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PRESIDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

It is my duty to-day to address a few words to you on Trade and International Law, which form the subjects of the Sixth Depart ment. They are closely connected, the extension of one increasing the importance of the other. As modern science removes or diminishes the physical or natural impediments to a free intercourse with foreign countries, the necessity becomes more urgently felt of removing those unnatural impediments which perverse legislation or groundless hostility had interposed. The acquaintances and the friendships formed by those who travelled for purposes of commerce or pleasure produced respect, and even affection, towards nations which had previously been looked upon with hatred, jealousy, or contempt. The mere free exchange of commodities was felt to be beneficial to the whole world, and the number daily increases of persons whose rights depend on the administration of foreign laws. It sometimes even becomes a matter of grave doubt and of serious importance to determine what is the country by the laws of which any particular case is to be decided. Is it to be the law of the country in which the question happens to be tried; or the law of the country in which the contract sought to be enforced was made; or the law of the country in which the subject of dispute is situated; or the law of the country in which the owner of the property was domiciled? It is obviously of importance to the free and friendly intercourse of different nations that such questions should be decided on the same principles by all States; and as this is a point on which their interests do not really conflict, there is good ground for hoping that a fair discussion of the principles applicable to such cases may lead to unanimity as to the law to be administered when a conflict of laws occurs. It would be still better if the laws could be assimilated in all countries, so far as they affect commerce and their mutual relations, for then no conflict of laws would be likely to arise. It would be impossible to enumerate all such cases; for increased intercourse will give rise to cases never thought of before, and every

day will add to the importance of international law in its effects on nations at peace and friendship with each other. But there is also a law of nations chiefly adapted to a state of war; and the sad events now occurring at the other side of the Atlantic have on this occasion given a prominence to this branch of international law which I hope in future it will not possess. War is the greatest impediment to that progress which this Association has at heart. The rights of war discussed in this department were the maritime rights of belligerents. Hitherto those points have been discussed both at home and abroad with a feeling that every increase of belligerent rights was an advantage to England at the expense of the rest of the world. It appeared to be a matter of course that she should be an actor in every maritime war. The situation is altered now; and England, as a neutral Power, is patiently submitting to all those restrictions, which on former occasions she had imposed on the commerce of neutral Powers. Our politicians and jurists now feel more strongly the other side of the question. Those rights have been narrowed as between European nations by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, to which the Government of the United States refused to accede. By that treaty it was agreed that the European Powers should not employ privateers in any future war, and that the goods of the enemy in neutral ships should be exempt from seizure. That the flag should cover the cargo. The American Government refused to abandon the employment of privateers unless the Europeans would consent to abandon the right of seizure of private vessels, except in cases justified by the laws relating to blockade, or to contraband of war. The maritime rights peculiar to belligerents are threefold-ist, The right of capturing the ships of the enemy, and such of the enemy's goods as are found therein; 2d, The right of seizing vessels bringing contraband of war to an enemy's port; 3d, The right to seize vessels going to or from a blockaded port, and intending to run through the blockade. The limits, the natural justice, and the advantage to the belligerents, of those rights or practices, have been made the subject of discussion in this department, in order to ascertain whether they might not be advantageously settled, or modified by treaty, or even altogether abandoned. It has been urged with great ability that the abandonment of the right of seizing the merchant vessels of the enemy would be advantageous to belligerents, and especially to Great Britain if she was engaged in war. That as by the Treaty of Paris the property of our merchants, if exported in foreign

vessels, would be exempt from seizure, while they would be exposed to that risk if exported in our own, our merchants would give the preference to neutral ships, in which their property would be secure; and thus the effect of the present state of the law is, that war, or even the apprehension of war, must immediately transfer the entire carrying trade of the country to neutral vessels, condemning our own ships to rot in idleness, and our sailors to enter into foreign service, and thus destroy the foundation of our maritime strength. When it is urged that the relaxation of this right of capture would give free scope to the commerce of the enemy, it is replied that such commerce may be effectually extinguished by a blockade. On the second point, that is, on the right to seize contraband of war in its passage to the enemy, there is not room for much diversity of opinion. It is a right given by the law of nature. It is an act of hostility to supply my enemy with arms to be used against me, and therefore it may be even fairly urged that it ought to be considered the duty of neutrals to prohibit the export of contraband of war to the belligerents. What is to be deemed contraband of war, is, however, a point on which considerable diversity of opinion has existed, and English jurists have been disposed to give a more enlarged meaning to the term than French. The more general opinion now appears to be, that it is inexpedient or impracticable to consider as contraband of war everything that can be useful to the enemy in his military operations, and that the term ought to be applied only to arms, to ammunition, and the materials of ammunition, and to ships obviously intended for purposes of war. But, granting the right to seize contraband of war in neutral vessels, and searching them, to ascertain whether this contraband forms part of their cargo, it may still be questioned whether it would not be a wise step to abandon it by treaty. It is said that the object of preventing the enemy from being supplied with such materials of war by neutrals may be better attained by an efficient blockade of the enemy's ports. That the law which permits the flag to cover the cargo is deprived of more than half its value to the neutral ship by the law of contraband, which leaves it still exposed to the annoyance and inconvenience of a search by belligerent cruisers. This would permit the commerce of neutrals to be carried on without molestation-a strong inducement to them to continue in that state of neutrality, and a contrast to the former state of affairs, when the rights (real or fancied) of belligerents were exercised with such harshness as

