the proximate cause and looks to one more remote-the primary cause, as it may be deemed—and that is, the employment itself. For this, both parties are responsible, since they voluntarily engage in it as coadventurers, with personal injury to the employee as a probable and foreseen result. In ignoring any possible negligence of the employee producing or contributing to the injury, the lawmaker reasonably may have been influenced by the belief that, in modern industry, the utmost diligence in the employer's service is in some degree inconsistent with adequate care on the part of the employee for his own safety; that the more intently he devotes himself to the work, the less he can take precautions for his own security. And it is evident that the consequences of a disabling or fatal injury are precisely the same to the parties immediately affected, and to the community, whether the proximate cause be culpable or innocent. Viewing the entire matter, it cannot be pronounced arbitrary and unreasonable for the state to impose upon the employer the absolute duty of making a moderate and definite compensation in money to every disabled employee, or, in case of his death, to those who were entitled to look to him for support in lieu of the common-law liability confined to cases of negligence. This, of course, is not to say that any scale of compensation, however insignificant, on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable. In this case, no criticism is made on the ground that the compensation prescribed by the statute in question is unreasonable in amount, either in general or in the particular case. Any question' of that kind may be met when it arises. But, it is said, the statute strikes at the fundamentals of constitutional freedom of contract. * * * We recognize that the legislation. under review does measurably limit the freedom of employer and employee to agree respecting the terms of employment, and that it cannot be supported except on the ground that it is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. In our opinion it is fairly supportable upon that ground. And for this reason: The subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the matter of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course of hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in this as affecting the common welfare. * * * We have not overlooked the criticism that the act imposes no rule of conduct upon the employer with respect to the conditions of labor in the various industries embraced within its terms, prescribes no duty with regard to where the workmen shall work, the character of the machinery, tools, or appliances, the rules or regulations to be established, or the safety devices to be maintained. This statute does not concern itself with measures of prevention, which presumably are embraced in other laws. But the interest of the public is not confined to these. One of the grounds of its concern with the continued life and earning power of the individual is its interest in the prevention of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and crime. And, in our opinion, laws regulating the responsibility of employers for the injury or death of employees, arising out of the employment, bear so close a relation to the protection of the lives and safety of those concerned that they properly may be regarded as coming within the category of police regulations. * * * B.& B. BUS.LAW-39 No question is made but that the procedural provisions of the act are amply adequate to afford the notice and opportunity to be heard required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The denial of a trial by jury is not inconsistent with "due process." * * * The objection under the "equal protection" clause is not pressed. The only apparent basis for it is in the exclusion of farm laborers and domestic servants from the scheme. But, manifestly, this cannot be judicially declared to be an arbitrary classification, since it reasonably may be considered that the risks inherent in these occupations are exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar. * * * We conclude that the prescribed scheme of compulsory compensation is not repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and are brought to consider, next, the manner in which the employer is required to secure payment of the compensation. By section 50, this may be done in one of three ways: (a) State insurance; (b) insurance with an authorized insurance corporation or association; or (c) by a deposit of securities. The record shows that the predecessor of plaintiff in error chose the third method, and with the sanction of the Commission, deposited securities to the amount of $300,000, under section 50, and $30,000 in cash as a deposit to secure prompt and convenient payment, under section 25, with an agreement to make a further deposit if required. This was accompanied with a reservation of all contentions as to the invalidity of the act, and had not the effect of preventing plaintiff in error from raising the questions we have discussed. The system of compulsory compensation having been found to be within the power of the state, it is within the limits of permissible regulation, in aid of the system, to require the employer to furnish satisfactory proof of his financial ability to pay the compensation, and to deposit a reasonable amount of securities for that purpose. The