Page images
PDF
EPUB

PART time, he might still plead as he may do now, that the feather had worn the diamond something, but it was invisible.

III.

Or a falling

the whole

world.

To make his new paradox good, he telleth us a tale of a drop move tub;-that if a great "tun" (suppose the great tun at Heydelberg) were filled with water, "one little particle" (suppose a drop, or the hundredth part of a drop) "being moved, all the rest would be moved also ;" but "the greatness of the tun altereth not the case, and therefore the same would be true, if the whole world were the tunp." I answer, first, the case is not like. A tun of water is one continued body, apt for motion; but the world is full of contiguous bodies of all sorts, which are more apt to terminate an easy motion than to continue it. Secondly, I deny, that the least particle of water, suppose the hundredth part of a drop, falling into a great tun of water, doth move all the water in the tun. The first particle moves the second, but more weakly than itself was moved; the second moves the third, yet more weakly; the third moveth the fourth, still more weakly; and so successively, until the motive power cease altogether, before the hundredth, or it may be the thousandth, part of the water in the tun be moved. As we see in a stone thrown upwards: the motion is swifter or slower, of longer or of lesser continuance, according to the degree of the first impression of force and the figure of the thing cast upwards; which ceasing by continued diminution, the motion ceaseth. Violent motions are vehement in the beginning, remiss in the middle, and cease in the end. Lastly, I answer, that the case of a great tun and the whole world is not the same. The world is too large a sphere, and exceedeth the activity of poor little weak creatures; which are not able to leave such an impression of might, as should move upwards to the convex superficies of heaven, and downwards to the centre of the earth, and round about to the extremities of the world. If this were true, the fly might say in earnest, 'See what a dust I do raise.' 821 It hath been given out, that the burning of our heaths in England did hurt their vines in France. This had been strange, yet not so strange as his paradox,-that the least motions that are, "are communicated to the whole world;"

Phil., P. II. lib. ii. c. vi. sect. 1. §
12.]

P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxi. pp. 239, 240.]

II.

but wise men looked upon this pretence as a mere scarecrow or DISCOURSE made dragon; the hurt it did was nearer home, to destroy the young moorpouts, and spoil some young burgess's game.

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS ;-NUMBER XXII.

objects

philoso

He "cannot imagine how the question-whether outward Power of objects do necessitate or not necessitate the will-can any concerneth way be referred to moral philosophy." That is his fault. If the moral the objects do necessitate the will, they take away both virtue pher. and vice, that is, moral good and moral evil, which consist in preelection, and cannot stand with antecedent necessitation to one. To reform his error, let him consult with Aristotle ; "Those things that are fair and pleasant" do seem to be "violent" after a sort, "because, being without us, they move and necessitate" agents to act with their beauty and delight; but it is not so'. What he addeth-that "the principles of moral philosophy are the laws","-is an absurd supposititious obtrusion of the municipal law in place of the law of right reason; which error hath formerly been sufficiently refelled'. And to his "horse" that "is lame from some cause that was not in his power"," I answer, that the lameness is a natural or accidental defect in the horse, but to instance in a horse as a fit subject of virtue or vice is a moral defect in him. If he desire to speak to the purpose, he must leave such impertinencies.

seeketh to

hypotheti

solute.

In the next Animadversion, I meet with nothing but a mere still he sawing of the wind, or an altercation about nothing. All the obtrude difference between him and me is concerning an antecedent ne- cal necescessity; but of a necessity of consequence-that when a thing sity for abis produced it must necessarily be so as it is-there can be no question between us. He himself confesseth as much,-"If the Bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule-'Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is,'-he understandeth me not*;”—and he confesseth, that the necessity which he maintaineth, is "an antecedent necessity derived from the beginning of time."

[blocks in formation]

III.

PART And yet, nevertheless, a great part of that altercation which he makes in these Animadversions, is about such a necessity. Socrates confesseth, that naturally he had vicious inclinations. This is no more than a proclivity to evil. If by his own condescension he fall into sin, this is but a hypothetical necessity; yet he maketh it an antecedent necessity. Socrates, by his good endeavours, reformeth his vicious propensions, and acquireth the contrary habits or virtues. This is but a hypothetical necessity, yet he pretendeth it to be antecedent. Lastly, Socrates, by the help of these habits which he himself had acquired, doth freely do virtuous actions. Still here is no necessity but consequent, and still he pretendeth to antecedent. "Either" (saith he) "these habits do necessitate the will, or the will followeth nota." If these habits or somewhat else do not necessitate the will, it may follow freely. But, saith he, if they do only facilitate men to do such acts, "then what they do, they do notb." I deny his consequence. Acquired habits are not solitary, but social and adjuvant, causes of virtuous actions. His next error is yet more gross, making the person of the ing all one preacher, and not the sound of his voice, to be the object of with T. H. hearing; adding, that the preacher's." voice is the same thing

Hearing and speak

a mere "

with the hearing, and a fancy of the hearers." Thus (as com-
monly errors spring from confusion) he confoundeth the
images of sounds with sounds themselves. What then? Is
the report of a cannon, or the sound of a trumpet, turned to
fancy?" By the same reason he may say, that the
preacher himself is nothing but a mere "fancy;" there is as
much ground for the one as for the other. If he go on in this
manner, he will move me beyond "smiling," to laugh out-
right. In what sense the object of sight is the cause of sight,
and in what sense it is not the cause of sight, I have shewed
distinctly. Here he setteth down another "great paradox,” as
he himself styleth it out of gallantry,-"that in all the senses
the object is the agent'." If he had not said "the agent," which
signifieth either the sole agent, or the principal agent, but
[Cic., Tusc. Quæst., iv. 37; De
Fato, c. 5.-Alex. Aphrod., De Fato,
§ vi. p. 31. 8vo. Lond. 1658.]

a

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii.

p. 245.]

b

[Ibid.]

