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PART

III.

a locomotive faculty? Judge without prejudice, what a miserable subterfuge is this, which many men confide so much in.

[Answer..

T. H. dis

distinc

tions.]

CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT
TO HIS ARGUMENTS ARE BY HIM REMOVED.

T. H.-He saith, a man may perhaps answer, that the avows both necessity of things held by him is not a Stoical necessity, but a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have not used, nor indeed have ever heard before. Nor do I think any man could make "Stoical" and "Christian" two kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of doctrine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

[Reply.]

necessity

(so called)

But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as making against his own tenet. "Where all the causes," saith he, "being joined together and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary." For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any one of those, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now it is manifest, that the First Cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it; and therefore, by his own reason, all effects are necessary. Nor is that distinction, of necessary in respect of the First Cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine. It does (as he well noteth) imply a contradiction.

J. D. Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I [Christian have joined them together in one paragraph. He likes not the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoical and Christian; no more do I. We agree in the conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the other; and because I conceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly

guised Stoical

necessity.]

I.

detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into DISCOURSE those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly), under another form of expression, introduce it again at the back door after they had openly cast it out at the fore door. But T. H. rusheth boldly, without distinctions (which he accounts but "jargon") and without foresight, upon the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics. He confesseth, that "they may be two kinds of doctrine." "May be ?" Nay, they are, without all peradventure. And he himself is the first who bears the name of a Christian that 694 I have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he likes not the names of "Stoical" and "Christian" destiny (do not blame him), though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To admit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is to make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first call that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Christians, Christian destiny, and that other maintained by Stoics, Stoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If he had been as careful in reading other men's opinions as he is confident in setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing but the name itself often used. But if [The terms the name of "fatum Christianum" do offend him, let him called by Lipemployit with Lipsius, "fatum verum :" who divides destiny into four sius.] kinds; 1. "mathematical" or astrological destiny, 2. "natural" destiny, 3. "Stoical" or "violent" destiny, and 4. "true destiny;" which he calls ordinarily "nostrum"destiny, that is, of Christians, and "fatum pium," that is, godly destiny, and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny, to be a "series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel." Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines thought he came too near them; as appears by his Epistle to the reader in a later edition', and by that note in the margent of his twentieth chapter,-"Whatsoever I dispute

k [Lipsius,] De Const., lib. i. cc. 17, 18, 19. [Op. tom. ii. pp. 10, 11. fol. Lugd. 1613.]

[In the 3rd edition, Svo. Antwerp. 1586, headed" Ad Lectorem pro Con

-"our"

stantiâ meâ Præscriptio." He begins
with a complaint, that-" Negant satis
pie hoc argumentum a me tractatum,
negant locis aliquot satis vere."]

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PART here, I submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admonished, I will correct it; one may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy." So fearful was heto overshoot himself; and yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency. T. H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any "sect." And I say, so much the worse. It is better to be the disciple of an old sect, than the ringleader of a new.

[The First Cause not a necessary

cause of all effects.]

Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the First Cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes,— though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old Lamiæ, which could put out their eyes when they list; as, namely, that the faculty of willing, when it is determined in order to the act (which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a bird, when she is fast in a man's hand, &c.,-yet he hath espied another thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, that "if any one cause in the whole series of causes, much more the First Cause, be necessary, it determineth the rest;" but, saith he, "it is manifest, that the First Cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next." I am glad; yet it is not I who contradict myself, but it is one of his "manifest" truths which I contradict,-that "the First Cause is a necessary cause of all effects ;"-which I say is a "manifest" falsehood. Those things which God wills without Himself, He wills freely, not necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all that is in its power. But it is evident, that God doth not all things without Himself which He can do, or which He hath power Luke iii. 8. to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan, but Matt. xxvi. He did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to the succour of Christ, but He did not. God can make T. H. live the years of Methuselah; but it is not necessary that He shall do so, nor probable that He will do so. The productive power of God is infinite, but the whole created world is finite; and therefore God might still produce more if it pleased Him". But this it is, when men go on in a confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had considered the

53.

m

[p. 12. B. in marg. ed. 1613.]

Prima, Qu. xxv. art. 5.]

n

[See Thom. Aquin., Summ., P.

1.

difference between a necessary being and a necessary cause, Discourse or between those actions of God, which are immanent within Himself, and the transient works of God, which are extrinsecal without Himself, he would never have proposed such an evident error for a manifest truth. "Qui pauca considerat, facilè pronuntiat.”

NUMBER XIX.

tion iii.

from com

J. D.-3. Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from [Distinccompulsion, and liberty from necessitation. The will, say Between they, is free from compulsion, but not free from necessitation. liberty And this they fortify with two reasons: first, because it is pulsion and liberty granted by all divines, that hypothetical necessity, or neces- from necessitation.] sity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty; secondly, because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we.

dent neces

sity in

To the first reason, I confess, that necessity upon a sup- [Anteceposition may sometimes consist with true liberty; as when it signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding volves compulsion.] 695 in that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the supposition be not in the agent's power, nor depend upon any thing that is in his power; if there be an exterior antecedent cause, which doth necessitate the effect; to call this free, is to be "mad with reason P."

freedom of

angels.]

To the second reason, I confess, that God and the good [Of the angels are more free than we are; that is, intensively, in the God, and degree of freedom, but not extensively, in the latitude of the of the good object; according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specification. A liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or a determination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise and a necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification and a necessity of specification, are not compatible, nor can consist together. He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all to the purpose.

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PART

[Answer.]

T. H.-But the distinction of free into free from compulIII. sion and free from necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to do a thing so, as terror be not the cause of his will to do it. For a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it; as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do any thing from love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion: and yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from necessitation I say nothing can be; and 'tis that which he undertook to disprove.

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This distinction, he says, useth to be "fortified" by "two reasons;" but they are not mine. The first, he says, is, that "it is granted by all divines, that a hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon supposition, may stand with liberty." That you may understand this, I will give you an example of hypothetical necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat, this is a hypothetical necessity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition; that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true, whensoever uttered: but 'tis not the necessity of the thing; nor is it therefore necessary, that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use to "fortify" my distinctions with such reasons. Let him confute them as he will, it contents me. But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an easy and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave usage of such terms as hypothetical necessity and necessity upon supposition, and such like terms of schoolmen, obscured and made to seem profound learning.

The second reason, that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion and free from necessitation, he says, is, that "God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we." The reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true, that "God and good angels do good necessarily," and yet are "free;" but because I find not in the articles of our faith nor in the decrees of our Church set down, in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point; and am

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