Sir R. Palmer, Q.C., Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and C. Hall, for the plaintiffs. Jessel, Q.C., and Kekewich, for the Earl of Devon. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that no property or privilege of the plaintiffs within the meaning of the General Pier and Harbour Act was interfered with by the defendants, and consequently that the consent of the plaintiffs to the erection of the pier was not required; and he dismissed the bill with costs. Solicitors: Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle ; Lake & Co.; Sympson & Warner. M. R. ANSTEY V. NEWMAN. May 26. Administration - Real Estate - Marshalling Assets· Voluntary Settlement. This was the further consideration of a creditors' suit for the administration of the estate of a testator who had died insolvent. It appeared that the testator had, in 1849, made a voluntary settlement of certain real estate, which may for the purposes of this note be called Whiteacre. Subsequently he mortgaged Whiteacre with other real estate (Blackacre). Bristowe, Q.C., and Dunning, for the plaintiff, contended that the creditors were entitled to marshal the assets by throwing the whole of the mortgage debt on Whiteacre, it being admitted that they were unable to set aside the settlement as being a fraud on creditors. Southgate, Q.C., Bush, and Everitt, for the defendants, were not called upon. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that there was no right in the creditors to marshal the assets in the way sought. Solicitors: Meredith & Lucas; Travers Burges. Trustee-Costs of Suit-Trustee Relief Act. In this case, upon a sale of real estate in 1867, part of the purchase-money was invested in the names of two trustees, to be held by them, and the dividends accumulated, until sufficient legal evidence was produced that a person who had not been heard of since 1841 had died previously to 1861; and upon such evidence being produced the fund and the accumulations were to be paid to the vendors. In 1868 the vendors, contending that sufficient legal evidence of the death had been furnished, applied to the trustees either to transfer the fund to them, or to transfer it into Court under the Trustee Relief Act, so that the title thereto might be determined. The trustees declined to do either. The bill in this suit was then filed to compel a transfer to the plaintiffs. This was the hearing of the cause, and the plaintiff's title to a transfer was not disputed, the only question being as to the costs of the suit. Mr. Bush was a director when he executed the transfer, the validity of which was disputed on two grounds: first, that it was made in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme to relieve Mr. Bush and some of his co-directors of their liability; and, secondly, that the provisions of the articles of association with respect to transfers had not been complied with. Jessel, Q.C. and Lindley, for Houldsworth's executors. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the transfer was made in perfect good faith, but that the provisions of the articles of association had not been complied with; and that Mr. Bush, being a director, could not be heard to say that he had ceased to be a shareholder, and was, therefore, liable as a contributory. Solicitors: J. Elliott Fox; Warry, Robins, & Burges; Horn & Murray. V.-C. J. In re LANGDALE'S SETTLEMENT TRUSTS. May 7. Settlement-Investment of Trust Moneys-Securities of a Foreign Country. This was a petition by the trustees of a marriage settlement and the tenants for life, for the direction of the Court on the question, whether certain obligations or bonds of the "Compagnie des Chemins de fer du Midi," were securities of a foreign country within the meaning of the trust for investment. Under the settlement the trustees were empowered, with the consent of the tenants for life, to call in the trust fund then invested on mortgage security, and to re-invest "in the Parliamentary stocks or public funds of Great Britain, or Bank Stock, or India Stock, or the shares or stock of any railway company or dock company, or at interest in or upon government or real securities, or upon East India bonds or debentures, or preference stock or debentures of any railway or dock company, or in the purchase of, or in or upon the bonds, debentures, or other securities, or the stocks or funds of any colony or foreign country." By conventions made and authorized by the French Government the railways mentioned in the petition were leased to the "Compagnie des Chemins de fer du Midi," and the payment within fifty years of the capital expended on the lines was guaranteed, by an "amortisation " or sinking fund, together with interest, in the meantime, the guarantees being made a charge on the treasury of France. The conventions were approved by the Legislative body of France, and by a resolution of the Senate, which acts were sanctioned by the law of the Emperor and an Imperial decree. The "Compagnie des Chemins de fer du Midi," had, under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture, Trade, and Public Works, issued obligations or bonds bearing interest and secured in preference to the shareholders upon the products of the railways and upon the said guarantees. The petitioners submitted to the Court whether the trust moneys which had been called in could properly be re-invested on these obligations or bonds, having regard to the terms of the Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and A. E. Miller, for the plaintiff. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Ayrton, for the defendants, the trustees. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the trustees were en-settlement. titled only to such costs as they would have got if they had paid the fund into Court under the Trustee Relief Act and the plaintiffs had presented a petition for payment of the fund to them. Solicitors: Ilurrisons; Emmets & Co. M. R. In re AGRICULTURIST CATTLE INSURANCE COMPANY. BUSH'S CASE. Snape, for the petitioners. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR Considered that the obligations or bonds were not bonds or securities of a foreign country, and declined to sanction the investment. Solicitor: A. S. Lawson. May 27. V.-C. J. Winding-up-Contributory-Transfer of Shares-Provisions of Articles of Association-Liability of Director. HEWITSON v. SHERWIN. May 26. Practice-Contempt-Costs-32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (Debtors Act, 1869.) G. Lovell moved on behalf of Sparke, one of the defendants, This was an application by the executors of a deceased share-that the defendants Sherwin and Peacock might stand committed holder named Houldsworth, who had been settled on the list of for a contempt of Court for non-payment of costs ordered to be contributories of the company, that Mr. F. W. Bush, who had paid by them on the hearing of certain exceptions for scandal, and formerly been a shareholder in the company, but had executed a since taxed at 31l. 5s. 4d., or that for default of payment of such transfer of his shares some time previous to the commencement taxed costs Sherwin and Peacock might be committed to prison of the winding-up, might be settled on the list of contributories. for six weeks under the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62). Exceptions had been taken by the defendant Sparke to a passage in an affidavit filed by Sherwin on behalf of himself and Peacock, as scandalous and irrelevant. On the 15th of March, 1870, an order was made for expunging the portion of the affidavit complained of, and directing a taxation of the costs of the defendant Sparke now moving. A writ of fi. fa. had been issued, but the sheriff had returned nulla bona. Upon the first branch of the motion, for an immediate committal for contempt, the Vice-Chancellor held that he had no jurisdiction in the face of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62. G. Lovell contended that the defendant was at all events entitled to the order asked by the second branch of the motion, according to 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 5. Fry, Q.C., and Horsey, opposed the motion, and contended that an order for payment of costs did not constitute a debt within the meaning of s. 5 of the Act. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the application was within the Act, and that where a Court of competent jurisdiction had ordered payment of money, whether in the shape of costs or anything else, that was a debt due in pursuance of an order or judgment of this Court, which was of competent jurisdiction to make the order. The order would be that the defendants pay to Sparke the sum of 31l. 5s. 4d. by monthly instalments of 21., together with 57. for the costs of this application, and in default of such payment a committal might be applied for. Solicitors: Townsend & Co.; Drew & Wilkinson. V.-C. J. THOMPSON v. FISHER. May 31. Will-Construction-Executory Devise. Robert Fisher, by his will, dated the 5th of December, 1829, directed his trustees, after the decease or second marriage of his widow, whichever should first happen, to convey, assign, and assure all his seven houses in Queen Street and Ann Street, and certain other property, all situate in Lancaster, unto and to the use of his son Thomas Fisher" and the heirs of his body lawfully issuing, but in such manner and form nevertheless, and subject to such limitations and restrictions, as that if the said Thomas Fisher shall happen to depart this life without leaving lawful issue, then that the said hereditaments and premises, and every of them, may after his decease descend unincumbered unto and belong to my daughter the said Ruth Fisher, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, according to the respective nature and tenure thereof." The testator died in Novembor, 1834. His widow died in 1857, and his daughter Ruth (wife of Michael Thompson) died in September, 1866, leaving the plaintiff, R. F. Thompson, her eldest son and her-at-law. Thomas Fisher and his wife were both past 