negotiable paper thus transferred-the latter may sue on it in his own name, and although the original debt is not extinguished, the creditor has the right to apply the proceeds of the securities, when realized, to its extinction-nay, he is bound to do it, and whatever he does realize on them is a payment pro tanto." If it be the right of the pledgee to apply money collected on the securities, it is the right of the pledgor to consider money thus in hand as a payment. If such is the law of the case, he (the defendant) is entitled, the case being made, to have it so declared, and to have a credit on the original debt. This the court ought to do, if for no other reason than to avoid litigation. As before stated, the court had jurisdiction, in this case, of this subject-matter, and we think it erred in not ruling that this money was by law to be appropriated to the plaintiff's debt, and as a consequence, that the defendant was entitled to a credit for the amount of it. Upon these grounds we remand the case. SECTION 5.-THE CONTRACT OF SURETYSHIP A surety is one who is under contract to pay the debt of another. The contract assumes various forms. At the time of a sale of goods by C. to D., S. may promise to pay if D. does not. Or D. may give his note for the purchase price to C., S. signing as indorser, or S. may sign as a joint maker with D. In all these cases, if S. assumed his obligation to enable D. to obtain credit with C., S. is a surety for D., the principal debtor. The liability of S. to C. is not identical in the three cases supposed, for in one case he has assumed a collateral or secondary obligation on a simple contract, in another he is secondarily liable on a negotiable instrument, and in the last case he is primarily liable on a negotiable instrument. But in many respects S. sustains the same relation to C. and D. in all three cases, as well as in other cases where the contract of suretyship assumes other forms. The law of suretyship, or of principal and surety, is usually treated as a branch of the law separate and distinct from the general law of contracts. However, the relation of S. to C. and D. is contractual, and accordingly these general principles of the law of contract are applicable. In addition, we find that a number of principles of law developed by courts of equity materially affect the legal relations of the parties. We are here interested in noting, very briefly, indeed, some of the more important rights of the surety. Looking at the subject from the standpoint of the law of contracts, the problem in the main is to ascertain the terms of the contract. As will appear, some of the most important terms and conditions in the contract of suretyship are implied, either in fact or in law. BOATMEN'S SAVINGS BANK v. JOHNSON et al. (St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1887. 24 Mo. App. 316.) THOMPSON, J. The single question presented by this record is whether an indorser or surety is released by a composition agreement between the holder of the obligation and the maker, acceptor, or other principal debtor, which composition, in express terms, reserves every right and remedy which the holder, or obligee, has against other persons. The question must be answered, upon authority, that such agreement does not discharge the indorser or surety. Two principles are universally conceded in respect of the rights of sureties, and are not disputed by the parties to this proceeding: (1) That a valid agreement between a creditor and his principal debtor, whereby the creditor, in consideration of the payment of a part of the debt, discharges the principal debtor, will, without more, operate to discharge a surety. (2) That an agreement between a creditor and his principal debtor, whereby the creditor agrees, for a consideration, to extend the time of payment, will, without more, operate to discharge a surety. But it is an exception to the former of these rules, equally well settled, that such an agreement will not operate to discharge a surety where the agreement itself contains an express reservation of the remedies of the creditor against sureties, or against all persons other than the principal debtor, who may be liable. * * * * * * It is an equally well-settled exception to the second of these rules that such an agreement will not operate to discharge a surety, where the agreement itself contains an express reservation of the remedies of the creditor against sureties, or, against all persons other than the principal debtor who may be liable. These two exceptions to the two rules above stated rest upon the same principle. They are grounded upon the principle that, where a contract expressly reserves the remedy of the creditor against other persons (which includes sureties), the sureties are in no way prejudiced by the agreement. By entering into such an agreement, the principal debtor impliedly consents that whatever remedies his sureties have against him shall remain open to them. They are thereafter at liberty to pay the debt at once, and proceed immediately against their principal for reimbursement. An examination of many decisions shows that the principles which support these two exceptions to the respective rules above stated are precisely the same. Courts adopt the same mode of reasoning in the two cases, and cite interchangeably decisions where the agreement was for a discharge