seas in fact, however they may be designated. And seas in fact do not cease to be such, and become lakes, because by local custom they may be so called. in their territorial jurisdiction. As we have | gating those waters and the persons on board before stated, a vessel is deemed part of the remains unaffected. The limitation to the territory of the country to which she belongs. jurisdiction by the qualification that the ofUpon that subject we quote the language of fenses punishable are committed on vessels Mr. Webster, while Secretary of State, in in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, his letter to Lord Ashburton of August, 1842. creek, basin, or bay "without the jurisdiction Speaking for the government of the United of any particular state," which means without States, he stated with great clearness and the jurisdiction of any state of the Union, force the doctrine which is now recognized does not apply to vessels on the *"high [266 by all countries. He said: "It is natural seas" of the lakes, but only to vessels on the to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of waters designated as connecting with them. its territory, though at sea, as the state re- So far as vessels on those seas are concerned, tains its jurisdiction over them; and, accord- there is no limitation named to the authority ing to the commonly received custom, this of the United States. It is true that lakes, jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels even properly so called, that is, bodies of water in parts of the sea subject to a foreign domin- whose dimensions are capable of measureinent ion. This is the doctrine of the law of na- by the unaided vision, within the limits of tions, clearly laid down by writers of re- a state, are part of its territory and subject ceived authority, and entirely conformable, to its jurisdiction, but bodies of water of an as it is supposed, with the practice of modern extent which cannot be measured by the unnations. If a murder be committed on board aided vision, and which are navigable at all of an American vessel by one of the crew times in all directions, and border on differupon another or upon a passenger, or by a ent nations or states or people, and find their passenger on one of the crew or another pas-outlet in the ocean as in the present case, are senger, while such vessel is lying in a port within the jurisdiction of a foreign state or Sovereignty, the offense is cognizable and punishable by the proper court of the United States in the same manner as if such offense 265] had *been committed on board the vessel on the high seas. The law of England is supposed to be the same. It is true that the jurisdiction of a nation over a vessel belonging to it, while lying in the port of another, is not necessarily wholly exclusive. We do not so consider or so assert it. For any unlawful acts done by her while thus lying in port, and for all contracts entered into while there, by her master or owners, she and they must, doubtless, be answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if her master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption be claimed for them. But, nevertheless, the law of nations, as I have stated it, and the statutes of governments founded on that law, as I have referred to them, show that enlightened nations, in modern times, do clearly hold that the jurisdiction and laws of a nation accompany her ships not only over the high seas, but into ports and harbors, or wheresoever else they may be water-borne, for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights, duties, and obligations of those on board thereof, and that, to the extent of the exercise of this jurisdiction, they are considered as parts of the territory of the nation herself." Webster's Works, vol. 6, pp. 306, 307. We do not accept the doctrine that, because by the treaty between the United States and Great Britain the boundary line between the two countries is run through the center of the lakes, their character as seas is changed, or that the jurisdiction of the United States to regulate vessels belonging to their citizens navigating those waters and to punish of fenses committed upon such vessels, is in any respect impaired. Whatever effect may be given to the boundary line between the two countries, the jurisdiction of the United States over the vessels of their citizens navi In our judgment the District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan had jurisdiction to try the defendant upon the indictment found, and it having been transferred to the circuit court, that court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial, and the demurrer to its jurisdiction should have been overruled. Our opinion, in answer to the certificate, is that the courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under section 5346 of the Revised Statutes, to try a person for an assault, with a dangerous weapon, committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, when such vessel is in the Detroit river, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada; and it will be returned to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Sixth Circuit and Eastern District of Michigan, and