the store and get goods to the amount he had won, and have it charged to the loser. Instead of drawing goods at the end of each game and squaring accounts, the banker, in the presence of each player, would report the debts and credits to Riley, who kept a private memorandum thereof. If at any time a party who had credit on this account wanted anything, Riley would give it to him from the company's goods, and charge it to some person against whom there was a debt; and, if the amount drawn was greater than the debit against any one loser, it would be distributed among several, and would then be entered on the company's books as goods obtained by the several losers. This arrangement was made between the men and Riley before the games commenced in the fall, and was also known to the foreman of the camp. During the winter there was charged against plaintiff on store account $81.38. Of this amount, $12.53 was taken by plaintiff for his personal use, and $7.40 was delivered to winners on the personal order of plaintiff. The remainder was for goods turned over to the various winners pursuant to the original agreement at various times during the winter, and without any express direction from plaintiff. Riley was one of the gamblers, and, as agent for the defendant, assented to the arrangements before stated. The effect of this agreement was that defendant, by Riley, stood as banker for each man to the amount of wages earned, and agreed to turn the same over, or such portion as was lost, to the winners at the games. This was to be done pursuant to the arrangement made between the men and Riley before the games were commenced. same. * * * The trial court held that this agreement was illegal and void, as being promotive of gambling, and gave no authority to Riley to deliver goods to winners and charge them to the loser; that, when the men were present and got the goods themselves, they were properly chargeable to them, regardless of what they did with them. Upon this theory the plaintiff was held chargeable with the goods to the amount of $7.40, which were turned over to winners in his presence and under his direction. The decision of the trial court seems to have been founded upon a correct appreciation of our statutes condemning gambling, and all agreements and transactions based thereon or growing out of the The whole scheme was illegal, void, and contrary to the statutes and to public policy as well. The plan of operations was known to defendant's foreman, and carried on with his knowledge and acquiescence. Except for the agreement as to delivery of goods. and the plan of shifting credits, it is not at all likely that the games would have been continued. We are entirely satisfied with the conclusion of the trial court, and must therefore affirm the judgment. The court found that plaintiff's wages amounted to $166, and that his total debts were $23.33, and directed judgment for $136.67,-a mistake of $6 against plaintiff. Judgment was entered as directed, and the mistake, not being prejudicial to defendant, affords no ground for complaint on its part. The judgment is affirmed. SECTION 5.-OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ILLEGAL CONTRACTS DUNTON v. WESTCHESTER FIRE INS. CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1908. 104 Me. 372, 71 Atl. 1037, 20 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1058.) Action by Dunton against an insurance company on a fire insurance policy, which provided for arbitration as to amount due, as a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action on the policy. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant excepts. WHITEHOUSE, J. * * * It has been long established by authority both in this country and in Englana that if parties stipulate in contracts of insurance and other similar contracts to submit to arbitration the question of the amount of damage or any similar matters that do not go to the root of the action, it is entirely competent for them to make such an agreement a condition precedent to the right of action; and if it appears from the express terms of the contract, or from necessary implication, that such was the intention, it will be upheld by the courts, and no action can be maintained upon the contract without proof on the part of the plaintiff that he has fulfilled the stipulation in the contract or made all reasonable effort to fulfill it. The effect of such an agreement is not to refer a cause of action, but to provide that a cause of action shall arise as soon as the amount to be paid has been determined, and not before. It does not deprive the courts of their jurisdiction, but simply provides a reasonable method of estimating and ascertaining the amount of the loss, and leaves the general question of liability to be determined by the judicial courts. Exceptions overruled. LIVINGSTON v. PAGE. (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1902. 74 Vt. 356, 52 Atl. 965, 59 L. R. A. 336, 93 Am. St. Rep. 901.) Action of assumpsit by James H. Livingston against Carrol S. Page. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff brings exceptions. MUNSON, J. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved that a verdict be directed in his favor, on the ground that the contract claimed by the plaintiff was void, as against public policy. The court held the contract void for the reason assigned, and directed a verdict accordingly. The case is here upon the plaintiff's exception to this holding. The plaintiff called the defendant as a witness. The evidence consisted of certain correspondence had by the parties; and the testimony of the parties as to the circumstances in which the letters were written, the meaning that was attached to the language used, the matters inclosed for publication by one party and the services rendered by the other, and subsequent transactions bearing upon their understanding of the relations they had sustained. The defendant claimed that no contract with the plaintiff was in fact consummated, and that the only contract ever contemplated was one for the publication of extracts from other papers at a legitimate charge for the space actually taken. The plaintiff did not claim to recover on this ground, but claimed to recover a reasonable compensation for the support and influence of his paper and his services as its editor. The plaintiff was a Democrat, publishing a Democratic paper of independent proclivities. The defendant was a Republican, seeking a nomination to congress from a Republican convention. It appeared from the plaintiff's testimony that he considered defendant's proposal an application for the use and influence of his paper in the nature of a retainer; that he accepted it with the understanding that his paper and his services as editor would be at the command of the defendant during the campaign, to be settled for at its close; that he was to do all he could to influence the choice of delegates and secure the defendant's nomination; that original matter was within the scope of his contract, and that his editorials were written in that view; that he supported defendant because of this contract and the money he was to get out of it; that he expected to receive a larger compensation if defendant was nominated than he otherwise would; that he tried to conceal his relations with the defendant from the public, and understood that the defendant was trying to do the same; that he took this course because it would make his efforts in influencing voters in defendant's behalf more successful. In Strasburger v. Burk, 13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 607, decided by the city court of Baltimore, the defendant was the keeper of a lager beer saloon, and agreed to give his political influence and furnish beer and cigars to secure a caucus nomination for the plaintiff's father. The gratuitous furnishing of food or liquor to secure votes at an election was prohibited by the Code, but the only statutory recognition of primary elections was a provision for the preservation of order. The court considered that in applying the principles of public policy no distinction could be made between voluntary meetings of this character and elections ordained by law. Mr. McCrary adopts. the conclusions of this opinion in his work on Elections, and applies the doctrine to the sale of influence, as well as the sale of votes. Mr. Redfield, in commenting upon the same opinion in 13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) at page 610, says that the invalidity of contracts designed to control the freedom of elections results from the principles of common law, and that those relating to caucuses cannot be made an exception on the ground that such meetings are not recognized by the statute. We cannot doubt the correctness of this conclusion. The rule would largely fail of its purpose if not so applied. When the voters are unevenly divided into two parties, the nomination of the stronger organization is usually equivalent to an election. And when party action is less decisive the subsequent efforts of the voters are ordinarily confined to a selection from the candidates regularly presented. The individual voter. of a large electorate can seldom give an effective expression to a choice that is not in line with the action of some party convention. To secure a free and exact expression of the sovereign will, there must be a proper selection of candidates, as well as an honest election. If the choice of delegates and the action of the nominating convention are improperly determined, the election ballots will fail to express the real judgment of the voters. It is not claimed in argument, and no ground occurs to us upon which it could be claimed, that this contract was any the less obnoxious to the law because the purchased influence was to be exerted through the columns of the plaintiff's paper. A newspaper is understood to present the views of some one connected with its management or views deemed consistent with some settled policy, and has a patronage and influence which are due to that understanding. As long as the editorial column is relied upon as a public teacher and adviser, there can be no more dangerous deception than that resulting from the secret purIchase of its favor. We hold that the contract testified to and relied upon by the plaintiff is contrary to public policy, and therefore void. Judgment affirmed. HARBISON v. SHIRLEY et al. (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1908. 