Fry, Q.C.. and Warmington, for the petitioners, contended, parents. The master paid the mother the wages due up to the that the restraint against anticipation in the deed-poll must be day of leaving. He had no intention or expectation of receiving rejected, as being an invasion of the rule against perpetuities, E. M. back again into his house. and cited Fry v. Capper (Kay, 163).

she would not be removeable by reason of any provision in the | Sussex. By s. 26 the right and property of all the wharves, said Act."

THE QUEEN ON THE PROSECUTION OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE

...

quays, buildings . . . and of all the works erected in and about the harbour, in pursuance of the Acts, are vested in the commissioners. By s. 27 the commissioners were required to deepen, cleanse, scour, and enlarge the channel of the harbour, and to make a new pier or piers, with the necessary wharfing, to confine the channel opposite to and near the intended entrance into the harbour. By s. 83, after the whole of the piers and other works are made, the commissioners are to levy duties. The commissioners made the new entrance, and made the new piers to confine the channel, as authorized, and the channel and piers are situate in the respondents' parish. The respondents had rated the appellants in respect of the harbour, piers, and works, and the question for the Court was whether they are so liable to be

rated.

Mellish, Q.C. (Gates with him), for the appellants. Pollock, Q.C. (Merrifield with him), for the respondents. THE COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held that the soil in the channel was not, by the statute, vested in the appellants, and therefore they were not rateable in respect of it; that the soil on which the piers were built was vested in them, and that they were the occupiers of the piers, but that the occupation of the piers was not sufficiently connected with earning the tolls so as to make them rateable, and gave judgment for the respondents. Attorney for appellants: W. Clarke. Attorney for respondents: 4. S. Edmunds.

THE QUEEN ELIZABETH WILLIAMS.

Judgment in the Absence of the Defendant.

May 2.

POOR LAW UNION OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF THE CITY OF EXETER, APPS.; THE GUARDIANS OF THE SAINT THOMAS POOR LAW UNION IN THE COUNTY OF DEVON, RESPS. Poor-Settlement by paying Public Taxes of Parish-3 W. & M. c. 11, s. 6-"Improvement-rate and Lamp-rate." W. H. Tupman before his death occupied and inhabited a house in the parish of St. Sidwell in the Poor Law Union of Exeter, for one year from Michaelmas, 1867, to Michaelmas, 1868, at a yearly rent above 10. He was assessed to the poor-rate, but did not pay any of it. In the month of July 1868, he paid his share, which was demanded of him and for which he was assessed, towards the improvement-rate and lamp-rate, as hereinafter stated, for the said parish in respect of his occupation of the house. The improvement and lamp-rates are levied under the authority of a local Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. cvi. By ss. 2 & 3, Commissioners are to be appointed, and are to be elected by the Q. B. parishioners and inhabitants of the several parishes and precincts Practice-Indictment removed into Queen's Bench-Pronouncing within the city of Exeter. By ss. 40-135, the commissioners are empowered to pave and light the streets of Exeter. By s. 136, An indictment for perjury was removed into this Court, by they are once in every year to rate and assess, under the name of the Exeter improvement-rate, the several landlords, owners, tenants, and occupiers of all houses within the city. Sect. 139 gives similar powers to levy the lamp-rate. By s. 141 the commissioners are to appoint two or more of the inhabitants of the city, or of each parish, precinct, or ward within the city, to be assessors of the rates and assessments, and such assessors are required to make and assess such rates and assessments. The question was, whether Ann Tupman and her children, being the widow and legitimate children of the said W. H. Tupman, had gained a settlement in the parish of St. Sidwell by his having been charged with, and paid, his share towards the public taxes or levies of the parish under 3 W. & M. c. 11, s. 6. Anderson, and Mackey, for the appellants, contended, that the rate being levied upon the whole city of Exeter, it was not one of the public taxes or levies of the parish within 3 W. & M. c. 11, s. 6, and that it did not appear that the tax was assessed or collected by the officers of the parish.

Sir J. B. Karslake, Q.C., and McKellar, for the respondents, were not called upon.

THE COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held, that the improvement and lamp-rates were not distinguishable in principle from the land tax, and that the present case was governed by Rex v. Bramley (Bur. Set. Ca. 75), and St. George, Hanover Square v. Cambridge Union (Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 1), and that a settlement had been gained. Attorney for appellants: J. E. Fox. Attorney for respondents: Cooke.

the defendant, under the usual recognisances, pursuant to 16 Vict. c. 30, ss. 4, 5; and the defendant was tried and found guilty at the sittings in London after last term, but sentence was not passed.

