establish and advance it: for the end of Logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of Morality is to procure the affections to obey 209 reason, and not to invade it; the end of Rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it for these abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo, for caution. And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out of a just hatred of the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of Rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon 210, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech; knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection; so seeing that she cannot be shewed to the Sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to shew her to the Imagination in lively representation: for to shew her to Reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man. Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections, Video meliora, proboque; [whereby they who not only see the better course, but approve it also, nevertheless follow the worse], reason would become captive and servile, if Eloquence of Persuasions did not practise and win the Imagination from the Affection's part, and contract a confederacy between the Reason and Imagination against the Affections. For the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth; the difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time; and therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. We conclude therefore, that Rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worse part, than Logic with Sophistry, or Morality with Vice 211. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that Logic differeth from Rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that Logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and Rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place Rhetoric as between Logic on the one side and moral or civil knowledge on the 209 In the translation he says ut rationi militent; to fight on the side of reason. 210 In the translation he says, more correctly, "it was noted by Thucydides as a censure passed upon Cleon" (tale quidpiam solitum fuisse objici Cleoni); for the observation is made by Diodotus in his answer to Cleon's speech, iii. 42. 211 The last clause is omitted in the translation. I do not know why. For according to Bacon's doctrine, expounded originally in the Meditationes Sacræ upon the text non accipit stultus verba prudentiæ nisi ea dixeris quæ versantur in corde ejus, and repeated here a little further on,-namely, that a man can neither protect his own virtue against evil arts, nor reclaim others from vice, without the help of the knowledge of evil,Morality has a relation to Vice exactly corresponding with that of Logic to Sophistry; unless it be maintained that the Logician ought to be prepared to practise Sophistry as well as to detect and defeat it. other, as participating of both for the proofs and demonstrations of Logic are toward all men indifferent and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of Rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors : Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion De prudentia privati. [to be in the woods an Orpheus, among the dolphins an Arion]: which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want, whilst by the observing their wellgraced forms of speech they leese the volubility of application: and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry 212; not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy. Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which (as I said) are but Colores boni attendances 213: and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence et mali, of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the simplicis et popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparacomparati. tive, which are as the Sophisms of Rhetoric (as I touched before). For example: SOPHISMA. Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum. REDARGUTIO. Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces. Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor: sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur214. The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three one, that there be but a few of many; another, that their Elenches are not annexed 215: and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same; for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, your enemies will be glad of this: Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ : than by hearing it said only, This is evil for you. Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before touching Provision or Preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention; which appeareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call Antitheta, and the latter Formulæ. Antitheta are Theses argued pro et contra; wherein men may be more large 212 Being a thing which the more it is considered the more it will be valued (rem certe quam quo attentius quis recogitet, eo pluris faciet). 213 and which are all of the nature of collections for store (pertinent omnia ad promptuariam). 214 SOPHISM. That which people praise is good, that which they blame is bad. ELENCHE. He praises his wares who wants to get them off his hands. It is naught, it is naught, sayth the buyer; but when he is gone he will vaunt. 215 In the translation, instead of the single example given above, he inserts a collection of twelve, by way of specimen; each having the elenche annexed and completely explained. This collection is a translation, with corrections and additions, of the English tract entitled "Colours of Good and Evil," which was printed along with the Essays in 1597. B.W. K Antitheta and laborious: but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences; not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference. PRO VERBIS LEGIS. Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a literâ. PRO SENTENTIA LEGIS. Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula 216. 217 Formulæ are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect. A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE. So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future. 218 There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one Critical, the other Pedantical.219 For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing 220 of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books. Whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great pre. judice. For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not is false set down: as the Priest that where he found it written of St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam [he was let down in a basket], mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam [he was let out by the gate]; because sporta was an hard word, and out of his reading 221; and surely their errors, though 216 FOR THE WORDS of the Law.-Interpretation which departs from the letter, is not interpretation but divination. When the letter is departed from the Judge becomes the Lawgiver. FOR THE INTENTION OF THE LAW.-The sense according to which each word is to be interpreted must be collected from all the words together. Of these antitheta a large collection will be found in the De Augmentis, set forth by way of specimen in the manner here recommended. 217 Of these formula-or formulæ minores as he afterwards called them-three other examples are given in the De Augmentis, all from Cicero. Bacon's own speeches and narrative writings would supply many very good ones. 218 De Aug. vi. 4. 219 Pædagogica, in the translation. 220 in writing, in the original; and also in the editions 1629 and 1633. The transla tion has in lectione librorum consistit. 