perience, and sufficiently clear and self-evident, he is welcome to his opinion; but in the mean while let him remember that I am in pursuit, as I said at first, not of beauty but of utility and truth: and let him withal call to mind the ancient parable of the two gates of sleep : Sunt geminæ Somni portæ, quarum altera fertur Great no doubt is the magnificence of the ivory gate, but the true dreams pass through the gate of horn. To these observations concerning moral philosophy may be added, That there seems to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as I said that the good of the body consisted of health, beauty, strength and pleasure; so the good of the mind considered according to the precepts of moral knowledge tends to this; to make the mind sound and without perturbation; beautiful and graced with decency; and strong and agile for all the duties of life; lastly, not stupid, but retaining a lively sense of pleasure and comfort in an honest way. These three as in the body so in the mind seldom all meet together. For it is easy to observe that many have strength of wit and courage, who are yet disordered by perturbations and have little beauty and decency in their manners; some again have an elegance and fineness of carriage, who have neither honesty of will nor strength for action; and some again have honest and reformed minds who can neither become themselves nor manage business while others, though perhaps endowed with all these three, yet from a Stoical severity and insensibility have no pleasure in the virtuous actions which they practise. But though it happen that of these four two or three of them sometimes meet, yet the meeting of them all is, as I have said, very rare. I have now handled that general part of human philosophy which contemplates man as he consists of body and spirit, but segregate and apart from society. 33 Virg. Æn. vi. 894 :-- Two gates the entrance of Sleep's house adorn : Book VIII. CHAPTER I. The Division of Civil Knowledge into the Doctrine concerning Conversation, Negotiation, and Empire or State Government. THERE is an old story, most excellent king, that many philosophers being met together in the presence of the ambassador of a foreign prince, each endeavouring to give a sample of his wisdom, that the ambassador might be able to make a report of the wonderful wisdom of Greece; one of them remained silent and propounded nothing; insomuch that the ambassador turning to him, said, "What have you to say for me to report?" To whom he answered, "Tell your king that you have found a man in Greece, who knew how to hold his tongue i". And in truth, in this synopsis of the arts I have forgotten to mention the art of silence, which (since it is commonly deficient) I will now teach by my own example. For since the course of the argument has now brought me down to that point, that I should presently handle the art of government; and since I am writing to so great a king who is such a master in that art, wherein he has been trained from his cradle; and since I cannot altogether forget what position I have held under your majesty; I thought that I should better approve myself by silence on such a matter before your majesty, than by speech. Cicero indeed makes mention not only of an art, but of a kind of eloquence in silence; for in one of his letters to Atticus, after relating a conversation between himself and another person on both sides of a subject, he writes, "Here I borrowed part of your eloquence, for I held my tongue 2". Pindar again (whose peculiar gift it was to surprise men's minds with some striking expression, as with a magic rod), utters some such saying as this, "Silence sometimes says more than speech 3". Wherefore in this part I have determined to be silent, or to be very brief, which is next thing to silence; but before I come to the arts of government, I must first make some observations touching the other parts of civil knowledge. Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject, which of all others is most immersed in matter, and with most difficulty reduced to axioms. Nevertheless there are some circumstances to relieve this difficulty; for first, as Cato the Censor used to say of the Romans, "that they were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could but get some few of them to go right, the rest would follow 4"; so in that respect the duty of moral philosophy is more difficult than that of policy. Secondly, moral philosophy propounds to itself to imbue and endow the mind with internal goodness; but civil knowledge requires only an external goodness, for that suffices for society. And therefore it often comes to pass that there be evil times in good governments; as in the sacred history we find it said more than once in speaking of good and pious kings, "Howbeit the people had not yet directed their heart aright to the Lord God of their Fathers 5"; wherefore in this respect also the office of moral philosophy is more difficult. Thirdly, states as great engines are moved slowly and not without great efforts, whence they are not so soon put out of frame; for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so in states the good government of previous years prevents the errors of succeeding times from causing immediate ruin; but the resolutions and morality of partiSee Plut. de Garrulitate, and Diog. Laert. vii. 24. The person in question was his nephew, Q. Cicero. 4 Plut. in Cato, c. 8. 5 2 Chron. xx. 33. 