of his shipment is a certain sum and thereby secures a reduced transportation rate, he is bound by that declaration or agreement, estopped from claiming or recovering more than that value in case of loss of or damage to the property, and conclusively presumed to have known the governing tariff. * * * On March 4, 1915, ** the [first] Cummins Amendment was approved. It is perfectly plain that the purpose of this law is, except as otherwise provided therein, to invalidate all limitations of carrier's liability for loss, damage, or injury to property transported caused by the initial carrier or by another carrier to which it may be delivered or which may participate in transporting it. * * * The so-called uniform bill of lading, which has been in use in official and Western Classification territories, contains, and has contained, a provision that claims for loss or damage must be presented to the carrier within four months, but until the Croninger Case, supra, was decided by the Supreme Court, no effort was made by the carriers generally to enforce or to observe that provision. After the Croninger Case was decided the carriers adopted an entirely different course and took the position that this provision was in the bill of lading, the terms of the bill of lading were in the rate schedules, and therefore it was unlawful to depart from that requirement. This created a general controversy, and the sudden change from ignoring a rule to literally enforcing it necessarily created multitudes of unjust discriminations. The question was presented to and considered by the Commission, and as the fair and only means of composing the situation and avoiding endless controversy and litigation, the Commission issued its report. In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 29 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 417. The Cummins Amendment makes it unlawful for the carrier to fix a period for giving notice of claims shorter than ninety days, for the filing of claims shorter than four months, and for the institution of suits shorter than two years. The law does not indicate the time or date from which these several periods of time shall be computed. * * * It is to be remembered that the Cummins Amendment is not a separate statute, but is an amendment to the act. It must, therefore, be construed as a part of, and in connection with other portions of the act, and in such a way as to give effect to the whole statute. There does not seem to be any indication of legislative intent to change any provision of the act other than that part known as the Carmack Amend ment. * * * The legislation is aimed at specified contracts and declares them to be unlawful. The lawful rates on file at this time, therefore, are the rates providing for the limited liability. The Cummins Amendment, by making contracts limiting liability for loss caused by the carriers unlawful, does not destroy these rates, but they remain in effect and are lawfully applicable, for the 10 per cent. increased rates are merely additional and can not stand in and of themselves. Applying correct rules of interpretation, the Cummins Amendment does not automatically bring into effect the increased rates named in the classifications and tariff publications as applicable to shipments, which are not made subject to the terms of the uniform or carrier's bill of lading. May the carriers lawfully provide in their tariffs and rate schedules that their liability shall be for the full value of the property at the time and place of shipment? * * * The Cummins Amendment clearly places upon the carriers liability for the full actual loss, damage, or injury to the property transported which is caused by them, and it makes unlawful any limitation of that liability, or of the amount of recovery thereunder, in any receipt, bill of lading, contract, rule, regulation, or tariff filed with this Commission, without respect to the manner or form in which such limitation is sought to be made. The loss or damage must, apparently, be either as of the time and place of shipment, time and place of loss or damage, or time and place of destination. Where rates are lawfully dependent upon declared values, the property, of which the value of the property may constitute an element, and such classification is necessarily as of the time and place of shipment. It is therefore believed that the liability of the carrier may be limited to the full value of the property so classified and established as of the time and place of ship ment. Does the amendment to the act apply to export and import shipments to and from foreign countries not adjacent to the United States? This must be answered in the negative, in view of the fact that, while specifically stating that its terms shall apply to property received for transportation from certain points to certain other points, it makes no reference to shipments from a point in the United States to a point in a nonadjacent foreign country, or from a nonadjacent foreign country to a point in the United States. In the proviso, "that if the goods are hidden from view by wrapping, boxing, or other means, and the carrier is not notified as to the character of the goods," what is the proper interpretation to be placed upon the words "and the carrier is not notified as to the character of the goods"? * * * The word "character" as here used clearly relates primarily to value, or to those qualities affecting value, and when the entire proviso is considered the meaning seems to be that if the qualities affecting value of the goods are hidden from the carrier's view, or are not known