them to receive the evidence of other parties, even although it should bear directly against the prisoner.

At the conclusion of the examination of the witnesses for the defence, the Court, on the application of the prisoner to that effect, will, if they think it expedient, permit him to comment upon the evidence which he has brought before them, or urge any matter in his justification which he may have omitted in his first address. But it is not usual to allow the prosecutor the privilege he would have in the courts of common law of making a reply. Here we observe that the members of courts-martial, however deficient they may, at times, have shown themselves to be in knowledge of the technicalities of the law, have, from general usage, so governed their mode of proceeding as to throw the balance of argument, if the case admit of it, directly in favour of the prisoner.

The witnesses should not be examined within hearing of each other; neither should they be allowed to communicate together during the trial: the president of the Court will give directions to this effect. The first rule is easily enforced; the latter, in the confined space of a ship, is more difficult perhaps, then, it would be better to say, that they should not converse on any matter pertaining to the pending trial. If a witness should disobey these orders, it would scarcely be right to deprive the party who called him of his evidence. This, however, is a point for the decision of the Court. It may, at all events, be inferred that the value of

his testimony would be materially lessened by the appearance of collusion which a disregard of the above injunctions would carry with it.

The task of prosecuting generally, but not necessarily, devolves upon the captain of the ship to which the accused belongs: in some cases, the prosecutor is called upon to give evidence; but this, as before remarked, would be no bar to his continuing in the Court afterwards. It would be very dangerous to hold that a prisoner should so far have the power of modelling his own court-martial as to be enabled by summoning, ad libitum, his witnesses, to exclude either the prosecutor, or any particular members from the Court. It is in general more likely to mislead than to furnish any useful direction to give an opinion upon speculative questions. We therefore think it impossible to say more than that the prisoner, by summoning the prosecutor as his witness, does not obtain the legal right to exclude him from being present in the Court to conduct the prosecution. But who shall or who shall not be admitted to be present during a trial must be subject to the control of the Court, who are, upon all occasions, the proper persons to decide such questions, upon the respective circumstances belonging to them.

CHAP. X.

ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES.

Attendance of Civilians to give Evidence cannot be enforced. -Penalty for refusing to give Evidence, or prevaricating, or behaving with Contempt to the Court, only applicable to Persons in the Fleet. In Cases where the Contempt extends to an Interruption of the Proceedings. - Penalty attached to wilful and corrupt Perjury. — Civilians required as Witnesses to have their Expenses paid. — Prisoners of War and Persons confined in any Gaol required as Witnesses.

THERE is no clause in the Acts of Parliament relating to the government of the navy similar to that in the Army Mutiny Act, compelling the attendance of civilians, duly summoned, to give evidence at courts-martial. Civilians are, of course, frequently examined at naval courts-martial; but it must be remembered that there is no law by which the Court could enforce their presence; neither would they be subject to punishment for contempt of Court, for, by the Act 22 Geo. 2. cap. 33. sect. 17., the penalties for refusing to give evidence, or prevaricating, or behaving with contempt to the Court, are applicable only to "persons in the fleet," that is to say, to those who are, at the time, amenable to naval discipline. But if the contempt should extend so far as to interrupt the proceedings, the party offending, in whatever station of life he might

be, would be liable to commitment during the sitting of the Court, for all courts of record have an inherent right to repress contempts in the nature of immediate interruptions. To invest any jurisdiction with a power of either fining or imprisoning, makes it a court of record instantly. A naval court-martial, then, since it has the power to imprison, must consequently be deemed a court of record. Now, the doubt is, whether the 17th section of the act referred to, respecting contempts of Court, which section is applicable only to "persons in the fleet," does not restrict the general power of committing for contempt to the particular case of those persons. Mr. Twiss, counsel for the Admiralty in 1825, was of opinion that the power of the Court in this respect was general, if the contempt amounted to an interruption or obstruction of its proceedings. Such commitment, however, could not extend to a lengthened imprisonment, but must naturally terminate with the dissolution of the Court originating it.

If in evidence given before a court-martial, “any person or persons" should commit wilful and corrupt perjury, or procure or suborn any person to commit perjury, they would be liable to all the pains and penalties attached to the crime of perjury, notwithstanding they may not have been subject to naval discipline.

To make a false answer to a question in the course of a legal investigation the subject of an indictment for wilful and corrupt perjury, it is

essential that the question itself should be one which is material to the issue. If any person in the fleet should refuse to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or should prevaricate, the Court is authorised to punish such person by imprisonment for any period not exceeding three months; and if any person in the fleet should behave with contempt to the Court, he would be subject to imprisonment for one month.

If the attendance of civilians to give evidence before a court-martial be required, care should be taken, at the time of serving the notice, to tender a reasonable sum to defray their expenses to and from the place of trial, and for their maintenance during the period of the trial. Lawyers, and members of the medical profession, are entitled to remuneration for loss of time; so, also, are those witnesses who may be in "poor circumstances." Naval and military officers are entitled to a reasonable sum, to cover the expenses they may incur by attending on the Court.

If the evidence of prisoners of war be required, their attendance will be ordered by the Secretary of State.

By the 43rd of Geo. 3. cap. 140., any judge of the Courts of King's Bench, or Common Pleas, or any baron of the Court of Exchequer, is authorised to award a writ of habeas corpus for bringing any prisoner, confined in any gaol in England, before a court-martial, either for trial, or for the purpose of being examined on any matter depending before such court-martial.