4.]

II.

(saith he), "there is no man but understands," &c., "that Discourse where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude, regularity or irregularity, that is between them, is made in and by the things themselves that are compared; the Bishop therefore, that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies Him to be the cause both of the law and of the action"." This is that which he himself calleth "blasphemy" elsewhere,—that God is the author or cause of sin. 782 Sin is nothing but the irregularity of the act. So St. John defineth it in express terms, " ȧpapтía éσтìv ý ávoμía"-"sin [1 John iii. is an anomy," or "an irregularity," or "a transgression of the law." For "sin is nothing else but a declination from the rule,” that is, an irregularity. Another definition of sin is this,-"Sin is that which is thought, or said, or done against the eternal laws." Still you see, the formal reason of sin doth consist in the contrariety to the law, that is, the irregularity. Others define sin to be "a want of rectitude, or a privation of conformity to the rulet ;" that is, irregularity. An irregular action is sin materially; irregularity is sin formally. Others define sin to be "a free transgression of the commandment"." Every one of these definitions demonstrate, that Mr. Hobbes maketh God to be properly the cause of sin.

"He who is the cause of God no

cause of ir

But let us weigh his argument. the law, and the cause of the action, is the cause of the irre- regularity. gularity; but God is the cause of the law, and the cause of the action." I deny his assumption. God indeed is "the cause of the law," but God is not the total or adequate "cause of the action." Nay, God is not at all "the cause of the action" quâ talis-as it is irregular, but the free agent. To use our former instance of an unjust judge: the prince is the author or cause of the law, and the prince is the cause of the judiciary action of the judge in general, because the judge de

P [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 111.]

[Ibid., p. 105. See above p. 308. note x.]

["Peccatum est transgressio legis." Aug., De Cons. Evang., lib. ii. c. 4. (§ 13; Op. tom. iii. P. ii. p. 31); quoted by Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. i. c. 1; Op. tom. iii. p. 71. A; who adds,-" Nihil est enim aliud

III.

PART riveth all his power of judicature from the prince; but the prince is not the cause of the irregularity, or repugnance, or non-conformity, or contrariety, which is between the judge's actions and the law, but the judge himself; who by his own fault did abuse and misapply that good general power, which was committed and entrusted to him by the prince; he is the only cause of the anomy or irregularity. Or as a scrivener, that teacheth one to write, and sets him a copy, is both the cause of the rule and of the action or writing, and yet not the cause of the irregularity or deviation from the rule. Sin is a defect, or deviation, or irregularity. No defect, no deviation, no irregularity, can proceed from God. But herein doth consist T. H. his error, that he distinguisheth not between an essential and an accidental subordination, or between a good general power and the determination or misapplication of this general power to evil. What times are we fallen into! to see it publicly maintained, that God is the cause of all irregularity, or deviation from His own rules.

[CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;]—

NUMBER XIII.

Here is no need of Castigations, there being no Animad

versions.

CASTIGATIONS UPON THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XIV.

In the beginning he repeateth his empty objections, from "what shall be, shall be," and from "foreknowledge," and that "a man cannot choose to-day for to-morrow;" and thence concludeth (nemine consentiente), that my deductions are irrational and fallacious, and that he "need make no further answer*." As if he should say, I sent forth two or three light horsemen to vapour, who were soundly beaten back, and made their defence with their heels, therefore I need not answer the charge of the main battle. He told me, that I "did not understand" him, if I thought he "held no [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 133.]

II.

other necessity, than that which is contained in that old foolish DiscoURSE rule, whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it isy?" But I see, when all is done, he must sit down and be contented to make his best of that "old foolish rule;" for "prescience," and "what shall be, shall be," do imply no more.

be unjust.

In the next place, he chargeth me with three great "absur- Laws may dities: the first, that" I "say, a law may be unjust; the second, that a law may be tyrannical; the third, that" I "say, it is an unjust law which prescribes things impossible in themselves to be done." A grievous accusation. These absurdities are “at age,” let them even "answer for themselves."

He saith, "Civil laws are made by every man that is subject to them, because every one of them consented to the placing of the legislative powera."

