I. affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions; DISCOURSE as if the devising of an ill-grounded paradox were as great an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of the new world. And to this paradox in particular:—I meddle not with natural actions, because the subject of my discourse is moral liberty; but if he intend not only the kinds of things, but every individual creature, and not only in natural but voluntary actions, I desire to know, how Prester John, or the Great Mogul, or the King of China, or any one of so many millions of their subjects, do concur to my writing of this reply. If they do not, among his other speculations concerning this matter, I hope he will give us some restrictions. It were hard to make all the negroes accessary to all the murders that are committed in Europe. NUMBER XXII. moral effi J. D.—Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us, how we are [iii. The haled hither and thither with outward objects. To this answer, I cacy of outward objects.] First, that the power which outward objects have over us, [Such efficacy partly is for the most part by our own default; because of those our own fault.] vicious habits which we have contracted. Therefore, though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them, yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a paralytic man, to use Aristotle's comparison, shedding the liquor deserves to be punished; for though his act be unwilling, yet his intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this infirmity". Secondly, I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and [Not irresistible.] bad company, and outward objects, do indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By prayers, tears, meditations, vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations, a man may get a contrary habit; and gain the victory, not only over outward objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the king of the little world of himself. n [Vide Aristot., Ethic., III. vii. 15.] "Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ, Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously, and provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with outward objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son P. "I would beat thee" (said the philosopher), "but that I am angry." One spake lowest when he was most moved. Another poured out the water when he was thirsty. Another "made a covenant with" his "eyes." Neither opportunity nor enticement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire with the three children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical, necessity; they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty. T. H.-Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, external objects presented to men of such and such temperatures do make their actions necessary; and says, the power that such objects have over us proceeds from our own fault. But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power. And therefore that opinion may hold true for all this answer. Further he saith, "Prayer, fasting," &c. may alter our habits. 'Tis true; but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and make it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not been. Besides, we are not moved nor disposed to prayer, or any other action, but by outward objects; as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Thirdly, he saith, "a resolved mind is not easily surprised:" as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, he alone wept not; and of the philosopher that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things, I confess, have or may have been [Claudian., De IV. Consul. Hono rii, Carm. viii. vv. 258-261.] P [See the Odyss., xix. 204-212.] [An anecdote told of Plato; see Diog. Laert., iii. 39.] I. done; and do prove only, that it was not necessary for DISCOURSE 706 Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove, that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain as he did from weeping, nor the philosopher to abstain as he did from striking, nor the other man to forbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have proved. Lastly, he confesseth, that the disposition of objects "may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive." To which I answer, 'tis impossible: for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may infer it can be in no danger at all. J. D. The third pretence was out of moral philosophy [Reply.] misunderstood, that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions. The first is, that it is not material, though the power of outward objects do "proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power." Well, but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? Then his answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that are not and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at all; it is not a fault in us, not to do those things which never were in our power to do; but they are the faults of these causes from whence they do proceed. Next, he confesseth, that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted, and to get the contrary habit. "True" (saith he), 'but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the other way.' By which very consideration it appears, that that which he calls a 'necessity' is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty, but they do not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself a habit of temperance, may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act; and so on the contrary. Acts are not opposed to habits, but other habits. He adds, that "we are not moved to prayer or any other action but by outward III. PART objects; as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent." Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make "godly preachers," and "pious company," to be "outward objects," which are outward agents; secondly, to affirm, that the will "is not moved but by outward objects." The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, by men, and most effectually, by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited (extraordinarily indeed but) efficaciously and determinately. This is more than "equivalent" with "outward objects." Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the appetibility of objects and the unruliness of passions; as I shewed by examples. He answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I am not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which I intend ;-that the rational will hath power, both to slight the most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions. When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have produced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work. Lastly, whereas I say, that "outward objects may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty;" he catcheth at it, and objects, that "liberty is in no danger, but to be lost, but" I "say, it cannot be lost, therefore" he infers, that it is "in no danger at all." I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost;many more men do abuse their wits than lose them ;secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished, as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet it is not totally lost; thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason, yet many, by excess of study, or by continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion, which they have cherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected object, do become very sots, and I. deprive themselves of the use of reason, and consequently of DisCOURSE liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or that parti707 cular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath lost his former liberty to choose a good one. NUMBER XXIII. natural effi dictate of standing.] otherwise J. D.-Fourthly, the natural philosopher doth teach, that [iv. The the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the under- cacy of standing. It is true, indeed, the will should follow the the last direction of the understanding, but I am not satisfied that it the underdoth evermore follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place, [The case "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." As that great in point of Roman said of two suitors, that the one produced the better fact.] reasons, but the other must have the offices; so reason often lies dejected at the feet of affection. Things nearer to the senses move more powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his child than for "the sin of [See Micah vi. 7.] his soul;" yet appreciatively, in the estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of God a greater evil than any temporal loss. ther extrin. antece Next, I do not believe, that a man is bound to weigh the [Such a expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to cause neithe least grain in the balance of his understanding, or to secal nor run up into his watch-tower with his perspective to take dent.] notice of every jackdaw that flies by, for fear of some hidden danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to petite observations; as concerning every rag that a man wears, each drop of drink, each morsel of bread that he eats, each pace that he walks. Thus many steps must he go, not one more, nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What is this but a rack and a gibbet to the conscience? But God leaves many things indifferent, though man be so curious he will not. A good architect will be sure to provide sufficient materials for his building; but what particular number of stones, or trees, he troubles not his head. And suppose he |