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Bronson v. Kinzie. 1 H.

ARTHUR BRONSON, Complainant, v. JOHN H. KINZIE AND JULIETTE A., his Wife, EDMUND K. BUSSING and JOHN S. BUSSING, THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE STATE BANK OF ILLINOIS, JAY HATHWAY, MARY ANN WOLCOTT, DANIEL S. GRisWOLD, CAROLINE DUNHAM, and ALONZO HUNTINGTON, Defendants.

1 H. 311.

A mortgage contained a power to the creditor to sell on breach of the condition, and thereby pay the debt; this power was valid, under the laws of the State when given. Held, that a law, subsequently passed, giving to the mortgagor twelve months to redeem the property from the purchaser at such a sale, and prohibiting it from being made for less than two thirds of its appraised value, so altered the remedy of the creditor, as to impair the obligation of the contract.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

TANEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes before the court upon a division of opinion in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Illinois, upon certain questions which arose in the case, and which have been certified to this court according to the act of congress.

It appears from the record, that, on the 13th of July, 1838, John H. Kinzie executed a bond to Arthur Bronson, conditioned for the payment of $4,000, on the 1st of July, 1842, with interest thereon, to be paid semiannually; and, in order to secure the payment of the said sum of money and interest, Kinzie and wife, on the same day, conveyed to the said Bronson, in fee-simple, by way of mortgage, one undivided half part of certain houses and lots in the town of Chicago, with the usual proviso that the deed should be null and void if the said principal and interest were duly paid; and Kinzie, among other things, covenanted that, if default should be made in the payment of the principal or interest, or any part thereof, it should be lawful for Bronson or his representatives to enter upon and sell the mortgaged premises at public auction, and, as attorney of Kinzie and wife, to convey the same to the purchaser; and out of the moneys arising from such sale, to retain the amount that might then be due him on the aforesaid bond, with the costs and charges of sale, rendering the overplus, if any, to Kinzie.

The interest not having been paid, Bronson, on the 27th of [*312] *March, 1841, filed his bill to foreclose the mortgage. In the mean time, after the mortgage was made, and before the bill was filed, the legislature of Illinois, on the 19th of February, 1841, passed a law, the 8th section of which provided that mortgagors and judgment creditors should have the same right to redeem mortgaged premises sold by the decree of a court of chancery, that

Bronson v. Kinzie. 1 H.

had been given to the debtors and judgment creditors by a previous law passed in 1825, in cases where lands were sold under execution. The law of 1825 authorized the party whose lands should be sold by execution, after that law took effect, to redeem them within twelve months from the day of sale, by repaying the purchase-money with interest at the rate of ten per cent.; and if the debtor did not redeem it within the time limited, any judgment creditor was authorized to do so upon the like terms, within fifteen months from the sale. This act, which took effect on the 1st of May, 1825, was held, it seems, not to extend to sales of mortgaged premises under a decree of foreclosure; and the act of February 19, 1841, above mentioned, was passed to embrace them.

By another act of the legislature of Illinois, approved the 27th of February, 1841, it was directed that, "when any execution should be issued out of any of the courts of the State, and be levied on any property, real or personal, or both, it should be the duty of the officer levying such execution, to summon three householders of the proper county, one of whom should be chosen by such officer, one by the plaintiff, and one by the defendant in the execution; or, in default of the parties making such choice, the officer should choose for them; which householders, after being duly sworn by such officer so to do, should fairly and impartially value the property upon which such execution was levied, having reference to its cash value, and that they should indorse the valuation thereof upon the execution, or upon a piece of paper thereunto attached, signed by them; and when such property should be offered for sale, it should not be struck off, unless two thirds of the amount of such valuation should be bid therefor." It further provided, among other things, that all sales of mortgaged property should be made according to the provisions of that act, whether the foreclosure of said mortgage was by judgment at law or decree in chancery. It also directed that the provisions of this law should extend to all judgments [* 313 ] rendered prior to the 1st of May, 1841, and to all judgments that might be rendered on any contract or cause of action accruing prior to that day, and not to any other judgments than as before specified. These are, in substance, the provisions of these acts, as far as they are material to the present controversy.

On the 19th of June, 1841, after the laws above mentioned had been passed, the circuit court of the United States for the district of Illinois adopted the following rules:

"Ordered, that when the marshal shall levy an execution upon real estate, he shall have it appraised and sold under the provisions of the law of this State, entitled, An act regulating the sale of prop

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Bronson v. Kizie. 1 H.

erty,' approved February 27, 1841, if the case come within the provisions of that law; and any two or three householders selected under the law, agreeing, may make the valuation of the premises required.

"Before the sale of any real estate on execution, the marshal shall give notice thirty days in a newspaper published in the county where the land lies; and if there be no paper published in the county, then the notice shall be given thirty days before the sale, by notice, as the statute requires. The court adopt the 8th section of the act of this State, to amend the act concerning judgments, &c., passed 19th of February, 1841, which regulates the sale of mortgaged premises, &c., except where special direction shall be given in the decree of sale."

