Johnson v. The State.

To the introduction of this evidence exception was taken, and it was one of the grounds for which a new trial was asked. We are of opinion that the Court erred in admitting the evidence. Proof of the witness' "standing for integrity" was only an indirect mode of proving his general moral character, evidence of which the Court had excluded.

The character of the witness not having been impeached, it was incompetent to support him by evidence of his general moral character, or that which is equivalent to such evidence. Prewitt v. Cox, ante, page 15. In addition to what is said. in the case above cited, we quote the following passage from the opinion of the Court in the case of Rogers v. Moore, 10 Conn. 13: "To discredit the stories of witnesses, is a part of the business of almost every trial; and the methods to which the ingenuity of counsel will resort to effect this, are various. Sometimes it is done by a critical cross-examination; sometimes by the contradictory testimony of others; and frequently by an impeachment of the general character of the witness. But if the credibility of a witness is impaired, otherwise than by an impeachment of his general character, as if it be shown that he is under the influence of partiality or prejudice; and, therefore, an issue is to be joined and tried upon his general reputation for truth, it would very much embarrass the progress of trials. And this can not be neces

sary, because the law presumes the general character of a witness to be good until it shall be impeached."

Per Curiam.-The judgment below is reversed.
John Baker, for the appellant.

Oscar B. Hord, Attorney General, and R. A. Clements, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State.

Cummings et al. v. Sharpe et al.

CUMMINGS et al. v. SHARPE et al.

MARRIED WOMEN.--The income or proceeds arising from the separate real estate of a married woman can only be subjected to the payment of her debts, contracted during coverture, by a proceeding in equity for that particular purpose, and not by an ordinary common law action and judgment against her.

APPEAL from the Cass Common Pleas.

HANNA, J.-Suit on a note. It was averred, among other things, that said female defendant is and was, at the time she executed the note, the wife of her co-defendant; that she is in the habit and practice of making contracts in her own. name, and without the co-operation of her husband; that he is insolvent; that she owns property in her separate right, and all they use and occupy belongs to her; that the payees of the note furnished goods, merchandize and necessaries to the defendants for their joint use and benefit, for which said female defendant had contracted and agreed to pay, and executed said note, alone, on closing up said account, upon which she had made various payments, &c.

There was a demurrer to the complaint overruled, and judgment taken against the female defendant alone, upon a trial by the Court, on an issue made by the general denial filed by the female; her husband filed no answer. It is not shown whether the property held by her was real or personal, nor how it was acquired. The evidence is not in the record. The judgment is in the usual and ordinary form against the female defendant, as if she were sole.

Some parts of the complaint would indicate that the pleader had intended to proceed, as in equity, to subject the separate property of the wife to the payment of the debt, but this appears in the sequel to have been abandoned and a judgment as at law taken against her separately.

Cummings et al. v. Sharpe et al.

This could not have been done before the enactment of our present statutes; and the simple question is, whether said statutes have changed the rule upon the subject.

It has been held that, as to the seperate real estate of the wife, she holds the same now without the exclusive power of alienation. 1 G. & H. Stat. p. 375, § 5; Cox's Adm'r v. Wood, 20 Ind. 54. It has also been held that, under § 5, acts 1853, 1 G. & H. p. 295 and note, the same rules and limitations exist as to personal property held by her, if acquired by the modes prescribed in said statute, to-wit: by "descent, devise or gift." Reese v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 195. This is in accordance with the common law.

Upon the supposition that it may have been real property that was owned by the female, in the case at bar, and that such fact was disclosed by the evidence, the question is, whether such income or proceeds as might arise therefrom would authorize a proceeding and judgment as a law against the female.

We are of opinion our statutes were not intended to, nor have they, changed the common law rule upon that subject. The mode in which such proceeds could be reached is indicated in the case in 20 Ind. cited. This would involve a proceeding as in equity.

It is not necessary for us to pass upon the question attempted to be raised, whether the separate property of the wife is liable, in such proceeding of an equitable character, for her contracts made as herein stated.

Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause remanded.

J. W. Robinson, for the appellant.

Broadhurst v. The State.

BROADHURST v. THE STATE.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE.-An information for a felony must show that the felony, on a charge of which the defendant is alleged to be in custody, is the same felony for which the information is filed.

APPEAL from the Gibson Common Pleas.

WORDEN, J.-Information against the appellant and one Franklin Broadhurst, for the larceny of a pocket book, and 5 dollars in silver coin, the property of Samuel D. Wallis.

To give the Court jurisdiction, it was alleged as follows: "That Franklin Broadhurst and Nathaniel Broadhurst are now in the custody of the sheriff of said county of Gibson, on the charge of having feloniously stolen, taken and carried away, on said 8th day of March, A. D. 1862, at and in the county of Gibson, and State of Indiana, the personal property of one Samuel D. Wallis; and, further, that the said Nathaniel Broadhurst and Franklin Broadhurst have not been indicted by the grand jury of the county of Gibson aforesaid, for said offence."

Trial, conviction and judgment that the defendants be imprisoned in the penitentiary for five years.

The information is fatally defective in not alleging facts sufficient to give the Court below jurisdiction. It should have appeared from the information, either by direct averment, or from the facts alleged, that the defendants were in custody on a charge of the same felony for which the information was filed. Justice v. The State, 17 Ind. 56. This does not appear from the information before us. The defendants might have been in custody on a charge of the larceny of the "personal property of said Samuel D. Wallis," and yet not on a charge of the larceny of the pocket book and money in question.

Davidson et al. v. Nebaker et al.

Per Curiam.-The judgment against Nathaniel Broadhurst, who alone appeals, is reversed.

McDonald & Roache, for the appellant.

Oscar B. Hord, Attorney General, for the State.

SHARPE V. HARDING et al.

APPEAL from the Marion Common Pleas.

Per Curiam.-The judgment in this case will be affirmed for the reasons given in King v. Brewer, 19 Ind. 267. The facts of each case, and the law arising upon them, being, in effect, the same.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

J. L. Ketchum, for the appellant.

R. L. Walpole, for the appellees.

DAVIDSON et al. v. NEBAKER et al.

JUDGMENT ACTION.-A judgment is a debt of record, and an action will lie to recover it, whether the judgment is foreign or domestic, and notwithstanding the plaintiff may have a remedy on the judgment, in the Court where it was rendered, by execution or otherwise.

APPEAL from the Warren Common Pleas.

WORDEN, J.-This was an action by the appellees against the appellants, upon a judgment recovered by the plaintiffs