trate, and must be founded on evidence presented to such justice or magistrate. On its face it must state the nature of the charge and give the name or a description of the person or persons to be arrested. The evidence on which it issues in some jurisdictions may be oral, while in others it must be in the form of an affidavit. The cause of arrest must be stated in apt words, yet the details of the crime need not be set forth-it is sufficient if details are set out in the complaint on file. The cause for arrest may be stated somewhat as follows: "Whereas by complaint under oath, made before me by John Jones, it appears that Peter Smith did on the sixth day of June, 1909, in the County of Cook and State of Illinois, commit the crime of assault and battery; therefore you are commanded to forthwith arrest the said Peter Smith," etc.

The obnoxious practice of issuing general warrants, to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing them, has long been discountenanced in England, and is expressly forbidden in most American states by constitutional or statutory provisions.

§ 10. Same: Description of person to be arrested. The warrant, being issued on evidence presented to the magistrate, and passed upon by him, can only operate against the individual or individuals against whom in his opinion sufficient cause for arrest has thereby been shown, leaving no discretion to the officer executing the warrant as to the person or persons to be arrested; consequently the warrant should describe the accused with such a degree of accuracy, that from the description alone, the officer may know whom to arrest.

Generally the accused is described by his known name; but if his name be not known to the magistrate, some other description should be given by which he can be identified. The supreme court of Maine held the following description to be insufficient: "A person whose name is unknown but whose person is well known of the vassalboro, in the county of Kennebec," the court saying: "The omission of the name, as a means of identification, is justified only on grounds of necessity; and when this is not known the warrant must indicate on whom it is to be served in some other way, by a specification of his personal appearance, his occupation, his precise place of residence or of labor, his recent history, or some facts which give a special designation that the constitution requires" (10).

A United States commissioner issued a warrant directing the arrest of James West, really intending it for Vandy West, who was arrested by it. Suit was brought for false imprisonment. The Supreme Court of the United States held that as he had never been known by the name of James West, he could maintain his action (11). In New Hampshire a writ directing the arrest of George Melvil was served upon George Melvin. Melvin brought suit for false imprisonment and obtained a verdict. In sustaining the verdict the court said: "It is well settled that he who causes another to be arrested by a

(10) Harwood v. Siphers, 70 Me. 464. (11) West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78.

wrong name, is a trespasser, even if the process was intended to be against the person actually arrested” (12).

§ 11. John Doe warrants. There has long been a prevailing notion, unfounded in law and condemned by courts, that where the accused's name is unknown he may be described as "John Doe" or "Richard Roe." A warrant which directs the officer to arrest John Doe, is only valid against a person whose name is John Doe; nor is it any better if it directs the officer to arrest "John Doe, to be pointed out;" for the magistrate has no power to direct any other person to be pointed out as John Doe. If the officer is not acquainted with John Doe, he may seek information as to his identity; but that is the identity of John Doe, and not of an unknown person. In a New York case, the warrant directed the officer to "take the body of John Doe, the person carrying off the cannon," meaning Levi Mead, who at the time of his arrest upon the same warrant, was leading a horse attached to the cannon wagon. Mead brought suit for false imprisonment, and it was held that he was entitled to damages (13). In the same state a warrant was issued for "John Doe and Richard Roe," and was served upon Samuel W. Lovell, one of the persons for whom it was intended, who was tried and convicted. It was held that he could maintain an action for false imprisonment (14). In Massachusetts a complaint was filed charging that

"John Doe or Richard Roe whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown" had committed assault and battery; upon which a warrant to the same effect issued, and an effort was made to arrest Morris Crotty, for whom the warrant was actually intended. Crotty and his friends made a vigorous resistance, for which they were indicted for riot; but the supreme court held that the resistance was lawful in that the warrant should have given the best possible description of the person to be arrested (15).

§ 12. Treatment of prisoners subsequent to arrest. Unless there is an express practice to the contrary, the law requires that a prisoner, arrested with or without a warrant, must be taken before a court or magistrate, with the least practicable delay. The court or magistrate may then immediately proceed to hear the matter, or may postpone it to a future time, and admit the prisoner to bail, if the charge be a bailable one. Notwithstanding the well settled condition of the law in this regard, public apathy has permitted a vicious practice to grow up in our large cities, by which prisoners are taken to police stations and there confined a considerable time before they are permitted to appear before a court or magistrate. The officer generally attempts to justify this illegal detention, on the ground that each prisoner must be "booked" at the station, and that the prosecution should have time to prepare the case against him. There is no

(15) Com. v. Crotty, 10 Allen 403.

necessity to "book" a prisoner at the station, when there is no necessity for temporary confinement; nor have the police officers authority to delay proceedings, while the case is being prepared, for that is a matter exclusively within the control of the court or magistrate (16).

(16) Wright v. Court, 6 Dowl, & Ry, 623,