In fpeaking of the prefent war, between this kingdom and her colonies, P. 32, "he begs that it may be attend"ed to, that he has chofen to try this question by the "general principles of civil liberty, and not by the "practice of former times, or by the charters granted "to the colonies. But he wishes to have the question brought to a higher teft and furer iffue. The queftion, issue. "with all liberal enquirers, ought to be, not what ju"rifdiction over them precedents, ftatutes, and charters "give; but reafon and equity, and the rights of huma"nity give. This is, in truth, a queftion which no kingdom has ever before had occafion to agitate. The "cafe of a free country branching itself out in the man66 ner Britain has done, and fending to a diftant world "colonies, which have there from fmall beginnings, and "under free conftitutions, of their own, increased and "formed a body of powerful ftates, likely foon to be"come fuperior to the parent ftate. This is a cafe which "is new in the hiftory of mankind, and it is extremely "improper to judge of it by the rules of narrow and partial policy, or to confider it on any other ground "than the general one of reafon and juftice."

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On this ground I propofe to meet Dr. Price. The queftion fhall again be brought to this higher teft: when, from a comparison between his fentiments and mine, a ftill furer iffue may refult, whether reafon and equity and the rights of humanity can fupport his principles of civil liberty, or whether they give to the fupreme legiflature of this nation a right of refifting it by arms.

As Dr. Price affects to deduce his arguments from those principles which alone, in his opinion, can form the true foundation of all juft government, and from thence to eftablish a plenary juftification of the American revolt, he fays, P. 2. In order to obtain a more diftinct and accurate view of liberty, as fuch, it will be useful to "confider it under the four following general divifions. First phyfical liberty.-Secondly moral liberty-Thirdly "religious liberty-and fourthly civil liberty. Thefe heads comprehend under them all the different kinds "of liberty, and he has placed civil liberty laft, because he means to apply to it all he fhall fay of the other kinds of liberty.'"

Such

Such being the Doctor's divifions of liberty, he proceeds to give a definition of each of them. As I mean not fuperficially to treat the subject contained in his obfervations, and as he, profeffedly, intends "to apply to civil "liberty all he fhall fay of the other kinds," it becomes expedient that these definitions be not inattentively examined. And, if the refult of this difquifition fhall prove them to be erroneous, impracticable and fubverfive of the ends of national fociety, as they, confeffedly, include the principles on which he grounds his juftification of the American refiftance, there can exift but little reason piecemeal to demolish that edifice which he has thereon erected. The foundation being fapped, the whole fabric neceffarily tumbles into ruin. To effect that end fhall be the endeavour of this enquiry.

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"By phyfical liberty," p. 3, "he means that principle of Spontaneity or self-determination, which con"ftitutes us agents, or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering them properly our own, and not "the effects of the operation of any foreign caufe:" and, p. 4, 66 in all thefe cafes" (the four divifions of liberty) there is a force, which ftands in opposition to "the agent's own will, which, as far as it operates, "produces fervitude in the firft cafe" (physical liberty). "This force is incompatible with the very idea of voluntary motion, and the subject of it is a mere in"ftrument, which never acts, but is always afted upon."

In order to determine the juftnefs and precision of this definition, fo peremptorily laid down, Dr. Price fhould have previously explained the ends of man's existence: the fituation in which he is placed, not only refpecting thofe of his own fpecies, but of all other beings, whether they be animal or vegetable, and the earth itself. At the fame time, ought he not to have delineated the faculties, both mental and corporeal, of that being who enjoys this phyfical liberty? On the contrary, he has confidered his definitions as felf-evident axioms, and there on, as indifputable truths, erected his obfervations and doctrine of the antecedent liberties. The truth of these definitions, and the existence of fuch liberties, fo deferibed, I fhall prefume to examine. To that intent, it becomes requifite to analyfe the human mind into its B 2

more

more diftinctive faculties, and to enquire into the motives and modes of their operations. For, without the previous knowledge of the human powers, by what means can the phyfical liberty of man be defined or determined. And without knowing the fituation in which he ftands, refpecting the objects abovementioned, in what manner can his rights be afcertained?

I will, therefore, firft, confider him in that which is generally fuppofed to be his primaeval ftate, before the earch, and all that it produces and fuftains, were divided, and became the fpecific property of individuals and of nations, as an ifolated being; totally unaffociated with all others of his race; and abfolutely dependent on the exertion of his own peculiar faculties, for the acquiring of all fuch objects, as are, by nature, made indifpenfibly requifite to the ends and exiftence of fuch a creature. In proceeding from this primordial state, I shall endeavour to fhew the origin, progreffion and establishment of national fociety, and confequently the nature of moral, civil, and religious liberty.