Due notice was served upon the defendant and her bail that she was to appear in Court to receive judgment on the 28th of April. She did not appear, and affidavits were filed of due service of the notices, and that it was believed from inquiries that the defendant had gone to America.

Parry, Serjt., now moved that the recognisances be estreated, and that the Court proceed to pass sentence upon the defendant. He relied on 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 70, s. 9, which gives power to the presiding judge at any trial for felony or misdemeanour upon a record in the Queen's Bench, to pronounce judgment during the sittings or assizes, as well upon the defendants who shall have suffered judgment by default or confession as upon those who shall be tried and convicted, whether such persons be present or not in Court; and he argued that this shewed that this Court must already have had the same power which was thus not present in Court. given to a judge, of passing sentence upon a defendant though

THE COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Hannen, JJ.) ordered the recognisances to be estreated, but doubted their power to sentence a defendant not present in Court; and the case of Reg. v. Chichester (17 Q. B. 504, n.), having been brought to their notice, refused to pronounce judgment.

Attorneys for prosecution: Wontner & Sons,

In re PACKER.

April 27.

of the South Eastern Railway, whence it was forwarded to the | C. P. plaintiff by the South Eastern Railway Company, Buckmeister paying the freight for the former portion of the transit, and the Married Woman-Fines and Recoveries Act (3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 74)— plaintiff the freight for the latter portion. There had been other Acknowledgment of Deed. dealings between the parties upon the same terms. On its arrival F. M. White moved for leave to file a certificate of the acknowat Bromley, the flour was found to be damaged through negli-ledgment of a deed by a married woman, under the following cirgence in the carriage, to the extent of 137. 18s.

For the defendants it was contended, upon the authority of Coombes v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company (3 H. & N. 510), that, inasmuch as the property in the flour had not passed to the plaintiff when it arrived at the Bricklayers' Arms Station, the action should have been brought by Buckmeister; for that the liability of the company must be ascertained at the time the goods are received by them.

A verdict was found for the plaintiff, and upon a motion to enter a nonsuit,

THE COURT held that, the goods having been delivered to the defendants to be carried by the authority of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was the person responsible to them for the carriage, and therefore entitled to sue them for negligence. Rule refused.

April 22 Practice-Interrogatories-Answers tending to criminate-32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, s. 19.

cumstances:

The deed was a mortgage deed made the 20th of October, 1857, by a married woman, and contained a power of appointment of the equity of redemption, which was subsequently exercised by her in favour of her husband, the present applicant. The deed had been acknowledged before two perpetual commissioners, who had signed the usual memorandum on the back of the deed and a certificate of acknowledgment, but had not made any affidavit of it, as required by the rules of Court. The deed had never been filed, and the two commissioners and the married woman were all dead. The applicant had entered into an agreement to sell the land, and then, for the first time, during the last month, discovered that the deed had not been filed. Affidavits by the husband and his attorney were produced, verifying the signatures of the two commissioners and the married woman and the other parties to the deed, and stating that the commissioners had told the husband when he came into the room, after his wife had been separately examined by them, that his wife understood the contents of the deed, and freely consented to it. The affidavits also stated, that the married woman was at the time of full age and sound mind, and that one of the commissioners was a person in no way concerned for or connected with any of the parties.

THE COURT, under the special circumstances of the case, and as the affidavits were the best that could be obtained, and complied with the requirements of the Act, though not of the rules of Court, allowed the deed and certificate and affidavits to be filed. Attorneys for applicant: Dyne & Harvey.

In an action for a libel published in a magazine, the plaintiff sought for further and better answers to interrogatories for the purpose of obtaining an admission by the defendant that he was the publisher. The 19th section of the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, having re-enacted the provision in 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 1, and the statutory declaration of the publisher having in the interim been dispensed with, it was contended that the Court might, in virtue of its equitable power under s. 51 of the Common Law Procedure C. P. Act, 1854, order the particulars asked for. The defendant had declined to answer the interrogatories on the ground that his Bankrupt―Composition Deed-Omission to plead—Discharge from answers might tend to make him criminally responsible for the alleged libel. Bramwell, B., at chambers, refused to make an order upon him to answer; and this application was by way of appeal.

THE COURT refused to grant a rule, inasmuch as they did not feel warranted in depriving the defendant of a privilege which the law gave him, when they had not the means of affording him the protection which the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, s. 19, was intended to give.

ALLEN v. CARTER.

Custody.