70, and there had never been any issue of their marriage. The trustees of the will and Thomas Fisher had executed conveyances of the hereditaments directed by the testator to be assigned and conveyed; and these conveyances proceeded on the assumption that Thomas Fisher was entitled to be made tenant in tail of the property. The plaintiff, on the other hand, insisted that, according to the true construction of the will, Thomas Fisher became entitled to an estate for his life only, with a limitation over in favour of testator's daughter Ruth, and that the direction for such conveyance was an executory trust to be executed by a limitation to Thomas Fisher for life, with remainder in favour of his issue as purchasers in tail, with remainder to testator's daughter, Ruth Thompson, in fee. The bill was filed to establish this construction, and set aside the conveyances that had been executed on the contrary theory. J. Williams, Q.C., and Marten, for the plaintiff. Eddis, Q.C., and Harrison, for the defendants. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the case was an exact illustration of an executory trust, as to which the testator had not been his own conveyancer. The primary intention was to give over the property to Ruth if Thomas died without leaving issue; and the words "subject to such limitations and restrictions," &c., must have effect given to them so far as the law allowed. The declaration would be, in accordance with the prayer, that the direction contained in the will was an executory trust, to be executed by a conveyance to the use of Thomas Fisher during his life, with remainder to his issue as purchasers in tail, with remainder to testator's daughter Ruth in fee. Solicitors: H. S. Willett: Bell, Brodrick, & Gray. Partition-Will-Substituted Gift to Children-Sale-Defendant entitled to One-fifth out of Jurisdiction and not served-Order for Sale not made. Partition suit on further consideration. William Hurry, by his will, dated in 1840, gave realty after the decease of his wife to his four brothers and his brother-in-law (naming them), to hold to them, their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common. In the case of the death of either in the lifetime of his wife leaving lawful issue, he gave the share of him so dying to "all his children," their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common. In case of the death of any one or more of his said brothers dying in the lifetime of his wife without leaving lawful issue living at his or their death, or leaving such issue and the same should die under the age of 21, he gave the part or share of him so dying unto the survivors of them equally. The result of inquiries was, that two brothers, John and Thomas, and the brother-in-law, Thomas Elsum, died in the lifetime of the wife. John had had fourteen children, all of whom attained 21, but nine only survived their father. Thomas had two children of age and now living. Thomas Elsum had had nine children, all of whom attained 21, but five only survived their father. One of the questions was, whether all the children of Thomas Hurry and Thomas Elsum who attained 21 took their respective father's share, or only those who attained 21 and survived their respective father; a question which depended on whether the gift to the children was an original or a substituted gift. Plummer (E. Leigh Pemberton with him), Crossley, and A. Dixon, appeared for the various parties. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR referred to In re Merricks' Trusts (Law Rep. 1 Eq. 551), and held that this was a substitutionary gift to the children who should attain 21: consequently, that those children only who attained 21 and survived their parent participated in the share. Henry Hurry, one of the brothers, entitled to one-fifth of the estate, had been found to be out of the jurisdiction; and it was stated that he was supposed to be in Australia. He had not been served; and it did not appear that any attempt had been made to serve him. Upon a sale being asked for, THE VICE-CHANCELLOR having referred to the Act, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40, considered that he could not order a sale in the absence of Henry Hurry, and said that he must be served. His Honour ordered the cause to stand over for the plaintiffs to serve the defendant Henry Hurry, or otherwise bring him before the Court. Solicitors: Nethersole & Speechly, agents for John Peed, Whittlesey; C. V. Field. Common Law. Q. B. By 11 & 12 Vict. c. clxiii., " An Act for the Sanitary Improvement of the City of London," s. 162, "it shall not be lawful for and Charlton; and so obstructing an alleged public footpath along the top of the sea-wall. No evidence was given as to the construction of the sea-wall, but it had been kept up for many years, and repaired by the Commissioners of Sewers. So far back as the memory of man extends the path along the top of the sea-wall had been used without interruption, by all persons, for the purposes of recreation and business, as a public footpath. any person to erect in any street any hoard or scaffold for any Mellish, Q.C. (Barrow with him), for the plaintiffs. Raymond (with him W. B. Cooper), for the defendants, contended that the user as a footpath was inconsistent with the purposes of a sea-wall, and therefore there could be no dedication. