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a steamer of theirs, at request of plaintiffs in error. was begun conformably to one of the statutory methods, by the filing of a verified claim and the issuance of a summons. The claim filed was against S. Baxter & Co., but the summons issued to Sutcliff, Baxter and A. M. Brooks.

Wholly disregarding any technical objection that possibly might have been made to the verified claim for being against a partnership without naming the parties, defendants appeared on the return day of the summons, and to an oral complaint then interposed demurred on the ground that the facts stated were insufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the complaint showed the cause of action to be a maritime contract. The court overruled the demurrer, defendants answered, issue was joined, trial was had, and judgment against defendants for sixty dollars and costs was rendered.

A jury trial afterward, in the district court on appeal, resulted in a verdict against defendants for fifty-five dollars. The verdict being in and judgment not yet entered, defendants moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, and because the complaint failed to state facts enough to constitute a cause of action. Such lack of jurisdiction or insufficiency of the complaint, however, was not clear to the district judge, and he therefore denied the motion. Exception was taken to this ruling Then a motion was made by defendants for judgment in their favor for the costs made on the appeal. This motion was denied, an exception taken, and judgment entered for the amount of the verdict and all costs made in the district and justice's court.

There are three errors assigned, namely: First, the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the action; second, the court erred in denying the motion for a judgment for costs of the appeal; and, third, the court erred in giving a judgment in favor of defendants in error. On the argument, two principal questions are presented, one of jurisdiction and one of costs. It is said that there was no jurisdiction in the court below, first, because the verified claim, naming the firm only, and not the individual partners, is not a good foundation of jurisdiction under our statute; and, second, because the oral complaint, certified from the justice's docket, shows a contract to do an entire round of service without showing in addition an entire performance or a waiver of performance. But it seems to us that all defect of parties defendant existing on the face of the verified claim was cured by the appearance of defendants in answer to summons, and by their proceeding to plead, without specifically objecting to the supposed defect. And we do not deem that the complaint sets up a contract that might not be satisfied by the limited amount of service that the plaintiff pleads. On the other main question-that of costs-we have more difficulty. It brings to us, and compels us to construe section 522 of the civil practice act, a section which was manifestly designed, in the wisdom of the legislature, to discourage unreasonable and vexatious appeals, but which is so inartificially worded as not plainly to expose the exact outlines of the

design. This five hundred and twenty-second section is of kindred matter with sections 510 and 514, as will be seen by placing the three together, as follows:

Section 510. "Costs shall be allowed the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered, except as is otherwise provided by law." Section 514. "In all cases where costs and disbursements are not allowed to the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to have judgment in his favor for the same." Section 522. "In all civil actions tried before a justice of the peace, in which an appeal shall be taken to the district court, and the party appellant shall not recover a more favorable judgment in the district court than before the justice of the peace, such appellant shall pay all costs accruing after the appeal.” Now, if we suppose that the words "more favorable" are used in the five hundred and twenty-second section to express a change, however small in amount, in favor of the party appealing, then a moment's scrutiny of the accompanying language discovers two possible constructions, one of which was adopted by the district court, and the other of which is contended for here by plaintiffs in error. Plaintiffs in error are arguing that the section was intended to provide for every case in which a party appellant fails to get the judgment enhanced or reduced in his favor, while the judge of the district court concludes that the section was only meant to cover the case of a party who has obtained a judgment in his favor before a justice, and who, not content with the amount of it, seeks by appeal a larger award. Either of these constructions, if put in practice, would, it seems to us, often work unnecessary hardship.

