iston, supra, pp. 36, 37. Whether that is true of contracts to marry is not certain. Many elements foreign to the ordinary business contract enter into such engagements. It does not seem a far-fetched assumption in such cases that one will release where the other has repented. We shall assume, however, that the criticism is valid where the promise is intended as an inducement to only one of the two parties to the contract. It may then be sheer speculation to say that the other party could have been persuaded to rescind. But where the promise is held out as an inducement to both parties alike, there are new and different implications. One does not commonly apply pressure to coerce the will and action of those who are anxious to proceed. The attempt to sway their conduct by new inducements is an implied admission that both may waiver; that one equally with the other must be strengthened and persuaded; and that rescission or at least delay is something to be averted, and something, therefore, within the range of not unreasonable expectation. If pressure, applied to both, and holding both to their course, is not the purpose of the promise, it is at least the natural tendency and the probable result. The defendant knew that a man and a woman were assuming the responsibilities of wedlock in the belief that adequate provision had been made for the woman and for future offspring. He offered_this inducement to both while they were free to retract or to delay. That they neither retracted nor delayed is certain. It is not to be expected that they should lay bare all the motives and promptings, some avowed and conscious, others perhaps half-conscious and inarticulate, which swayed their conduct. It is enough that the natural consequence of the defendant's promise was to induce them to put the thought of rescission or delay aside. From that moment, there was no longer a real alternative. There was no longer what philosophers call a "living" option. This in itself permits the inference of detriment. The same inference follows, not so inevitably, but still legitimately, where the statement is made to induce the preservation of a contract. It will not do to divert the minds of others from a given line of conduct, and then to urge that because of the diversion the opportunity has gone by to say how their minds would otherwise have acted. If the tendency of the promise is to induce them to persevere, reliance and detriment may be inferred from the mere fact of performance. The springs of conduct are subtle and varied. One who meddles with them must not insist upon too nice a measure of proof that the spring which he released was effective to the exclusion of all others. * * One other line of argument must be considered. The suggestion is made that the defendant's promise was not made animo contrahendi. It was not designed, we are told, to sway the conduct of any one; it was merely the offer of a gift which found its motive in the engagement of the daughter to the count. Undoubtedly, the prospective marriage is not to be deemed a consideration for the promise "unless the parties have dealt with it on that footing." Holmes, Common Law, p. 292. * * * "Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties." Philpot v. Gruninger, 14 Wall. 570, 577, 20 L. Ed. 743. * * * But here the very formality of the agreement suggests a purpose to affect the legal relations of the signers. One does not commonly pledge one's self to generosity in the language of a covenant. That the parties believed there was a consideration is certain. The document recites the engagement and the coming marriage. It states that these are the "consideration" for the promise. The failure to marry would have made the promise ineffective. In these circumstances we cannot say that the promise was not intended to control the conduct of those whom it was designed to benefit. Certainly we cannot draw that inference as one of law. Both sides moved for the direction of a verdict, and the trial judge became by consent the trier of the facts. If conflicting inferences were possible, he chose those favorable to the plaintiff. The conclusion to which we are thus led is reinforced by those considerations of public policy which cluster about contracts that touch the marriage relation. The law favors marriage settlements, and seeks to uphold them. It puts them for many purposes in a class by themselves. * * * It has enforced them at times where consideration, if present at all, has been dependent upon doubtful inference. * It strains, if need be, to the uttermost the interpretation of equivocal words and conduct in the effort to hold men to the honorable fulfillment of engagements designed to influence in their deepest relations the lives of others. The judgment should be affirmed with costs. * * SECTION 4.-PROMISES IN THE NATURE OF MILLER et al. v. WESTERN COLLEGE OF TOLEDO. (Supreme Court of Illinois, 1998. 177 III. 280, 52 N. E. 432. 42 L. R. A. 797.. 