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) were clearly of opinion that there was no such legal inconsistency, and that on the evidence there was the same presumption of a dedication by the owner of the soil in this case as in any other case of uninterrupted user by the public. Attorneys for plaintiffs: Kingsford & Dorman, for E. W. James, Greenwich. Attorney for defendants: J. Evans. Rogue and Vagabond-Frequenting Highway with intent to commit a Felony-5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4. Mellish, Q.C. (Raymond with him), applied for a rule calling on the commissioners to shew cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding them to grant to one William Brass, under George Timson having been committed to gaol by the justices and according to the terms and provisions of the above Act, a of the liberty of St. Albans, on a warrant stating him to have licence to erect a hoard round the site of the new Post-office, been convicted (under 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4), "as a rogue and abutting on the north on Angel Street, on the south on New-vagabond, for that he being a suspected person did frequent a gate Street, on the east on St. Martin's-le-Grand, and on the west on Bath Street, containing 45,000 square feet. It appeared from the affidavits that Brass had entered into a contract with the Commissioners of Works on the 6th of December, 1869, to erect the building by the 31st of December, 1871. Brass having applied to the City Commissioners of Sewers for a licence, they refused it, except on the following conditions: 1. That there be a separate licence for the hoard in each of the four streets. 2. That the licences shall continue for two months only. 3. That a fee of 101. be paid for each licence. 4. That no placards, &c, for purposes of advertising shall be placed or affixed against the hoard. J. Brown, Q.C., shewed cause in the first instance: It was conceded that 101. was not an unreasonable fee, and on the other points the parties agreed to be bound by the decision of the Court on the present rule. THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Mellor and Hannen, JJ.), were of opinion that on the proper construction of the statute 1, only one licence was required for the whole arca; 2, that the commissioners were not bound by the time alleged to be required by the applicant in any case, but had a discretion in the matter, but they ought to exercise this discretion reasonably, and give a bona fide judgment in the matter, and that where it was clear that the erection of the building would take two years, it was not reasonable to grant only a two months licence; 3, that they had no power under the statute to impose such a condition in the licence forbidding the erection of placards, &c., for the purpose of advertising. And the Court accordingly made the rule absolute for a mandamus on the terms prayed. Attorney for prosecutor: J. Mackrell. Attorney for defendants: A. J. Baylis, certain public highway" a writ of habeas corpus was issued a chambers on the application of the prisoner. The prisoner being now brought up in custody, Codd moved to discharge him, on the ground that the warrant of commitment was bad for not shewing that the highway frequented by the defendant was a highway leading to a place of public resort, and cited In re Jones (7 Ex. 586; 21 L. J. (Ex.) 116), in which the construction put on the statute by the Court of Queen's Bench in Reg. v. Brown (17 Q. B. 833) was dissented from by the Court of Exchequer, and the opinion of Patteson, J., in the last-mentioned case followed. Willis opposed the application, contended that the construction of the Queen's Bench was correct, and further suggested that the commitment might be amended by the conviction. THE COURT (Kelly, C.B,, Channell and Cleasby, BB.) approved and followed the case of In re Jones; held that the prisoner being actually brought up upon the habeas corpus they could not let the case stand over for the conviction to be brought up; and discharged the prisoner. Ex. Attorney for prisoner: Bailey Pugh. Action for a Reward-Knowledge by Plaintiff of Advertisement. Declaration on an advertisement offering 50l. to any person who would give such information as would lead to the discovery of a stolen mare, and the conviction of the offender or offenders; alleging that plaintiff had given such information as led to the conviction of the offender. Demurrer on the ground that the declaration did not allege that plaintiff knew of the advertisement, or was induced by the offer of the reward to give the information. Wills, for the demurrer. Barnard, for the declaration, was not called upon. THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Channel and Cleasby, BB.,), referring to Williams v. Carwardine (4 B. & Ad. 621), gave judgment for the plaintiff. Attorney for plaintiff: T. B. Apps. Attorneys for defendant: Taylor, Ho ire, & Tay'or. . . PAGE 147 148 148 ALLEN. BONNETT (Bankrupt-Fraudulent Conveyance-Pre- . 