 having provided that concessions to others should became common to the parties. it was unreasonable to expect that Frane would insist on a right corresponding with that conceded to Great Britain To allow that our legitimate commerce might be diverted from its destination, and our cargoes be carried to and sold in a glutted market. was indeed a concession, and would seem to demand a correspond. ing concession to France. Unfortunately for us, this concession to Great Britain became a great annoyance to our commerce. Th combination against the trade of neutrals with France, and the facility with which Great Britain, by the superiority of her navy, could intercept that commerce, had rendered the prices of all ar ticles of sustenance exceedingly high in France, and low in Eng. land. The rule of compensation, with the former, was the port of destination; with the latter, the port of entry; and both nations paid us, if they paid at all, the price in the cheapest market. If France could not sustain th position that this concession to Gr at Britain was the extension of a corresponding right to her, still it is not clear that the concession itself was not an injury to hr. Her complaints on this point, whether groundless or not, perplex ed and annoyed us, and it was exceedingly desirable to be relieved rom them.

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By the 11th article of that treaty, "the two parties guarantee mutually, for the present and forever, against all other powers, to wit: the United States to his most Christian majesty, the present possessions of the crown of France in America, as well as those it may acquire by the future treaty of peace; and his most hristian majesty guarantees to the United States their liberty, 90 vereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions, and the possessions and additions or conquests that their conf deration say obtain during the war, from any of the dumimons now or her tolor possessed by Gr at Britain in North America, conformable to the 5th and 6th articles above written. The whole as their possession shall be fixed and assured to the said states at the moment of the cessation of the present war with England."-The fifth and sixth articles alluded to, provided that if the U. States should make conquest of the British possessions in North Ameri ca or Bermuda, these should belong to them, and that France should renounce all claim to them; and it was further provided in the 12th article, that the reciprocal guaranty should have ef fect the moment the war should commence between France and England, or if no such war, then at the moment hostilities should arise between Great Britain and the United States." At the time of the ratification of this treaty, the possessions of the crown of France in America were, we believe, Cayenne on the continent, and the islands St Domingo, Martinico, Gaudaloupe, St. Lucia St. Vincent, Tobago, Descada, Marie Galante, St Pierre, and Mi qualʊn.

By the 23d article of the tresty of commerce of 1778, it was stipu lated that free ships should give freedom to goods and persons, contraband of war, and soldiers in the service of an enemy excepted. By the treaty of 1794 with Great Britain, it was conceded that the property and persons of ber enemies might be taken from our ships. The result was, that while the property and subjects of Great Britain were on board of our vess is, protected fro French cruisers, those of France were denied such protection from British cruisers, and subjected to capture. It was contend ed that by this provision in the British treaty, that of 1778 became modified, and that the right resulted to France to seize and cap. ture British property and subjects on board of our vessels, since we had conceded to the latter the right to take those of the former. | Such a claim your committee will not attempt either to resist or Io the war of our revolution, France lost several of these issupport. It was one which our own government might have re-lands, which were restored to her by the peace of 1783. This gua sisted by arguments very satisfactory to themselves, but very un-ranty was "for the present and forever;” and should any other pow satisfactory to France. It was a subject of controversy,

In our freaty with Great Britain we had extended the articles of contraband far beyond all reasonable limits, and many articles, particularly materials for ship building, were included in the list, which were expressly exempted in our treaty with France. Whether this was a concession, entitling France to corresponding rights or privileges, or a just ground of complaint, is not now necessary to be determined; it was complained of as an injury, it was a claim from which it was desirable to be relieved.

Another injury of which France complained, and perhaps justly, was our submission to the British, rule of 1756, profubiting all commerce of a neutral with her enemie's colonies not permitted in time of peace. By the decrees of the national convention of the 19th February, and 26th March. 1793, the ports of France and her colonies were opened to neutrals on the same terms as to her own citizens. On the 6th of November, of the same year, Great

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er the reafter attempt the conquest of the possessions of ither party, thus guarantied, the party attacked, might demand suecors of the other, and, in case of failure and loss, an indemnity. It has not, we believe, been ever pretended, that France, on her part, had failed to fulfil this guaranty. By the first article of the treaty of peace of 1783, his Britaunie majesty acknowledged the United States, (the identical party to the treaty of 1778), to be free, suve reign and indepewlent, and relinquished all claim to them for ever; and by bonndaries perfectly satisfactory to the U. States.