it is so ordered. Mr. Justice Gray dissenting: The opinion of the majority of the court is avowedly based upon the hypothesis that the open waters of the Great Lakes are "high seas," within the meaning of section 5346 of the Revised Statutes, on which the indictment in this case is founded. n That hypothesis I am unable to accept. It appears to me to be inconsistent *with [267 the settled meaning of the term "high seas, in our law, and in common speech, and especially as used in the Crimes Acts of the United States, as heretofore uniformly expounded by this court, and by the justices thereof. According to all the authorities, without exception, "the high seas" denote the ocean, the common highway of all nations-sometimes as including, sometimes as excluding, bays and arms of the sea, or waters next the coast, which are within the dominion and jurisdiction of particular states-but never as extending to any waters not immediately connecting with the sea. United The first Crimes Act of the United States | and Judge Betts held that a vessel in the East provided, in section 8, for the punishment of river, or western extremity of Long Island murder or other capital offense committed Sound, was not upon the high seas. "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, States v. Wilson, 3 Blatchf. 435. basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any The Crimes Act of March 3, 1825, chap. particular state;" and, in section 12, for the 65, was drafted by Mr. Justice Story, to suppunishment of any person who should "com- ply the defects of former acts. 1 Story, Life mit manslaughter upon the high seas,' but of Story, 297, 437, 439, 440; 2 Story, Life not mentioning in that section any other of Story, 402. That Act, in sections 4, 6-8, waters. Act of April 30, 1790, chap. 9, 111 and 22, provided for the punishment of Stat. at L. 113, 115. In United States v. murder, of assaults with a dangerous weapon Wiltberger, decided by this court in 1820, it or with intent to kill, and of various other was adjudged that manslaughter committed crimes. "upon the high seas, or in any arm by the master upon one of the seamen, on of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, board a merchant vessel of the United States, basin or bay," thus covering all tide waters, below low water mark of a river flowing into including a dock or basin, or a landlocked the sea in China, was not "manslaughter bay, in which the tide ebbs and flows from upon the high seas,' nor within the Act of the sea, though in a foreign state, if [269 1790; and Chief Justice Marshall, in deliver-within the admiralty jurisdiction of the ing judgment, said: "If the words be taken United States, and out of the jurisdiction according to the common understanding of of any particular state" of the Union. 4 Stat. mankind, if they be taken in their popular at L. 115-118, 122. and received sense, the high scas,' if not in all instances confined to the ocean which washes a coast, can never extend to a river about half a mile wide, and in the interior of a country.' 18 U. S. 5 Wheat. 76, 94 [5: 37, 42]. In United States v. Brailsford, this court held that the words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," in section 8 of the Act of 1790, meant a state of the Union, and not a foreign state; and that a ship lying at anchor in an open roadstead, within a marine league of a foreign shore, and not in a river, haven, basin or bay, might be found by a jury to be on the high seas. 18 U. S. Wheat. 184, 189, 200 [5: 64, 65, 68]. A 268] similar *decision had been previous ly made by Mr. Justice Story. United States V. Ross, 1 Gall. 624. In United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, which was an indictment on the provision of section 22 of the Act of 1825 (re-enacted in the very section of the Revised Statutes now in question) for an assault with a dangerous weapon and with intent to kill, Mr. Justice Story, in deciding that a place in Boston harbor within the body of a county was a bay or haven or arm of the sea, but was not the high seas, said: "There cannot, I think, be any doubt as to what is the true meaning of the words 'high seas' in this statute. Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Commentaries (1 Bl. Com. 110) uses the words 'high sea' and 5'main sea' (altum mare, or le haut meer) as synonymous; and he adds, that the main sea begins at the low water mark.' But though this may be one sense of the terms, to distinguish the divided empire, which the admiralty possesses between high water and low water mark, when it is full sea, from that which the common law possesses, when it is ebb sea; yet the more common sense is, to express the open, unenclosed ocean, or that portion of the sea, which is without the fauces terræ on the seacoast, in contradistinction to that, which is surrounded or enclosed between narrow headlands or promontories." And, after referring to United States v. Wiltberger, above cited, and other authorities, he concluded: "From this view of the subject, I am entirely satisfied, as well upon the language of the authorities, as the descriptive words in the context, that the words high scas' in this statute are used in contradistinction to arms of the sea, and bays, creeks, etc. within the narrow headlands of the coast; and comprehend only the open ocean. which washes the seacoast, or is not included with the body of any county in any particular state." 