150 M. R. 150 151 BOYS, In re. EEDES v. BOYS. Ex parte HOP PLANTERS' COM- 152 150 149 8. 164) GOODSMAN'S WILL, In re (Practice-Trustee Relief Act-Cons. Ord. xli. r. 4-Notice of Payment into Court) V.-C. M. GUNNELL v. WHITEAR (Will-Bequest to the "sole use and benefit" of a Married Woman-Conduct of Trustee-Costs) V.-C. S. HALL'S CASE. In re UNITED SERVICE COMPANY (ContributorySigning Memorandum-Allotment of Shares-Release) M. R. HASSALL v. WRIGHT (Assignment of Patent-Registration-Patent Law Amendment Act (15 & 16 Vict. c. 83), 8. 35-Right of unregistered Assignee to sue-Registration after Bill filedExclusive Licence to use a Patent-Covenant to manufacture in a workmanlike manner-Rules for acting upon such Covenants) V.-C. M. 151 HOLT v. MAYOR, &c., OF ROCHDALE (Bill by Landowner against Corporation-Excess of exercise of Statutory Power-Damage -Power of taking Lands by Agreement) V.-C. J. KENNEDY V. WAKEFIELD (Production of Documents-Summons by Defendants against Co-defendants-Affidavit ordered) V.-C. S. 151 Kettlewell v. BARSTOW (Practice-Motion to dismiss-Waiver) V.-C. J. 153 LUMLEY V. DESBOROUGH (Bill to set aside Documents by alleged Husband-Alleged Wife's previous Marriage-Evidence, want of, to shew that she knew she was acting fraudulently-Bill dismissed with Costs) 154 V.-C. S. 151 L. C. 147 V.-C. M. 152 Common Law. . PAGE Q. B. 154 Ex. 155 P. & M. 156 P. & M. 156 ALLEN v. GRAVES (Contract, Evidence to support-Shares-Liability of Jobber) ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. LORD EUSTACE CECIL (Succession Duty "New Succession"-16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, 8. 15) MYCOCK V. MYCOCK (Suit for Dissolution-Cruelty and Adultery proved - Alteration of Prayer-Right of Respondent to oppose) O'LOUGHLIN (J. E.), IN THE GOODS OF (Will-Residue-Effects) PRESTON, APP.; BUCKLEY, RESP. (Beerhouse-Amount of Rating required—“ Parish or Place"-" Township”-3 & 4 Vict. c. 61, 8. 1) Q. B. 154 REGINA . JESSE SMITH (Receiving Stolen Goods--Larceny by Partner-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91-31 & 32 Vict. c. 116) C. C. 156 REGINA v. KILHAM (False Pretences-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 8. 88— "Obtaining" Goods-Temporary use of Goods) REGINA v. SEBERG (Evidence-Ownership of Vessel-RegistrationCrime on High Seas-Criminal Jurisdiction) REGINA v. WILLIAM KAY (Forgery-24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 24Authority for Payment"- Warrant for Payment' "Request for Payment - Receipt-Practice) VIVIAN . VIVIAN AND MARQUIS OF WATERFORD. LESLIE INTERVENING (Dissolution of Marriage-Decree Nisi-Intervention of one of the Public-Costs-23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, 8. 7) P. & M. 156 Share-taking Contract-The Court will not expand it. The memorandum and articles of association of an incorporated Scottish joint stock company, stated the actually paid-up capital of the concern to be 100,000l., only 5000l. remaining to be called. The register and certificates gave corresponding representations. Mr. Waterhouse purchased 300 shares, and paid up 57. for each, being, as he imagined, all that would be asked of him. He was mistaken. It turned out that the alleged realized capital of 100,0007. was a fable. Nothing had been paid up beyond Mr. Waterhouse's 1500l. The company was ordered to be wound up. The respondent was appointed liquidator. He presented a petition to the Court of Session, praying that a call of 30l. per share should be made. Mr. Waterhouse, relying on his contract, resisted the application. The Court decided against him. He appealed to the House. The decision was reversed, the Law Peers being unanimous in their opinion that this case had no resemblance to that of Overend, Gurney, & Co., where the liquidator enforced the shareholder's contract, whereas here the liquidator sought to expand it. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Fitzroy Kelly, for the appellant. MANCEAUX, Ex parte (Patent-Costs) No. 20.-1870, Kay, Q.C., Haddan, and T. Aston, for the application. THE LORD CHANCELLOR made an order of reference to the law officer, as in Ec parte Yates (Law Rep. 5 Ch. 1), but said that in all similar cases for the future, he should order the opponents to pay the costs of the hearing, as the reference was a matter of indulgence to them. Solicitors: Johnson & Weatheralls; Appleyard. L. C. & L. J. GIFFARD. June 2. ATHERTON v. BRITISH NATION ASSURANCE COMPANY. The plaintiff in this case was the assignee of a policy for 1000. Jessel, Q.C., and Bevir, for the appellants. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and North, for the plaintiff. 