third clause of section 50 has not been, and presumably will not be, construed so as to give an unbridled discretion to the Commission; nor is it to be presumed that solvent employers will be prevented from becoming self-insurers on reasonable terms. No question is made but that the terms imposed upon this railroad company were reasonable in view of the magnitude of its operations, the number of its employees, and the amount of its pay roll (about $50,000,000 annually); hence no criticism of the practical effect of the third clause is suggested. This being so, it is obvious that this case presents no question as to whether the state might, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel employers to effect insurance according to either of the plans mentioned in the first and second clauses. There is no such compulsion, since self-insurance under the third clause presumably is open to all employers on reasonable terms that it is within the power of the state to impose. Regarded as optional arrangements, for acceptance or rejection by employers unwilling to comply with that clause, the plans of insurance are unexceptionable from the constitutional standpoint. Manifestly, the employee is not injuriously affected in a constitutional sense by the provisions giving to the employer an option to secure payment of the compensation in either of the modes prescribed, for there is no presumption that either will prove inadequate to safeguard the employee's interests. Judgment affirmed. CHAPTER V RELATIONS OF THE AGENT AND THIRD PERSONS Section. 1. Rights of the Agent Against Third Persons. 2. Rights of Third Persons Against the Agent. SECTION 1.-RIGHTS OF THE AGENT AGAINST THIRD PERSONS ROWE v. RAND. (Supreme Court of Indiana, 1887. 111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 377.) * NIBLACK, J. * * An agent may sue in his own name-First, when the contract is in writing, and is expressly made with him, although he may have been known to act as agent; secondly, when the agent is the only known or ostensible principal, and is therefore, in contemplation of law, the real contracting party; thirdly, when, by the usage of trade, he is authorized to act as owner, or as a principal contracting party, notwithstanding his well-known position as agent only. But this right of an agent to bring an action in certain cases in his own name is subordinate to the rights of the principal, who may, unless in particular cases where the agent has a lien or some other vested right, bring suit himself, and thus suspend or extinguish the right of the agent. * * * NAMQUIT WORSTED CO. v. WHITMAN et al. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1915. 221 Fed. 49, 136 C. C. A. 575.) Action by William Whitman and others against the Namquit Worsted Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. The action was on a contract for the sale of "50,000 lbs. 3-grade white worsted yarn for delivery during Oct., Nov., and Dec., '09." PUTNAM, Circuit Judge. This case was submitted to the District Court with the statutory waiver of a jury. The plaintiffs, now the defendants in error, executed the contract sued on in their own names. The real principal whom they represented was the Arlington Mills. The evidence shows that the plaintiffs were selling agents of all its product, and, of course, they were entitled to their commission on the transaction. By the settled rules of the English courts, which have been adopted in the United States, the plaintiffs were entitled to sue in their own names, both because they executed the contract in their own names, and because they had an interest in the contract to the extent of their commission. The rule is exceptional, as stated in Chitty on Contracts (11th Am. Ed.) pp. 316, 317, and also as stated more fully in Mechem on Agency (2d Ed.) § 2024. In the notes to the latter there is a list of cases showing that the rule has been fully adopted by the courts in the United States. As it appears in the authorities cited, the suit brought in the name of an agent covers the interests of both agent and principal; and the form of proceedings is anomalous, as shown by Mechem, and also in Colburn v. Phillips, 13 Gray (Mass.) 64, 66. On the latter account, the practice shows that the pleadings which were made in this case are sufficient; and we add no comment in reference to them. Where there are so many errors assigned in comparison with the substantial matters in question as we find here, each will, as usual, be treated briefly. The first point made by the plaintiff in error is based on the proposition that there is no evidence that the plaintiffs were agents of the Arlington Mills. The court found that J. H. Merrill, who signed the contract with the plaintiffs, "was duly authorized to sign, and did sign, on behalf of the Namquit Worsted Company.' The contract itself which Merrill signed used the words, "from Arlington Mills," and the court found that the parties had previously executed contracts similar to this one, and had had extensive dealings of a similar character. We think, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Namquit Company assumed and understood that the contract was for the benefit of the Arlington Mills. The point is also made that the damage alleged was not capable of being estimated under the contract and the testimony; but, in view of the fact that the court adopted the lowest scale of damages suggested in the case, there is no difficulty on this point. Nor do we find any difficulty in the other matter of fact which was made an element in the errors assigned that a certain approval of the plaintiffs was lacking. * * * The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, with interest; and the costs of appeal are allowed to the defendants in error. * * * MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO. v. PERU-VAN ZANDT IMPLEMENT CO. (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1906. 