221 For this illustration, which as reflecting upon a Priest might have been offensive at Rome, another is substituted in the De Augmentis, which is "not so palpable and ridiculous." A striking instance of the same kind occurs in two recent editions of this very work. In an edition of the Advancement of Learning published by J. W. Parker in 1852. Orosius is substituted for Osor us in the passage (p. 283), "Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal Bishop, to be in price"; with the following note: "All the editions have Osorius, which however must be a mere misprint. He was not a Portuguese, but a Spaniard, born at Tarragona, nor indeed ever a bishop. He was sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem, and is supposed to have died in Africa in the earlier part of the fifth century." In the following year Mr. H. Bohn published a translation of the De Augmentis, which is little more than a reprint of Shaw's transla. they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct. The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries; wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain. The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations 222. The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read. And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read 223. For Pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of Tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of great fruit. As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them. Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest and so proceed 'to the more difficult; and in what courses 224 to press the more difficult and then to turn them to the more easy for it is one method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes. A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; 'for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the Mathematics giveth a remedy there. unto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting; and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences. Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help; for as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularise a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to their thriving; and as it was noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed: so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten tion, revised and edited by Mr. Joseph Devey. In this edition Orosius is silently sub. stituted for Osorius in the same passage, with this note: "Neither a Portuguese, nor a bishop, but a Spanish monk born at Tarragona, and sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem in the commencement of the fifth century". The mistake is the more remarkable because the passage in Bacon refers obviously and unmistakably to the period of the Reformation. 222 This point is omitted in the translation, except in so far as it is involved in an observation which is added under the next head-viz. that editors besides giving " some brief censure and judgment of their authors" should compare them with other writers on the same subjects. But I am inclined to suspect that the omission was accidental for the truth is, that without constant reference to the times and circumstances in which he wrote hardly any author can be properly understood. 223 This point is also omitted in the translation; perhaps as included in the "censure and judgment"; which (he adds) is as it were the Critic's chair; an office ennobled in his time by some great men, majores certe nostro judicio quam pro modulo criticorum,— men above the stature of critics. 224 So all the editions: probably a misprint for cases. by education, yet when they fall unto great men or great matters, do work great and important effects; whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage-players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Cæsar, Blæsus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutiners; which were suddenly rescued ; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner :These poor innocent wretches, appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother? that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany to treat of the common cause, and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blæsus, what is done with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.225 With which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar; whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such matter, but he played it merely as if he had been upon the stage. 225 The last clause does not give the exact meaning of the original, from which it may seem that Bacon was reporting the speech from memory; unless it be that a line has accidentally dropped out. By inserting after "fellows" the words "seeing us put to death for no crime, but only for ", &c. the sense would be represented with sufficient accuracy. In the translation, this passage relating to "Pedantical knowledge",-that is the knowledge which concerns the instruction of youth-is considerably enlarged, and a distinct opinion is expressed upon many of the points which are here only noticed as worthy of inquiry. He begins by recommending the schools of the Jesuits as the best model, an opinion which he had already intimated in the first book of the Advancement. He approves of a collegiate education both for boys and young men, as distinguished from a private education under masters. He wishes compendiums to be avoided, and the system which, aiming at precocity, produces overconfidence and a mere show of proficiency. He would encourage independence of mind, and if any one shows a taste for studies which lie out of the regular course, and can find time to pursue them, he would by no means have him restrained. Of the two methods mentioned in the text, one beginning with the easiest tasks, the other with the most difficult, he recommends a judicious intermixture, as best for the advancement of the powers both of mind and body. With regard to the "application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits," he observes (besides its use as a corrective of mental defects) that masters ought to attend to it for the guidance of the parents in choosing their sons' course of life; and also because a man will advance so much faster in studies for which he has a natural aptitude than in any others. With regard to the "ordering of exercises " he recommends the system of intermissions. (Itaque tutius est intermittere exercitia et subinde repetere, quam assidue continuare et urgere). Lastly he would decidedly have the art of acting (actio theatralis) made a part of the education of youth. The Jesuits, he says, do not despise it; and he thinks they are right; for though it be of ill repute as a profes. sion (si sit professoria, infamis est) yet as a part of discipline it is of excellent use. It strengthens the memory, it regulates the tone and effect of the voice and pronunciation, it teaches a decent carriage of the countenance and gesture, it begets no small degree of confidence, and accustoms young men to bear being looked at. In Bacon's time, when masques acted by young gentlemen of the Universities or Inns of Court were the favour. ite entertainment of princes, these things were probably better attended to than they are now-and he could have pointed no doubt to many living examples in illustration of his remark. The examples which modern experience supplies are all of the negative kind, but not therefore the less significant. The art of speaking, of recitation, even of reading aloud, is not now taught at all; and the consequence is that even among men otherwise accomplished not many will be found who can either speak a speech of their own, or recite the speech of another, or read a book aloud, so as to be listened to with pleasure in a mixed company for a quarter of an hour together. |