5 Mason, 297-299. In United States v. Hamilton, Mr. Justice Story held that larceny in an enclosed dock, within the ebb and flow of the tide, in a foreign port, was not larceny "upon the high seas, under section 16 of the Act of 1790. 1 Mason, 152. In United States v. Morel, it was held by Mr. Justice Baldwin and Judge Hopkinson, that an indictment on the same section was not sustained by proof of stealing in a land locked harbor of one of the Bahama Islands; the court saying: "The open sea, the high sea, the ocean, is that which is the common highway of nations, the common domain within the body of no country, and under the particular right or jurisdiction of no sovereign, but open, free and common to all alike, as a common and equal right." 13 Am. Jur. 279, 282. And in United States v. Jackson, a like decision was made by Mr. Justice Thompson and Judge Betts as to larceny in the harbor of Vera Cruz, because "the high seas were, properly speaking, within the territory of no state or country. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 3, 4. In United States v. Robinson, 4 Mason, 307, which was an indictment on the Act of March 26, 1804, chap. 40 (2 Stat. at L. 290) for destroying a vessel "on the high seas" with intent to defraud the underwriters, Mr. Justice Story held that a landlocked bay in Bermuda could not be considered as the high seas. And, under the same statute, Mr. Justice Nelson Here we have the deliberate opinion of Mr. Justice Story, who had drafted the Act, who had taken part in all the previous decisions of this court upon the subject, and who had often considered it at the circuit, that the words "high seas" in the very enactment now before us "comprehend only the *open [270 ocean, which washes the sea coast, or is not included within the body of any county in any particular state." delivering that judgment, clearly distinguished the Great Lakes from the high seas. This appears in his statement of the question whether "the admiralty jurisdiction, in mat So Chancellor Kent says: "The high seas mean the waters of the ocean without the boundary of any county, and they are with in the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty up to high water mark when the tide is full.ters of contract and tort, which the courts of The open ocean which washes the seacoast is used in contradistinction to arms of the sea enclosed within the fauces terræ, or narrow headlands and promontories: and under this head are included rivers, harbors, creeks, basins, bays, etc., where the tide ebbs and flows." 1 Kent, Com. 367. If we turn to the principal Amercian dictionaries, we find the following definitions of "high seas": In Worcester, high seas, the open ocean. In Webster, "high seas, (law) the open sea; the part of the ocean not in the territorial waters of any particular Sovereignty, usually distant three miles or more from the coast line." In the Century Dictionary, "high seas" are defined as "the open sea or ocean; the highway of waters;" and, in law, either (1) the waters of the ocean to high water mark, or (2) those "not within the territorial jurisdiction of any nation, but the free highway of all nations, the waters of the ocean exterior to a line parallel to the general direction of the shore and distant a marine league therefrom;" and it is added: "The Great Lakes are not deemed high seas. A fortnight after the passage of the Act of 1825, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, decided that the general admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States was limited to tide waters. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U. S. 10 Wheat. 428 [6: 358]. That decision was followed in 1833, in Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U. S. 7 Pet. 324 [8: 700], in 1837, in The Orleans, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 175 [9: 677], and in 1847, in Waring v. Clarke, 46 U. S. 5 How. 441 [12: 226]. For more than half a century after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress took no step towards extending the admiralty jurisdiction beyond such waters. In the Act of February 26, 1845, chap. 20, extending that jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort, "upon the lakes and the navigable waters connecting the same," Congress clearly treated those lakes and waters as distinct from, and not included within, "the high seas or tide waters." 5 271] Stat. at L. 726. *And Congress never | indicated any intention to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the United States "to the Great Lakes and the connecting waters" until three years after the assault alleged in the indictment in this case. Act of September 4, 1890, chap. 874, 26 Stat. at L. 424. the United States may lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes, under the power to regulate commerce;" as well as in his pregnant observations, "These lakes are, in truth, inland seas. Different states border on them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other. 