Spring, 12 Mass. Rep., 297. Dawl v. Trask, Ibid, 154. Townley v. Sumral, 2 Peters, 182. Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cowen, 432. Skelton v. Brewster, 8 Johns. R., 293, second edition. Stocking v. Sage, 1 Conn. Rep., 519 Gold v. Phillips, 10 Johns. Rep., 412. Myers v. Morse, 15 Johns. Rep., 425. Chase v. Day, 17. Johns. Rep., 114. Slingerland v. Morse, 7 Johns. Rep., 463. Mease v. Wagner, 1 McCord, 395. Madden v. McCray, Ibid, 486. Olmstead v. Greenly, 18 Johns. Rep., 12. 2. What is the nature of a contract of a guarantee ? It is a collateral engagement for another, as distinguished from an original and direct agreement for the party's own act. It is of the essence of this contract, that there should be a principal debtor; and the party agreeing to become responsible for him, incurs no obligation as surety, if no valid claim against the principal ever arises; and his liability as surety upon a tenable demand against the principal, ceases when such demand is extinguished.-Chitty on Contracts, 397. Institute Just., lib. 3, tit. 21. Digest, lib. 46, tit. 1. Code, lib. 8, tit. 41. Nov. 4. Vennius in Inst., lib. 3, tit. 21. Averani, lib. 2, ch. 3 and 4. Noodt. Commentaire, p. 351. Struvius Synt. Juris. Civ. Exercises, 47. Didier Herauld, lib. 2, ch. 24. Godefroi in Code Theo., lib. 4, tit. 20. Vetriarius Universum Ins. Civil. Priv., lib. 3, art. 21. Schilter Exercit. in Pandect, 1 Part., p. 96. Dumat, 1 Part., lib. 3, tit. 5. Pothier des Oblig., 365. As the obligation of sureties is an obligation accessary to that of a principal debtor, it follows that it is of the essence, that there should be a valid obligation of a principal debtor; consequently, if the principal is not obliged, neither is the surety, as there can be no accessary without a principal obligation, according to the rule of law, cum causa principalis non consistit, ne ea quidem quæ sequuntur, locum habent, l. 178. Ff. de Rega Jur. Pothier des Oblig., 366. Puffendorf, lib. 5, ch. 10, sec. 11 Noodt. Probabilia Juris., lib. 2, ch. 1. The rule that a party cannot be liable upon a contract of guarantee, unless the principal has incurred a legal responsibility, is true in some instances, in form or words rather than in substance. In the case of a guarantee to answer for the price of goods to be supplied to a married woman, or goods (not necessaries) to be sold to an infant, or other persons incompetent to contract, no doubt the party guaranteeing, though professedly contracting only in the character of a surety, would be responsible. He could not object the incompetency of the (supposed) principal; or he might, by construction of law, be treated as the principal For the same reasons, a person who, without authority, contracts as agent for another person, may be viewed as the principal and absolute debtor.-Magg v. Ames, 4 Bing., 470. 3 Chitty's Pleading, 5th edit., 909. Polhill v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald., 114. Morely v. Boothby, 3 Bing., 113. Conn. v. Coburn, 7 New Hamp. R., 368. Clarke v. Foxcroft, 7 Greenleaf, 348. Pearson v. Parker, 3 New Hamp. R., 366. Cornwall v. Gould, 4 Pick., 454. Bonney v. Seeley, 2 Wend., 481. New York State Bank v. Fletcher, 5 Wen, 85. Mauri v. Hefferman, 13 Johns,, 58. Wetherby v. Mann, 11 Johns., 518. Simpson v. Patten, 4 Johns., 422. Jackson v. Raynor, 12 Johns., 291. Elliott v. Guise, 7 Har. & Johns., 457. Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns., 29. Bailey v. Freeman, 4 Johns., 280. Clark v. Small, 6 Yerger, 418. Aldridge v. Turner, 1 Gill & Johns., 427. Tenney v. Prince, 4 Pick., 385. S. C., 7 Pick., 243. Flagg v. Upham, 10 Pick., 148. Neelson v. Sanborne, 2 New Hamp. R., 414, 415. Tenney v. Prince, 4 Pick., 386, 387. D'Wolf v. Raband, 1 Peters' S. C. R., 476. Bailey v. Freeman, 11 Johns., 221. Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. R., 358. Wheelwright v. Moore, 2 Hall, 143. S. C., 1 Hall, 648. 1 Hall, 201. The surety of a minor is often more strictly obliged than the princi pal, who may, if the contract is injurious, be relieved against his obligation, whereas the surety is obliged without the hopes of restitution. In cause cognitione versabitur, utrum soli ei succurrendum sit, an etiam his, qui pro eo obligati sunt, utputa fidejussoribus. Itaque si cum scirem minorem, et ei fidem non haberem, tu fidejusseris pro eo, non est æquum fidejussori in necem meam subveniri; sed potius ipsi denegando erit mandati actio. In summa, perpendendum erit Prætori, cui potius subveniat, utrum creditori, an fidejussori; nam minor captus neutri tenebitur. -Digest, lib. 41, tit. 1, l. 13, de Minor., l. 1. Cod. de Fidej. Minor. Pothier on Oblig., 376. Puffendorf, lib. 5, ch. 10, sec. 10. Noodt. Com., 351. Gothefredi in Code Theo., lib. 4, tit. 20, tome 1, p. 402. Dumat, part 1 lib. 3, chap. 7, sec. 3. 3. What is the rule as to the necessary considerations to support a contract of guarantee ? It is enough if the person for whom the guarantee becomes surety receives a benefit, or the person to whom the guarantee is given suffer inconvenience, as an inducement to the surety to become guarantee for the principal debtor.-Chitty on Contracts, 398. Norton et al. v. Eastman, 4 Greenl., 521. Caton v. Shaw et al., 2 Har. & Gill., 13. An undertaking to answer for the debt of another, though in writing, and signed by the defendant, is void, if no consideration move between the plaintiff and defendant, either of forbearance or otherwise.—Elliott v. Guise, 7 Har. & Johns., 457. Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. R., 29 Baily v. Freeman, 4 Johns., 280. Clarke v. Small, 6 Yerger, 418. A guarantee of a note, like any other promise without consideration, is void. Aldridge v. Turner, 1 Gill & Johns., 427. Tenny v. Prince, 4 Pick., 385. S. C., 7 Pick., 243. Flagg v. Upham, 10 Pick., 148. Neelson v. Sanborne, 2 New Hamp. R., 414, 415. Unless the undertaking is contemporaneous with the original debt.-Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns., 29. Tenny v. Prince, 4 Pick. Rep., 386, 387. Per Parker, C. J. D'Wolf v. Raband, 1 Peters' S. C. R., 476. Bailey v. Freeman, 11 Johns., 221. Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. Rep., 358. Wheelwright v. Moore, 2 Hall, 143. S. C., 1 Hall, 648. 1 Hall, 201. Morely v. Boothby, 3 Bing., 113. The main rule, in regard to the sufficiency of the consideration, seems to be, that it may arise either, 1st. By reason of a benefit resulting to the party promising, or at his request, to a third person, by act of the promisee; 2d. On occasion of the latter sustaining any loss or inconvenience, or subjecting himself to any charge or obligation at the instance of the person making the promise, although such person obtain no advan Waiver of a legal right, at the request of another person, is a good The incurring a liability in consequence of the promise of another, Jewett v. Warran, 12 Mass. R., 300. But the assumption of a supposed danger or liability, which has no And where one, through a mistake of the law, acknowledged himself An agreement to forbear for a certain or reasonable time, to institute Upton, 4 Greenleaf, 552. See Elting v. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. Rep., 237 A mere moral obligation to pay a demand or perform a duty, is, in 4. How far are contracts of surety affected by the statute of frauds ? The statute of frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, sec. 4, provides "that no ac- The object of the statute was to reach every case of mere suretyship, Cutler v. Hinton, 6 Randolph, Clarke v. Small, 6 Yerger, 418. Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick., 166. Dearborn v. Parks, 5 Greenleaf, 81. Levy v. Merril, 4 Greenleaf, 180. Stephens v. Winne, 2 Nott & McCord, 372. Neelson v. Sanborne, 2 N Hamp., 414. Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn., 81. Hiller v. Irvine, 1 Dev., 103. Buckley v. Beardsley, 2 Southard, 570. Violet v. Patten, 5 Cranch, 142. Taylor v. Ross, 3 Yerger, 330. 2 Starkie on Evidence, (5th American edit.) 349, No. 1. 3 Kent, (3d edit.) 121, 122. 1 Phillips on Evid., 359 Malsam v. Wharam, 2 Term. Rep., 80. Anderson v. Hayman, 1 H. Bl., 120. Peekham v. Faria, 13 Doug., 13. Miles v. Sculthorpe, 2 Campb., 215. Rains v. Storry, 3 Car. & Payne, 181. Keater v. Temple, 1 Bos. & Pull., 158. Barber v. Fox, 1 Stark. Rep., 270. Croft v. Smallwood, 1 Esp. Rep., 121. Kirkham v. Martyr, 2 Barn. & Ald., 613. Edge v. Frost, 4 Dowl. & Ryl., 243. Langdale v. Parry, 2 Id., 337. Wood v. Benson, 2 Cromp. & Jarv., 94. Dixon v. Hatfield, 2 Bing., 439. 10 Moor, 42. Bamptin v. Pauline, 4 Bing., 264. 12 Moor, 497. Edwards v. Kelley, 6 Maul. & Selw., 204. Thomas v. Williams, 10 Barn. & Cress., 664. Jarmain v. Algar, Ryan & Moody, 248. Goodman v. Chase, 1 Barn. & Ald., 297. Thomas v. Cooke, 8 Barn. & Cress., 728. 3 Man. & Ryl., 444. Skin v. Booke, 1 Barn. & Adolph., 124. Adams v. Dansey, 6 Bing., 506. 4 Moor & Payne, 245. Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 Barn. & Ald., 595. Jenkins v. Reynolds, 6 Moore, 86. 3 Brod. & Bing., 14. Morely v. Boothby, 3 Bing., 107. 10 Moore, 395. Evans v. Duncombe, 1 Cromp. & Jarv., 372. Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 Barn. & Cress., 73. It is now fully settled, that to render a memorandum or agreement in writing valid under the 4th section of the statute, the consideration for the promise, as well as the engagement itself, must be stated therein, and that the omission cannot be supplied by parol testimony.-Wain v. Walters, 5 East, 10. Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 Barn. & Ald., 595. Jenkins v. Reynolds, 6 Moore, 86. 3 Brod. & Bing., 14. Morely v. Boothby, 3 Bing., 107. 10 Moore, 395. Evans v. Duncombe, 1 Cromp. & Jarv., 372. Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 Barn. & Cress., 73. This construction of the statute of frauds has been adopted in New York. Sears v. Brink, 3 Johns. 210. Leonard v. Vredenburg, 8 Johns., 29. Watson v. Randall, 20 Wendell, 201. Larson v. Wyman, 14 Wend., 246. So in South Carolina.-Stephens v. Wynn, 2 Nott & McCord, 372. The same has been recognized in New Hampshire.-Neelson v. Samborne, 2 New Hampshire, 414. A different construction has been given to this statute in Massachusetts.-Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass., 221. and has been confirmed by the revised statutes of Mass., ch. 74, sec. 2. In Maine the same construction has been given as in Massachusetts.-Levy v. Merrill, 4 Greenleaf, 180. So in Connecticut.-Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn., 81. So in North Carolina.-Miller v. Irvine, 1 Dev., 103. So in New Jersey.-Buckler v. Beardsley, 2 South., 570. These decisions have turned mainly on the force of the word agreement. And where the word promise has been employed in the statute, as in Virginia and Tennessee, the construction has not been so strict.-Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142. Taylor v. Ross, 3 Yerger, 330. 2 Starkie on Ev., (5th Am. ed.) 349, No. 1. 3 Kent, (3d ed.) 121, 122. |