sion, if the deed is not committed, is only a misdemeanor.(1) Accessory after the fact.-One who, knowing a felony to have been committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon.(b) What is required to make a person an accessory after the fact? (a) There must have been some felony committed and completed; (b) the party larged must have had notice, direct or implied, at the time he assists, etc., the felon, that he had committed the felony; (c) he must have done some act to assist the felon personally. It will suffice if there has been any assistance given in order to hinder the felon's apprehension, trial, or punishment; for example, concealing him in the house, supplying him with horse or money to facilitate his escape. But merely suffering the principal to escape will not make the party an accessory after the fact.(c) Receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen is generally treated as a separate offense; the receiver being convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or summary offense, according as the stealing of the property is a felony, misdemeanor, or offense punishable on summary conviction.() If, however the stealing, obtaining, etc., is a felony, the receiver may be indicted either as an accessory after the fact, or for a substantive felony.(e) (1) In states where there is a common-law jurisdiction as to crimes, the accessory can be tried only jointly with the principal, or after the conviction of the principal. Able v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 698; Tully v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush, 154. But in states where there are none but statutory crimes, the accessory, when guilty, is guilty of a substantive crime, and can therefore be tried, though the principal has not been indicted. Noland v. State, 19 Ohio, 131; Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496; Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind. 52. But, in Indiana, an accessory can not be convicted after the alleged principal has been acquitted. McCarty v. State, 44 Ind. 214. In Michigan, the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, in felony, is abolished, and all concerned in the commission of a felony, as in a misdemeanor, are made principals by statute. 2 Rev. Stat. (1872), 2173, § 7934. (b) 1 Hale, P. C. 618. (e) 1 Hale, P. C. 618, etc.; R. v. Chapple, 9 C. & P. 355. (d) v. p. 218. (e) 24 and 25 Vict., c. 96, 2 91. We have noticed (ƒ) that, as a rule, the wife is protected from criminal liability for acts committed in the presence of her husband. Much more, then, can she claim this immunity when the offense with which she is charged is that of receiving and assisting her husband. There is no exemption in respect of any other relation. Even the husband may be convicted for assisting his wife. An accessory after the fact to a felony may be tried in the same manner as an accessory before the fact; that is, either as an accessory with the principal, or after his conviction, or as for a substantive felony, independently of the principal.(g) But where an indictment contains two counts, the first charging the accused person as principal in a felony, the second charging him as accessory after the fact to the same felony, the prosecution must elect upon which count they will proceed.(h) He is, in general, punishable with imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years (with or without hard labor), and may also be required to find security for keeping the peace, or, in default, to suffer additional imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.) But an accessory after the fact to murder may receive sentence of penal servitude for life, or for any less term to five years or imprisonment not exceeding two years.(j) A receiver of stolen goods is liable to a maximum punishment of penal servitude for fourteen years.(k) It has been observed that the distinction of principals and accessories is found only in the case of felonies. As to treason: Both every kind of incitement which in a felony would make a man an accessory before the fact, and every kind of assistance which would make him an accessory after the fact, in treason will make the offender a principal traitor. This rule is said to exist propter odium delicti. As to misdemeanors: Those who aid or counsel the com (ƒ) v. p. 32. (h) R. v. Brannon, 14 Cox, 394 (g) 24 and 25 Vict., c. 94, 8 3. (i) 24 and 25 Vict., c. 94, § 4. 27 and 28 Vict., c. 47, § 2. mission of the crime are dealt with as principals;() those who merely assist after the misdemeanor has been committed are not punishable, unless indeed the act amount to the misdemeanor of rescue, obstructing the officer, or the like.(m) The following outline of the present state of the law on the subject of degrees of guilt may serve to place the matter in a clearer light: There are no accessories in treason or misdemeanors, only in felonies. Principals, whether of the first or second degree, are virtually dealt with in the same way. Accessories, whether before or after the fact, may be treated as such, or as charged with a substantive felony; but if once tried in either of these capacities, the other may not be afterward resorted to. Accessories before the fact receive the same punishment as principals; accessories after the fact generally imprisonment not exceeding two years. In the following imaginary case examples of each of the four kinds of participation in a crime will be found. A. incites B. and C. to murder a person. B. enters the house and cuts the man's throat, while C. waits outside to give warning in case any one should approach. B. and C. flee to D., who, knowing that the murder has been completed, lends horses to facilitate their escape. Here B. is principal in the first degree, C. in the second degree, A. is accessory before the fact, D. after the fact. (1) 24 and 25 Vict., c. 94, 8 8. (m) R. v. Greenwood, 21 L. J. (M. C.) 127. BOOK II. CLEARLY it will be advisable to adopt some logical plan in treating of the various offenses which come under the cognizance of tribunals of criminal jurisdiction. Though, of course, crimes which primarily affect the state or the public also affect the individuals who constitute that state or public; and crimes which in their immediate effect wrong individuals indirectly or are productive of public evil, yet the division of crimes into Offenses of a Public Nature and Offenses of a Private Nature or against Individuals, may be resorted to without fear of confusion. There are other possible modes of arrangement; for example, according to the different tribunals before which, or the different processes by which, the crimes are prosecuted (as in the French penal code), according to the punishments with which the crimes are visited, etc. Taking as the main division that indicated above, the general order will be determined, as far as possible, by the wideness of the province of the various crimes, thus commencing with offenses against the law of nations. (42) PART I. OFFENSES OF A PUBLIC NATURE. CHAPTER I. OFFENSES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS. CERTAIN offenses are regarded as violating those unwritten laws which are admitted by nations in general, and which it is their duty to have enforced. It must not be assumed that any state is at liberty to take upon itself the punishment of an offense against the law of nations, if such offense is committed within the territories of a foreign jurisdiction. The most that it can do in such case is to demand that justice be done by the foreign state; and if such state implicates itself in the offense by neglecting to proceed against the offender, then to put on pressure to enforce its requirements. But the case is otherwise if the offense is committed in parts which are considered extraterritorial, such as the high seas. In these, all nations. equally have an interest, and will proceed against individuals who are guilty of offenses against the law of nations. PIRACY. The term includes both the common-law offense, and also certain offenses which have been provided against by particular statutes. Piracy at common law. (a)―The offense consists in committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed upon land, would have (a) v. Phillimore, vol. 1. c. 20 |