53 U. S. 12 How. 452, 453 [13: 1062]. So in The Eagle v. Fraser, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 15 [19: 365], in which it was decided that the admiralty jurisdiction over all navigable waters, having been declared in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, to depend upon the Constitution, and not upon any Act of Congress, extended to the British side of the Detroit river, Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking for this court, observed the same distinction, saying that the district courts could take cognizance of "all civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction upon the lakes and waters connecting them, the same as upon the high seas, bays and rivers navigable from the sea. 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 21 [19: 368]. The lakes are not high seas, for the very reason that they are inland seas, within the exclusive jurisdiction and control of those countries within whose territories they lie, or between whose territories they are the boundary; and therein essentially differ from "the high seas, where the law of no particular *state has exclusive force, but [272 all are equal." Bradley, J., in National Steam Nav. Co. v. Dyer ("The Scotland") 105 U. S. 24, 29 [26: 1001, 1003]. The distinction is familiar and well established in international law. As was said by Sir William Scott: "In the sea, out of the reach of cannon shot, universal use is presumed; in rivers flowing through conterminous states, a common use to the different states is presumed." The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. 336, 339. In a case in which a municipal seizure under the Customs Act of March 2, 1799, chap. 22, § 29 (1 Stat. at L. 649) in the St. Mary's river, then forming the boundary between the United States and the Spanish territory, of a vessel bound up that river to the Spanish waters and Spanish possessions, was held unlawful, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for this court, said that, "upon the general principles of the law of nations, the waters of the whole river must be considered as common to both nations, for all purposes of navigation, as a common highway, necessary for the advantageous use of its own territorial rights and possessions:" and he distinguished the waters of the river, common to the two nations between whose dominions it flowed, from "the ocean, the common highway of all nations." The Apollon, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 362, 369, 371 [6: 111, 113]. Vattel says: "The open sea is not of a The judgment of this court in 1851, in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. 443 [13: 1058], overruling The Thomas Jefferson and the cases which followed it, and holding the Act of 1845 to be constitutional, did not proceed upon any assumption that the Great Lakes were "high seas;" but upon the broad ground that "the lakes and the waters connecting them are undoubtedly pub-nature to be possessed, no one being able to lic waters," and therefore "within the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in the Constitution of the United States." 53 U. S. 12 How. 457 [13: 1064]. Chief Justice Taney. in settle there so as to hinder others from passing over it." 1 Vattel, chap. 23, § 280. "No nation, therefore, has the right to take possession of the open sea, or to claim the sole use of it, to the exclusion of other nations."281. "Every lake, entirely included in a country, belongs to the nation owning the country, which in possessing itself of a territory is considered as having appropriated to itself everything included in it; and, as it seldom happens that the property of a lake of considerable size falls to individuals, it remains common to the nation. If this lake is situated between two states, it is presumed to be divided between them at the middle, so long as there is neither title, nor constant and manifest custom, to determine otherwise." chap. 22. § 274. Wheaton says: "The sea cannot become 273] the exclusive property *of any nation. And consequently the use of the sea, for these purposes" (navigation, commerce and fisheries) remains open and common to all mankind." Wheat. International Law (8th ed.) § 187. "The territory of the state includes the lakes, seas and rivers, entirely enclosed within its limits. The rivers which flow through the territory also form a part of the domain, from their sources to their mouths, or as far as they flow within the territory, including the bays or estuaries formed by their junction with the sea. Where a navigable river forms the boundary of conterminous states, the middle of the channel is generally taken as the line of separation between the two states, the presumption of law being that the right of navigation is common to both; but this presumption may be destroyed by actual proof of prior occupancy and long undisturbed possession, giving to one of the riparian proprietors the exclusive title to the entire river." § 192. Phillimore, after observing that "no difficulty can arise with respect to rivers and lakes entirely enclosed within the limits of a state," and discussing the rights in rivers which flow through more than one state, and the rights in the open sea, in