a word whose meaning, taken by itself, is clear, has been inaccurately used.84 "Noscitur a Sociis" is an old maxim which summarizes the rule both of language and of law that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those with which they are associated.85 4. The circumstances under which a writing was made may always be shown. The question the court is seeking to answer is the meaning of the writing at the time and place when the contract was made; and all the surrounding circumstances at that time necessarily throw light upon the meaning of the contract. The importance of this rule and the fact that it is sometimes supposed to be applicable only in the case of an ambiguous writing makes necessary some discussion in a subsequent section as well as some definition of what is meant by surrounding circumstances.

86

§ 619. Secondary rules. The main purpose of the instrument will be given effect.

It not infrequently happens that even after the application of the primary principles which have been considered and obtaining all possible light from surrounding circumstances, usages, the nature of the business, and the object of the bargain, it is still uncertain what the contract legally means. Under these circumstances certain rules are recognized as helpful in arriving at a conclusion.

Frederick, 115 Ia. 517, 88 N. W. 1055;
Atkinson v. Sinnott, 67 Miss. 502, 7
So. 289; Simmons v. Groom, 167 N.
Car. 271, 83 S. E. 471; Pendleton v.
Saunders, 19 Or. 9, 24 Pac. 506; Lehigh,
etc., Coal Co. v. Wright, 177 Pa. 387,
35 Atl. 919; Kentzler v. Accident
Assoc., 88 Wis. 589, 60 N. W. 1002.

84 "There is a distinction between an inaccuracy and an ambiguity of language. Language may be inaccurate without being ambiguous, and it may be ambiguous though perfectly accurate. . . . The language may be inaccurate but if the court can determine the meaning of this inaccurate language without any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts upon which, from the nature of lan

guage in general, its meaning depends, the language though inaccurate, could not be ambiguous." Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 543, quoting from Riggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239."

85 Elliott v. Bishop, 10 Exch. 496, 519, 11 Exch. 113; State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 196 Ala. 570, 72 So. 99; Morse v. Fire &c. Ins. Co., 30 Wis. 534, 537, 11 Am. Rep. 587. So in the construction of statutes. State v. Liffring, 61 Ohio St. 39, 50, 55 N. E. 168, 46 L. R. A. 334, 76 Ann. St. Rep. 358; Blake v. Blake, 75 Wis. 339, 43 N. W. 144.

86 Batchelder v. Batchelder, 220 Mass. 42, 107 N. E. 455. See infra, § 629.

1. The court will if possible give effect to all parts of the instrument and a construction which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provisions will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the writing useless or inexplicable; 87 and if this is impossible a construction which gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the contract will be favored. Indeed,

"In many cases a more stringent rule has been laid down, which is that, if the minor provision of the contract is irreconcilable with the obvious general intent, it would for that reason be sacrificed altogether for the promotion of the general purpose of the agreement."

in giving effect to the general meaning of a writing particular words are sometimes wholly disregarded, or supplied.90 Thus "or" may be given the meaning of "and," or vice versa, if the remainder of the agreement shows that a reasonable person in the position of the parties would so understand it.91 Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U. S. 387, 60 L. Ed. 1058, 36 S. Ct. 662; Greil v. Stollenwerck (Ala.), 78 So. 79; English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S. W. 817; New Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Kramer, 57 Colo. 218, 141 Pac. 498; Grimes v. Barndollar, 58 Colo. 421, 148 Pac. 256; Sanitary District v. McMahon & Montgomery Co., 110 Ill. App. 510; Switzer v. Pinconning Mfg. Co., 59 Mich. 488, 26 N. W. 762; Caledonia Coal Co. v. Consolidated Coal Co., 181 Mich. 431, 148 N. W. 187; Home Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 111 Miss. 420, 71 So. 739; McGavock v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 64 Neb. 440, 90 N. W. 230; Fleischman v. Furgueson, 223 N. Y. 235, 119 N. E. 400; Reynolds v. Stockman, 109 S. Car. 112, 95 S. E. 341; McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah, 239, 60 Pac. 1100, 50 L. R. A. 371; Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Utah, 207, 143 Pac. 234; Smith v. Ramsey, 116 Va. 530, 82 S. E. 189.

* Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moo. P. C. 199, 228. In Marx v. American Malting Co., 169 Fed. 582, 584, 95 C. C. A. 80, the court said: "It is a fundamental rule in the interpretation of agreements that we should ascertain the prime object and purpose of the parties, and, in case of ambiguity produced by its minor provisions, the latter should, if possible, be so construed as not to conflict with the main purpose."

89 Edwards v. Jefferson Standard L. Ins. Co., 173 N. Car. 614, 92 S. E. 695; Withington v. Gypsy Oil Co. (Okl.), 172 Pac. 634. Thus in a bond for which the condition provided that a debt should not be paid which was recited in the instrument as an obligation, the word "not" was rejected. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H. L. C. 40.

90 To carry out the main intention manifested in a writing, "words may be transposed, rejected or supplied, if necessary to make its meaning more clear." Potthoff v. Safety Armorite Conduit Co., 143 N. Y. App. Div. 161, 163, 127 N. Y. S. 994. See also Parkhurst v. Smith, Willes, 327, 332; Pacific Surety Co. v. Toye, 224 Mass. 98, 112 N. E. 653.

91 Dumont v. United States, 98 U. S. 142, 25 L. Ed. 65; Manson v. Dayton, 153 Fed. 258, 82 C. C. A. 588; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 120 Ill. 603, 11 N. E. 867; Decker v. Carr, 11 N. Y. App. Div. 432, 42 N. Y. S. 243, affd. 154 N. Y. 764, 49 N. E. 1096; Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 83 Pa. 223; Bettman v. Harness, 42

Clerical or grammatical errors may be corrected; 92 singular or plural language may be treated as if it were the other; 93 and other illustrations might be given of the same principle.94 Punctuation will be disregarded if the words of a contract indicate that it has been erroneously inserted or omitted; 95 but it may aid in determining the meaning of doubtful language. The freedom of construction permissible is, however, necessarily limited by the principle that unexpressed intention is of no legal effect. The reason for interpolating, omitting or disregarding specific words is that in the remainder of the writing an intention is expressed which makes it evident that particular words were erroneously used.

Therefore where there is a repugnancy between general clauses and specific ones, the latter will govern; 96 and even if

W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271, 36 L. R. A. 566. Cf. with Atlantic Terra Cotta Co. v. Masons' Supply Co., 180 Fed. 332, 103 C. C. A. 462; Bridgers v. Ormond, 153 N. C. 113, 68 S. E. 973.

92 Wood v. Coman, 56 Ala. 283; Cox v. Britt, 22 Ark. 567; Sprague v. Edwards, 48 Cal. 239; Kellogg v. Mix, 37 Conn. 243; Atlanta, etc., Railroad Co. v. Spear, 32 Ga. 550; Calumet, etc., Canal & Dock Co. v. Russell, 68 Ill. 426; Aulick v. Wallace, 12 Bush, 531; Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45, 22 N. E. 71, 5 L. R. A. 43; King v. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194, 34 N. W. 689; Fowler v. Woodward, 26 Minn. 347, 4 N. W. 231; Brookman v. Kurzman, 94 N. Y. 272; Hoffman v. Riehl, 27 Mo. 554; Tenney v. Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Burr v. Broadway Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 267; Dodd v. Bartholomew, 44 Ohio St. 171, 5 N. E. 866; Watters v. Bredin, 70 Pa. 235; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 148 Pa. 216, 23 Atl. 985; Eatherly v. Eatherly, 1 Coldw. 461, 78 Am. Dec. 495; Carnagy v. Woodcock, 2 Munf. 234, 5 Am. Dec. 470; Liston v. Jenkins, 2 W. Va. 62.

93 George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564, 26 L. Ed. 232; Cowles Electric, etc., Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 C. C. A. 616,

47 U.S. App. 531; Leith v. Bush, 61 Pa. 395.

94 Boykin v. Bank of Mobile, 72 Ala. 262, 47 Am. Rep. 408; Irwin v. Nichols, 87 Ark. 97, 112 S. W. 209; Berry v. Kowalsky, 95 Cal. 134, 30 Pac. 202, 29 Am. St. Rep. 101; Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International M. E. Co., 140 Ill. 248, 28 N. E. 1044, 33 Am. St. Rep. 234; Schroeder v. Griggs, 80 Kans. 357, 102 Pac. 469; Way v. Greer, 196 Mass. 237, 81 N. E. 1002; Monmouth Park Ass'n v. Wallis Iron Works, 55 N. J. L. 132, 26 Atl. 140, 19 L. R. A. 456, 39 Am. St. Rep. 626.