To the time of the convention of the 30th of September, 1800, our limits had not been disturbed and our liberty, independence, and sovereignty"continued “absolute and onimited "

With France it was very different. She has been despoiled of many of her possessions in America; had lost the fine island of Martinico, with others of inferior note; and was in danger of los-" ing the rest.

In 1791, when the ecalition was formed against France by the treaties of Pavia and Pilmitz, she had been nearly four years distracted by a revolution, sanguinary in its character beyond example. It was known that England was a party to that coalition. War, in fact, existed with England before France, in 1793, declared against her. Her ambassador had been sent home, and this, by the treaty of 1786, between the parties, was to be considered as a communement of hostihties.

pean wars, our guaranty of her American possessions was highly important to her; and, consequently, she, in 1793, gave instructions to her minister here, that, in any new treaty with us, he should make this guaranty an indispensable condition.

Whatever might have been our obligations to France, under the provisions of the treaty of alliance, it was not to have been expect ed that she would have been convinced that we were exonerated, while we entertained such difference of opinion on the subject our seives. And it is recollected that two of our most distinguished statesmen took opposite sides of the question, and engaged in the contest at great length, and with much learning and ability. If the government of the United States could have proved, to our satis faction, that this elaim for indemnity was utterly groundless, stifl it was necessary to go further and satisfy France. This claim, just or otherwise, was a subject of controversy, which we severely jelt; with which we were exceedingly perplexed, and from which we were extremely solicitous to be relieved. Your committee are well aware that it is believed by some, that, in consequence of the collisions of 1798 and 1799, our treaties with France were aunuiled, and all obligations under them had ceased. France had, under various pretexts, taken and sequestered, or condemned, property of our citizens to a large amount. At that time our controversy with her was approaching a crisis; and such were our complaints, that congress, by the act of 28th May, 1798, authorized the president to cause to be seized, and brought in for adjudication, the armed vessels of the French republic, which should have commitour coasts for that purpose, and to retake any vessel captured; and by an act of the 7th of July, of the same year, our treaties and the consular convention with her were abrogated. A partial war ensued: there were several engagements on the ocean; and some of her national vessels were captured. Still we were not in such ac tual open war as would absolve us from treaty stipulations. It would be difficult to convince France that we could annul the treaties by an ex parte act of legislation; and as to the contest, it was never understood here that this was such a war as would annul a treaty. By the acts of congress of 13th June, 1798. and 15th February, 1799, suspending our commercial intercourse with the French republic, the president was authorized to discontinue the prohibitions and restore the intercourse, on satisfactory evidence that the French aggressions had ceased. And surely if this had been an actual, open, flagrant war, such as would abrogate all treaties, congress could not, by law, have authorized the president to make peace, but with the advice and consent of the senate, twothirds concurring. In the president's instructions to bis envoys to France, (Messrs. Ellinsworth, Davie, and Murray,) dated 22d Octo ber, 1799, he says:

This conduct of the French republic would well have justified an immediate declaration of war on the part of the United States; but desirous of maintaining peace, and still willing to leave open the door of reconciliation with France, the United States contented themselves with preparations for defence, and measures calculated to protect their commerce." The convention of 1800, was, mores over, not a treaty of peace, either in form or substance. The treaties of 1778 were the basis of the negotiation. The question between the negotiators was, not so much whether war had annul led these treaties, as whether they should be annulled by negotiation. They were expressly recognized in the second article of the convention, and that article being afterwards expunged by mu tual consent, these treaties became null and void by convention, and not by war."