The obvious and primary divifion of man is into a fentient and material principle. Without entering into a circumftantial detail of all his faculties, either mental or corporeal, I fhall, at prefent, only confider him in a partial view; as a being endowed with fenfe, fenfation, and appetite, together with the bodily powers of locomotion, and of performing others obedient to the will. By fenfe I mean the intuitive power of seeing, hearing, fmelling, tafting, feeling, which arifes from the different organization of the parts appropriated to thefe feveral offices. By thefe the intelligence of external things is conveyed to the mind; and by these it is taught, not only to diftinguish one object from another, but the different qualities and degrees of all, as they refpectively appertain to each fenje;-by fenfation, that power of perceiving pleasure and fain, which, in fome degree, from the leaft to the greateft, is united with every idea imparted by the fenfes. By thefe mankind are admonished to felect that which is beneficial, and to avoid that which is prejudicial to the ends of their being formed By appetite, I mean that inftinctive emotion, which is fubfequent of pleasurable and

painful

painful fenfation, which urges us to will and to obtain the agreeable, and to avert the noxious, by the exertion of all our faculties.

As these

It will hardly be denied, that man, by nature, is born to live, and procreate; and that he has an indifputable right to thofe means by which thefe ends are to be obtained. Or that he enjoys a phyfical liberty of exerting his faculties, to the attainment of fuch objects as are neceffary to felf-prefervation and the perpetuating of his race; not only in common with all other men; but in contradiftinction, and preference of felf, to all other beings, in all inftances where either of them cannot be obtained, but by that preference. Yet, fuch is the ftate of humankind, that, notwithstanding nature hath beftowed on all men thefe faculties and rights, the former are, nevertheless, by her unerring decrees, circumfcribed in their energy and operation, not only refpecting man, as he ftands in relation to all other productions, but comparatively, alfo, with others of his own kind: and the latter are not attainable by every individual of the race. objects are fuch as cannot be at all times acquired, nor preferved, when gotten, by the utmost exertion of the faculties of a fingle man, whatever may be the energy of volition, does it not irrefiftibly follow, from Dr. Frice's definition of physical liberty, that in all fuch events, proceeding from actions of fpontaneity, or felf-determination, which conftitutes an agent, his will is effectually opposed; and, by that force or impoffibility, that the agent himself is placed in a ftate of jervitude. Man, therefore, in every circumftance wherein that force prevails against his will, is, by nature, formed a flave: and, confequently, in all fuch cafes, he can have no claim to phyfical liberty. Unless he can, by nature, be entitled to enjoy that, which, by the laws of nature, he has not powers to acquire and retain. In what a multiplicity of inftances will Dr. Price's freeman, then, be found to be enflaved! is man enabled to forefee the iffues of his own intents and tranfactions; whether he fhall prove fuccefsful in his fearch of fuftenance; in the retention of what he has acquired; or the prefervation of himself from death and injury? and yet, in all thefe circumftances and innumerable others, in which he wills to know the

B 3

events

events of his endeavours, and is utterly unable, is he not reduced to fervitude? in like manner, because he is incapable of feeing in the dark, or objects very remote ; of hearing founds beyond certain diftances and below fome degrees; of tasting what is not offered to his palate, or has no flavour; of Imelling inodorous things, and of feeling what he does not touch; all which he may will, does that force, inftituted by nature, which oppofes this will, deprive him of physical liberty? if it do, nature deprives him of what the never gave, and I leave to Dr. Price the reconcilement of that contradiction."

Because, by all poffible endeavours, no man can, extend his arm beyond its length, in order to reach that food which is otherwise unattainable, and which he wills to have; nor move his feet with the celerity of a greyhound, to catch the animal he wills to poffefs; because the bird, he wills to catch, efcapes his hand, and he cannot fly and feize it, like the faulcon in the air; because the fifh he wills to take eludes his grafp, and he cannot dive, like the otter, to seize his prey; because he cannot afcend inacceffible eminences, to gather the fruits which grow thereon, and he wills to have; defcend perpendicular precipices, to avoid the tyger, which he wills to escape; nor obtain the food he wills to eat, without labour; in all these acts of spontaneity and felf-determination, wherein the agent's will is oppofed by force, is he not reduced to fervitude? and, as fervitude implies a mafter, is he not the flave of brutes, fowls, fifh, mountains and precipices? but can man be deprived of his physical liberty, by not obtaining his will in those acts, which, by the inflitutes of nature, he is incapacitated to accomplish? as the rights of humanity are founded on the neceffity of acquiring what is requifite for the ends of man's existence, fo his phyfical liberty is founded on what his faculties can perform and not on what he may fpontaneously felf determine, and will to have. The force, therefore, which oppofes the agent's will, can, in no fenfe, render him a flave; because, to be reduced to fervility is to fall from that condition to which, by nature, man is born.

With a view more explicitly to discover, whether phyfical liberty do really confift in the agent's being unopposed

by