almost to make it the interest of neutrals to abandon their neutrality, and to take a part in the contest. It does not appear that this denunciation of the trade in contraband of war is likely to have the effect intended, of crippling the power of the enemy by preventing him from having a sufficient supply of arms and ammunition. It merely compels him to purchase them at a higher rate, and puts him to such a pecuniary loss as might be occasioned by an interruption of any other branch of his trade. Never were belligerent rights enforced with greater harshness than by the Federal States of America in their present war with their Southern brethren, and yet the reverses which the Confederate States have lately endured are clearly caused by the exhaustion of their military population, and not by the deficiency of any supplies of arms, and ammunition which a relaxation of the laws relating to blockade or contraband of war would have placed within their reach. The laws of blockade have, perhaps more than any other maritime law, led to disputes between nations with conflicting interests. The right may be briefly stated thus: A belligerent power blockading any port of the enemy has a right to exclude all neutral commerce from that port. The two questions most likely to arise are, What constitutes a blockade? and, By what means is neutral commerce to be excluded? Some have contended that a town should not be considered blockaded unless it is invested by land as well as by sea, or, at least, unless there is an intention to take the town; but this view of international law, which would make it substantially impossible for Great Britain ever to enforce a blockade, has never been acquiesced in by England; and when she was considered to bear at most the third rank as a maritime power, she acquiesced in a blockade of Dunkirk by the Dutch. What is required by international law, and provided for by treaty, is that the blockade should not be what is contemptuously called a paper blockade— that is, a mere proclamation prohibiting neutral commerce with the blockaded port; but that a blockade to be binding must be efficient—that is, it must be supported by such a fleet, stationed in the harbour, or its immediate vicinity, as obviously to expose to imminent risk of capture any vessel attempting to enter the blockaded port. What is imminent risk, may, like any other question of degrees, be made the subject of dispute. It is to be judged of by the number and position of the vessels engaged in the blockade, and perhaps also by a comparison of the number of ships which successfully run the blockade, with the number of those which are

captured in making the attempt. The mode of enforcing the blockade is by seizing and confiscating the ships which attempt to violate it; and this again (so fertile of litigation is this important subject) leads to two questions more: First, Can belligerent vessels at a distance from the blockaded port lawfully seize ships which have either proceeded from the blockaded port, or whose destination is that port, and which may therefore be presumed to have the intention of breaking the blockade? The second question is, Ought this risk of capture on the high seas to be considered as in part constituting that imminent risk which justifies a blockade by making it efficient? It is nearly certain that in future wars or treaties those two questions will be resolved in the negative. The passing of a blockade is not a hostile act, like supplying an enemy with arms and ammunition. It is therefore not to be punished by capture, except when the capture is effected by a chase by one of the blockading squadron, in which case the pursuit, as long as the chase is kept in sight, shews that the task of escaping from the blockade is not yet fully accomplished. Still less is it reasonable to capture a neutral vessel on account of its supposed intention to violate the blockade; perhaps the blockade may be at an end before the vessel reaches the blockaded port, or the destination of the vessel may be changed. A desire to insist on this right would shew a consciousness that the blockade was insufficient. The value of the right would be proportional to the inefficiency of the blockade. If the blockade were perfect, no occasion for its exercise would ever occur. No ship could ever be found on the high seas which had proceeded from the blockaded port; and as the ship would certainly be captured when it approached the coast, there. would be no object in claiming a right to anticipate that capture. by seizing it on the high seas. The value of this privilege would be in proportion to the inefficiency of the blockade; and for avoiding disputes, it is more conformable to sound principles of international jurisprudence that the law should be settled so as to make it necessary for the belligerent to keep up an efficient blockade, or to abandon it. This disposes of the second question-viz., Ought this risk of capture on the high seas, at a distance from the port, to be considered as forming part of that imminent risk which is necessary in order to give lawful validity to the blockade? Of course, if the capture is not permitted, it adds nothing to the risk ; but even if such capture were lawful, the risk is not of that obvious character which is necessary to a blockade. The utility of a block

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