139 Iowa, 605, 117 N. W. 963, EVANS, J. * The authorities are not altogether in harmony as to the rule which renders a contract void when it is entered into by one of the parties with the intent to violate the law, and where such intent is known or suspected by the other party. The great weight of authority, however, in our opinion is that mere knowledge or suspicion on the part of the lessor that the lessee intends to violate the law upon the property will not of itself render a contract void. In order to defeat a recovery for rent by the lessor, it must be shown that he participated in some degree, however slight, in the wrongful purpose and intent that the property should be so used. Mere indifference on his part as to the intended use of the property is not sufficient. If the lessor in any way aids the lessee in his unlawful design, such participation will render the contract void. His relation to the unlawful purpose must be in some degree active, rather than merely passive or indifferent. If he does any act in aid of the unlawful purpose, however slight, it is sufficient participation on his part to defeat recovery. But, until there be some degree of connivance shown, a contract will not be avoided. * The law finds itself in close quarters at this point, and is confronted with danger at either side. On the one hand, it must needs withhold its sanction from contracts entered into for criminal purposes; and, on the other hand, it ought not to go so far as to offer undue inducement to beneficiaries of contracts to taint them with criminality for the very purpose of avoiding liability thereon after receiving the benefits of performance by the other party, lest the latter evil become greater than the first. While, therefore, it is true that the line of distinction drawn in the authorities above cited is somewhat fine, it is also true that it requires a thin blade to divide the "joints and marrow" of one evil to be checked and another to be avoided. This court has not heretofore passed directly upon this question. * * * * Under the evidence in this case, the most that can be said is that the plaintiff feared or suspected that intoxicating liquors might be sold upon the premises. There is no testimony indicating any connivance on his part. The lease expressly forbade the use of the premises for any unlawful purpose. It is urged in argument that this was a mere pretense to cover up the real purpose; but the evidence does not warrant such contention. The defendant Shirley testified to his conversation with the plaintiff as follows: "Mr. Harbison said that he did not want anything sold in there that would cause a nuisance. He said 'You want it for restaurant purpose. All right, take for restaurant purposes.'" This oral statement is in harmony with the prohibition of the lease, and indicates no ulterior purpose on the part of the plaintiff. There was no other evidence on the question. The burden was upon the defendants to prove their affirmative defense. They have wholly failed to do so. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and entered judgment for the amount claimed. The judgment is right, and is affirmed. ROGERS v. BLUENSTEIN. (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1905. 124 Ga. 501, 52 S. E. 617 Action by Laura B. Rogers against S. Bluenstein. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff brings error. Laura B. Rogers brought an action against S. Bluenstein to recover a diamond ring and setting and a diamond pendant and setting. The evidence showed that on June 18, 1902, the plaintiff executed an instrument in writing by which she conveyed the diamonds to one Carroll D. Judson for the sum of $400. He executed to her on the same day a paper whereby he agreed to sell the diamonds to her on or before October 15th for the sum of $408. LUMPKIN, J. It is legally possible for one person to buy property from another and agree to resell it to the vendor at a higher price payable in future. If such be the actual transaction, the law will enforce it. The difficulty frequently arising is to determine whether in a given' instance the parties intended a sale or a mortgage. * * * If Bluenstein in fact bought the diamonds from Judson with the assent of Mrs. Rogers, and agreed to sell them to her at an advanced price payable in the future, there would be nothing unlawful about it. If in fact the transaction was one by which Bluenstein loaned Mrs. Rogers a sum of money at a usurious rate of interest, it was illegal, and the title so obtained was tainted with usury. The transaction, being on its face apparently lawful, might, nevertheless, be shown to be a device for concealing usury. But the burden of proving this rested on the party asserting it. * * There was a considerable amount of evidence tending to show that in fact the title of the defendant was tainted with usury, but it was not free from conflict. In addition to what appeared on the face of the papers, when asked in regard to a loan to the plaintiff, defendant testified: "There was no loan with her. * * *As to how much money I let Mrs. Rogers have, I never had a contract with Mrs. Rogers. The bill of sale shows what I paid Judson. I don't remember exactly$413, or something. * * And I gave an option to purchase back on the 14th of February, 1903." If the jury based their verdict on the belief that this was in fact a sale with an agreement to resell, we cannot say that they were without evidence authorizing them to do so. The plaintiff in error alleges that the court erred in charging that if the diamonds were conveyed to the defendant as a security for a debt which was tainted with usury, and not in fact as a sale with the right to repurchase, and if she tendered the defendant the amount of money due upon her contract with him, and it was refused, she would be entitled to recover the difference between the amount of her debt at the |