by force in acts of felf-determination, for the attainment of his will, let me adduce examples of what must frequently have happened in the primeval ftate of humankind. It has been previously obferv'd, that nature hath given to man an indifputable right to all things which may fuftain and preferve his life, in preference to that of all other beings; and, confequently, a physical liberty of exerting his powers, as far as they can extend, to the accomplishment of that purpofe, whether it be in acquiring aliment or averting injuries. But, as men are unequal in degrees of intellect, courage and ftrength, there muft, neceffarily, exift one, or a few fuch human beings, that is fingly fuperior to any other, who may be, individually, opposed to him: one of thefe fuperior man, fuppofe, hath acquired a fufficiency of food for a days fubfiftance: and one of the inferior has proved unfuccefsful in his enand at

deavours. Should the latter fef-deterhich he poffefles,

tempt to take from the

will not he, who exceeds in excellence, will and endeayour, alfo to preferve it? In this inftance, each of them is actuated by fpontaneity or felf-determination: and according to the inftitutes of nature, which have decreed, that every man has a right to preferve his own life in preference to that of every other's. But, if he who wills to difpoffefs the other be fruftrated by the fuperior force of him who wills to retain what he has gotten, has the former loft his physical liberty, becaufe his faculties are inadequate to his will or felf-determination? and, if he hath, was he not, by the unerring and univerfal laws of nature, which originally pronounced that a lefs fhould invariably fubmit to a greater force, born to fervitude? Are not all men, therefore, whose wills are oppofed and conquered in their contentions, as phyfically flaves as Freemen? hence, is it not evident, that the moft exalted in mental and corporeal faculties are the only human beings who can enjoy Dr. Price's phyfical liberty in perfection. Because they alone, in oppofition to the force of every other man, can carry the purposes of their wills into certain execution. In confequence of the preceding ftate of the effects which originate from the inequality of men's abilities, does it not neceffarily refult that, in proportion as individuals approach to the highest excel

B 4

lence

1

lence of human attributes, every one, the most excellent excepted, is, in degrees proportioned to his abilities, not only a freeman, but a fovereign, refpecting those below, and a flave refpecting thofe above him? according to the principles of Dr. Price, in P. 35, "if any part of a man's property is fubject to the discretion of another the whole "must be fo;" those therefore who are at the discretion of others, to impofe on them what conditions they pleafe, are in an absolute state of flavery. And every man, but the moft powerful is by nature doomed to be a flave. Because he, alone, is endowed with that principle of Spontaneity or felf-determination, which conftitutes an agent, and gives him powers to follow his own will, who is fuperior to all that force, which can stand in oppofition to it, proceeding from the will of every other man. Such being the iffue of this enquiry into freedom and fervitude, as they are established by nature, where the will of one perfon is oppofed, by force, to that of another, let me now examine, whether effecting the acts of volition, where no force opposes it, be, in all inftances, confentaneous with physical liberty.

It will hardly be opposed, that phyfical liberty cannot extend beyond the ends, for which man, by nature, was created. Every act, therefore, which exceeds thofe ends, is not an exertion of physical or natural liberty, but a viølation of her laws. It cannot confift of an independence on the decrees of nature, but of acting in conformity therewith. It has been already faid, that every man, who ftands in immediate neceffity, hath a right, in preference of self-preservation, to exert his fuperior powers against every other, in order to obtain that aliment, without which he cannot live. But has he, on that account, a right to deprive him of more than what will fuffice, untill he can acquire fuftenance by his own efforts; because the other, confcious of the inefficacy of his abilities oppofes no force to the will of that invader. The prefent prefervation of life being all that is requifite, and he who is difpoffeffed of his whole, being, by nature entitled to live equally with the other, is fuch an exertion of fpontaneity and will, by the latter in confequence of his fuperior powers being unoppofed by force, an act of physical liberty?

If an individual of each fex be united, by the attractives of appetite, in preference of each other to all the human race, and another man fpontaneously felf-determine to enjoy the woman, fhould he, in order to accomplish his wil, without being oppofed by force, put the former to death, and poffefs what he defired, has he not exceeded the limits of phyfical liberty?

If a man fhall fpontaneoufly felf-determine to commit the execrable deed of pædarafty or beftiality, and his will fhould be unoppofed by force, in either inftance do the fpontaneity, and want of force to refift, convert these heinous tranfgreffions of the laws of nature into acts of phyfical liberty? and if the boy fhould refift, and the beaft kick and difappoint his unnatural luft, will thefe forces opposed to his will, reduce him to fervitude?