April 28

of Exchange Act, on the 1st of August, 1868, which was served The plaintiff sued out a writ against one Lamb, under the Bills on the 3rd. Lamb, on the 8th of August, executed a deed of composition under s. 198 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, which was duly filed and registered on the 13th. On the 15th judgment was signed against Lamb for want of appearance to the writ, and a fi. fa. issued, under which the now defendant, the sheriff, entered into possession of Lamb's goods. On the 17th of August Lamb took out a summons calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why the sheriff should not withdraw from possession, upon the ground that Lamb had obtained his protection from the Bankruptcy Court. This summons was heard by Blackburn, J., and dismissed on the ground that the then defendant had omitted April 26. to plead the deed. A second summons was taken out on the 19th to set aside the judgment. That summons was heard before Willes, J., and dismissed on the same ground.

Accidental Injury-Negligence of a Fellow Workman.
The plaintiff, a bricklayer, was employed by the day to build a
wall on the premises of the defendants. Whilst so engaged, the
scaffold on which he was standing gave way, in consequence of
the insufficient size and the rottenness of the putlogs on which it
rested, and the plaintiff was much hurt. The plaintiff was
engaged by the defendants' foreman, but there was no evidence
that the defendants were aware of the insufficiency of the mate-
rials, or that the person employed by them to erect the scaffold
was not a competent workman.

A verdict having been found for the defendants,
THE COURT refused a rule for a new trial.

Grantham, for the plaintiff.

Attorney for plaintiff: F. Scarth.

On the 25th of September a ca. ca. issued against Lamb (the goods seized under the fi. fa. having proved insufficient to satisfy the judgment), and he was taken thereon, but was discharged by the sheriff on production of the certificate of registration of the composition deed.

Upon a special case,

THE COURT held that the sheriff was not justified in releasing
Lamb from custody, he having had an opportunity of pleading
the deed, and having omitted to avail himself of it.
G. Francis, for the plaintiff.

Denman, Q.C. (Abbott with him), for the defendant.
Attorney for plaintiff: Edmund Newman.

Attorneys for defendant: Abbott, Jenkins, & Abbott.

C. P.

May 3. property. Mary Sleeman, the niece and sole executrix of the ALLEN, APP.; Geddes, TowN-CLERK OF WARRINGTON, RESP. will of Mary Morgan, took probate of it, intermarried in the year Parliament- Borough Vote-Notice of Objection-Several Lists-1857 with William Williams, and died in September, 1863. She Description of List-6 Vict. c. 18, s. 17, sched. B., No. 11. took possession of a portion of James H. Morgan's estate, but disposed of it as if it belonged to her testatrix, Mary Morgan. The borough of Warrington consists of three townships (one In December, 1867, administration of the unadministered goods being Warrington), each having a separate overseer and a sepa- of James H. Morgan was granted to Thomas Sleeman, and in rate list of voters, the register being composed of the three lists. September, 1868, a suit was instituted in the Court of Chancery A notice of objection was signed "S. D., on the list of voters for for the administration of the estate of James H. Morgan. For Golborne Street, in the borough of Warrington." On the argu- the purposes of this suit it was necessary that a representative ment of the case, it was contended that the notice was bad for should be appointed of the estate of Mary Williams. not shewing upon the list of which of the three townships the Dr. Spinks, Q.C., now moved the Court to allow a citation to objector's name appeared. The case was sent back to the re-issue calling upon William Williams to take administration of vising barrister for the purpose of stating distinctly in which the goods of his wife, or shew cause why it should not be township Golborne Street was situate, and whether the descrip- granted to James Sleeman. He referred to In the Goods of Mary tion given would be commonly understood to refer to that town-Keane (1 Hagg. Ecc. 692); In the Goods of George Johnson (2 Sw. & ship. The case was returned with the following amendment:Tr. 595). "There was only one Golborne Street in the borough of Warrington, and that was in the township of Warrington, and the description of the abode given would be commonly understood in the borough as designating the list for the township of Warrington."

THE COURT held that the amendment, though somewhat
ambiguous, shewed that the notice could not mislead, and was
a substantial compliance with the Act.
Decision affirmed.

Holker, Q.C., and T. I. Barstow, for the appellant.
Attorney for appellant: Le Riche, for W. Leader, Wigan.

LORD PENZANCE:-It seems to follow, from the necessity of the case, that some method should be devised to litigate the question, whether and to what extent the estate of Mary Williams is indebted to that of James H. Morgan, and for that purpose a cant has no direct interest, but he has an indirect one, and representative of Mary Morgan must be appointed. The applitherefore he may have the citation against William Williams for which he asks. When the citation is returned, it will be for consideration whether the grant made to him shall be limited, and if so, to what extent.

