OF THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA FROM ITS ORGANIZATION UNTIL THE END OF THE JANUARY TERM, 1887, INCLUD- REPORTS UP TO AND INCLUDING VOLUME LXX, EXCEPT ALSO OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN IOWA AND OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE BY EMLIN MCCLAIN, A. M., LL.B., RESIDENT PROFESSOR OF LAW AT THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA AND VOL. II. CHICAGO: CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY. 1887. Entered according to Act of Congress in the year eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, BY EMLIN MCCLAIN, in the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. DAVID ATWOOD, MADISON, WIS. DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA, FROM ITS ORGANIZATION TO MARCH TERM, 1887 (MORRIS-LXX IOWA). MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. 1. In general: Where a party went before a justice of the peace and swore to certain facts, and the justice, erroneously believing such facts to constitute a crime, caused the person charged to be arrested, held, that the party stating such facts was not liable for malicious prosecution: Newman v. Davis, 58-447. 2. In an action for malicious prosecution for resisting an officer in making an arrest, the guilt or innocence of the party who was being arrested, or the reasonable ground of belief on the part of such officer as to whether a person arrested was guilty or not, is immaterial: Montgomery v. Sutton, 58 697. 3. A party who maliciously and without probable cause prosecutes another upon a criminal charge cannot avoid his liability by showing that the information or indictment was defective or insufficient, either in substance or form: Shaul v. Brown, 28–37. 4. In an action for malicious prosecution in testifying before a grand jury, held improper to ask one of the grand jurors as a witness whether the evidence of defendant was taken into consideration in passing upon the case: Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57-474. 5. Where a malicious prosecution is commenced by a party and afterwards the indictment is quashed and a new indictment found, such party will be responsible for the proceedings under the new indictment, although it VOL. II -1 does not appear that he had anything to do The perwith the resubmission of the cause. son causing the criminal action to be commenced is liable for its continuance: Johnson v. Miller, 63-529. 6. In order to render a party liable for malicious prosecution it is not necessary to show that he testified falsely for the prosecution: Bowman v. Brown, 52-437. 7. If defendant can show that plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact of his acquittal of the crime charged, was in fact guilty of the crime, no recovery for malicious prosecution can be had: Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57–474. 8. Conspiracy to prosecute: Where a person is charged with a conspiracy to carry on a malicious prosecution, it is sufficient to prove his acts were such as would naturally and ordinarily produce the acts of the other party to the conspiracy in commencing the suit complained of. It is not required that it appear that the acts done were necessary to the institution of the prosecution: Green v. Cochran, 43–544. 9. Statements between the several parties jointly sued for malicious prosecution are not receivable in evidence against them, unless the conspiracy is proved, and the declaration is shown to have been made during the existence of such conspiracy and in aid of the common design: Johnson v. Miller, 63-529. 10. Held, that evidence that plaintiff's barn was burned and that a rope or a threat |