95 Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 98 Fed. 240, 39 C. C. A. 45, 47 L. R. A. 308; Cowles Electric Smelting Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 Fed. 616; Allen v. United States Fidelity, etc., Co., 269 Ill. 234, 109 N. E. 1035; Burgess v. Badger, 124 Ill. 288, 14 N. E. 850; General Accident, etc., Co. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031, L. R. A. 1917 D. 952; Perry v. J. L. Mott Iron Works Co., 207 Mass. 501, 93 N. E. 798; Rice v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co., 88 Neb. 307, 129 N. W. 425.

96 English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S. W. 817.

there is no actual repugnancy if the words of the contract are taken literally, yet when from the whole instrument it appears that the purpose of the parties was solely directed towards the particular matter to which the special clause or words relate the general words will be restrained.97 Thus the recital of a bond may restrain the literal terms of the condition.98 It is also an accepted principle that "the general words in a release are limited always to that thing or those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given;" 99 and indeed it has been laid down broadly that general words in any contract relating to a particular subject shall be construed as meaning things of the same kind as the particular matters referred to.99 But "general words following an enumeration of particular things may include other things not ejusdem generis, if such appears to have been the intention of the parties." 1

37 Browning v. Wright, 2 B. & P. 13; Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 B. & P. 565, 574; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432, 438, 28 N. E. 780; Whalon v. Kauffman, 19 Johns. 97; Bricker v. Bricker, 11 Ohio St. 240. See also Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U. S. 165, 58 L. Ed. 898, 34 S. Ct. 553.

*Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169, 183, 11 L. Ed. 89; Union Pacific Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 19 U. S. App. 612, 23 L. R. A. 581, 9 C. C. A. 14; Canton Inst. . Murphy, 156 Mass. 305, 31 N. E. 285; Kellogg v. Scott, 58 N. J. Eq. 344, 44 Atl. 190; National Mech. Bkg. Assn. v. Conkling, 90 N. Y. 116, 43 Am. Rep. 146. "If the recitals are clear and the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern the construction. If the recitals are ambiguous and the operative art is clear, the operative part must prevail. If both the recitals and the operative part are clear, but they are inconsistent with each other, the operative part is to be preferred." Ez parte Dawes, 17 Q. B. D. 275, 286; quoted with approval in Williams v. Barkley, 165 N. Y. 48, 57, 58 N. E. 765. * Directors, etc., of the S. W. Ry.

Co. v. Blackmore, L. R. 4 H. L. 610, 623; Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564, 581, 35 L. Ed. 860, 12 S. Ct. 84; Lumley v. Wabash Railway Co., 76 Md. 66, 22 C. C. A. 60; French v. Arnett, 15 Ind. App. 674, 44 N. E. 551; Blair v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 89 Mo. 383, 1 S. W. 350; McIntyre v. Williamson, 1 Edw. Ch. 34; Jeffreys v. Southern Ry. Co., 127 N. C. 377, 37 S. E. 515; cp. Jackson v. Ely, 57 Ohio St. 450, 49 N. E. 792.

994 Agar v. Atheneum Life Assur. Soc., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 725; Hendricks v. Webster, 159 Fed. 927, 87 C. C. A. 107; Fisher Electric Co. v. Bath Iron Works, 116 Mich. 293, 74 N. W. 493; Meyers v. Wood, 173 Mo. App. 564, 158 S. W. 909; New York Metal Ceiling Co. v. New York, 133 N. Y. App. Div. 110, 117 N. Y. S. 632; Smith's Est., 210 Pa. 604, 60 Atl. 255; Daly v. Old, 35 Utah, 74, 99 Pac. 460, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463; Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 532, 539, 91 S. E. 391, 394.

1 Lindeke v. Associates' Realty Co., 146 Fed. 630, 77 C. C. A. 56; Shaw v. Pope, 80 Conn. 206, 209, 67 Atl. 495.

§ 620. Secondary rules: The instrument will be construed if possible so that it shall be effective and reasonable.

A construction which makes the contract lawful will be preferred over one which would make it unlawful; 2 a construction which renders the contract valid and its performance possible will be preferred to one which makes it void or its performance impossible or meaningless; a construction which