Lessassier v. Kennedy. by which he subjected your petitioners to a liability which was his own, and which he should have met; that his said conduct and acts were violative of his obligations in the premises and your petitioners' rights; were unlawful, illegal, and have caused to your petitioners loss and damage to the extent of said amount paid by them." From this statement of the case it is apparent that the suit was not brought against Kennedy to enforce any liability of his under the National Banking Act. That liability was disposed of in the suit of the receiver against him for its enforcement. Neither do Lessassier & Binder claim under the receiver, nor are they seeking to enforce the liability of Kennedy as a shareholder. Their claim, and their only claim against him is for his failure to insert his own name, or that of some other responsible person, in the blank which had been left by them in the transfer they signed on the books of the bank for the stock he had bought. His obligation to them, if any there is, grows out of his contract with them as a purchaser, and not out of the Banking Law. That presents no Federal question. There is nothing in that law which makes it his duty to save his assignors from harm by reason of their former ownership, or which required him to register his ownership for their protection. Neither is it at all important that in its opinion, the Supreme Court of the State expressed a doubt as to the correctness of the judgment against Lessassier & Binder. That judgment as it stood was conclusive on that point, and if Kennedy had been liable to them at all, it would have been for the amount adjudged, because he had been called upon to defend if he desired to do so. He was discharged, not because the judg ment was wrong, but because he had not, in the opinion of the court, been guilty of any neglect of duty toward those against whom it was rendered, which would make him liable to them therefor. The motion to dismiss is granted. Butler v. Coleman. BUTLER V. COLEMAN.* SAME V. MIXTER. SAME V. WHITNEY. SAME V. DEMMON. Attachment-before judgment · (124 U. S. 721.) Federal jurisdiction — unlawful attachment— bond for property — validity — action to set aside bond — equity — jurisdiction. Under U. S. Revised Statutes, section 5242, providing that no attachment before final judgment shall be issued in any State court against a National bank, and U. S. Revised Statutes, section 915, entitling the plaintiff in actions in the Federal courts to similar remedies by attachment to those provided by the laws of the State in which such courts are held, a Federal court may not issue a writ of attachment before final judgment against a National bank. A bond given to release property from an illegal attachment is void. The principal in a bond given in an attachment suit may maintain an action in equity to have the bond declared void and the property held by the sureties as indemnity returned. A PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. George Mixter, Henry M. Whitney and Daniel L. Demmon each brought an attachment suit against the Pacific National Bank of Boston, and all obtained judgment. The bank, by Peter Butler, its receiver, brings error. The bank, by its receiver, also brought suit in equity against Lewis Coleman, John Shepard, George Mixter, Lucy E. Prescott, executrix of Calvin B. Prescott, deceased, Henry M. Whitney and Daniel L. Demmon to recover possession of property of the bank deposited with Coleman and Shepard to secure them against loss on account of bonds signed by them as sureties, and given to release property seized on these attachments. The bill was dismissed on the hearing and the receiver appeals. * Reversing Price v. Coleman, 22 Fed. Rep. 694. Butler v. Coleman. A. A. Ranney, for appellant and plaintiff in error. Joshua D. Ball, for appellees Mixter and Prescott. Alfred D. Foster, for appellee Whitney. Henry Wheeler, for appellee Demmon. Richard Stone, for appellees Coleman and Shepard. * * * WAITE, C. J. All of these cases involve the same general question, and they may properly be considered and decided together. From the records it appears that the Pacific National Bank of Boston was an association for carrying on the business of banking, organized under the National Bank Act. On the 20th of November, 1881, it became embarrassed, and was placed in charge of a bank examiner, in whose control it remained until March 18, 1882, when its doors were opened for business with the consent of the Comptroller of the Currency. By statute, in Massachusetts civil actions are begun by original writ, which "may be framed either to attach the goods or estate of the defendant, and, for want thereof, to take his body; or it may be by original summons, with or without an order to attach the goods or estate." Pub. Stat. Mass. 1882, chap. 161, §§ 13, 14. "All real and personal estate liable to be taken on execution may be attached upon the original writ in any action in which debt or damages are recoverable, and may be held as security to satisfy such judgment as the plaintiff may recover." § 38. "A person or corporation whose goods or estate are attached on mesne process in a civil action may, at any time before final judgment, dissolve such