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officers are paid; and it offers a premium for bringing in new risks, The only condition of membership is a certain condition of health and probability of duration of life. The case presented is not that of an organization whose primary object, is social, literary or benevolent, and to which a feature of mutual insurance is added for the purpose of mutual aid. Such associations may exist which can not be said to be carrying on the business of insurance, and with which, we suppose, it was not the intention of the legislature to interfere.

We think that plaintiff is entitled to judgment, and it is so ordered. All the judges concur.

Secs. 11 and 12 provide that when the company has subscriptions, or proposals for insurance of a prescribed character and amunt, and that it has certain amount of moneys or stocks or bonds, and has deposited with the superintendent a certain amount of securities, he shall issue a certificate of authority to commence business, which is filed with the recorder of the county, and is the authority of the company.

Secs 19 and 21 prohibit any home companies from doing business in the state until they make a de posit of securities with the superintendent.

Sec. 36, as amended (see acts of 1874, p. 81, $ 3), provides that “No company sball transact in this state any business mentioned in the first section of this act, un. less it shall first procure from said superintendent a certificate stating that the foregoing requireinents have been complied with, and authorizing it to do business.

Every such company shall be required to procure annually, for the use of its agents and solici. tors, copies of a renewal certificate of authority hereinafter provided for."

(Before the amen Iment of 1874, sec. 36 read: "no such company mentioned in the 13th section of this act shall transact in this state any business mentioned in the first section thereof, unless," etc. The companies mentioned in the thirteenth section are stock and mutual companies.)

The 46th sec. (Wag. Stats., p. 756, ch. 76), reads: "No company organized under the provisions of this act shall undertake any business or risks, except as herein provided," etc. As amended in 1874 (acts 1874. p. 81, $ 5), sec. 46, reads: "That no individual or association of individuals, under any style or name, shall be permitted to do the business mentioned in the first section of this act within this state, unless he or they shall first fully comply with all the provisions of the laws of this state governing the business of life assurance."

Sec 53. repeals the old assurance laws (chs. 67 and 90 G. S. 1865), and all other acts and parts of acts incone sistent with the act.

THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF REASONABLE

BELIEF.

Note.- Article 8, Wag. Stats., under which defendant justifies, is entitled “Benevolent, Religions and Educational Associations.” Section 1 (as amended, see act of 1874, p. 22), reads: “Any lodge of Freeina. sons, or Odd-Feliows, divisions of Sons of Temperance, Grange, subordinate grange or county council of Patrons of Husbandry, or any other association organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or any library company, school, college or other association organized for the promotion of literature, science or art, or any gymnastic or other association organized for the purpose of promoting either of the objects above named, and for all similar purposes, by whatever name they may be known, consisting of not less than three persons, and also any association of merchants and others in any incorporated city, organized not for pecuniary protit, but as a board of trade, or chamber of commerce, or exchange, or under any other name, for the general promotion of trade and commerce, or of any special branch thereof, in such city, consisting of not less than nine persons, may be constituted and declared a body politic and corporate, with all the privileges, and subject to all the liabilities and restrictions contained in this act” (chapter).

Sec. 2 provides for filing articles and petitions for incorporation with circuit court.

Sec. 3 provides that the circuit judge, if he "shall be of the opinion that said articles of association be not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the United States, or of this state," shall permit the articles to be filed with the clerk, and issue a ce rtificate of incorporation in prescribed form." Sec. 4 provides for amendments to articles of association. Sec. 5 provides for churches becoming incorporated. Sec. 6 provides for corporate meetings. Sec. 7 authorizes raising of money; 8, for record of proceedings; 9, fees of clerks. In 1874 (p. 23), a new section was added authorizing colleges to confer degrees, and in 1877 three new sections were added, providing for the consolidation of companies and the merger of their charters. This is the substance of article 8 as it is now in force.

The sections of the insurance laws (ch. 76, art. 2, Wag. Stats.), in point are:

“Sec. 1. That any number of persons not less than thirteen may associate and form a company for the purpose of making assurance upon the lives of individuals, and every assurance pertaining thereto, or connected therewith, and to grant, purchase and dispose of annuities and endowments of every kind and description whatsoever."

Sec. 4 requires corporators to file in the office of superintendent of insurance a declaration containing copy of proposed charter.

Sec. 10 requires the superintendent to submit the charter to the attorney-general of the state, who examines it, and if found by him correct, he returns it to the superintendent; the superintendent then delivers certitied copy to corporators, and they become a body corporate, authorized to receive subscriptions.

arose

Two cases of some importance, on the subject of the etfect, in the eye of the law, of reasonable belief, as affording an excuse for a certain course of action, are reported in the current number of Cox's Criminal Cases. One of them is a decision of the Queen's Bench Division in this country, and in it the questi as to how far reasonable belief may be an answer to an action for malicious prosecution.