In this state of things, France, struggling with internal and external enemies, powerful and vindictive, her American possessions unprotected and exposed to the superior naval power of Great Britain, the president of the United States, in 1793, issued his proclamation of neutrality, avowing and defining the policy to be pursued by the governm ut, and prescribing the rule of strict and rigid impartiality towards the belligerents. There can be no doubt that, at this time, the casus foederis had pccurred, if France had demanded a fulfilment of the guaranty. War between France and England actually existed; the French American possessions were threatened; early in April, the British forces garrisoned Martinico; and during the next year, most of the French possessions in the West Indies were captured by the British land and naval forces. Froin the commencement of this war in Europe, our government was exceedingly apprehensive that France would require us to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of alliance. On the 21st of December, 1792, Mr. Morris, our minister in France, in bis letter to the scretary of state, expresses his apprehension that "theted depredations on our citizens, or should be found hovering on question respecting the guaranty of American possessions may be agitated, especially if France should attempt to defend her is lands," and, disclaiming the discussion of the question of our obligation, expresses his "wish that all our treaties, (however onerous), may be strictly fulfilled, according to their true intent and meaning." The subject of the guaranty was one from which our go vernment felt much anxiety to be relieved. To the time of the convention of 1800, France had uniformly insisted that we were obligated to fulfil the guaranty. While in the United States pub lic opion had been much divided, and some of our most distinguish ed statesmen had taken opposite sides of the question. It was iusisted that this was only a defensive alliance, and that in this war France was the aggressor Whether this ground was tenatie in point of fact or principle admits of much doubt. France, then distracted by internal commotions, was also contending against Europe in arms. The objects of the coalition were well understood, and it was well known that England was a party to that coalition from the first. France was to be coerced to restore her legitimate monarch, and by means too, which violated all the laws of neutrality. If ever a nation is engaged in a defensive war, it is in resisting enemies whose professed object is to regulate its internal government. It is quite certain that one of the parties to the guaranty has not the exclusive right to determine whether the other is the aggressor in a war in which it may be engaged. France, perhaps, had a right to determine, for herself, when her, honor and safety required that she should resort to arms, and had we been at war and demanded of her the fulfilment of this mutual guaranty, we should have scarcely been satisfied with the auswer, this is a defensive alliance, and you are the aggressors." And it is at least, a subject of controversy, whether, by this treaty of alliance, the casus foederis did only occur when one of the parties is engaged in a defensive war The United States guaranteed to France, for the present time and forever, not only her present possessions in America, but those which she inight acquire by the future treaty of peace. France, by the terms of the treaty engaged voluntarily in the war with Great Britain, and as against her this war was clearly offensive, and with the expectation, too, of an acquisition of territory "by the future treaty of peace." The proclamation of neutrality, by the president, of February 179 o evidence that it was his opinion that the carus foederis had not occurred. The question was presented to his secretaries or "cabinet," and they were equally divided; Messrs. Jefferson and Randolph taking the affirmative, and Messrs. Hamilton and Knox the negative of the question, Whatever may have been the opinion of the president himself, it does not appear that he ever expressed it. The federal government had then been in operation less than four years; its success had satisfied the expectations of its friends; the revolution ary debt had been funded, and provision made for its extinguish ment; we were fast recovering from the losses and sufferings of the revolution, and from the state of almost anarchy, which succeeded it. But one northwestern posts were still held by the British, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of peace: we were at war The American ministers who negotiated the convention of 1800 with the Indians, our citizens were poor, and public credit were, moreover, specially instructed to claim and insist on indemhad scarcely revived. The war of the French revolution was extra- nities for illegal captures and detentions; and, in their first project ordinary and sanguinary; and when, and what, was to be its term they in the second article proposed provision for mutual indemn iustion, no one could predict. Considering then our own weak-fication for individual citizens, but were cautiously silent on the ness and necessities, and the superiority of the British, as a naval subject of the guaranty. The French negotiators insisted on the power, it was difficult and hazardous for us, if we should attempt advantages resulting from the priority of treaties. At length they it, to preserve to France her possessions in America. The presi-proposed the simple alternative, either the ancient treaties, with dent determined, very wisely, that before any demand should be the advantages resulting from their priority, and the stipulation made on us by France, he would prescribe and enjoin a strictly im- of reciprocal indemnities, or a new treaty, assuring equality with partial neutrality, towards the parties at war, trusting to events, out indemuity. Our ministers proposed: "1. A renewal and conand preferring, perhaps, future indemnity to France for the loss firmation of former treaties. 2. The payment, in seven years, of she might sustain of her possessions in America, rather than to be three millions of francs, to reduce the right, as to privateers and involved in a war of such a character, threatening wide desolation, their prizes, to those of the most favored nation. 3. In lieu of and putting at hazard the prosperity, if not the independence, of the mutual guaranty in the treaty of alliance, that, when either the U. ited States. Even admitting that the time had not come, party should be attacked, the other should furnish and deliver when France could claim the benefit of this guaranty, we were property to the amount of one milion of franes: either party to be still entangled with this alliance; for the obligation was for the pre-exouerated from this stipulation on paying within seven years the sent and forever. Until the alliance should be dissolved, by mutu gross sum of five millions. 4. To place commerce on a footing of al consent, or open war, we were liable to be involved in every war the most favored nation. 5. A reciprocal stipulation for inden in which the French possessions in America might be in danger.nity. And although the guaranty was mutual, yet, considering the rela tive condition of France and the United States, her obligation to us was merely nominal; it was worth nothing. But, inasmuch as it was necessary for France to exert her whyte strength in hex Euro