After these rules were adopted—that is to say, at December term, 1841 the bill filed by Bronson, as hereinbefore mentioned, came on for final hearing in the circuit court; and thereupon the complainant moved the court for a final decree of strict foreclosure of said mortgage, or that the mortgaged premises should be sold to the highest bidder, without being subject to said rule and the act referred This motion was resisted on part of defendants, who moved that the decree should direct the sale according to said rule and act.

to.

And the judges being opposed in opinion on the following points, to wit:

1. Whether the decree in this case should be so entered as to direct the sale of the said mortgaged premises according to the said

statute of the State of Illinois above mentioned; or whether [ * 314 ] *the same premises should be sold at public auction, to the highest bidder, without regard to the said law.

2. Whether the decree in this case shall or shall not direct the sale of the mortgaged premises, without being first valued by three householders, and without requiring two thirds of the amount of the said valuation to be bid, according to the said act of the State of Illinois.

3. Whether the terms of the mortgage in this case do or do not require it to be excepted from the operation of the rule above recited.

On motion of the complainant, it was ordered and directed that this cause, with said points, be certified to the supreme court, in pursuance of the act of congress. And it is upon these questions, thus certified, that the case is now before us; and the 8th section of the act of February 19, and the entire act of February 27, are set forth at large in the record, as the laws referred to in the above mentioned rules of the circuit court. The case has been submitted to the

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Bronson v. Kinzie. 1 H.

court, for decision, by a written agreement between the counsel on both sides. On the part of the complainant, a printed argument has been filed, but none has been offered on behalf of the defendant. As the case involves a constitutional question of great importance, we should have preferred a full argument at the bar. But the parties are entitled, by the rules of the court, to bring it before us in the manner they have adopted; and it being our duty to decide the questions certified to us by the circuit court, we have bestowed upon the subject the careful and deliberate consideration which its importance demands.

Upon the points certified, the question is, whether the laws of Illinois, of the 19th and the 27th of February, 1841, come within that clause of the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts.

The laws of a State, regulating the process of its courts, and prescribing the manner in which it shall be executed, of course, do not bind the courts of the United States, whose proceedings must be governed by the acts of congress. The act of 1792,' however, adopted the process used in the state courts, as it stood in 1789; and, since then, the act of 1828,2 on the same subject, has been [315] passed; and the 3d section of this law directs that final process issued on judgments and decrees in any of the courts of the United States, and the proceedings thereupon, shall be the same, except their style, in each State, respectively, as were then used in the courts of such State, and authorizes the courts of the United States, if they see fit, in their discretion, by rules of court, so far to alter final process as to conform the same to any change which might afterwards be adopted, by the legislatures of the respective States, for the state courts. Any acts of a state legislature, therefore, in relation to final process, passed since 1828, are of no force in the courts of the United States, unless adopted by rules of court, according to the provisions of this act of congress. And, although such state laws may have been so adopted, yet they are inoperative and of no force, if in conflict with the constitution or an act of congress.

As concerns the allegations of the contract upon which this controversy has arisen, they depend upon the laws of Illinois as they stood at the time the mortgage deed was executed. The money due was indeed to be paid in New York. But the mortgage given to secure the debt was made in Illinois for real property situated in thạt State, and the rights which the mortgagee acquired in the premises depended upon the laws of that State. In other words, the existing

11 Stats. at Large, 275.

2 4 Ib. 278.

Bronson v. Kinzie. 1 H.

laws of Illinois created and defined the legal and equitable obliga tions of the mortgage contract.

If the laws of the State passed afterwards had done nothing more than change the remedy upon contracts of this description, they would be liable to no constitutional objection. For, undoubtedly, a State may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in its courts in relation to past contracts as well as future. It may, for example, shorten the period of time within which claims shall be barred by the statute of limitations. It may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the remedy, to be exercised or not by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and humanity. It must reside in every State to enable it to secure its citiharassing litigation, and to protect them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every community. And, although a new remedy may be deemed less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree render the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the constitution.

[* 316] zens from unjust and

This subject came before the supreme court in the case of Green v. Biddle, decided in 1823, and reported in 8 Wheat. 1. It appears to have been twice elaborately argued by counsel on both sides, and deliberately considered by the court. On the part of the demandant in that case, it was insisted that the laws of Kentucky passed in 1797 and 1812, concerning occupying claimants of land, impaired the obligation of the compact made with Virginia in 1789. On the other hand, it was contended that these laws only regulated the remedy, and did not operate on the right to the lands. In deciding the point the court say: "It is no answer that the acts of Kentucky now in question are regulations of the remedy, and not of the right to the lands. If these acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact as if they directly overturned his rights and interests." And in the opinion delivered by the court after the second argument, the same rule is

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