SECTION 6.-CONTRACTS NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN THE SPACE OF ONE YEAR The section of the Statute of Frauds here involved provides as follows: No action shall be brought upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. DOYLE v. DIXON. (Supreme Judicial Court of. Massachusetts, 1867. 97 Mass. 208, Defendant sold his grocery business to plaintiff, and agreed not to go into the grocery business in the same village within the next five years. Defendant contends that this agreement is within the statute of frauds. The trial judge ruled that the agreement was not within the statute. Defendant excepts to this ruling. GRAY, J. It is well settled that an oral agreement which according to the expression and contemplation of the parties may or may not be fully performed within a year is not within that clause of the statute of frauds, which requires any "agreement not to be performed within one year from the making thereof" to be in writing in order to maintain an action. An agreement therefore which will be completely performed according to its terms and intention if either party should die within the year is not within the statute. Thus in Peters v, Westborough, 19 Pick. 364, 31 Am. Dec. 142, it was held that an agreement to support a child until a certain age at which the child would not arrive for several years was not within the statute, because it depended upon the contingency of the child's life, and, if the child should die within one year would be wholly performed. On the other hand, if the agreement cannot be completely performed within a year, the fact that it may be terminated, or further performance excused or rendered impossible, by the death of the promisor or of another person within a year, is not sufficient to take it out of the statute. It was therefore held in Hill v. Hooper, 1 Gray, 131, that an agreement to employ a boy for five years and to pay his father certain sums at stated periods during that time was within the statute; for although by the death of the boy the services which were the consideration of the promise would cease, and the promise therefore be determined, it would certainly not be completely performed. So if the death of the promisor within the year would merely prevent full performance of the agreement, it is within the statute; but if his death would leave the agreement completely performed and its purpose fully carried out, it is not. It has accordingly been repeatedly held by this court that an agreement not hereafter to carry on a certain business at a particular place was not within the statute, because, being only a personal engagement to forbear doing certain acts, not stipulating for any * thing beyond the promisor's life, and imposing no duties upon his legal representatives, it would be fully performed within the year. * An agreement not to engage in a certain kind of business at a particular place for a specified number of years is within the same principle; for whether a man agrees not to do a thing for his life, or never to do it, or only not to do it for a certain number of years, it is in either form an agreement by which he does not promise that anything shall be done after his death, and the performance of which is therefore completed with his life. An agreement to do a thing for a certain time may perhaps bind the promisor's representatives, and at any rate is not performed if he dies within that time. But a mere agreement that he will himself refrain from doing a certain thing is fully performed if he keeps it so long as he is capable of doing or refraining. The agreement of the defendant not to go into business again in Chicopee for five years was therefore not within the statute of frauds. * * * Exceptions overruled. O'DONNELL v. DAILY NEWS CO. OF MINNEAPOLIS. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1912. 119 Minn. 378, 138 N. W. 677.) PHILIP E. BROWN, J. This is an action for damages for breach of an alleged contract for the plaintiff's employment as advertising manager for the defendant, the Minneapolis Daily News. * * Was the contract within the statute of frauds, as being a contract not to be performed within one year from the making thereof? In its ultimate analysis, however, the question here is: What must be deemed to be the date contemplated by the contract for the commencement of its performance? For it is settled that a contract for services, which by its terms shows that it is not to be performed or is incapable of performance within one year from the making thereof, is within the statute, * * * while a contract for one year's services commencing on the date of the contract is not within the statute. * * * Does, then, the contract here involved show that it was not to be performed or was incapable of performance within one year from the date on which it was made, January 31, 1910? The plaintiff contends that it does not so appear, insisting that it must be deemed to be for one year's services, beginning January 31st, and ending on the same date in the following year. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that the contract was for services beginning February 7th. As between these two contentions, we hold with the defendant. February 7th was the date in the minds of the parties throughout the negotiations, and such date was expressly incorporated in the contract by the telegrams and the letter above quoted. It was the date fixed as giving the plaintiff a reasonable time in which to reach Minneapolis from his home in another state, and the distance he would have. to travel in order to reach Minneapolis precluded the possibility of his actually beginning work in that city on the date of his telegram of acceptance. Undoubtedly the parties could have contracted that the plaintiff's services, and his pay, should be deemed to begin January 31st; but they did not do this. Nor did they leave the date undetermined. They fix * * * ed February 7th as the date when the plaintiff should come and take the position contracted for. If nothing whatever had been said about when the plaintiff was to report for work, there might be room for the plaintiff's contention that a contract is, if possible, to be construed so as to keep it out of the operation of the statute of frauds, and that where no other date is specified the date of the contract will be presumed to be the date for the commencement of its performance; but where, as in this case, the contract indicates the date when the services are to begin such contentions are irrelevant. * And it makes no difference that the year is exceeded by only a week. “An hour more than the time specified is in law as fatal to the contract as though it were two, five, or a hundred years." * * * * * The contract in this case being, as we have held above, one which contemplated that its performance should commence in futuro, and that the services contracted for should continue for one year from the commencement thereof, it follows that, in the absence of writing suffi-` cient to satisfy the statute of frauds, the plaintiff was not entitled in any event to a more favorable judgment than he obtained. Judgment affirmed. SECTION 7.-CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY The English Statute of Frauds prescribed that all contracts for the sale of goods of the value of £10, in order to be enforceable, must be in writing, unless the buyer has made a partial payment or accepted and received the goods. This section has been re-enacted in most, but not all, of the states in this country. The section was commonly made to apply to contracts where the value of the property was $50 or over. There is some variation as to the amount in the various states. The Uniform Sales Act, which has codified most of the common law relating to contracts for the sale of goods, contains a section which is a restatement of that section of the statute of frauds dealing with sales of personal property. This section reads as follows: Section 4. (1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold, or sold, and actually received the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf. (2) The provisions of this section apply to every such contract or sale notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time or may not, at the time of such contract or sale, be actually made, procured or provided or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery; but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the provisions of this section shall not apply. (3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section, when the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses, by words or conduct, his assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods. GODDARD v. BINNEY. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1874. 115 Mass. 450, The plaintiff, a carriage manufacturer in Boston, testified that the defendant came to his place of business in April, 1872, and directed the plaintiff to make for him a buggy, and the plaintiff entered the order in his order book; the defendant gave directions that the color of the lining should be drab, and the outside seat of cane, and as to the painting, and also that the buggy was to have on it his monogram and initials. The sum of $675 was agreed as the price. It was to be done in or about four months. The plaintiff immediately began work upon the buggy and made every part, it being painted, lined, and with the initials, as ordered. By the fire of November 9, 1872, this buggy and all the property on the plaintiff's premises were destroyed. Plaintiff sues defendant for the price. Upon the evidence, the presiding judge directed a verdict for the defendant. AMES, J. Whether an agreement like that described in this report should be considered as a contract for the sale of goods, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, or a contract for labor, services and materials, and therefore not within that statute, is a question upon which there is a conflict of authority. According to a long course of decisions in New York, and in some other states of the Union, an agreement for the sale of any commodity not in existence at the time, but which the vendor is to manufacture or put in a condition to be delivered (such as flour from wheat not yet ground, or nails to be made from iron in the vendor's hands), is not a contract of sale within the meaning of the statute. In England, on the other hand, the tendency of the recent decisions is to treat all contracts of such a kind intended to result in a sale, as substantially contracts for the sale of chattels; and the decision in Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S. 272, goes so far as to hold that a contract to make and fit a set of artificial teeth for a patient is essentially a contract for the sale of goods, and therefore is subject to the provisions of the statute. * * * * * * In this commonwealth, a rule avoiding both of these extremes was established in Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205, 32 Am. Dec. 256, and has been recognized and affirmed in repeated decisions of more recent date. The effect of these decisions we understand to be this, namely, that a contract for the sale of articles then existing, or such as the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market, whether on hand at the time or not, is a contract for the sale of goods, to which the statute applies. But on the other hand, if the goods are to be manufactured especially for the purchaser, and upon his special order, and not for the general market, the case is not within the statute. * * * "The distinction," says Chief Justice Shaw, in Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Metc. 353, "we believe is now well understood. When a person stipulates for the future sale of articles, which he is habitually making, and which, at the time, are not made or finished, it is essentially a contract of sale, and not a contract for labor; otherwise, when the article is made pursuant to the agreement." In Gardner v. Joy, 9 Metc. 177, a contract to buy a certain number of boxes of candles at a fixed rate per pound, which the vendor said he would manufacture and deliver in about three months, was held to be a contract of sale and within the statute. * * * In this case, the carriage was not only built for the defendant, but in conformity in some respects with his directions, and at his request was marked with his initials. It was neither intended nor adapted for the general market. * * * We must therefore hold that the statute of frauds does not apply to the contract which the plaintiff is seeking to enforce in this action. * Judgment entered for the plaintiff. * WEEKS v. CRIE et al. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1900. 94 Me. 458, 48 Atl. 107, *80 Am. St. Rep. 410.) Assumpsit to recover damages for nondelivery of a quantity of fish, which the plaintiff alleged he purchased of the defendants under an oral contract. The defendants denied the contract, and invoked the statute of frauds. The verdict was for plaintiff, and damages assessed at $128.70. * * * SAVAGE, J. At the trial of this case the plaintiff claimed, and introduced evidence tending to show, that the defendants in November, 1898, orally agreed to sell him from three to five hundred drums of hake at $1.65 per kentle, to be delivered at Rockland when called for by him, and at the same interview agreed to sell him ten barrels of split herring at $4.25 per barrel, to be delivered in Rockland by next boat from Criehaven, which would be within one week; that he (the plaintiff) orally agreed with the defendants to purchase the hake and the herring upon these terms. It was admitted by the defendants that they sold the herring to the plaintiff as claimed, and that they were delivered according to the agreement, and paid for by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in January, 1899, demanded 300 drums of hake to be delivered in accordance with the alleged agreement, but the defendants refused to deliver them; and to recover damages for that alleged breach of contract this action was brought. The defendants denied that they agreed to sell any hake to the plaintiff. But the jury, under instructions to which no exceptions were taken, have found they did make such a contract. In this contingency the defendants claim that, if any such contract of sale was made, it was oral merely, and, being for more than $30, it was invalid under the statute of frauds. The case shows that no memorandum was made, and nothing was given in earnest to bind the bargain; and the defendants claim that no part of the goods sold were accepted and received by the purchaser, so as to bind the defendants to deliver the hake. This last proposition is controverted by the plaintiff, and hereon, as will be seen, the case hinges. * * * The plaintiff, however, contends that the contracts for the hake and the herring constituted in fact but one entire contract for hake and herring, and that his acceptance and receipt of the herring, a part of the |