France never admitted that these treaties were never annulled by war. In the negotiation which resulted in the convention of 30th September, 1800, the French ministers insisted, that “the treaties which united France and the United States are not broken-even war could not have broken them;" and that "the mis understanding which existed was not a state of war, at least on the side of France."

The president, in his instructions to Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, of the 15th of July, 1797, the same as those given af terwards to Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, in 1799, observes that "specific succors have the advantage of certainty, and are less liable to occasion war," and proposes that, "instead of troops and ships of war, it will be convenient to stipulate," in a future war, "for a moderate sum of money, or quantity of provisions, at the option of France," not to exceed the annual sum of two hundred thousand dollars; but cautions dis ministers not to stir the question of guaranty, if France is silent on the subject.

Finally, the last branch of the French alternative was substantially agreed to. For the second article of the convention provides, or rather declares, that, "the ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties, not being able to agree at present respecting the

treaty of alliance of the 6th February, 1778, and the treaty of commerce of the same date, and the convention of the 14th No vember, seventeen hundred and eighty eight, por upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further at a convenient time; and, until they may have agreed on these points the said treaties and convention shall have no operation." This convention was ratified by the United States, expunging this arncle, and limiting its duration to eight years, France agreed to the limitation, and to the "retrenchment of the article, adding, however, a proviso, "that, by this retrenchment, the two states renounce the respectiv pretensions which are the object of the said article." This convention had been negotiated under the administration of Mr. John Adams; and Mr. Jefferson, who had sue creded him, supposing, probably, that this proviso made such an alteration in the convention as to r quire the further advice and consent of the senate, submitted it to their consideration; and, on th: 19th December, 1801, they resolved, (two-thirds of the members present concurring therein), that they considered the said Convention as fully ratified and that it be returned to the presi❘ deat for the usual promulgation. It was accordingly promul gated in the ususi form.

Although it has been doubted by some, whether this convention was constitutionally ratified, yet, as it was made with the advice and cons nt of the senate, two-thirds concurring therein; as it was observed during eight years as the supreme law of the land and, if null and void, would leave open the claims for reciprocal indem pity and mutual guaranty, your committee can see neither the reason nor policy of raising a doubt of its validity.