of the principal debtor, and where it was merely for an extension of time to him. This principle has been applied in a number of cases where the agreement was merely that the creditor would not sue the principal debtor within a stated period of time. * ** In these cases, where there is a reservation of the remedies of the creditor against all other persons, or against sureties, the reasons upon which the courts refuse to discharge the sureties, are twofold: (1) The reason above stated, that the agreement in no way prejudices the surety as to any remedy which he may have against his principal. (2) The additional reason that a covenant not to sue cannot be pleaded in bar of an action, in case it is brought in violation of the covenant, the courts proceeding upon the refinement that such a covenant affords merely the ground of an action for damages. This distinction was noticed by our Supreme Court in Rucker v. Robinson, 38 Mo. 154, 90 Am. Dec. 412. Whether it is well or ill founded, we need not now consider. Assuming that it is well founded, the defendant's position is not helped, because, in the cases where the agreement was merely an agreement not to sue, the courts have universally rested their decisions as well upon the reason that the sureties were not prejudiced by the agreement, and hence not discharged, as upon the reason that the agreement did not prevent the creditor from suing the principal debtor at any time. An examination of numerous cases convinces us that, with one or two isolated exceptions, they afford no ground for raising the distinction, which has been attempted in this case, between agreements not to sue and agreements to discharge the principal debtor entirely, reserving rights against all other persons. * * * We find, then, that the exception to the general rule, which supports the plaintiff's claim in this case, has been thoroughly settled in England, and in this country, by the most authoritative courts; and as we have no jurisdiction to change the law, we must hold that the circuit court erred in the view that the defendant was not liable, and in nonsuiting the plaintiff. * * The judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded. * UTTERSON v. ELMORE et al. (Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1911. 154 Mo. App. 646, 136 S. W. 9.) GRAY, J. This is a suit brought by the plaintiff against D. R. Elmore & Son, and Sam Jones and M. Beckman, for $321.71. In July, 1908, the plaintiff made a contract with said Elmore & Son to build a residence for him. At the time the contract was made, a bond was executed by the contractors to the plaintiff, with the defendant Jones and Beckman as sureties, in the sum of $1,000, for the completion of the building according to plans and specifications. The contractors failed to complete the building according to the contract or the plans and specifications, and also failed to pay bills for material, so that the plaintiff, in addition to the contract price, was compelled to pay the above sum. This suit was instituted against the contractors and the sureties. The cause was tried before the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the contractors for $259.45, but in favor of the sureties. The plaintiff appealed from that judgment to this court, and the only question for decision here is whether the trial court was right in excusing the sureties on the bond. The written contract for the completion of the building, entered into between the plaintiff and the contractors, expressly authorized changes in the work and in the plans and specifications. The bond, however, was conditioned for the performance of the contract, but read as follows: "If the said D. R. Elmore & Son shall duly perform said contract by completing the building as described by the plans and specifications and deliver it up free from liens or claims then this obligation shall be void." The contract provided the work should be done within a specified time and a penalty of a certain amount per day was added for the failure so to do. The plans and specifications made no provision for any changes, and contained no clause requiring the work to be done within a specified time, or a penalty for failure to do so. The sureties claim that without their consent the plaintiff and the contractors made alterations and changes in the building, and on account thereof they were released. The only testimony relating to the changes was given by the plaintiff. He testified that the doors were made six inches larger than called for in the plans, and he paid the contractors therefor $2.50; that another change was made in a door, and he paid therefor 50 cents; that a change was made in the way of attaching rafters, resulting in extra plastering, amounting to $17.75; that a change was made in the balcony, by leaving out one window and moving one, and that he paid the contractors extra therefor the sum of $18; that shingles were substituted for ridge poles at the extra expense of $2.25. He also testified to a number of other changes made under an agreement between himself and the contractors without the consent of the sureties, but that said changes in no wise increased the cost of the building. Had the bond been conditioned that the contractors should construct the building according to the contract, then the changes made under an agreement between the plaintiff and the