69 Am. St. Rep. 242.) In the matter of the estate of Mary Beatty, deceased, the Western College of Toledo obtained a judgment against Jacob Miller and another, executors, and they appealed to the Appellate Court, which af firmed the judgment, and they again appeal. * * * The note, filed as a claim against the estate of the deceased, is as follows: "$7,000.00. Dover, Ill., Dec. 9, 1887. In consideration of a desire to aid the cause of Christian education, and the privilege of sending one student four years free of tuition, I promise to pay to the order of the treasurer of Western College, of Toledo, Iowa, for the erection of the Ladies' Boarding Hall of said college, on or before the first day of December, 1910, the sum of seven thousand dollars, without interest: provided, that in the event of my death before the maturity of this note it shall become then due. Mary Beatty. P. O.: Dover. County: Bureau. State: Ill. Witness: H. H. Maynard. W. M. Beardshear." * * * The appellee is a college located at Toledo, in the state of Iowa, and is under the management of the denomination known as the United Brethren in Christ. Prior to December, 1887, the college had commenced the erection of a building to be known as the "Ladies' Boarding Hall" of the college and had expended upon the stone foundation thereof the sum of $2,000, donated to it by a man in Ohio, named Dodds. In December, 1887, representatives of the college appealed to the deceased, Mary Beatty, at her home in Dover, Ill., for a donation of $10, 000, to complete the erection of said hall, she being a member of the denomination to which the college belonged. On December 9, 1887, she was visited by H. H. Maynard, a soliciting agent of the college, and W. M. Beardshear, president of the college. On December 3, 1887, she had given to Maynard $500 in cash, a note for $1,500, payable on or before December 3, 1890, and a note for $5,000 of like tenor with the note for $7,000 above set forth. On December 9, 1887, she destroyed the $5,000 note, and gave to Maynard and Beardshear the $7,000 note above described, and also a short-time note for $1,000. * * * 99 MAGRUDER, J. It is contended, however, that the note for $7,000, filed as a claim in this case was executed and delivered without any valid consideration to support it. The note recites upon its face that the maker thereof promises to pay "in consideration of a desire to aid the cause of Christian education, and the privilege of sending one student four years free of tuition. * * Whether this note, upon its face, imports a consideration or not, it is well settled that proof may be introduced to show the facts in regard to the consideration of the note. The evidence tends to show that the deceased availed herself of the privilege, specified in the note, of sending one student four years free of tuition. The certificate embodying such privilege was issued to Mrs. Beatty, and was made use of by a female student upon the order of Mrs. Beatty. We do not deem it necessary, however, to decide whether or not the privilege specified upon the face of the note, and the use of it made by the deceased, constituted a valid consideration. The proof tends to show that the note for $7,000 was a gift or donation to the college. Such a note partakes of the nature of a voluntary subscription to raise a fund or promote an object. It is well settled that a promissory note without consideration, and intended as a gift to the payee by the maker thereof, is but a promise to make a gift in the future, and is not enforceable. As a gift it is always revocable until it is executed, and is not executed until it is paid. "The promise stands as a mere offer, and may, by necessary consequence, be revoked at any time before it is acted upon." Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill. 475, 34 Am. Rep. 187. In Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 Ill. 647, we said (page 652): "If a party delivers his own promissory note as a gift, it is but a promise to pay a sum certain at a future day, and we are not aware such a promise can be enforced, either at law or in equity. It could not be enforced against the maker in his lifetime, and his representatives could defend against it on the ground there was no consideration." * * But, while such a note, amounting to a mere gift, is open to the defense of a want of consideration, yet that defense cannot be made to it if money has been expended, or liabilities have been incurred, in reliance upon the note. If money has been expended, or liabilities have been incurred, which, by legal necessity, must cause loss or injury to the person so expending money or incurring liability, if the note is not paid, the donor or maker thereof is, in good conscience, bound to pay; and the gift will be upheld upon the ground of estoppel, and not by reason of any valid consideration in the original undertaking. We have said: "It is the expending of money, etc., or incurring a legal liability on the faith of the promise, which gives the right of action; and without this there is no right of action." Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill. 475, 34 Am. Rep. 187. * There was evidence in the case at bar tending to show that the ap pellee expended money in the construction of the building known as "Ladies' Boarding Hall" upon the faith of the promise made by the deceased as embodied in the note for $7,000. It makes no difference that she did not advance any money upon that note, but preferred to donate $6,700, and take back certificates, which secured to her the payment of annuities thereon during her life. The instructions given by the court to the jury required them to find whether or not the college, during the lifetime of Mary Beatty, entered into a contract to build and erect, and did build and erect, and expend moneys and incur liabilities in building and erecting, the Ladies' Boarding Hall on the faith and strength of the note for $7,000. The question as to the expenditure of such moneys and the incurring of such liabilities upon. the faith and strength of the note was a question of fact, which was submitted to the jury by the instructions. In the present state of the record, we are obliged to assume that the jury found in favor of such expenditures of money and the incurring of such liabilities on the part of the appellee. This being so, the appellee is entitled to its right of action, even if the note for $7,000 was without consideration before it was thus acted upon. Upon this branch of the case, therefore, we are of the opinion that the courts below committed no error in holding the claim of appellee to be a valid claim. * * * Judgment affirmed. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF ALBANY v. COOPER. (Court of Appeals of New York, 1889. 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352, 3 L. R. A. 468, 8 Am. St. Rep. 767. Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, made the first Tuesday of May, 1887, which reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee, and ordered a new trial. This was a reference under the statute of a disputed claim against the estate of Thomas P. Crook, defendants' intestate. The claim arose under a subscription paper, of which the following is a copy: "We, the undersigned, hereby severally promise and agree to and with the trustees of the First Presbyterian Church in this city of Albany, in consideration of one dollar to each of us in hand paid and the agreements of each other in this contract contained, to pay on or before three years from the date hereof to said trustees the sum set opposite to our respective names, but upon the express condition, and not otherwise, that the sum of $45,000 in the aggregate shall be subscribed and paid in for the purpose hereinafter stated; and if within one year from this date said sum shall not be subscribed or paid in for such purpose, then this agreement to be null and of no effect.. The purpose of this subscription is to pay off the mortgage debt of $45,000. now a lien upon the church edifice of said church, and the subscription or contribution for that purpose must equal that sum in the aggregate to make this agreement binding. "Dated May 18, 1884." The defendants' intestate made two subscriptions to this paperone of $5,000 and the other of $500. He paid upon the subscription $2,000. The claim was for the balance. ANDREWS, J. It is, we think, an insuperable objection to the maintenance of this action that there was no valid consideration to uphold the subscription of the defendants' intestate. It is, of course, unquestionable that no action can be maintained to enforce a gratuitous promise, however worthy the object intended to be promoted. The performance of such a promise rests wholly on the will of the person making it. He can refuse to perform, and his legal right to do so cannot be disputed, although his refusal may disappoint reasonable expectations, or may not be justified in the forum of conscience. By the terms of the subscription paper the subscribers promise and agree to and with the trustees of the First Presbyterian Church of Albany, to pay to said trustees, within three years from its date, the sums severally subscribed by them, for the purpose of paying off "the mortgage-debt of $45,000 on the church edifice," upon the condition that the whole sum shall be subscribed or paid in within one year. It recites a consideration, viz., “in consideration of one dollar to each of us (subscribers) in hand paid and the agreement of each other in this contract contained." It was shown that the one dollar recited to have been paid was not in fact paid, and the fact that the promise of each subscriber was made by reason of and in reliance upon similar promises by the others constitutes no consideration as between the corporation for whose benefit the promise was made and the promisors. The recital of a consideration paid does not preclude the promisor from disputing the fact in a case like this, nor does the statement of a particular consideration which, on its face, is insufficient to support a promise, give it any validity, although the fact recited may be true. It has sometimes been supposed that when several persons promise to contribute to a common object, desired by all, the promise of each may be a good consideration. for the promise of others, and this although the object in view is one in which the promisors have no pecuniary or legal interest, and the performance of the promise by one of the promisors would not in a legal sense be beneficial to the others. This seems to have been the view of the chancellor as expressed in Stewart v. Hamilton College, when it was tried before the Court of Errors, 2 Denio, 417, and dicta of judges will be found to the same effect in other cases. * * * But the doctrine of the chancellor, as we understand, was overruled when the Hamilton College Case came before this court (1 N. Y. 581), as have been also the dicta in the Massachusetts cases, by the court in that state, in the recent case of Cottage Street Methodist Episcopal Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 23 Am. Rep. 286. The doctrine seems to us unsound in principle. It proceeds on the assumption that a stranger both to the consideration and the promise, and whose only relation to the transaction is that of donee of an executory gift, may sue to enforce the payment of the gratuity for the reason that there has been a breach of contract between the several promisors and a failure to carry out as between themselves their mutual engagement. It is in no proper sense a case of mutual promises, as between the plaintiff and defendant. * * * In the disposition of this case we must, therefore, reject the consideration recited in the subscription paper as ground for supporting the promise of the defendant's intestate, the money consideration, because it had no basis in fact, and the mutual promise between the subscribers, because, there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the promisors. Some consideration must, therefore, be found other than that expressly stated in the subscription paper, in order to sustain the action. It is urged that a consideration may be found in |