the value of the consideration paid by France for the release of the claims. the same difficulty was presented in the case of Spain. The claimants were obliged to submit to our estimate, and receive the amount which we determined the cession to be worth. Had w, in the case of Spain, obtained the cession of territory, and made no provision to pay our citizens for claims released, this would have been a case against the petitioners; as it is, it is certainly a case in their favor. In each case, the consideration for the release was worth something, and upon that something we ought, in one case, as we did in the other, to fix a fair and reasonable value, and remunerate the claimants to that amount. A board of commissioners, such as was proposed by our ministers, might have burdened us with a debt equal to the losses of the French possessions, with the addition of indemnities for infractions of the treaty of commerce, and the sums thus awarded might have equalled, and even exceeded, the actual losses of all the claimants. They now ask us to determine the amount ourselves, to provide for the examination, liquidation, and payment of their claims, and they will then be satished that they have been treated as others. The United States have faithfully fulfilled their engagements with foreign nations and the individual states; they have satisfied, their citizens for Spanish spoliations. In the convention of 1803, for the purchase of Louisiana, they reserved twenty millions of franes out of the consideration to satisfy our citizens for “debts” due to them by the French government prior to 30th September 1800, and expressly stipulated in their favor in the fifth article of the convention of that date between the United States and France. They have, moreover, discharged a debt of gratitude to the indigent At any rate, it is certain by its provisions the petitioners have officers and soldiers of the revolution; and the case of the peti lost all prospect of indemnity from France. And now the questioners sems to stand nearly alone, unadjusted, unsatisfied. Your tion presented by the petitioners recurs: are the United States committee, in fine, can see nothing in their case which takes it bound to remunerate them to any amount? That a nation is not from the ordinary rule of justice, which requires that an agent shall obliged to press the claims of its citizens upon a foreign power at account for what he receives for his principal, or from that avowthe risk and expense of a war is readily admitted It is obligateded and practiced on by the government in other cases. And they only to a fair exertion of its ability. As an agent of the claimant, cannot perceive how we can withhold from these claimauts their it should not press his claims so far as to subject others to qual just due, consistently with the clause in the constitution which or greater injuries. The Un-ted States, therefore, in pressing these provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use claims as far as they safely could, and seeing no prospect of suc without just compensation." cess, might have been justified in waving or postponing them, or The late conventaking a less sum than their actual amount. tion with Great Britain taking a gross for slaves and property taken from our citizens, duting the late war, is an example. We obtamed all we could for the claimants, reserving nothing to oursel cs. But, clearly, the petitioners present no such axe. Had the deficiency, in the case cited, breu reserved for the benefit of the United States, or any part converted to their use, the claimi ants might have presented a case analogous to that of the petitioners. In this, dr the consideration of the committee, France and the United States had reciprocal claims for infractions of the law of nations and existing treaties. Whether those of France were valid up no, they were matters of controversy, which it was our interest to settle and adjust. Had the convention, as was pro posed by our ministers, provised for reciprocal indemnitis, and had commissioners bien appointed to liquidate th clains and de termine their validity, it is impossible to say what tight have been the result. Certain it is, that in such case the United States would never have laid their hands on the adjust d claims of their own citizens, to discharg those which might be allowed to France or her citizens. Suelt an offset would be taking private property for public uses without just compensation, an is expressly pro hit itd by the constitution. And how would such a cas- vary from that of the petitioners? It is now too late for the United Stats to question the justice and va idity of these claims, as against France. We have pressed them upon her as valid and just; she has amitted them, and given us an equivalent to release them. We have released them, and though they were uni quidated still they are capable of liqu dation, and either their amount, or the value which we obtain d for their thachang, wou'd be equitably due to the chamanis. Were the question between mdividuals, the case would be ci ar. If one takes the claim of another, whether a mat

ter of controversy or a liquidau d debt, he is bound to respond for the full value. And if an agent, though held responsible only for a fair exertion of his ability, converts the property or rights of his principal to his own benefit, he should surely account to him at least to the value of the ben fit received. If we consider the C. S. in the character of agents for the claimants, accountable for a fairy rtion of th ir ability, we should remunerate them for what

we did obtain.

Were tins a new principle, and we were now about to establish it as a rule, although we should do it with much caution and deliberation, y t we cannot pure ive what better rule conll be adopt ed. But it seems to your commitee that it is already established and one by which the United States have always professed to be governed, and by which, as we believe, they have guerally acted. In our compacts with several states, whenever we have taken for our own use, property reserved by the compact to them, we have readily admitted our liability to respond. In that with the Shit of Georgia, we had, among other things, supuiated to extin garsh the Inden titt within her inits. In attempting to fui, this stipulation, we, in a treaty with the Indians, eeded to certain, divatuals, a portion of the same lanus as a part of the considera tion for the extinguishment of title thus toking, for our own use.

Your committee have endeavored to ascertain the probable amount of these claims thus released; and to that end they wrote to the secretary of state for information, and have received the answer marked A. and the document marked B; by which it appears that the number of claims for losses, by seizures and deteasions, from 1793 to 1800 both inclusive, is 444, and for contracts for supplies, &c. 12; that those on which there has been an estimate, are 88; and the estimated amount is dolis.2,235,762 59 which is of about one-fifth of the number, and probably much mors than that proportion of the whole amount. There are, Drobably, many others which have not been returned to the department; and many of those which have been so returned may not be sustained for want of the n cessary proof, or for other rea sons-and the estimated amount of many is, doubtless, greatly exaggeraten.

From the best consideration your committee have been able to bestow on the subject, they are of opinion that the claims of our citizens against France for indemnity, which were released by the convention of the 30th September. 1800, whip examined and tiquidated would not exceed 8,000,000 dollars.