I deny his consequence. Indeed, in causes that are naturally, necessarily, and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is always the cause of the effect; as he that planteth a vineyard, is the cause of the vine. But in causes that are accidentally or contingently subordinate (as the people electing, the law-giver elected, and the law made, are), the cause of the cause is not always the cause of the effect; as he that planteth a vineyard, is not the cause of the drunkenness. The king's commission maketh a judge, but it is not the cause of his unrighteous judgment. Two cities 783 in Italy, contending about their bounds, chose the people of Rome to be their arbitrators; they gave either city a small pittance, and reserved all the rest to themselves,-" Quod in medio est, populo Romano adjudicetur." The two cities did not so much like their arbitrators at the first, as they detested the arbitrament at the last; and though they had contracted a necessity of compliance by their credulous submission, yet this did not free that unconscionable arbitrament from palpable injustice; no, nor yet so much as from palpable injury for though a man is not injured, who is willing to be injured ("volenti non fit injuria""), yet he who doth choose an arbitrator, doth not choose his unjust arbitrament; nor

[John ix.

21.]

III.

PART he that chooseth a law-giver, choose his tyrannical law. Though he have obliged himself to passive obedience, yet his obligation doth not render either the injurious arbitrament of the one, or the tyrannical law of the other, to be just. So the main ground of his error is a gross fallacy, which every sophister in the University is able to discover.

Impossibilities made by our

I answer, secondly, that though every subject had actually consented, as well to the laws, as to the law-giver, yea, though the law were made by the whole collective body of the people in their own persons, yet, if it be contrary to the law of God or nature, it is still an unjust law. The people cannot give that power to their prince, which they have not themselves.

Thirdly, many laws are made by those who are not duly invested with legislative power; which are therefore unjust laws.

Fourthly, many laws are made to bind foreigners, who exercise commerce with subjects; which, if they be contrary to the pacts and capitulations of the confederate nations, are unjust laws. Foreigners never consented to the placing of the legislative power.

Fifthly, no human power whatsoever, judiciary or legislative, civil or sacred, is exempted from excesses, and possibility of doing or making unjust acts.

Lastly, the people cannot confer more power upon their law-giver than God Himself doth confer; neither is their election a greater privilege from injustice, than God's own disposition but they, who have been placed in sovereign power by God Himself, have both made unjust laws, and prescribed unjust acts to their subjects.

:

I said, "Those laws were unjust, which prescribed things impossible in themselves." Against this he excepteth,— selves mayOnly contradictions are impossible in themselves, all other be justly imposed, things are possible in themselves, as to raise the dead, to [but] not impossibi- change the course of nature:" but never any "tyrant did bind them- a man to contradictions, or make a law, commanding him to do and not to do the same action, or to be and not to be in the same place at the same moment of time."

lities in

selves.

[Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 88;

Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

e [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. pp. 133, 134.]

784

11.

I answer, that tyrants may command, and by their depu- DISCOURSE ties have commanded, contradictory acts; as for the same subjects to appear before several judges in several places at the same time, and to do several duties inconsistent one with another, which imply a contradiction; and have punished subjects for disobedience in such cases.

Secondly, I answer, that when we say, 'Law-makers ought to command things possible,' it ought to be understood of things possible to their subjects, upon whom they impose their commands; not of such things as are possible to God Almighty. To make a law, that subjects should raise the dead, or change the course of nature (which he reckons as things possible in themselves), is as unjust a law as a law that should enjoin them contradictions, and the act as impossible to the subject.

Thirdly, these words-"impossible in themselves," which he layeth hold now, have a quite contrary sense to that which he imagineth, and are warranted by great authors. Some things are impossible to us by our own defaults; as for a man to hold the liquor firmly without shedding, who hath contracted the palsy by his own intemperance. These impossibilities may justly be forbidden and punished, when we have had power and lost it by our own fault. Secondly, there are other impossibilities in themselves, such as proceed not from our own faults, which never were in our power; as those which proceed from the antecedent determination of extrinsecal causes. To enjoin these by law, and to punish a man for not obeying, is unjust and tyrannical.

Whereas I called "just laws" the "ordinances of right reason," he saith, "it is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their livesh." His reason is, "If laws be erroneous shall they not be obeyed? shall we rather rebel ?" I answer, neither the one nor the other. We are not to obey them actively, because "we ought to obey God rather than Acts v. 29. man." Yet may we not rebel ;-" Submit yourselves to 13. every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake." Passive obedience is a mean between active obedience and rebellion. To

f [See Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15.] [Defence, Numb. xiv. above p. 88; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

h [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xiv. p. 134.]

1 Peter ii.