narrow seas or straits, and in portions of the sea next the coast or between headlands, says: "With respect to seas entirely enclosed by the land, so as to constitute a salt water lake, the general presumption of law is, that they belong to the surrounding territory or territories in as full and complete a manner as a freshwater lake. The Caspian and the Black Sea naturally belong to this class." And he proceeds to show that the rights of other nations than Turkey and Russia to navigate the Black Sea from the Mediterranean rest upon treaties only. 1 Phillim. International Law (3d ed.) arts. 155, 205, 205a. See also Wheat. International Law, § 182 and note; Treaty of 1862 of the United States with the Ottoman Empire, art. 11 (12 Stat. at L. 1216). The Mediterranean Sea, opening directly into the Atlantic Ocean at the Straits of Gibraltar, and washing the shores of many countries of different sovereigns, has, except ing such portions thereof as the Gulf of 274] Venice or the Straits of Messina, *been recognized and considered by all nations for centuries as part of the high seas, free to all mankind. Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, S42; Wheat. International Law, § 190. And it was the one sea familiarly known to the ancients as altum mare, the deep sea or "high sea," or simply altum, the deep. The freedom of the Baltic Sea, and of the sound connecting it with the North Sea, long and earnestly controverted, was finally estab lished in 1857 by a treaty of the five powers whose territories bordered thereon with other European nations, and by a separate treaty between the United States and Denmark. Wheat. International Law, SS 183-185, 187, note: 1 Phillim. International Law, arts. 179, 206; 11 Stat. at L. 719. As to the Great Lakes of North America, there has never been any doubt. They are in the heart of the continent, far above the flow of the tide from the sea. Lake Michigan is wholly within the limits and dominion of the United States, and of those states of the Union which surround it. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 [36: 1018], 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 172. The middle line of lakes Superior, Huron, Erie and Ontario, and of the waters connecting them, forms part of the boundary between the United States and the state of Michigan and other states of the Union, on the one hand, and the British possessions in Canada, on the other. Treaties of Paris in 1783, art. 2, and of Ghent in 1814, art. 6, and Decision of Commissioners under this article; 8 Stat. at L. 81, 221, 274; Charters and Constitutions, 994, 1453, 2026. No other nation has the right to navigate them, except by the permission, and subject to the laws, of the United States and Great Britain, respectively. The controversy between the United States and Great Britain as to the right of navigating the river St. Lawrence turned upon the effect to be given to the fact that one side of the Great Lakes and of the waters connecting them belonged to each country, as against the fact that both shores of the St. Lawrence below belonged to Great Britain; and it was never suggested that any third nation had a free and common right of navi gation of the lakes and their connecting waters. On the contrary, the exclusive right of the United States and Great Britain to navigate the lakes was *made the basis [275 of the American claim to the navigation of the river. On June 19, 1826, Mr. Clay, Secretary of State under President John Quincy Adams, in a letter to Mr. Gallatin, then Minister to England, said: "The United States and Great Britain have, between them the exclusive right of navigating the lakes. The St. Lawrence connects them with the ocean. The right to navigate both (the lakes and the ocean) includes that of passing from the one to the other through the natural link." Congressional Documents, 1827-28, No. 43, p. 19; Wheat. International Law, § 205. The right of citizens of the United States to navigate the St. Lawrence, as well as a right to British subjects to navigate Lake Michigan, was secured by treaties between the two countries in 1854 and 1871. 10 Stat. at L. 1091; 17 Stat. at L. 872. See also Act of July 26, 1892, chap. 248 (27 Stat. at L. 267); 1 Whart. International Law Dig. §§ 30, 31. No instance has been produced, in which the words "high seas" have been used to des ignate fresh inland waters, the entire juris- | the tide; every word in the description aptly diction and control of which belong to those designates tide waters; all the words, taken nations within whose territories they lie, or together, point to tide waters; and no other between whose territories they form the boundary. The conclusion seems to me inevitable that no part of the Great Lakes can be held to be "high seas," within the meaning of section 5346 of the Revised Statutes. The language of this section, immediately following the term "the high seas," is "or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin or bay." It is quite clear that the Detroit river is not an "arm of the sea, or a "haven, creek, basin or bay." Is it a "river," within the meaning of this enactment? Upon this point, I agree with the rest of the court that the language used must be read in conjunction with the term "the high seas,' and as referring to waters connecting with the high seas mentioned; and that Congress cannot be supposed to have intended to include fresh water rivers, and not to include the lakes from or into which they flow, and which, together with them, form a continuous passage for vessels. But if the lakes are not "high seas," nor included in the Act, the consequence would seem to be that the word "river" cannot be held to include a river connecting two of the lakes. 