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Much of the evidence in support of these claims is wanting, and supposed to be deposited with our minister, or the agent for claims at Paris. Your committee are of opinion that measures should be adopted to procure the evidence which is there, or else where, that the claim should be examined and liquidated, and, thereupon, provision ought to be made for the payment of a rea sonable sum for their final discharge They, therefore, recommend the following resolution:

Resolved. That the president of the United States he requested to procure the evidence and ducting its relating to the claims of our citizens against France, previously to the convention of the 3 th September, 1800, and to caus an aistract of the claims, and of the evidence and documents, to be laid before the senate at the commencement of the first session of the next congress.

ITEMS.

A sloop of war, called the Natchez, was launched at Norfolk on the 8th inst She is of the burthen of 800 tons, to carry 24 guns, and a first rate vessel of her class

The condition of the poor, in Ireland, is deplorable. "As you walk the streets you are assailed by wretched creatures whose faces indicate want and misery of every kind: The country parts of Ireland, which hitherto have been free from the elects of hunger, owing to the charity of the peasantry, frequently present instances of death occurring from actual starvation."

The National Intelligencer says-We understand that major John W. Hunter has been appointed, by the war department, agent for the settlement of the

part of the lands which we had stipulated to purchase to the use of G. orgin, to pay for another part which we dis purchase Geurgis comp ained, and claund an apropriation to extinguish the tibe to these "reservations." Her claim was too just to be reclaims of the militia of Georgia, for services renfused, and we readily grated the appropri tion. Many of our dered during the years 1772, 1778, and 1774. This citizens had suffed iuris from Spai siautor to those of which appointment, we understand, was made at the rethe petitio crs complain. Spain was unable to pay an adequate commendation of the whole Georgia delegation in indemnity, but y a cession of territory. fory for our bensiin: exonerated Spain from the cisims of our enti2ns, and paid them what we deemed a fair equivalent for the ces

We received the terri

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Should it be objected what it cannot be certamed what was PAINTED AT THE FRANKLIN PRESS, WATER STREET.

THIRD SERIES. No. 4-VOL VII.]

BALTIMORE, MARCH 24, 1827. `[Vol. XXXII. WHOLE No. 810

THE PAST-THE PRESENT-FOR THE FUTURE.

Edited and published by H. NILES & SON, at $5 per annUM, PAYABLE IN ADVANCE.

We present our friends this week with a whole various and important respects, should inspire us with sheet supplement, which has enabled us to dispose of many deep and solemn considerations as to the future; and stock and other articles, though the balance on hand re-indignantly forbid a yielding to temporary or politicalTM mains exceedingly large and equally interesting.

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party purposes, whatever may impede the march of The editors of the "National Intelligencer" have pub- prosperity, or cause abandonments of immutable prinlished several other numbers on the "signs of the times, ciples of right. It is the gift of PROVIDENCE, that which are read by every body, friend or opponent, and these United States should be free, independent and with uncommon avidity. It appearing that we could not, happy-and it depends upon ourselves whether we without setting aside our usual course of conduct, get in will retain or cast away the blessings bestowed. The the whole that they would probably have to say, and policy of this republic, whether it regards agricul insert the replications that might be offered, (for our practure, manufactures or commerce, interior or exte tice is to give both sides,) we determined, at least, to post-rior, must not be subjected to the caprices of tran pone the republication of their essays for the present; having also ourselves much to say concerning what we believe are great national interests.

We now offer to the consideration of our readers a very long, and, as we think it, an important essay, because of the facts collected and stated, on the principal branches of the agriculture of the United States, chiefly with a view to reconcile, so far as we can, the opinions of our fellow citizens as to certain points of much national concern, and do away the idea of conflicting interests, which politicians have too much encouraged, and seem now resolved to press with their utmost force. We have prepared this article with labor and exceeding care, and with an earnest desire to arrive at and speak the truth. Some mistakes as to principles, or errors of opinion, may exist in it, but nothing is distorted or knowingly misrepresented in the least possible degree. We therefore ask a candid and deliberate examination of this essay, long as it is, in a certain belief that the subjects discussed are worthy of it, though; they may be only indifferently or weakly handled by us; and if any will so far favor us as to detect and point out what is believed to be error, we will gladly correct aught we have said, if unable to sustain it by argument and a recurrence to first principles. In making up this article, we have not had much recourse to the writings or opinions of others, except for some of the figures used.

sient parties, or made a matter for political bargain-
ing-as has been partially the case heretofore, and,
as it appears probable, may be attempted again.