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

[Ibid.]

1 [Ibid.]

[Above in the Castig. of Animadv. Numb. vii, pp. 291, 292.]

f

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii.

p. 245.]

II.

only an agent, we had accorded so far. But the principal DISCOURSE agent in all the senses is the creature endowed with sense, or the sensitive soul perceiving and judging of the object by the proper organ. The preacher's voice and the auditor's hearing have two distinct subjects; otherwise speaking should be hearing, and hearing speaking. I conclude this Castigation 822 with the authority of as good a philosopher as himself, that "it is ridiculous to think external things either fair or delightful to be the causes of human actions, and not rather him who is easily taken with such objects"."

other mo

7.-Acts

vii. 9; xvii.

In the latter part of this Animadversion his errors are There are greater and more dangerous than in the former. He affirmeth, tions than that "the will is produced, generated, and formed, . . in such local. sort as accidents are effected in a corporeal subject," and yet "it" (the will) "cannot be moved"." As if generation, and augmentation, and alteration, were not kinds of motion or mutation'. But the last words-"because it goeth not from place to place"-do shew plainly, that he acknowledgeth no motion but local motion. What? No other natural motion but only local motion? No metaphorical motion? That were strange. We read in Holy Scripture of those who have been "moved with [Heb. xi. fear"-" moved with envy"-" moved with compassion""moved with choler"-" moved by the Holy Ghost." In all 5-Matt. these there is no local motion. Outward persuasives, inward 14; xvii. suggestions, are all motions. God moveth a man to good by i. 41; vi. His preventing grace. The devil moveth a man to sin by his temptations. There are many kinds of motions besides moving from place to place. He himself confesseth in this section, that " we are moved to prayer by outward objects." In the next place, supposing there were no other motions Spirits than local motions, yet he erreth in "attributing no motion to well as any thing but bodies!." The reasonable soul is moved acci- bodies. dentally, according to the motion of the body. The angels are spirits or spiritual substances, no bodies, by his leave; and yet move locally from place to place. Jacob sees "the angels [Gen. xxviii. 12.]

g [Aristot.,] Ethic., lib. III. c. ii. [§ 11.]

h [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

[According to Aristotle, atenous and ἀλλοίωσιs are species of κίνησις (Phys. Auscult., VII. ii. 1.), and yéveσis is a

species of μεταβολὴ (ibid., V. i. 10.).]
[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii.

p. 245.]

[In the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxii. above p. 144.]

1 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxii. p. 245.]

ix. 36; xiv.

27: Mark

34.-Dan.

viii. 7; xi.

11.-2 Pet. i. 21.]

moved as

III.

[Matt. iv. 11; Matt.

PART of God ascending and descending." The "angels came and ministered" unto Christ. The angels "shall gather the elect from the one end of Heaven to the other." The soul of Lazarus was borne by the angels "into Abraham's bosom." xvi. 22; God sent His angel to deliver Peter out of prison; and every

xxiv. 31,

&c.; Luke

Acts xii. 7

10; Heb. i. where useth His angels as "ministering spirits."

14.]

Both bo

dies and spirits

move themselves.

Quality in

fused by God.

Thirdly, he erreth in this also, that "nothing can move, that is not moved itself"." If he mean, that all power to move is from God, he speaketh truly, but impertinently; but if he mean (as he must mean if he mean sense), that nothing moveth which is not moved of some second cause, he speaketh untruly. The angels move themselves. All living creatures do move themselves by animal motion. The inanimate creatures do move themselves; heavy bodies descending downwards, light bodies ascending upwards, according to their own natures; and therefore nature is defined to be "an internal cause or principle of motion and rest"," &c. And even they who held, that "whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," did limit it to natural bodies, and make the form to be the mover in natural motion, and the soul in animal motion".

His last error in this Animadversion (and a dangerous one) is, that "it is not truly said, that acts or habits are infused by God, for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodies"." I wish, for his own quiet and other men's, that he were as great an enemy to errors and innovations, as he is to metaphors and distinctions. Affectation of words is not good, but contention about words is worse. By such an argument a man might take away all zones and zodiac in astronomy, moods and figures in logic, cones and cylinders in geometry; for all these are borrowed terms, as "infusion" is. What logician almost doth not distinguish between acquired habits and infused habits? If all "infusion" be of bodies, then he never “infused” any paradoxical principles into his auditors. When any difference doth arise about expressions, the only question is, whether there be any ground in nature

[ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]
« PreviousContinue »