In reality, is not the Doctor moft egregiously mistaken in his notions, both of phyfical liberty and of fervitude? the former confifts not in acts proceeding from Spontaneity, or felf-determination, nor of the agent's doing what he wills; but in a permiffion to execute that to which, by nature, he was decreed, according to the ends for which all men were created. Nor does Jervitude confift in being oppofed in acts of volition, by a fuperior force. But in being compelled to fubmit to fuch things as, by nature, they have a right to refift. That this is a juft definition of fervitude, I appeal to old Milton, an apoftolical republican, to whofe judgement neither Dr. Price nor rebellion itself can have any thing to oppose:

Unjustly, thou deprav'ft it with the name

Of fervitude, to ferve whom God ordains
Or Nature.

If the operations of the mind be ftri&tly attended to, it will manifeftly appear, that the will is no more connected with actions which originate from fpontaneity and felf-determination, than with those which fpring from the force of foreign caules. In every act, of every kind, felf-determination and the will muft neceffarily precede its beginning, without which a man muft eternally remain as immoveable as an automaton, actuated by the mechanical powers of involuntary motion only. Volition, therefore,

being indifpenfibly antecedent to every act of fervitude as well as of freedom, phyfical liberty cannot confift in acting in conformity to the will, but according to the feveral degrees of natural powers which are given to individuals; and the application of them to thofe ends, for which, by nature, they were formed. Reason, therefore, does pofitively pronounce, that physical liberty confifts not in acts confecutive of the will, proceeding from Spontaneity or felf-determination; nor fervitude in those proceeding from a foreign caufe or force, which opposes that will but that, whilft all men proceed according to the relative faculties which were given them, and to the ends defense for which they were formed, they enjoy all those rights, tal to which, by nature, they are entitled, and that this alone is phyfical liberty.

Repugnant as it may feem to Dr. Price's principles, I am under little doubt that it will be fhewn, in the fubfequent pages, that this very force, which operates against the agent's will, and reduces men to fervitude, is the fole fountain from which both moral, civil and religious liberty have emanated; the ftream by which they are ftill watered and kept in vigour; and without which humankind would have remained in one continued ftate of war, embittered with tyranny and enflavement. And, could this fervitude be annihilated, they would inevitably return to that deplorable condition.

B

SECTION II.

Of moral liberty.

EFORE I proceed to examine the juftness and precifion of Dr Price's definition of moral liberty, it feems requifite to give a more general, though fuccinct defcription of our mental faculties. Befides thofe of fenfe, fenfation and appetite, which are already mentioned in the preceding fection, there remain paffion, memory, imagination, faith and reafon.-By paffion I mean that emotion of the foul, which is infeparably con

nected,

nected, in different degrees, with every fenfation of plea fure and of pain, from the flightest liking to the strongest love, from the moft minute averfion to the most violent hatred. Into thefe, almost all the others may be refolved; as they differ more in the nature of their objects, than in that of the emotion, from the former of which they receive their different appellations. Hope and fear are, indeed, common to all the other paffions. Because the poffeffion of every pleafing object unenjoyed, may be hoped, and to be retained when gotten; and the unattainment of it when remote, and the lofs of it after pofleffion may be feared. In like manner, every difpleafing object, at a distance may be hoped never to arrive; and to be removed when prefent; and feared that it will come and never will defert us.

With every paffion there is uniformly connected an exertion, which is called defire. We defire to obtain and poffefs what we love and hope, to avoid and be freed from what we hate and fear. And that defire does, neceffarily, precede and influence the mind of man, in every act which he wills to undertake or to relinquish; and this in proportion to the degrees of ftrength of that paffion by which he is actuated. By memory, I mean the retention of the ideas and perceptions, acquired by the fenfes, fenfation, reflexion, and other acts of the intellect ;--by imagination, the power of recalling thofe ideas and perceptions, combining and difpofing of them in all the various modes in which they can be arranged;-by faith, a perfuafion of things, actions and events, not prefent to the fenfes, not proved, or not confentaneous with the common courfe of nature;---by reason, that faculty which, analyzing and comparing ideas, by whatever means they are brought to the fentient principle, derives from them fuch inferences and conclufions, as, confecutively arife therefrom; and which are received › us truths by the reafoner.

Morality is that relation in which men ftand in society, with refpect to their actions, confidered as beneficial or injurious; not only to one another, as individuals, but alfo to the whole community. It feems expedient therefore to fhew in what manner, by the human faculties operating in obedience to the laws of nature, as explained

in