These general remarks naturally occurred when
we sat down to make some observations on the past,
present and probable state of our agriculturalists-
in which we hope to adduce some facts and opinions
that will lead many to a serious consideration as to
that policy which ought to be steadily pursued. We
have no manner of reference to local circumstances
or peculiar things, except as they shall appear to af-
fect the well-being of the community at large-and, let
factions and parties draw their political or geographical
lines as they may, we never yet have believed that
there is any material diversity of interest among the
widely scattered people of the United States; and
that, in matters of business, the same amicable com-
promises do, or may, exist, which have been estab
lished in our political constitution, under which we
have had "peace, liberty and safety," however much
we have been agitated by political feelings-and the
jarrings between ins and outs, with the intrigues of
those who, in the language of De Witt Clinton, have
seemed as if they would "rather reign in h-l than
serve in heaven."

Vegetable and animal food (except rice) are the main agricultural products, for export, from the states Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Is land, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois-and partly so of Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee and Missouri. We shall take the three first and the three last years inserted in the valuable table given in the 28th vol. of this work, page 329, to see what progress we have made as to the export of ve

THE AGRICULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES. After considerable reflection on the subject and careful The chief products of our agriculture are vegetareferences to some of the important statistical facts ble and animal food and wool, tobacco and cotton, that bear upon it, we have reached the conclusion-with considerable quantities of flax and hemp, sugar, that, at no previous time, during the period of our &c. but we shall principally confine our remarks to national existence, has the state of our agriculture articles of the first class. more imperiously demanded the serious reflection and care of a wise and paternal government, than at the present moment. Though there is, perhaps, less of actual suffering in the United States than in any other country under heaven, a great degree of pecuniary distress and private embarrassment prevails; and the prospect before us" is, unless the profound attention of our statesmen shall be excited and exerted to relieve the people, that we cannot advance to those high destinies to which our republic seems cal. led, so certainly and rapidly as we ought. We to-getable and animal food: tally disavow any desire to build up a forced or artifi cial system, for the benefit of any class of individuals, even for the agricultural, and though they make up about three-fourths of our whole population- but hold it expedient and proper, at all times, and in behalf even of an individual citizen, to profit by all the advantages which God and nature have given, to premote "the general welfare," by securing the happiness and prosperity of all, and each, through wholesome employment and reasonable compensation for labor. Foreign commerce, as to many of our late most valuable commodities, fails to produce its former effects, and men have been compelled to turn their attention to new articles; and the mighty changes which have taken place in the condition of our country, in VOL. XXXII—~—No. 4.

Flour, bbls.

Flour, bbls.

1823

877,865

1823

756,702

1824

996,702

2,581,269

1791

619,681

1792

824,464

1793

1,074,639

2,519,784

Beef. Pork.

1791

62,771

27,781

1792

74,638

38,099

1793

75,106

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212,515 104,442
104,442

$316,657

Beef. Pork.

1822 97,610 68,352

1823 61,418 55,529

225,102 191,110
191,110

416,212

1

Shewing an increase in thirty five years, during which the population of the producing states has been almost trebled, of only 62,485 bbls. of flour and 99,255 barrels of beef and pork in three years, or a yearly increased export of 21,000 bbls of flour and 33,000 barrels of beef and pork. And, in the years 1791, 1792 and 1793 we exported 373,352 tierces of rice, and only 301,693 in the years 1822, 1823 and 1824.

demand, for the protection of which later, or either of them, we always stand as prepared even to contend in battle? It would be well for every person to enquire, in the secret of his own heart, why these things are-why it is that we despise, or neglect, that which we have within ourselves, while we support ministers abroad and maintain fleets of men-ofwar in the most distant seas, to defend by argument and arms, interests that yield so small a comparative profit, when we have reference to the amount received for flour or tobacco exported? We complain not of this defence-we wish it continued and extended as the case shall require; but we cannot see why property and products at home should not have the same fostering care as property and products abroad! If a tariff, which shall protect the growers and manufacturers of wool, and the scores of milFlour-dollars. Beef & Pork-dollars.lions of dollars vested by them,* may operate as a tax