Solicitors: Thomas White & Sons.

PAICE v. WALKER AND ANOTHER. Principal and Agent-Agent signing Contract. Action for not delivering wheat according to a contract made in the following form:-"Sold A. J. Paice, Esq., London, about 200 quarters wheat (as agents for John Schmidt & Co., of Danzig) .. (Signed) Walkers & Strange

P. & M.

May 3.

IN THE GOODS OF W. HARRIS. Two Wills, one limited to Property in England, the other to Property in Tasmania-Separate Executors-Probate—Practice. William Harris died at Leamington Priors, Warwickshire, on of May, 1867, and the 16th of July, 1867. In the first he exthe 7th of August, 1869. He executed two wills, dated the 24th pressed his desire and intention to be to dispose only thereby of in Hobart Town executors, and directed them to transfer the his property in Tasmania. He appointed three persons resident residue of his property in Tasmania to the executors of his English will, to be by them invested. The property disposed of in this will was property in Tasmania only. The second will commenced thus: "This is the last will and testament of," &c., "so far as regards my property in England, I having by a separate and distinct will disposed of my property in the colony of

The cause was tried before Kelly, CB, at Guildhall, on the 11th of December, 1869, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff for 461., leave being reserved to the defendants to move to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that they only acted as agents in making the contract, and that they were not personally liable. A rule having been obtained accordingly, Murphy (Pollock, Q.C., with him) shewed cause. Dowdeswell, Q.C. (Day with him), supported the rule, and contended, that as defendants appeared in the body of the contract to be acting as agents, they were not contracting parties, and THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, Pigott, Cleasby, BB.) dis-Tasmania, and which will I ratify and confirm by this will; and charged the rule, adopting the rule laid down in 2 Sm. L.C., 344, and holding that a person signing a contract with his own name, without any addition or qualification, is a contracting party, unless it appears upon the face of the contract, expressly, or by necessary implication, that he is only acting as agent, and also holding that the words " as agents, &c.," in the body of the contract, did not amount to such a statement.

could not be sued.

Attorneys for plaintiff: Hillearys & Tunstall.
Attorneys for defendants: Denton, Hall, & Barker.

P. & M.

IN THE GOODS OF M. WILLIAMS.

April 26. Administration-Proceedings in Chancery-Applicant having no direct Interest-Citation-Practice. James H. Morgan died on the 13th of April, 1851, a bachelor and intestate, leaving Mary Morgan, his sister, and Thomas Sleeman, Elizabeth Briggs, Mary Sleeman, and James Sleeman, the children of another sister, the only persons entitled in distribution to his property.

Mary Morgan, in May, 1851, took out administration to him, but died in January, 1852, without having divided her brother's

affected by this will." By this will the deceased disposed of his proI desire that the same may not be annulled, interfered with, or perty in England, and appointed different executors from those in the first will. This last will was proved in the District Registry at Birmingham on the 15th of October, 1869, and on the other will being presented for probate in the proper office at Hobart Town, it was refused, on the ground that a man can only have one will, and that, therefore, the two papers must be taken together, for so only did they constitute the deceased's will.

Pritchard now moved that the Court would revoke the probate already issued of the will dated the 16th of July, 1867, and decree probate of both papers as together constituting the will of the deceased. If the Court follows the decision in the case of In the motion; but there is a case not reported, In the Goods of Bishop Goods of Coode (Law Rep. 1 P. & M. 449), it will reject the Willson (November, 1866), in which the Court made an order similar to the one now asked for.

THE COURT, having referred to the papers connected with the grant made in the case of Bishop Willson, directed the probate of the will dated the 16th of July to be revoked, and decreed probate of the two papers dated the 24th of May and the 16th of July as together constituting the will of the deceased. Attorneys: Church, Jones, & Clarke.

124 ALLEN v. WALKER (Trespass—Assault— Action by Husband against
Lessee of his Wife-Separate Estate-Equitable Plea-Prac-
tice in Equity in restraining an Action of Assault). Ex. 132
ATHENS AND PIREUS RAILWAY COMPANY v. HUDSWELL (Security
for Costs-English Joint Stock Company for constructing a
Railway Abroad)
C. P. 131
CASTLE AND OTHERS v. PLAYFORD (Vendor and Purchaser--Agree-
ment that Purchaser shall bear Risks and Damages of the Sea
-Receipt of Bill of Lading-Delivery of Cargo-Condition
Precedent)