to the carrier, the proviso applies. * * * When the goods are not hidden from view, and the carrier is advised as to their character, all contracts or agreements purporting to limit the liability of the carrier for loss or damage caused by it are made void. A carrier, after the Cummins Amendment goes into effect, may not contract to limit its liability for loss or damage caused by it to the property. There is, however, no inhibition as to the limitation of the liability of a carrier for losses not caused by it or a succeeding carrier to which the property may be delivered. The amendment has expressly reapplied the limitation of the prior act with respect to loss or damage caused by the carriers chargeable therewith. It follows, therefore, that the interpretation applied to the act before it was amended is equally applicable to the amendment in so far as the latter affects the right of a carrier to establish rates conditional upon the shipper's assumption of the entire risk of loss attributable to causes beyond the carrier's control. From this it follows that under the amendment a contract or a tariff may lawfully limit to a reasonable maximum the liability of a carrier for losses which it does not B.& B.Bus.LAW-30 cause. It follows further that the rates provided by such tariff may be proportionate to the risk assumed. This provision of the statute as to goods concealed from view and of the character of which the carrier is not advised clearly prescribes the right of carriers under the direction or approval of the Commission to provide for a graduation of rates in accordance with the declared value of the property transported. The liability provided by the rates so established by the Commission is applicable no less to instances of loss or damage chargeable to the negligence of the carrier than to those occasioned by causes beyond the carrier's control. But the carriers may not contract to limit their liability for loss, damage, or injury caused by them to property the character of which is manifested by the shipment itself or otherwise disclosed. In this connection it has been suggested that the carrier might provide that in the event the shipper refused to declare the value the higher rates would apply. This suggestion cannot be approved. If the rate is lawfully conditioned upon the value as declared by the shipper, it is as much the shipper's duty to declare the true value of the shipment as it is his duty to declare the name of a commodity tendered for shipment as to which there are no different rates. It is important to keep in mind that the carriers are not prohibited from making different rates dependent upon the value of different grades of a given commodity; that, except as covered by the Cummins amendment; and that if, in any instance, the shipper declares the value to be less than the true value in order to get a lower rate than that to which he would otherwise be entitled, he violates, and is subject to the penalty prescribed in, section 10 of the act. The carrier would also be subject to the same penalty in such a case if, having knowledge that the value represented is not the true value, it nevertheless accepts the shipper's representation as to value for the purpose of applying the rate. Do the terms of the Cummins Amendment apply to the transportation of baggage? This must apparently be answered in the affirmative. Transportation of baggage is a part of the contract for transportation of the passenger. * * * The necessity for revision of the bills of lading, live stock contracts, and other similar contracts of carriage, as well as of certain parts of the carriers' classifications and rate schedules, is manifest. * * * If, in a proper manner and a proper proceeding, it shall be made to appear that, with regard to any commodity or commodities, the existing rates do not afford the carriers proper compensation for the services they perform and the risk which is imposed upon them, it could hardly be denied that the rates on such commodities might properly be increased in a sufficient amount to properly compensate the carriers for their added risk and liability. Where rates are lawfully based upon declared values the difference in rates should be no more than fairly and reasonably represents the added insurance. SECTION 4.-THE CONTRACT OF PLEDGE HALL v. PAGE. (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1848. 4 Ga. 428, 48 Am. Dec. 235.) NISBET, J. It appears by the record, that the defendant, acting as agent for the plaintiff below, sold certain goods for his principal, and at the same time a small amount of goods of his own; and took in payment for the whole, a note upon six months' time. The plaintiff brought trover for the note. * * * On the day that the goods were delivered to the defendant, the plaintiff received from him two notes, as collateral security, for the payment of the price of them. One of these notes, one hundred and thirtyfive dollars in amount, was paid to him. The payment was after this suit was commenced, and subsequent to the service of a process of garnishment upon the plaintiff, sued out at the instance of other creditors of the defendant. Upon the motion for a new trial, it was claimed that the verdict was erroneous, in this: That this sum of one hundred and thirty-five dollars was not allowed as a credit to the defendant. The court, upon this point, ruled "that by the evidence this sum was held subject to summons of garnishment at the instance of Hall's (the defendant's) creditors. It is very certain that either Hall or his creditors have a right to that money. Both cannot have