II. John viii.

whole "land;" and proceedeth from the special instigation of DISCOURSE the devil, who "was a murderer from the beginning." O how heavy (said one) is the weight of innocent blood! How 44. much do all authors, sacred and civil, inveigh against the shedding of innocent blood! Some have apprehended a 791 fish's head in the platter for the head of him they had murdered. Others, after a horrid murder, had been observed to have their hands continually upon their daggers'. This opinion of his takes away all difference between nocent and innocent blood. This inward guilt, these fears of vengeance, and the extraordinary providence of God in the discovery of murders, do proclaim aloud, that there is more in bloodguiltiness than the breach of mutual pacts between man and man.

torney

In the next place, he maketh us an elaborate discourse of T. H. ata lion, and a bear, and an ox', as if he stood probationer for general for the place of attorney-general of the brutes. This is evident, the brute -he hath deserved better of them, than either of his God, or of his religion, or of the human nature.

In the first place, he acquitteth the beasts from the dominion of man, and denieth that they owe him any subjection. He that shall use T. H. his books as the countryman did his prognostication, write down every thing contrary,-fair for foul, and foul for fair, true for false, and false for true,-if he could get but a good wager upon each opinion, would have advantage enough. I hope he doth not understand it of a political "dominion" or subjection, but only that the other creatures were designed by God for the use and service of men; in the same sense that Virgil saith,

"Sic vos non vobis vellera fertis oves.

"Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves"."

When God had created man, male and female, after His own image, He gave them His benediction; "Subdue the Gen. i. 28. earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowls of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." And this very dominion was a part of the image of God," wherein man was created. Therefore God [Gen. i. 27.]

[As is asserted of Richard III, after the murder of the two young princes: see Holinshead, Chron., vol. iii. p. 735.]

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 141, 142.]

R

[Ibid., p. 142.]

[Virgil, in Donatus' Life, c. xvii.]

III.

Gen. ii. 19.

Psal. viii.

PART brought all the creatures to man as to their lord and master under Himself, to "give them names," which is a sign and a proof of dominion. Therefore said the kingly prophet, "Thou madest him" (man) "to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet, all sheep and oxen," &c. Here is but a harsh beginning of his attorneyship.

6, [7.]

Secondly, he maintaineth, that the lion hath as much right, or, as he calleth it, "liberty," to eat the man, as the man hath to eat the ox. I hope he will not deny, that the Creator of all things had right to the donation of His own

Gen. ix. 3. creatures. Man hath God's deed of gift:-"Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things." Can he shew such another grant for the lions to devour men? When God said, [Gen.ix.6.]“Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man," was it intended only, that his blood should be preserved for the lions? or do not their teeth deface God's image as much as man's weapons? But "the lion had liberty to eat man long befored." He is mistaken. The creatures did bear a more awful respect to the image of God in man before his fall; but man's rebellion to God was punished with the rebellion of the creatures to him. He saith, "it was impossible for most men to have" God's "license" to use the creatures for their sustenance. Why so? As if all the world were not then comprised in the family of Noah: or as if the commandments and dispensations of God were not then delivered from father to son by tradition, as they were long after by writing. He asketh, how I would have been offended if he should have spoken of man as Pliny doth,-" than whom there is no living creature more wretched or more proud." Not half so much as now. Pliny taxeth only the faults of men; he vilifieth not their human nature. "Most wretched;"-what is that but an argument of the immortality of the soul? God would never have created the most noble of His creatures for

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv.

p. 141.]

[Ibid.] • [Ibid.]

f["Nec miserius quidquam homine aut superbius." Plin., Nat. Hist., lib. ii. c. 5; quoted by T. H., Qu., ibid.]

II.

the most wretched being. "Or more proud ;"—that is, than DISCOURSE some men. "Corruptio optimi pessima"-"the best things, being corrupted, turn the worst."

But he acknowledgeth "two advantages which man hath above other creatures, his tongue and his hands." Is it possible, that any man who believeth that he hath an immortal soul, or that reason and understanding are any thing but empty names, should so far forget himself and his thankfulness to God, as to prefer his tongue and his hands before an immortal soul and reason? Then we may well change the definition of a man which those old dunces the philosophers left us, 'man is a reasonable creature,' into this new one, 'man is a prating thing with two hands.' How much more was the human nature beholden to Tully, a heathen, who 792 said, that man differed from other creatures in reason and speech; or to Ovid, who styleth man,

"Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius alta!."

