Majesty had made to the allies to attain this object, your glory would be affected by all the delays and difficulties which were interposed; and that therefore the sooner the Prince of Orange could on his part labour efficaciously for the immediate conclusion of peace, the better it would be; that I was assured that your Majesty would give the same instructions to your plenipotentiaries in regard to all that should be just and reasonable.

M. de Bentinck said that he would not fail to inform the Prince of Orange of all this, and that your Majesty might rest assured that he would devote himself to it with good faith and with all his power; but that he was obliged to use great circumspection for fear of giving the allies umbrage, and that they might not imagine that he wished to compel them to make peace by force and authority; that the Emperor, in particular, is the most obstinate, and makes most opposition, in consequence of the unreasonable spirit of one of his chief ministers at Vienna, whose name I have forgotten; that the Spaniards are more reasonable, and have entirely intrusted all their interests to the Prince of Orange, who may deal with them as he thinks best. To this M. de Bentinck added, that the Prince of Orange had seen the proposal for peace which the plenipotentiaries of your Majesty have delivered at the conferences; which proposal the Prince of Orange had found perfectly satisfactory and very equitable, saying that, if he had drawn it up himself, he could not have made it better for all parties; that above all, it is drawn up in terms of dignity, but very

conciliatory, which has not always been the case; and that this particularly had given grounds for complaint and estrangement to most of the plenipotentiaries and ministers of the allies, more especially to those of the Emperor; that the Prince of Orange had already pointed out to them the conciliatory terms in question, observing that they contained nothing but what was reasonable, and that it was very difficult to oppose good reasons brought forward with civility and without any offensive expression.

M. de Bentinck told me further, that the Prince of Orange apprehended that the plenipotentiaries of your Majesty were not disposed to give your Majesty so favourable a testimony as he deserves, not only of his good intentions respecting the general peace, but also of his private sentiments for your Majesty; that even the plenipotentiaries or ministers of the Prince of Orange at the conferences have some reason to be not entirely satisfied with the plenipotentiaries of your Majesty, who have received their memoirs, and have not yet given any answer, though they had given one to those of the other allies; that he does not know the reason of this, unless it be the jealousy which they have conceived of the conferences of M. de Bentinck and myself; that he knows further that they have attempted to decry them and to render them odious, having given several ministers of the allies to understand that in one of these conferences M. de Bentinck had told me that the Prince of Orange would make the allies do just what he pleased, and that he knew how they must be managed. M. de Bentinck

assured me that some of the ministers of the allies had spoken of it to the Prince of Orange.

After finishing our conference in the orchard where we were, M. de Bentinck and myself went into the nearest house in the suburbs of Halle, where he copied out with his own hand, word for word, the article which your Majesty did me the honour to address to me on what concerns England, which I dictated to him myself. He proposed that it should be written by my secretary, who presented him with paper and ink, desiring to excuse himself, on the ground that writing was inconvenient to him, as he had been formerly wounded in his right hand. But, on my observing that I thought it would be better that he should write it himself, he did so without difficulty, and when he had finished, we read it over together, to see if it exactly corresponded to the copy which I had myself taken from that of your Majesty, and which was found entirely to agree with it word for word. He repeated that there were, indeed, still a few terms which it might be desirable to insert in this paper, but that he was satisfied with the mode in which it was drawn up, and that the Prince of Orange relied much more on the good faith and sincerity of your Majesty's intentions, of which I had assured him, scrupulously to observe the peace, and all that might be agreed upon, and understood by this paper, than on all the terms which it contained, and all those which might have been added to it.

(ENCLOSURE.)

Draught of an Article given by Marshal de BOUFFLERS to M. de BENTINCK, July 27. 1697.

"The King will engage by the treaty, not to assist, directly or indirectly, the enemies of the Prince of Orange, without any exception; binding himself further not to favour, in any manner whatsoever, the cabals, secret intrigues, factions and rebellions which may occur in England, nor those who shall excite or foment them, without any exception of person."

THE DUKE OF SHREWSBURY TO SIR JOSEPH WILLIAMSON.

Whitehall, July 18-28. 1697. It is plain the French have been unwilling to come to any immediate conclusion, expecting the success of the several projects they had on foot. I hope the event will dispose them to be more sincere hereafter in their intentions for a peace. However, it was certainly well advised to push them to a declaration; which, I perceive, was the end of my Lord Portland's interviews with Marshal Boufflers. Uncertainties may be dangerous to his Majesty's affairs abroad, and I am sure they are prejudicial to his interests at home.

If the war must be continued, it is time the thoughts of the nation were disposed to it, and that they did no longer flatter themselves with the deluding expectations of a peace, but turn their minds to support the war with vigour and resolu

tion, which I am sure they are better able to do this year than they were the last; and I do not doubt but they will be as willing, when they see no other means left, to save all that they have been thus long contending for. No man alive could more sincerely rejoice than I should at a safe and honourable agreement; but if the enemy will give so much credit to the false accounts of their correspondents here, that it cannot be obtained, I hope they will find, though we wish a peace more than they, we do not want it so much.

WILLIAM III. TO THE PENSIONARY HEINSIUS.

Camp near Brussels, July 29. 1697.

The conduct of the ambassadors of Spain is incomprehensible, if we consider the instructions which they have received, and how necessary to them is a speedy peace. I trust that I shall be able to induce the Elector of Bavaria to send them positive orders. I yesterday plainly declared to Count d'Aversberg, who begged me to tell him what I thought, that we could no longer continue the war, and that peace must be accepted on the conditions offered, and within the term prescribed. He promised to write to the Court of Vienna on He the subject by an extraordinary courier. seemed not to have much objection to it, but complained bitterly of the harshness of the conditions respecting Lorraine.