attachment by giving bond with sufficient sureties, *** with condition to pay to the plaintiff the amount, if any, that he may recover within thirty days after the final judg ment in such action." § 122. At the time the bank resumed business, it was indebted to George Mixter in the sum of $15,000; to Henry M. Whitney also in the sum of $15,000; to Daniel L. Demmon in the sum of $25,000; and to Calvin B. Prescott in the sum of $5,000. On the 24th of March, 1881, Mixter and Prescott each began a suit against the bank in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, by writ di Butler v. Coleman. recting an attachment, to recover the amounts due them respectively. Demmon also began a suit in the same court and in the, same way on the 28th of March, to recover the amount due him, and Whitney another on the 28th of April, upon the claim in his favor. At the time these suits were begun, the bank had money on deposit to its credit in the Maverick National Bank and in the Howard National Bank, and the necessary steps were taken to subject these deposits to the attachments which were issued in the several suits. The bank arranged with Lewis Coleman and John Shepard to become its sureties upon bonds to dissolve attachments in any actions that might be brought against it, and placed in their hands a certificate of deposit in the Maverick National Bank for $100,000, to be held as their protection against all liabilities which should be thus incurred. This certificate was afterward exchanged for $121,000 of the bonds of the Nantasket Company, $20,000 of the bonds of the Toledo, Delphos and Burlington Railroad Company and $15,000 of bonds of the Lebanon Springs Railroad Company. Immediately after each of the attachments in the above actions had been made, the bank executed a bond to the plaintiff in a penal sum suited to the amount of the claim, with Coleman and Shepard as its sureties, reciting the attachment, and that the bank "desires to dissolve said attachment according to law," and conditioned to be void "if the Pacific National Bank of Boston shall, within thirty days after the final judgment in the aforesaid action, pay to the plaintiff therein named the amount, if any, which he shall recover in such action." Upon the execution of the bond in each case, the attachment was dissolved. After this the bank closed its doors a second time, and on the 22d of May, 1882, a receiver was appointed by the Comptroller of the Carrency in accordance with the provisions of section 5234 of the Revised Statutes, and at once took possession of its assets and proceeded to wind up its affairs. When the receiver was appointed he found the several suits which had been commenced still pending. In the cases of Mixter, Whitney and Demmon he appeared, answered for the bank, filed motions to discharge the attachments, and motions to dismiss the suits. His motions were all overruled, and, his defenses not being sustained, judgments were rendered against the bank in each of the cases for the amounts 2 Butler v. Coleman. found to be due the several plaintiffs respectively. For the review of the action of the court in these cases the writs of error which are now under consideration were brought. The suit of Prescott still remains undisposed of in the Circuit Court. Failing in his motions and in his defenses at law, the receiver filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court against the several attaching creditors, and the sureties on the bonds given to dissolve the attachments, the object of which was to reduce to his possession the securities which were held by the sureties for their protection against liability, and to restrain the several attaching creditors from enforcing the attachment bonds on the ground, among others, "that the attachments made in said actions were unauthor ized, illegal and void." This bill was dismissed by the Circuit Court (22 Fed. Rep. 694), and from that decree the appeal which is now one of the subjects of consideration was taken. In the view we take of the case, the most important question to be considered is, whether an attachment can issue against a National bank before judgment in a suit begun in the Circuit Court of the United States. Section 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States contains this provision: "No attachment, injunction or execution shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action or proceeding, in any State, county or municipal court." The original National Bank Act contained nothing of this kind, but the prohibition first appeared in the act of March 3, 1873 (chap. 269, 2, 17 Stat. 603), as a new proviso added to section 57 of the act of June 3, 1864 (chap. 106, 13 Stat. 116). That section was originally as follows: "That suits, actions, and proceedings against any association under this act may be had in any circuit, district or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases: provided, however, that all proceedings to enjoin the Comptroller under this act shall be had in a circuit, district or territorial court of the United States, held in the district in which the association is located." The amending act was as follows: "That section fifty-seven * ** be amended by adding thereto the following: And |