In every case where an appeal effected no substantial change in the judgment appealed from, the appellee would be unjustly a sufferer, in having been compelled to resist it and await its termination, a still greater sufferer if compelled to pay the costs of it, and the victim of yet more aggravated wrong if he were the one whom the successive judgments showed to have been from the first in the right of the litigation. After very careful consideration, we are persuaded that neither the construction of the plaintiffs in error, nor that of the judge of the district court, is the true one. Both these considerations are strict, and contrary to that liberal rendering which is prescribed by section 763 of the practice act. Each of them is in conflict with the spirit and tends to defeat the aim of section 522. When the legislature makes mention of "a more favorable judgment," they do not mean one larger or less by a dollar or a mill, but one that shows the judgment below to have been substantially wrong. Properly construed, these words forbid the district court to render any judgment in favor of the appellant for costs of his appeal, unless he shall have recovered in that court a judgment substantially more favorable to him than the judgment was which the justice gave. Whether or not, in any particular case, the amount of enhancement or reduction is sufficient to make the judgment substantially more favorable, must of necessity depend upon the peculiar circumstances of that case, and be left to the sound

As a rule, a few

discretion of the district judge for his decision. cents or a few dollars, more or less, added to a judgment or subtracted from it, would not suffice to make it "more favorable" within the meaning of the statute. Upon the whole, therefore, our opinion is that the judgment of the district court be affirmed. WINGARD, J., and HoYT, J., concurred.

WHEELER V. PORT BLAKELEY MILL COMPANY.

July Term, 1881.

MECHANICS' LIENS-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.--A notice of a mechanic's lien will be held on demurrer to sufficiently describe the property sought to be charged, when the same is described therein as "a lot of sawlogs marked 'F. & A.,' now lying in a certain slough.

THE SAME-REQUISITES OF STATEMENT OF DEMAND.-The notice of such lien must contain a statement of the full amount of the lienor's demand before any deductions are made, and also the amount thereof after the deduction of all just credits and offsets. Unless each of such amounts is stated, the notice is insufficient. ERROR to the third judicial district court. The opinion states the facts.

Struve, Haines & Leary, for the plaintiff in error.

McNaught, Ferry & McNaught, for the defendant in error.

HOYT, J. In this cause the court below sustained a demurrer to the complaint therein and an exception to such action was duly taken, and said ruling is assigned here as error. The said demurrer was general and, therefore, the only question raised is as to whether or not the said complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The plaintiff in his complaint sought to enforce certain rights growing out of liens claimed on certain sawlogs, and the important question made below as well as here was as to the sufficiency of the notices of said liens as set out in said complaint. Two objections to said notices have been urged and fully argued: First, that they contained no sufficient description of the property sought to be charged; and, second, that the demands of the lienors were not sufficiently set out therein.

The description was as follows: "A lot of sawlogs marked 'F. & A.,' now lying in Ebey's slough." Is this a sufficient description? The statute requires the property to be so described as to render it thereby capable of identification with reasonable certainty. Does the above language so describe anything? What is a lot of logs? The definition of the word "lot" as applicable to its use in the above sentence is given by Webster as follows: "The separate portion belonging to one person, and hence a distinct parcel, a separate part, as a lot of goods. From which it appears that it means more than a mere quantity in this, that while it does not give any information as to the amount of a parcel or aggregation, yet it does clearly show that whatever the amount covered it is a parcel by itself distinct from all others. The description above quoted, therefore, is, in our opinion, equally as definite and certain as it would

have been had it read "A certain 'raft' of sawlogs marked 'F. & A.,' now lying in Ebey's slough." And this we think sufficient, for while it might be presumed that there were other rafts of logs in said slough, yet it would not be presumed, in the absence of proof thereof, that there are such other rafts with the logs therein marked "F. & A." It is doubtless true that upon proof that there were other rafts thus marked in said slough, an ambiguity latent in the description would be developed, but until such proof is made, such ambiguity does not appear, and therefore said description must be held good upon demurrer.

Now as to the second point above stated. Was the statement of the demand as set out in their notice sufficient? This must depend upon the language contained in the statute relating thereto; for however liberal a rule we may adopt in the construction of such laws, we cannot do violence to the language used unless such language is in some degree ambiguous so as to open the door for judicial construction. The statute says that such notices shall contain "a statement of the demand and the amount thereof after deducting as near as possible all just credits and offsets." From this language, it is clear to us that the legislature intended that such statement must contain at least two things, to wit: the full amount of the claim before any deductions were made, and also the amount thereof after the deduction of credit and offsets. Any other construction will no give weight to all the words of the statute, and in the absence of something in the context or in surrounding circumstances to indicate that some other method should be taken by which to arrive at the intention of the legislature, we know of no other rule than to construe the law as it reads, giving to each word therein used its form and ordinary meaning. Not only do we think that the statute thus requires the claim to be set out; but, in our opinion, such a provision was a reasonable and necessary one, as thus requiring the gross as well as the net demand to be set out tends greatly to prevent the filing of fraudulent or exorbitant claims, to the needless embarrassment of the owners of the property.

