The People ex rel. Coppers agt. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral. next day (August eighteen) the relatives of the deceased received written notice from the person who had signed the original receipt for the purchase-money of the lot, "that the remains of the late Denis Coppers cannot be kept in receiving vault for more than three days; if not removed at the expiration of that time, they will be interred in the unconsecrated ground." The children of the deceased were infants, the one of the age of nine years and the other of the age of thirteen years. The will of Denis Coppers was not admitted to probate until the 25th of August, 1879. When it became necessary, then, to initiate this suit and proceeding, and when they were in fact commenced, there were no executors qualified to act, and no children of sufficiently mature years to determine what should be done. Under such circumstances the three brothers (and the deceased left no other brothers or sisters, nor father or mother) commenced both the proceeding and action to protect the remains and to compel a burial in the spot which the deceased had himself selected. Is the law so inhuman as to declare that these brothers, who are the nearest of kin to the deceased, who are of the age of discretion, have no standing in court to effect their pious and loving intent? No attempt will be made to dispute the proposition of the learned counsel for the defendants, that the relators and plaintiffs are not "the next of kin," for as the deceased left children they could not be; but the admission of that proposition does not admit the conclusion for which they contend. As the next of kin of full age, the plaintiffs and relators, in view of the helplessness and infancy of the children of the dead brother, owed to that stricken family the moral duty at least, and, perhaps, the legal one, of superintending the burial of the remains. If that duty was not one which the law would compel, it will at least respect when it is voluntarily assumed and it will not close the doors of its courts to those who are seeking to have that done which humanity warmly commends. The defendants do not represent the owners of the plot or (if title has not passed) those VOL. LVIII 9 The People ex rel. Coppers agt. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral. who control the burials therein. He who paid during life for the right has directed his burial in the spot he purchased, and to prevent the execution of that direction the defendants cannot say the owners of the property are not before the court, nor can they successfully urge that the brothers of the deceased, under the peculiar circumstances of the case which makes their intervention proper, if not necessary, are so far divested of all duties and rights in the premises as to be powerless to invoke judicial action. The law recognizes in many cases rights and remedies springing from the necessity of a given case, and when brothers of a deceased person seek to protect his remains from maltreatment or insult, when they are the only persons in a situation to intervene, the law ought not inhumanely to say that they are intruders, having no standing in court for such a purpose, and decline to give a right or remedy which is oftentimes given and created upon the ground of necessity for less humane and meritorious objects. But the plaintiffs and relators have also a standing in court based upon a contract with the respondents and defendants. It was the money of the former which the latter received for the opening of the grave. That agreement remains unfulfilled and the price paid for the labor is unreturned. If the relief asked upon these motions is granted, the contract made will only be enforced against those who have promised performance, and in favor of those to whom the promise was given. Upon this ground, also, as well as upon that based upon kinship to the deceased, and the necessities of the case, it is held that judicial action is properly invoked by those who seek it. It is also argued that a mandamus is not the proper remedy. It is conceded that the cases are not uniform as to when the writ issues. Numerous decisions, however, can be found in which it has been held to properly issue to compel a corporation to do that which, by law, it is required to do, especially when no other adequate remedy exists. If we are right in The People ex rel. Coppers agt. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral. our view that the defendants should be deemed to be in the position of grantors of the cemetery plot to be owned by the grantee, his heirs and assigns, for burying their dead, then, as they have also received compensation for opening the grave, they are bound so to do. The need of burial is a pressing one, and there seems to be no other remedy which is adequate to the emergency. If, however, the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, objections founded upon the form of the proceeding have never been favorably regarded by me. Writs were originally devised by courts to redress peculiar grievances, and the power which could create can enlarge the original office, provided the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter and of the persons is not exceeded. A careful examination of the questions which have been submitted leads me to the conclusion that the respondents must open the grave, for doing which they have received. payment, and against them, as defendants in this action, an injunction must issue as prayed for. Such injunction is granted for the reason that as the defendants prevented the interment of the body in the spot to which it was entitled to be interred, and gave permission for its deposit in the vault, they cannot remove the same elsewhere for burial. The order will be settled on notice, so as to preserve the status of parties pending an appeal, if the defendants elect so to do. Anderson agt. Speers. SUPREME COURT. ROBERT J. ANDERSON agt. HENRY J. SPEERS. Action against trustee of manufacturing company-Complaint- Separate causes of action. In an action brought by a creditor of a manufacturing corporation against a trustee for a liability imposed by the fifteenth section of the act of 1848 for the filing of a false report, the complaint should show that the debt, for which the defendant is sought to be made liable, was contracted while he was a trustee. Where the complaint alleged that the defendant was, on the 13th day of January, 1877, and "before that date," a trustee: Held, not to be an averment that he was such trustee, in the year 1876, when the debt was alleged to be contracted. The filing of a false report on successive years gives rise to a separate cause of action as to each year. The allegations in one cause of action cannot be supplemented by those in another and separate cause in the same complaint, unless they are connected therewith by appropriate statements. Victory Webb, &c., Company agt. Beecher (55 How. P. R., 193) applied. DEMURRER to complaint. Special Term, October, 1879. Michael H. Cordozo, for demurrer. W. W. Niles, opposed. VAN VORST, J.-This action is brought against the defendant, as a trustee of a manufacturing corporation organized under the act of 1848, to enforce liabilities incurred under the fifteenth and twenty-third sections of that act. Three separate causes of action are relied upon. The first arises under section 15 and is for an alleged filing of a false report on the 13th of December, 1877. But this Anderson agt. Speers. cause of action is defective in not stating that the debt, for which the defendant is sought to be made liable, was contracted while he was a trustee. It is stated in the complaint in this connection that the defendant was, on the 13th day of January, 1877, and "before that date," and subsequent thereto, one of the trustees of the corporation. But that is not a statement that the defendant was a trustee in the year 1876, when the debt is alleged to have been contracted. If the defendant was a trustee a day previous to the 13th of January, 1877, that would satisfy the statement that he was a trustee before that day. The second cause of action grows out of the filing of a false report on the 13th January, 1878. The complaint terms this breach of the statute, as it undoubtedly is, "a further and other cause of action." Each act of the character of the one of which complaint is made, affords the creditor a right of action against the trustee in fault. The creditor on the trial may fail, as to the act complained of, as being committed in January, 1877, and may succeed as to the one alleged to have been done in January, 1878. But the second cause of action is defective, for the reasons above stated, with respect to the first cause; and, further, in that it omits to set up a debt against the corporation in favor of the plaintiff. In the first cause of action an indebtedness in favor of the plaintiff against the corporation is fully set up; but the second cause of action cannot be supported by the allegations in the first, as it contains no statements drawing to itself the statements of the first upon this subject (Moak's Van Santvoord's Pleadings [3d edition], 149). The third cause of action arises under the twenty-third section, and from the fact, as is alleged, that the indebtedness of the company exceeded the amount of its capital stock. In disclosing his last cause of action the pleader states that the defendant, during all the time between the 15th day of |