1865, executed a deed purporting to assign all his property, con- Glasse, Q.C., Higgins, and Chute, for the plaintiff. De Gex, Q.C., Cotton, Q.C., and Everitt, for the defendant. THEIR LORDSHIPS came to the conclusion, on the evidence, that the defendant had really made the previous advance to his nephew, and had made a subsequent substantial advance to him. Such deeds might be set aside under the statute of Elizabeth, or as really fraudulent, or as being acts of bankruptcy. This deed did not come under the statute of Elizabeth, nor was it a real fraud; and as a substantial advance was made to the bankrupt, and more than a year had elapsed before the bankruptcy, the deed was not void as an act of bankruptcy. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: Nickinson, Prall, & Nickinson; Duffield & Bruty. THEIR LORDSHIPS thought that the Master of the Rolls had not paid sufficient attention to the facts shewing the intemperate habits of Rigg, and dismissed the bill with costs, on the ground L. C. & L. J. GIFFARD. that there had been concealment and misrepresentation at the time when the policy was effected. Solicitors: G. L. P. Eyre & Co.; Sweeting & Lydall. Vendor and Purchaser-Specific Performance-Valuation. This was a suit for specific performance. The plaintiff and defendant both signed a memorandum of agreement for the purchase of an estate for 24,000l., and it was thereby further agreed that the plaintiff should take certain specified furniture, which was to be valued by valuers mutually agreed upon. Disputes afterwards arose between the plaintiff and defendant, and the defendant contended that a contract was to be prepared by his solicitors; and as the plaintiff did not agree to this, the defendant declined to nominate any valuer. The purchaser then filed the bill in this suit to enforce specific performance, which the Vice-Chancellor Stuart decreed. The defendant appealed. Sir R. Palmer, Q.C., Greene, Q.C., and Phear, for the defendant. THEIR LORDSHIPS held, in the first place, that the contract was complete, and that no further contract was intended. As to the failure in the appointment of a valuer, where the valuation by valuers was of the whole subject matter of the contract, or of an essential part, the Court could not decree specific performance where no valuers had been appointed. But where, as in this case, the valuation was only of some subsidiary part, the Court would treat it on the same principle as where the vendor had failed to make out a title to a small part. Here the Court would decree specific performance, and would itself ascertain the value of the chattels agreed to be sold. The vendor had attempted to avail himself of his own wrong, and the appeal would be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: W. C. Smith; Prior & Bigg. L. C. & L. J. GIFFARD. ALLEN v. BONNETT. FREEMAN V. POPE. June 8. Voluntary Settlement-13 Eliz. c. 5-Subsequent Creditor. This was an appeal from a decree of Vice-Chancellor James (Law Rep. 9 Eq. 206). Morgan, Q.C., and H. A. Giffard, for the appellant. Kay, Q.C., and Cozens-Hardy, for the plaintiff, and Fellous, for another respondent, were not called upon. THEIR LORDSHIPS affirmed the decree on the ground that the settlor reduced himself to insolvency by making the settlement. Solicitors: Sole, Turner, & Turner; Paterson, Snow, & Burney. L. J. GIFFARD. June 3. Injunction to restrain Nuisance-Suspending Sequestration A decree had been made in this case by the Master of the Rolls in November, 1868, restraining the defendants from polluting the river Taff with the sewage of their district. In July, 1869, a sequestration was issued against them for disobeying the order, but execution was suspended for a time, which had been repeatedly prolonged, to enable the defendants to carry into effect some temporary mode of abating the evil by a system of deodorising the sewage, pending the construction of the necessary works for permanently disposing of the sewage on a farm. The temporary works had, however, failed in accomplishing their object, and on the 9th of May the board applied for a further suspension of the sequestration, which the Master of the Rolls refused, and they appealed from his decision. Sir R. Palmer, Q.C., Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., and Phear, appeared for the appellants. Jessel, Q.C., and Marten, for the relators and plaintiffs, referred to Attorney-General v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum (Law Rep. 4 Ch. 146). THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD said that if the defendants were June 8. acting contumaciously he should not hesitate to let the sequestration go, whatever might be the consequences. But that not being so, and the interests of the public in the present case being of great importance, he should refer it to an engineer, to report whether, during the time that must elapse before the permanent works could be completed, anything further could be done to Bankrupt-Fraudulent Conveyance-Preference. This was a suit by the assignees of a bankrupt to set aside a mortgage deed. The bankrupt was a brickmaker, and in March, |