While we think it essential that the notice should contain the facts above mentioned, it is not, in our opinion, necessary that said essential facts should be stated separately, but only that they appear reasonably certain from the statement taken as a whole. Does the statement of demand in these notices embody the above described essential particulars? We have carefully examined them, and from such examination have been unable to determine the amount of the demand of the lienors, before the deduction of offsets, though the amount of such claims after such deduction fully appears, and we are, therefore, of the opinion that the statement of the demand in said notices is insufficient, for the reason that one of the above recited necessary averments was not sufficiently stated. The statement of the demand being thus defective, the notices were void and of no effect. Several other objections to the complaint have been argued by counsel, but as it is conceded that unless said

notices are valid, the action cannot be sustained, we do not deem it necessary to discuss the other questions raised.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the court below must therefore be affirmed.

GREENE, C. J., and WINGARD, J., concurred.

WADDELL ET AL. V. THE STEAMER DAISY

July Term, 1881.

APPEAL IN ADMIRALTY, PETITION FOR.-A petition for an appeal in admiralty from a definitive sentence, or for apostles, is not required to be in writing.

LETTERS DISMISSORY OF ADMIRALTY CAUSE.-The allowance of an appeal, in admiralty, and the granting of time by the lower court in which to perfect the same, is a sufficient letters dismissory of the cause.

THE FILING OF AN APPELLATORY LIBEL IS UNNECESSARY in this country on an appeal in admiralty.

AN APPEAL IN ADMIRALTY IS SUFFICIENT IN POINT OF TIME when the same was taken and allowed at the time of sentence, and perfected within the time fixed by the court.

NO MONITION FROM THE APPELLATE COURT is necessary to the perfection of an appeal in admiralty, when the same is allowed by the lower court without the intervention of such monition.

MARITIME CONTRACT, COMPLETED VESSEL.-Whether a contract for putting machinery into a steamer is a maritime one, so as to be enforceable in admiralty by a proceeding in rem, depends upon the fact whether the putting in of said machinery was a necessary part of the construction of said steamer as a completed vessel, consideration being had to the purposes for which she was intended. If the machinery were used in such construction, the contract was not a maritime one.

THE SAME.-A contract to furnish machinery to a steamer, which exists merely as an inchoate hull upon the ways, is not a maritime one.

PROCEEDINGS IN REM AGAINST VESSEL, POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO AUTHORIZE.-Whether the territorial legislature has power to authorize a proceeding in rem against a vessel for materials used in its construction, quare. However this may be, it has never sufficiently exercised such power so as to warrant a court in upholding such a proceeding.

SUB-CONTRACTOR, LIEN OF ON VESSEL.-Under the lien law of this territory, a sub-contractor has no lien upon a vessel for materials furnished by him to the contractor, and used in the construction of the vessel.

FEES IN ADMIRALTY CASES.-Section 823 et sequitur of the revised statutes of the United States, providing what the per foliam fee shall be in admiralty cases in the circuit and district courts of the United States, apply to such cases in the territorial courts. The territorial legislature has no power to regulate such fees.

APPEAL from the second judicial district court. The opinions state the facts.

Hanford, Burk & Rasin, for the appellants.

Struve, Haines & Leary, for the appellee.

HOYT, J. The attorneys for the respondents having reserved the right so to do in their brief, now move the court to dismiss the appeal herein, for the reasons stated in their brief, as follows: First, no petition for appeal, no petition for apostles, and no letters dismissory, signed by the judge of the court below, have been filed, and none are called for by the notice of appeal; second, no appellatory libel has been filed; third, the appeal was not taken or perfected at the time or at the same term the decree was entered, or at any regular term of the court entering said decree. They also now urge the further point that no monition issued out of this court to the court below to transmit the proceedings to this court.

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