276] *The question now before the court is not one, arising in a civil proceeding, of the extent of the general and comprehensive grant in the Constitution of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" to the courts of the United States. But it is a question, arising in a criminal prosecution, of the construction of particular words in a penal statute, which cannot be extended by the court to a similar or analogous case, not within their natural and obvious meaning. waters come within their natural and obvi. ous meaning, in the connection in which they are used. The evident intention of Congress, to be collected from the words it em ployed, was to punish offenses upon the sea, and upon any waters forming part of the sea, or immediately connecting with it, as far as high water mark, and not within the jurisdiction of any state of the Union; and the whole object *and effect of adding, af- [277 ter "the high seas," the words "or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin or bay, were to cure the defects of earlier statutes in this respect, and to in. clude all waters within the ebb and flow of the tide, which are estuaries or approaches of the high seas or open ocean. Upon this part of the case, the decision of this court in United States v. Berans, 16 U. S. 3 Wheat. 336 [4: 404], is much in point. That was an indictment for a murder committed by a marine upon another enlisted man on a ship of war of the United States lying in the harbor of Boston, and so within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of Massachusetts, and therefore, as the court held, not coming within the description in section 8 of the Act of April 30, 1790, chap. 9, "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." But the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States was also sought to be maintained under the provision of section 7 of the same Act, for the punishment of murder committed "within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 1 Stat. at L. 113. It was argued that a ship of war of the United States was "a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," and therefore within the Act. But this court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, held otherwise; and, while waiving a decis ion of the question whether any court of Massachusetts would have jurisdiction of the offenses; and recognizing as unquestionable the power of Congress to punish an offense committed by a marine on board a ship of war, wherever she may be; nevertheless held that Congress had not exercised that power by the provision last quoted, because the object with which the word "place" was associated-"fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine," and "district of country"-being all But, in order to come within the statute, fixed and territorial in their character, "the it is not enough that the offense was com- construction seems irresistible that, by the mitted within the admiralty jurisdiction words 'other place' was intended another of the United States;" and "out of the juris-place of a similar character with those prediction of any particular state" of the Union;viously enumerated, and with that which and upon a vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or to a citizen thereof. It must also be covered by the description, "upon the high seas, or upon any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin or bay. The place in the Detroit river within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada, where this offense is alleged to have been committed, was doubtless "within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States," under the decision in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. 443 [13: 1058], and was "out of the jurisdiction of any par ticular state, under the decision in United States v. Brailsford, 18 U. S. 5 Wheat. 184 [5 :| 64], already cited. Nor is there any doubt of the power of Congress to punish crimes committed on American vessels, wherever they may be afloat. United States v. Furlong, 18 U. S. 5 Wheat. 184, 194 [5: 64, 67] Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 610, 624-626 [21: 430, 436, 437]. The leading words of this description are applicable to nothing but the ocean and its adjacent waters within the ebb and flow of follows," and "the context shows the mind of the legislature *to have been fixed [278 on territorial objects of a similar character." 16 U. S. 3 Wheat. 390, 391 [4: 417]. Applying the same rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, to the enactment now before the court, the conclusion seems irresistible that, as the preceding words, "upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea." as well as |