1 This story is told of Zeno. cular persons are more suddenly subverted. And this makes moral knowledge more difficult, but civil knowledge more easy. Civil knowledge has three parts, according to the three summary actions of Society; the knowledge of conversation, the knowledge of negotiation, and the knowledge of empire or government. For there are three kinds of good which men seek in society, comfort against solitude, assistance in business, and protection against injuries; and they are three wisdoms of divers natures, which are often separate ; wisdom of behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state. The wisdom of conversation ought certainly not to be overmuch affected, but much less despised; for a wise management thereof has not only a grace and honour in itself, but an important influence in business and government. For as action in an orator, though an external quality, is held of such account as even to be preferred to those other parts which appear more important and internal; so in a man of business conversation and the management thereof, though employed on external objects, finds, if not the highest, yet at all events an eminent place. For look what an effect is produced by the countenance and the carriage of it. Well says the poet, Nec vultu destrue verba tuo 6. For a man may destroy and betray the force of his words by his countenance; nay, and the effect of his deeds also, if we believe Cicero; who in recommending to his brother affability towards the provincials, said that it did not so much consist in affording them easy access, as in receiving them with a courteous and open countenance. "It is nothing to have your door open, if your countenance be shut 7". So we see Atticus before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war still depending, carefully and seriously advised Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture 8. And if the government of the face and countenance alone be of such effect; much more is that of the speech and other carriage appertaining to conversation. Indeed all grace and dignity of behaviour may be summed up in the even balancing of our own dignity and that of others, as has been well expressed by Livy, (though not meant for this purpose) in that description which he gives of personal character. "Lest I should appear (says he) either arrogant or servile, whereof the one were to forget the liberty of others, the other to forget my own 9". On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much it may pass into a deformed and spurious affectation. "And then, what is more uncomely than to bring the manners of the stage into the business of life?" And even if it proceed not to that faulty extreme, yet too much time is consumed in these frivolous matters, and the mind is employed more than is right in the care of them. And therefore as in the universities preceptors use to advise young students from too much company-keeping, by saying, "Friends are the thieves of time"; so certainly the constant attention of the mind to the discretion of the behaviour is a great thief of more serious meditation. Again such as are accomplished in urbanity, and seem as formed by nature for that alone, generally find satisfaction enough therein, and seldom aspire to higher and more solid virtue; whereas those who are conscious of a defect in this point seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, there almost everything is becoming; but where that is not, it must be supplied by manners and behaviour. Again 6 Ovid, De Art. Am. ii. 312:— Let not your looks your words betray. 7 No such remark occurs in the letter ofadvice which Marcus Cicero wrote to his brother Quintus, when the latter was about to take possession of his province. But in Quintus's tract De Petitione Consulatsû in which he gives his brother advice as to his conduct in canvassing for the consulship, we find the antithesis quoted in the text, though somewhat differently worded. But of course the passage in which it occurs has no reference to any class of "provinciales." 8 See Cicero, Ep. ad Att. ix. 12; and compare the eighteenth letter of the same book, in which the interview with Cæsar is described. 9 Livy, xxiii. 12. there is no greater nor more common impediment of action than an overcurious observance of external decency, and the attendant of decency, which is an anxious watching of Time and Season. For as Solomon well observes, "He that regards the winds does not sow, and he that regards the clouds does not reap 10"; a man must make his opportunity as oft as find it. To conclude, this behaviour is as the garment of the mind, and ought to have the conditions of a garment. For first, it ought to be made in fashion; secondly it should not be too curious or costly; thirdly, it ought to be so framed as to best set forth any virtue of the mind, and supply and hide any deformity; lastly, and above all, it ought not be too strait, so as to confine the mind and interfere with its freedom in business and action. But this part of civil knowledge touching conversation has been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient. CHAPTER II. The Division of the Doctrine concerning Negotiation into the Doctrine concerning Scattered Occasions and the Doctrine concerning Advancement in Life.-Example of the Doctrine concerning Scattered Occasions from some of the Proverbs of Solomon.-Precepts concerning Advancement in Life. THE Doctrine concerning Negotiation is divided into the Doctrine concerning Scattered Occasions, and the Doctrine concerning Advancement in Life; whereof the one comprises all variety of business, and is as it were the secretary for the whole department of life; the other merely selects and suggests such things as relate to the improvement of a man's own fortune, and may serve each man for a private notebook or register of his own affairs. But before I descend to the species, I will make some preparatory remarks touching the doctrine concerning negotiation in general. The science of negotiation has not hitherto been handled in proportion to the importance of the subject, to the great derogation of learning and the professors thereof. For from this root springs chiefly that evil, with which the learned have been branded; " That there is no great concurrence between learning and practical wisdom". For if it be