73 Kan. 295, S5 Pac. 408, 6 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1058, 117 Am. St. Rep. 468, 9 Ann. Cas. 790.) Action by the Peru-Van Zandt Implement Company against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff. fendant brings error. De The Port Huron Engine & Thresher Company, of Port Huron, Mich., manufactures threshing machines and sells them throughout the country through local agents. The plaintiff, defendant in error, is its gent at Hutchinson, Kan. By the contract of agency, it is the duty of the Peru-Van Zandt Implement Company, to advertise, introduce, and sell the machines to those desiring to purchase, and, when a sale is made, an order is taken from the purchaser, in writing, directing the Port Huron Company to ship the machinery desired, stating price, manner of payment, and other particulars constituting the conditions of sale, which order is signed by the purchaser and delivered to the local agent. This order is forwarded to the Port Huron Company by the agent making the sale. Upon this order the machinery is shipped by the designated route and consigned to the local agent. It is the duty of the agent to receive the machinery and hold possession thereof until payment is made or secured as stipulated in the order of the buyer. In completing the sale the agent takes in payment * cash, notes, mortgages, or other security as directed, but delivers the machinery only after the sale has been approved by the Port Huron Company. Until such approval and delivery, the title to the machinery does not pass from the seller. The Peru-Van Zandt Company receives for its services in making such sales a commission of 40 per cent. of the selling price. * *The Peru-Van Zandt Company, under this employment, sold two machines for the aggregate sum of $920, and took from the purchasers written orders therefor, which were duly forwarded to the Port Huron Company. Upon receipt of the orders, the machines were shipped over the road of the plaintiff in error, consigned to the Peru-Van Zandt Implement Company, at Larned, Kan., with stopover to partly unload at Seward, Kan., being the points where the purchasers lived. The bill of lading contained nothing to indicate the relation existing between the consignor, the Port Huron Company, and the consignee, whether that of vendor and vendee, or principal and agent. The machines were shipped June 12, 1903, and in ordinary course would have arrived at destination within 10 days, but on account of negligent delays they did not arrive until some time in the month of August, long after the threshing season had closed and the sale contracts had, for that reason, been canceled. By the contract of shipment, the freight was payable before the delivery of machinery to consignee. The consignee declined to pay the freight, claiming that the damages suffered on account of delay far exceeded the amount of the freight bill. The carrier refused to deliver the goods until the freight was paid. Thereupon the defendant in error demanded that the machinery be delivered to it without payment of freight, and, upon refusal, commenced this suit. The demand was made in the name of the Port Huron Company, by the Peru-Van Zandt Company as agent. The petition alleges that the plaintiff is the agent and factor of the Port Huron Company, and avers the facts constituting their relationship, substantially as hereinbefore set forth. In the first cause of action the plaintiff asks judgment for the amount of commission lost by it, and in the second cause of action it demanded judgment for the value of the machines. The carrier retained, and still keeps, possession of the machines. The plaintiff recovered judgment for the price for which the machines were sold. Plaintiff in error brings the case here for review. GRAVES, J. * It is insisted that the plaintiff has no interest in the machinery in controversy, and, therefore, cannot maintain an action for its conversion. * * There is considerable confusion among the authorities as to whether the consignee or consignor is the proper party plaintiff in an action against a carrier, but the rule that a suit for the conversion of goods must be brought by the owner, or one having a beneficial interest in the property converted, seems to be fairly well established. Hutchinson on Carriers, §§ 731-734. The consignee is always presumed to possess the necessary ownership, until the contrary is shown. * *The ownership need not be extensive. An agent, factor, broker, bailee or other person having rights in the property to be protected, may maintain an action, and recover both for himself and the general owner. * * * * * * * * * * We think the plaintiff in this case had sufficient interest in the property to enable it to maintain this action. In Railroad v. Mower Co., 76 Me. 251, a case very similar to this, the court said: “Ordinarily, when a plaintiff sustains his action, it is presumed that the |