it, and Page (the plaintiff) cannot be delayed in his suit until the controversy between Hall and his creditors shall be ended. The jury, therefore, properly refused to abate Page's damages for that sum.' The opinion of the court thus expressed, is excepted to. We cannot assent to the doctrine, that collateral securities, pledged bona fide for the payment of a debt without any trust reserved, belongs to the pledgor or his creditors; that is to say, that they belong to him or them, in any sense, which will defeat the pledgee's right to them, or which is the same thing, to money raised on them as security for his debt. That right is paramount to the rights of other creditors, and is good against the pledgor himself, until the debt is paid. The pendency of a garnishment makes no difference. The pendency of this suit assumes that the debt is due. If this action can be sustained-if that assumption be trueupon the trial, it was competent for the court to appropriate the money received on the collaterals, to the plaintiff, and of course to credit the defendant. It ought to have been so appropriated. There was no necessity to await an issue on the garnishment. The court, on the trial of this suit, had jurisdiction of the matter. It did, in fact, exercisethat jurisdicton by determining that this money belonged to the defendant or his creditors. If it belonged to the defendant, it was pledged to pay this very debt. The creditors of the defendant had no rights in it, until the pledgee is paid. There could, therefore, be no controversy about it, between the defendant and the creditors, until the debt of the plaintiff is paid. But the debt, by the record, is not paid. The very question is: Shall it be now paid, to the extent of the money in hand? The plaintiff is not delayed at all. He is expedited; for a judgment that this money be allowed as a credit to the defendant, is an instantaneous payment to him. An appropriation in this way to the plaintiff would protect him on the trial of the garnish ment. Whether appropriated or not, his rights in this money are paramount to those of the garnishing creditors. There is nothing in this record, it may be proper to remark, which impeaches the fairness of this pledge. It is not obnoxious to the act of 1818, or any other law of the state. Upon the traverse of the plaintiff's answer to the_garnishment (he answering truly, as this record discloses the facts), I apprehend that the garnishing creditors could not get a judgment against the plaintiff, until they had first proven that his debt was paid. In that event, it is true, these collaterals and this money would belong to the defendant or his creditors. But only in that event. We examine this doctrine a little. We say that the deposit of these notes in the hands of the plaintiff, as collateral security for this debt, is a pawn or pledge. A pledge is a bailment of personal property as security for some debt or engagement. Story on Bailm. § 286. Ordinarily goods and chattels are the subject of pledges; but money, debts, negotiable instruments, choses in action, etc., may by the common law be delivered in pledge. * * * What are the rights of the pledgee in the thing pledged generally? In virtue of the pawn, he acquires a special property in the thing, and is entitled to the exclusive possession of it, during the time, and for the objects for which it is pledged. The right of possession is exclusive-that is, it is good against all the world, for the purpose for which it is pledged-in this case, that purpose is the payment of a debt. For that purpose, the right to the thing is perfect. It yields to no other right which did not attach upon it, in the shape of a lien, prior pledge, or some claim existing prior to the pledge, and good in law. It is perfect against the pledgor. For if he wrongfully get possession, a suit in favor of the pawnee will lie against him for the thing, or for damages. He can bring an action for it, also against a stranger, or an action against the stranger for damages. * * * He has also a right to sell the pledge, where there has been a default in the pledgor; if there is no stipulated time when the debt shall be paid, the pawnee may sell upon demand and notice. * * * He may file a bill in equity for foreclosure and sale, or upon demand and notice proceed to sell, ex mero motu, at his election. * * These are the principal rights of the pawnee. What, specially, are the rights of the pawnee of negotiable securities? He may recover and receive the money due thereon; he may bring suit upon them in his own He may sell them, and if he sells to a bona fide purchaser, the latter acquires an absolute property, if he buys without notice. * * * name. * * * It is not necessary to pursue this subject in detail. The pawnee is entitled to receive the money due on his collateral securities, and to hold it against his pawner and all the world, until he is paid. When a pledge is made for the benefit of the pledgee and a third person, who is also a creditor, and the fund raised is insufficient to pay both, the pledgee, being a creditor in possession, is entitled to preference. * * * If this is true as to other creditors, when there is a stipulation in their behalf, a fortiori, it is true as to creditors generally, as to whom there is no stipulation. The rights of the holder of negotiable instruments as collateral securities, in them, were considered by this court in the case of Bond v. Central Bank, 2 Ga. 106, and in Gibson v. Conner, 3 Ga. 52, 53. In the latter case we say: "The transferror parts with, and the transferee acquires, the legal title to the |