It is the quantity that establishes the capacity to produce, or the amount of the foreign demand; but if the money-value of these articles is regarded, it is probable that those exported in the three first years was, nearly, twice as large as that of those exported in the three last. Such value was not given in the official papers until the year 1803, and, referring again to the table, we have the following items:

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Together $23,442,000

4,135.000 4,300,000 4,141,000 12,576,000

Beef & Pork-dollars. 2,529,000 2,461,000

2,628,000

7,618,000

So we see that the money-value of the chief agricultural products exported from the many states named, was fourteen millions of dollars and considerably exceeding one half more in 1803, 1804 and 1805, than in 1822, 1823 and 1824. The value of the rice exported bears fully the same proportion in favor of the earliest years. There are no specialities in these selections-for the earliest and the latest years given in the table are offered, and almost any one of the early years compared with another of the later, will shew the same general fact.

-With these results before us, it is perfectly plain, or, indeed, self-evident, that the numerous people of the grain-growing and grazing states enumerated above, and containing about three-fourths of all the people of the United States, could not possibly depend upon the foreign demand for their surplus productions: hence it was indispensable to their exist ence, perhaps at least, to their reasonable comfort, (which no human laws can rightfully deprive them of), that they should turn their attention to other matters-and they have vested, probably, about 300 millions of dollars in manufacturing establishments, in the breeding of sheep, and in commerce and navigation, and the fisheries, to employ their surpius population, and give bread to the hungry. The present annual value of the products of sheep, because of their wool and skins only, is about twice or thrice as large as that of all the flour or tobacco at present exported, however much the latter articles engage the nationai legislation and public care, because we have been accustomed to look at things abroad and disregard those at home. We do not speak wildly. There are about fifteen millions of sheep-and their increase. wool and skins may be estimated at fifteen millions of dollars, which is considerably more than the average value of all our flour and tobacco annually exported for the last three years. Ought not this matter, this "wool-gathering" idea, as in derision it may be called, in respect to the home trade and home supply, to sink deep in our minds, when we compare it with the two GREAT STAPLES of our foreign trade and foreign

on other parts of the community (which, however, we do not admit that it would) shall not these say also, and with certainty, that they are taxed to keep up fleets in the Mediterranean, West Indian, South Atlantic and Great South seas, to protect articles exported of much less annual value than those which they produce and posse-s within our own landand ask why, peculiar privileges or advantages have been granted, or are continued?

Further-much fear is expressed of a loss of the British West India trade, and a shutting of the ports of Cuba would throw us into great alarm, because of a restricted demand for our four-and yet the New England states receive from New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, a much greater quantity of flour than we export to all the West India Islands. Those states import, from their sister states, more than 625,000 barrels a year, besides large quantities of corn-the whole foreign export of flour was only 813,000 barrels in 1825, and 858,000 in 1826. New England is enabled to receive and consume this great quantity because of her manufactures-more than 281,000 barrels were received at the single port of Boston, of which 72,000 were exported, leaving 209.000 for consumption, chiefly from Maryland and Virginia, in the last year; and the latter, of itself is almost equal to the whole export of the U. States to the British West Indies and Cuba-which, in 1825, was no more than 223,000 barrels. How small then, is the foreign demand compared with the home market, for the growers of grain? And if we allow to the people of the United States a quantity of bread stuffs equal onty to "a pick of corn per week," for each individual, the whole consumption will be about 150 millions of bushels a year, equal to 30 millions of barrels of flour, allowing five bushels of grain as equal to one barrel of flour), while the export is less than one million of barrels. Why, the horses and hogs in the U. States annually consume more than five times as much grain as would be equivalent to the quantity of flour exported! The foreign demand, however, even for so small a proportion of our bread-stufls produced, is exceedingly important, because of its effect to establish a seilmg-value for all the rest. But we have not time to descant upon the operations of scarcity and supply; and besides, their principle bas often been shewn in this work. The surplus, or want, of a small quantity, every body knows, has effect on the value of a whole quantity in market, to diminish or increase its price. And if we compare

The property vested in the wool-growing business has been thus estimated: For land, sheep,

$20,000,000 20,000,000

40,000,000

which is much under the real amount; and the annu̟-al product is $15,000,000 a year, as stated in the text.

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