Forst, &c. v. Davis. ter claim is neither sustained by the law nor the facts in this case. Appellee contends that under the facts in this case there can be no resulting trust in favor of appellants. It is further contended that the order of the revivor was legal, and that the confirmation of the sale was valid and that appellee is an innocent purchaser At the time of the death of Abram Forst the legal title to the lots in question was in his widow and children, and they could not be divested unless the sale made was confirmed and that could not be legally done until after the revivor of the action against said widow and heirs. The order of revivor was made within less than six months after the qualification of Regina Forst, and was therefore void and ineffectual to divest the heirs of the legal title. Section 507 of the Code, does not allow an order of revivor in such cases until six months after the qualification of the personal representative of decedent. The sale in this case was made May 2, 1891, and reported the 6th, and on the same day of the death of Abram Forst. Section 506 of the Code, has no application to the case at bar, the order of revivor having been made within less than six months after the death of Forst was absolutely void. (Buford v. Guthrie, 14 B. Mon.) It results therefore that the commissioner's deed to Regina Forst did not pass her the legal title to the lots; this being true it is not necessary to determine whether or not she held the property in trust for the benefit of the children. The amount of money of the wards of Regina Forst, which she used to pay for the bid of Kohn and David does not Forst, &c. v. Davis. certainly appear, nor does the proof establish any conspiracy between her and appellee to divest the children of Abram Forst of their title to the land. It is immaterial whether appellee had actual or constructive notice of the character of Regina Forst's title or claim to the lots, for the reason Regina Forst having no title to the land could not invest appellee with any. Inasmuch as the title yet remains in the appellants, it follows that they are entitled to recover in this action, but it appears that appellee in good faith paid Regina Forst and as it appears that she paid $6,444.45 of the indebtedness of Abram Forst in consideration of the assignment to her of the bid of Kohn & David for said lots, part. at least, of which, it seems, was her own money. She would therefore be entitled to be repaid such sum as she had paid out of her own funds for said bid, and under the facts in this case the appellee is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of said Regina Forst to the extent of the payment that he made to her for said lots, not exceeding $6,444.45, with interest from time of payment as to each of them, but Davis must account for the fair rental value of the property after he obtained control of it, but must be allowed interest on the purchase price and pay for improvements, if any, to the extent they increased the vendible value of the land, and also for all legal taxes paid by him on said property. It does not appear that Regina Forst is entitled to any compensation for care and attention to her children, nor does it appear that they have, as heirs, received any considerable amount of property, hence appellee is not entitled to any Bohon's Assignee v. Brown, &c. relief on account of her warranty of title to the lands, if she Upon the return of this case, the court will by proper proceedings ascertain the amount of the purchase price of said lot, paid by appellee to Regina Forst, as well as the amount of taxes, rents and improvements, as aforesaid, and upon appellants paying the amount found to be due to appellee, Davis, they will be entitled to a re-conveyance from him of said property, and upon the failure to pay such sum the court may order the sale of the property for the purpose of paying said sum and the residue, if any, to be paid to appellants, that is to the legal heirs of Abram Forst. But in no event can Davis be allowed a greater sum with interest added to it than Regina Forst paid out of her own funds for the bid of Kohn and Davis, but Davis will also be allowed such sums, if any, as may be found due him for legal taxes paid by him and for improvements as indicated herein. For the reasons indicated the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the judgment appealed from, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1. PEDDLERS' NOTE-CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PoLICE POWER.-The requirement of section 4223, of the Kentucky Statutes, that persons who sell patent rights shall have written Bohon's Assignee v. Brown, &c. on the face of the notes executed in consideration therefor the words "peddlers' note," is not in conflict with the Federal Patent Laws, and does not limit the right of the patentee, or his assignees in disposing of the patent right; but is only the exercise of a police power designed by the State to protect its citizens against fraud and imposition of itinerant persons. 2. PLEADING.-An answer in such cases which failed to allege that the payee of the note were itinerant persons or peddlers at the time of the sale of the patent rights or execution of the note in contest, was insufficient, the allegation that the note "is what is denominated by the laws of Kentucky as a peddler's note," being merely a legal conclusion. 3. NECOTIABLF INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED IN VIOLATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS ESTOPPEL-AS a general rule one who executes a negotiable promissory note knowing it to be the subject of barter and sale in the commercial world, and does not put into it words that would give warning to others not to buy it, is estopped from making a defense to the same after it has passed into the hands of a bank in this State; but where a statute in direct terms declares that a note given in violation of its provisions shall be void, it is so, no matter into whose hands it may pass. P. W. HARDIN FOR APPELLANT. CLEMENTS & THURMAN FOR APPELLEES. (Record and briefs not in the office.) JUDGE BURNAM DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. The complaint of appellant is based upon a promissory note executed by appellees Brown and Wells to Webb & Camp, which was made negotiable and payable at a bank in this State, and which was endorsed by the payees to one George Bohon and was by Bohon discounted and assigned to appellant for value, before its maturity, it being a banking institution organized under the national banking laws of the United States. Judgment is resisted by appellee upon the ground that Bohon's Assignee v. Brown, &c. the note sued on was executed in consideration of the right to sell in 25 counties of the State, exclusively, what was represented to be "The Webb & Camp Patent Automatic Broom Holder," and upon the further consideration that the payees were to furnish promptly, upon order and at agreed prices, such number of the patented articles as might be desired by appellees in the business of selling; and they further allege that payees were never the owners of any such patent as the note was given for, and that the note was procured from them by false and fraudulent representations as to the ownership of the alleged patent and by other fraudulent devices. They further allege that under the statute, the note sued on having been executed for the sale of territory for a patent right, it should have had written across the face of it the words, "Peddlers' Note," and not having such endorsement the note was null and void under the statute, and that appellant was not a purchaser in good faith without notice and before maturity of the consideration of the obligation sued on. All the affirmative allegations of the answer were denied by reply. The law and facts were submitted to the chancellor for trial, and he made a separate finding of his conclusions of fact, holding that the proof showed that the note sued on was executed for the right to sell a patent automatic broom holder; that the payees, before maturity and for value, assigned it to Bohon, and that the proof further conduced to show that Bohon afterwards assigned the note to plaintiff, after receiving full information of the considera tion of the note and of all appellees' alleged defenses, that |