variety of acts, some of which appear to have only a remote connection with the courts.

Contempts may be divided into two classes:

1. Direct, "which openly insults or resists the powers of the court, or the persons of the judges who preside there."

2. Consequential, "which (without such gross insolence or direct opposition) plainly tend to create an universal disregard of their authority.”

They may be also thus classified:

1. Those committed in the court itself; for example, by persistently applauding during a trial, or any other willful disturbance.

2. Those committed out of court; for example, by tampering with witnesses, jurors, etc.

The following are the chief instances:(0)

(a.) By inferior judges and magistrates-by acting unjustly, oppressively, or irregularly in their administration; or by disobeying writs issued out of the superior courts; by proceeding in a cause after it has been put a stop to or removed by writ of prohibition, certiorari, error, supersedeas, and the like. These are regarded as contempts of the superior courts (and especially the queen's bench division), which have a general superintendence over all inferior jurisdictions.

(b.) By sheriffs, bailiffs, jailers, and other officers of the court-by abusing the process of the law, or deceiving the parties by any acts of oppression, extortion, collusive beLavior, or culpable neglect of duty.

(c.) By solicitors, who are also officers of the court-by gross instances of fraud and corruption, injustice to clients, or other dishonest practices. (p)

(d.) By jurymen-in collateral matters relating to the discharge of their office, as by making default when summoned; refusing to be sworn or to give any verdict; eating or drinking without the leave of the court, especially at the

(0) 2 Hawk., c. 22.

(p) As to a barrister, v. Ex parte Pater, 5 B. & S. 299.

cost of either party; and other misbehavior of a similar kind; but not in the mere exercise of their judicial capacities, as by giving a false or erroneous verdict.

(e.) By witnesses-by making default when summoned; refusing to be sworn or examined, or prevaricating in their evidence when sworn.

(f.) By the parties to any suit or proceeding before the court, who by force of fraud willfully prevent or obstruct the course of justice; also by disobedience to any rule or order, made in the progress of a cause; by non-payment of costs, or by non-observance of awards which have been made rules of court.

(g.) By any persons—including a great variety of acts which imply disrespect to the court's authority. Any riotous, noisy, or indecent conduct in court, calculated to interrupt the proceedings, or to bring discredit upon the court.

Of another class are those committed by the offender not present in court; for example, by disobeying or treating with disrespect the queen's writ, or the rules or the process of the court; by perverting such writ or process to the purposes of private malice, extortion, or injustice; by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts of causes then depending in judgment; and by any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect, which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority is entirely lost among the people.(g)

The proceedings on a contempt of court are of two kinds: 1. If the contempt is committed in the face of the court, the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges, without any further proof or examination.

2. In the case of contempts committed out of court, if the judges see sufficient ground to suspect that a contempt has been committed, they either make a rule on the suspected party to show cause why an attachment should not

(9) As to contempt in general, see Miller v. Knox, 4 Bing. (N. C.)

574.

issue against him; or, in very flagrant cases, the attachment issues in the first instance.

[Power to punish contempts is inherent in courts of record. Hence, where a statute enumerates certain acts as punishable contempts, without expressly limiting the jurisdiction to such acts, the jurisdiction extends to others not enumerated. In re Moore et al., 63 N. C. 397; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384. Semble, contra: Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa, 245. In Ohio, the jurisdiction was expressly restricted to cases named in the statute. 1 S. & C. 258. As it is in the federal courts. Rev. Stats. 725. A publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, is a punishable contempt. Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. C. C. 77; Brunson's case, 12 Johns. 460; Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 438; In re Moore et al., 63 N. C. 397; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195. Contra: Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. (4 Smed. & M.), 751; Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa, 245. Jurisdiction over such contempts, in Kentucky, is taken away by statute. Rev. Stat. (1877), 357.