contractors would not release the sureties. The contract expressly provided that changes might be made, and where the contract so reads and the bond is conditioned for its faithful performance, then the surety is liable, notwithstanding the changes. * * The bond in this case does not provide for the completion of the contract by the contractors in all its details. It simply provides for the completion of the contract "by completing the building as described by the plans and specifications." * It must be accepted as the settled law of this state that there is no implied obligation on the part of a surety that he has undertaken more or other than that expressed in his contract, and it is only to the extent and in the manner and under the circumstances pointed out that he is bound. * * * It is also well settled that any substantial change made in the contract by the principal and the contractor, without the consent of the surety, will release the latter regardless whether the alterations were injurious or beneficial to the surety. *. * In this case the sureties' undertaking, when strictly construed, only required the performance of the contract to the extent of completing the building according to the plans and specifications. Their liability, therefore, is not to be measured by obligations requiring the completion of the building according to a contract in which are provisions for changes and alterations. * * * The second count of plaintiff's petition is based upon the fact that the contractors did not complete the building within the time specified in the contract. The contract provided liquidated damages of $3 per day for each day the work remained incomplete after the time specified for its completion in the contract. At the beginning of the trial the defendants objected to the introduction of testimony on said count, for the reason that it did not state a cause of action against the sureties. The court sustained the objection as to the sureties, and plaintiff acquiesced in such ruling by making no point thereon in his motion for 'new trial. As we have stated, the condition of the bond was not for the full performance of the contract in every particular, and therefore the sureties were not liable for the failure to perform that part of the contract. This part of the opinion is written solely for the purpose of illustrating the other issue in the case. Inasmuch as the bond is not conditioned for the performance of all the terms of the contract, the liability of the sureties must be limited to the parts of the contract mentioned and described in the bond, to wit, by completing the building as described by the plans and specifications. The contention of appellant is that the changes were so immaterial that they should be ignored. There is much merit in this contention. If we were free from controlling decisions in this state, we might adopt appellant's view. But in Beers v. Wold, 116 Mo. 179, 22 S. W. 620, the contract price for the work was over $31,000. The real expense and cost of changes amounted to a little over $221. The contention was that they were so immaterial that they should be ignored. The Supreme Court, speaking through Black, J., said: "Can it be said these changes, taken as a whole, were so small that the. law will take no notice of them? We think not. No case to which we are cited will justify any such conclusion. To a suit to recover the expense brought about by these alterations, it would be no answer to say that they were immaterial. These changes destroyed the identity of the contract, and that is sufficient to discharge the sureties." This case is in point, and we are bound by it. In addition to the changes heretofore enumerated and which were made at an increased cost, there were numerous changes made by agreement between the plaintiff and the contractors. Some of them in no manner affected the actual cost of the building, and a number of them decreased the cost thereof. But when all the alterations are taken together, they substantially changed the contract, and under the rule in this state that the surety has the right to stand on the very letter of his contract, and that any material change in the same, without his consent, releases him, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in holding the sureties were not liable in this case, and the judgment will be affirmed. * BLANCHARD v. BLANCHARD. (Court of Appeals of New York, 1911. 201 N. Y. 134, 94 N. E. 630, 37 L. R. A. [N. S.] 783.) Action by Esther F. Blanchard, as administratrix of the estate of Flint Blanchard, deceased, against Amos F. Blanchard. Appeal by defendant from judgment in favor of plaintiff. COLLIN, J. The defendant on May 12, 1900, made his negotiable promissory note for $1,100.15, payable with interest to the order of Flint Blanchard and to mature August 12, 1900. Flint Blanchard indorsed it for the accommodation of the defendant, who then delivered it to and received thereupon from Daniel Griswold the sum of $1,100.15. Flint Blanchard on July 9, 1900, waived demand of payment and notice of the nonpayment thereof. The defendant made no payment upon the note. Flint Blanchard made two small payments thereon, and after his death, February 17, 1906, and plaintiff's appointment, March 5, 1906, plaintiff paid February 19, 1907, to Griswold upon his demand $1,101.50, the amount unpaid thereon; the statute |