rightly observed, of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, the wisdom of behaviour is by learned men for the most part despised, as a thing servile, and moreover an enemy to meditation. For wisdom of government, it is true that as often as learned men are called to the helm, they acquit themselves well, but that happens to few. But for the wisdom of business (of which I am now speaking), wherein man's life is most conversant, there are no books at all written of it, except some few civil advertisements collected in one or two little volumes, which have no proportion to the magnitude of the subject. For if books were written of this as of the other, I doubt not but learned men with but little experience would far excel men of long experience without learning, and outshoot them (as they say) in their own bow. Neither is there any reason to fear that the matter of this knowledge should be so variable that it falls not under precept; for it is much less infinite than that science of government, which notwithstanding we see is excellently laboured and reduced. Of this kind of wisdom it seems some of the ancient Romans in the best times were professors: for Cicero reports that a little before his age senators who had most name and opinion for wisdom and practice in affairs (as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others) used to walk at certain hours in the Forum, where they might give audience to their fellow-citizens, who would consult with them not merely on subjects of law but on all sorts of business; as on the marriage of a daughter, the education of a son, the purchase of a farm, a contract, accusation, defence, and every other occasion incident to man's life 1. Whence it appears that there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight and experience of the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon particular causes, but is gathered by general observation of causes of like nature. For so we see in that book which Cicero wrote to his brother, " on Canvassing for the Consulship" 2 (being the only book of particular business that I know written by the ancients), although it especially concerned an action then 2 De Petit. Consulatus. 10 Eccles. xi. 4. 1 Cicero, De Orat. iii. 33. on foot, yet it contained many political axioms which prescribe not only a temporary but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But of this kind there is nothing any way comparable to those Aphorisms composed by Solomon the King, of whom the Scriptures testify, "that his heart was as the sands of the sea 3"; for as the sands of the sea encompass all the coasts of the earth, so did his wisdom embrace all things human as well as divine. But in these Aphorisms, besides those of a theological character, there are not a few excellent civil precepts and cautions, springing from the inmost recesses of wisdom and extending to much variety of occasions. Wherefore seeing I set down this knowledge of scattered occasions (which is the first part of the knowledge touching negotiation) among the deficients, I will stay awhile upon it according to my custom, and offer to consideration an example of the same, taken from the Aphorisms or Proverbs of Solomon. Nor in my opinion can I be with reason blamed for seeking a politic meaning in one of the Sacred writers; for if those commentaries were extant which this same Solomon wrote touching the nature of things, (wherein he treated of every vegetable, from the moss upon the wall to the cedar of Lebanon, and likewise of all animals) 4, it would surely be lawful to interpret them in a natural sense; and therefore we may here use the same liberty in matters political. An Example of a portion of the doctrine concerning scattered occasions, taken from some of the Proverbs of Solomon. PROVERB. (1.) A soft answer turneth away wrath 5. Explanation. If the anger of a prince or a superior be kindled against you, and it is your turn to speak, Solomon gives two directions; first, "that an answer be made," and secondly," that it be soft"; the former contains three precepts. First, to beware of a sullen and obstinate silence, which either takes the fault entirely on yourself, as if you had no answer to make; or secretly impugns your superior of injustice, insinuating that his ears are not open to a defence, though a just one. Secondly, to beware of postponing the matter and demanding another time for defence; which either conveys the same impression as the preceding one, that your superior is carried away by too great an excitement of temper; or plainly intimates that having no answer ready you are meditating a false and artificial defence. Wherefore it will ever be the best course to bring forward something in excuse directly as the occasion arises. Thirdly, that an answer at all events be made; not a simple confession or submission, but with a mixture of defence and excuse; for a different course is unsafe, except with very generous and noble characters, which are extremely rare. It follows in the other precept, that the answer be soft, not harsh or rough. PROVERB. (2.) A wise servant shall have rule over a foolish son, and shall have part of the inheritance among the brethren 6. Explanation. In all disordered and discordant families there is ever some servant or humble friend of great influence, who acts as arbiter and settles their disputes, and to whom on that account both the whole family and the master himself are subject. Such a man, if he is pursuing his own interests, foments and aggravates the family feuds; but if he is truly faithful and upright he deserves a great reward; even to be counted as one of the brothers, or at least to have the direction of the inheritance in trust. PROVERB. (3.) If a wise man contend with a fool, whether he rage or laugh, he shall find no rest 7. 31 Kings, iv. 29. 4 Kings, iv. 33. 6 Prov. xvii. 2. 5 Prov. XV. I. 7 Prov. xxix. 9. |