Proceedings upon a contempt are criminal proceedings, though begun in a civil suit. United States v. Wayne, Wall. C. C. 134; People v. Craft, 7 Paige, 325; Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196. The judgment is not reviewable, unless such review is provided by statute. In re Cooper,

32 Vt. 429; Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant (Penn.) Cas. 453. At least for contempt committed in open court. State v. Woodfin, 5 Ired. Law, 199; Easton v. State, 39 Ala. 551; Grove v. State, 24 Tex. 12; Casey v. State, 25 Tex. 380. Appellate court will not retry the question of contempt, but will correct the sentence, if that be illegal. Bickley v. Commonwealth, 1 J. J. Marsh. 575; Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. (Ky.), 619. No appeal, unless allowed by statute. Hunter v. State, 6 Ind. 423. But the right of appeal, in such cases, is given by the provision giving the right of appeal in all criminal cases. Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196. Can be reviewed in Michigan by writ of error. Rev. Stat. (1871), 1969; see People v. Simonson, 9 Mich. 492; Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 449. Is reviewable on petition in error, in Ohio. Lowe v. State, 9 Ohio St. 337. In Ohio, a written charge of the matter alleged to be a contempt must be filed before adjudication and hearing allowed on it, even in case of contempt committed in open court, in presence and hearing of the court. Lowe v. State, 9 Ohio St. 337. In Kentucky, punishment for contempt shall not exceed a fine of thirty dollars, or imprisonment for thirty hours, unless the fact of contempt be first ascertained by verdict of a jury. Rev. Stat (1877), 356.

For full consideration of procedure in cases of contempt, see Cartwright's case, 114 Mass. 230, and Spinning et al. v. Ohio Trust Co., 2 Disney (Sup. Ct. Cin.), 354.]

CHAPTER V.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE.

MANY of the crimes mentioned in other chapters involve a breach of the peace. But the offenses now to be dealt with are those in which the breach of the peace is the prominent feature. In some― for example, in libel-at first sight the injury done to the individual appears to be the principal point; but a consideration of the way in which the law deals with the offense shows that it is otherwise. Thus, proof of the truth of a libel will not amount to a defense, unless it was for the public benefit that the matter should be published.

RIOTS. (r)

There are two minor offenses, which, as steps to the graver crime of riot, must first be noticed.

An unlawful assembly is any meeting of three or more persons under such circumstances of alarm, either from the large numbers, the mode or time of the assembly, etc., as in the opinion of firm and rational men are likely to endanger the peace; there being no aggressive act actually done. (8) All parties joining in and countenancing the proceedings are criminally liable. It is generally considered that the intention must be to do something which, if actually executed, would amount to a riot. (t) But a lawful assembly is not rendered unlawful by reason of the knowledge of those taking part in it that opposition will be raised to it, which opposition will in all probability give rise to a breach of the peace by those creating it. (u)

A rout is said to be the disturbance of the peace caused by those who, after assembling together to do a thing which, if executed, would amount to a riot.

(r) For riotous destruction of churches and other buildings, v. p. 266. (s) R. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91.

(t) For unlawful assemblies of another nature, v. p. 58.

(u) Beatty v. Gillbanks, 51 L. J. (M. C.) 117; 9 Q. B. D. 308.

A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons,assembling together of their own authority, with an intent mutually to assist one another against any who oppose them in the execution of some enterprise of a private nature, and afterward actually executing the same, in a turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, and this whether the act intended be of itself lawful or unlawful.(u)

An example will more clearly show the difference between these three crimes. A hundred men, armed with sticks, meet together at night to consult about the destruction of a fence which their landlord has erected: this is an unlawful assembly. They march out together, from the place of meeting, in the direction of the fence: this amounts to a rout. They arrive at the fence, and, amid great confusion, violently pull it down: this is a riot.

To constitute a riot, the object need not be unlawful, if the acts are done in a manner calculated to inspire terror. But there must be an unlawful assembling; therefore a disturbance arising among people already met together will be a mere affray; unless, indeed, there be a deliberate forming into parties. The object must be of a local or private nature; otherwise, as if to redress a public grievance, it amounts to treason.(x)

The gist of the offense is the unlawful manner of proceeding, that is, with circumstances of force or violence. Therefore assembling for the purpose of an unlawful object, and actually executing it, is not a riot, if it is done peaceably.(y)

These three offenses are misdemeanors, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.

For the case of riots which assume a more formidable aspect further provision is made by statute.(2) If twelve or more persons are unlawfully assembled to the disturbance of the peace, and being required by proclamation, (a) by a justice of the peace, sheriff, or under-sheriff, mayor,

(u) 1 Hawk., c. 65, ? 1.

(y) v. 1 Hawk., c. 65.

44

(a) 'Reading the riot act."

(x) v. p. 49.

(z) Riot act, 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 5.