If he have no better luck in defending his Leviathan, he will have no great cause to boast of his " making" men examplesk."

And now it seemeth he hath played his masterpiece; for in the rest of his Animadversions in this section we find a low ebb of matter. Concerning consultations, he saith nothing but this, that my writing "was caused physically, antecedently, extrinsecally," by his answer'. In good time. By which I see right well, that he understandeth not what a physical cause is. Did he think his answer was so mathematical to compel or necessitate me to write? No, I confess I determined myself. And his answer was but a slender occasion; which would have had little weight with me, but for a wiser Prov. xxvi. 5. ["Anman's advice, to prevent his over-weening opinion of his own gwer a fool abilities. And then followeth his old dish of twice-sodden according to his folly, coleworts, about "free," and "necessary," and "contingent," and "free to do if he willm;" which we have had often enough already.

lest he be

wise in his own con

ceit."]

His distinction between "seen" and " unseen necessity"," Seen and

PART
III.

deserveth more consideration. The meaning is, that seen necessity doth take away consultation, but unseen necessity doth not take away consultation, or human endeavours.

Unseen necessity is of two sorts. Either it is altogether unseen and unknown, either what it is, or that it is; such a necessity doth not take away consultation, or human endeavours. Suppose an office were privately disposed; yet he who knoweth nothing of the disposition of it, may be as solicitous and industrious to obtain it as though it were not disposed at all. But the necessity which he laboureth to introduce, is no such unseen unknown necessity. For though he know not what the causes have determined particularly, or what the necessity is, yet he believeth, that he knoweth in general, that the causes are determined from eternity, and that there is an absolute necessity.

The second sort of unseen necessity is that, which is unseen in particular what it is, but it is not unknown in general that it is. And this kind of unseen necessity doth take away all consultation, and endeavours, and the use of means, as much as if it were seen in particular. As, supposing that the Cardinals have elected a Pope in private, but the declaration of the person who is elected is kept secret; here is a necessity, the Papacy is full; and this necessity is unseen in particular, whilst no man knoweth who it is; yet, forasmuch as it is known that it is, it taketh away all endeavours and consultations as much as if the Pope were publicly enthroned. Or suppose a jury have given in a privy verdict; no man knoweth what it is until the next court-day, yet it is known generally that the jurors are agreed and the verdict is given in: here is an unseen necessity; yet he who should use any further consultations or make further applications in the case, were a fool. So, though the particular determination of the causes be not known to us what it is, yet, if we know that the causes are particularly determined from eternity, we know that no consultation or endeavour of ours can alter them.

But it may be further objected, that, though they cannot alter them, yet they may help to accomplish them. It was Acts xxvii. necessary, that all who sailed with St. Paul should be saved 22. and 31. from shipwreck; yet St. Paul told them, that "except" the

II.

shipmen "did abide in the ship, they could not be saved." DISCOURSE So, though the event be necessarily determined, yet consultation or the like means may be necessary to the determination of it. I answer, the question is not, whether the means be necessary to the end; for that is agreed upon by all parties; but the question is, to whom the ordering of the means which are necessary to the production of the event, doth properly belong, whether to the First Cause or to the free agent. If it belong to the free agent under God (as we say it doth), then it concerneth him to use consultations and all good endeavours, as requisite means to obtain the desired end. But if the disposition of the means belong solely and wholly to God (as he saith it doth), and if God have ordered all means, as well as ends and events, particularly and precisely, then it were not only a thankless and superfluous office to consult what were the fittest means to obtain an end, when God hath determined what must be the only means, and no other; but also a sauciness, and a kind of tempting of God, for a man to intrude himself into the execution of God Al793 mighty's decrees; whereas he ought rather to cast away all care and all thought on his part, and resign himself up wholly to the disposition of the second causes, which act nothing but by the special determination of God.

be abso

monitions

vain.

Concerning admonition he saith less than of consultation. If all things "The reason" (saith he), "why we admonish men" of under- lutely nestanding rather than "children," fools, and madmen, is cessary, adbecause they are more capable of "the good and evil conse- are all quences of their actions," and have more "experience," and their passions are more conform to their "admonitors;" that is to say, moderate and staid. And then, after his braggadocio manner, he concludeth,-"There be therefore reasons under heaven which the Bishop knows not of "." My one reason- -"because they have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not"-includeth more than all his three reasons put together. What is it that weigheth the good and evil consequences of our actions? Reason. What is it that preserveth us from being transported with our passions? Reason. And what is experienced [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 144, 145.] P [Ibid., p. 145.]