The facts of the case to which we refer (Lowe v. Collum, 13 C. C. C. 641) were briefly as follows: The plaintiff and defendant had a serious dispute about business matters. The defendant received a letter threatening his life, which letter, after showing it to his wife and son, he forwarded to the authorities at Dublin Castle, to. gether with a letter, stating that he believed the threat. ening letter to have been written by the plaintiff, and enclosing another admittedly in the bandwriting of the plaintiff. In consequence of this, criminal proceedings were instituted by the Government, and the plain. tiff was prosecuted at Petty Sessions; and on the hearing of the summons, which, however, missed, the defendant gave evidence as a witness against the plaintiff. He had, also, sworn an information against him. The plaintiff' then brought the present action for maliciously causing the summons to be issued. One of the issues knit on the pleadings was whether the defendant did the act mentioned in the plaint: and this issue seems to have been submitted

was dis

to the jury by the learned judge who tried the case ent connection. After alluding to the fact of the com(Mr. Sergeant Armstrong), with the observation that

munication being privileged, he proceeds; “If he does there was evidence proper for their consideration to not use the occasion for the reason for which the privsustain the affirmative of that issue-namely, the de- ilege was given, but uses it for some indirect and fendant's act in swearing the information, followed by wrong reason or motive of his own, then there is malthe prosecution in fact. On this portion of the case ice. There are certain tests as to when malice exists. Mr. Justice Fitzgerald's observations are worthy of It is not malice as in pleading that is to be understood notice: “If the first issue had been left to the jury by the expression cises of this kind, but it means a with that instruction only, I should have no hesitation wrong feeling in the defendant's mind. There are in coming to the conclusion that in this particular case two tests to show whether there is malice, when dethe instruction was erroneous. The case is peculiar. famatory statements have been published on a privilThere is no doubt that the prosecution was in fact in- eged occasion. If it is proved that the defendant stated stituted and carried on, and the summons sued out at wbat he knew at the time to be false, then everybody the instance of the public prosecutor and not the de- assumes the existence of malice, and that he acted from fendant, and further, that the actual position of the a wrong motive, and no one inquires what the motive defendant in making his information was a witness

was. But, supposing it is not proved that the defendalone. Prima facie, therefore, he is not responsible ant knew at the time that what he stated was false, for the prosecution, and the mere making of the infor- still he may not be acting for the reason for which the mation, followed by the subsequent proceedings at privilege was given; and if from anger or any wrong Petty Sessions, would not make him liable. He may, motive he states as true what he does not know to be however, on other grounds be answerable. The de- true, the jury may infer that he did not make the statefendant set the authorities in motion by his letter to ment for the true reason, but that he made it from an the Chief Secretary, and if he then entertained the indirect motive; and if he has acted for any other opinion and did believe that the letter called the threat- reason than that for which the privilege is given, he ening letter was in the plaintiff's handwriting, and would not be protected.” His Lordsbip further oblaid the case before the authorities with a view to serves-and tbis part of his judgment clearly would bring the offender to justice, he would not be respon- seem to be in support of Mr. Justice Fitzgerald's sible for the prosecution that followed, even though it statement_“I apprehend that if he did believe the was clear he was mistaken, and though the opinion he statements to be true, and if want of belief in their entertained should subsequently appear to have been truth was the only thing tending to show malice alunreasonable. But if, on the other hand, the defend. leged against him, the only question would be, not ant, by a statement willfully false—that is to say, by would a reasonable man believe the statements to be representing the letter in question to be in the hand- true, but did the defendant believe them. The test of writing of the plaintiff, when he either knew it was not, stupidity and obstinacy is not a fair one-for stupidity or did not believe that it was-induced the public or obstinacy would only be evidence tending to show prosecutor to enter on the enquiry and institute an that the belief was not genuine.” However this may unfounded prosecution, then be may justly be held re- be, in our humble opinion it is quite possible that sponsible for the consequesnces.” This latter section honesty and stupidity, or vindictrveness, may co-exof the learned judge's judgment is certainly necessary isi to such an extent as ought to render a person liable as a safeguard to the somewhat sweeping doctrine laid in damages, even though he might really believe in the down. It would perhaps not have been too much if truth of bis statements. The rule, at any rate, laid the doctrine had been a little further qualified by an down in Perryman v. Lister would seem to be a sound allusion to what we take to be the undoubted law, as one, and not lightly to be overlooked. laid down in Perryman v. Lister, R. L. 3 Ex. 197— An interesting and instructive case on this subject namely, that the absence of inquiry is an element in de- will be found reported in the New Zealand Jurist, termining the question of reasonable and probable New Series, Vol. I, p, 21, which would seem to point cause. Although the decision of the Exchequer to the fact that juries in the colonies are permitted at Chamber in that case was finally reversed in the House least as wide a latitude as would be allowed in this of Lords (L. R. 4 H. L. 535), yet this test was accepted country. In that case, Blakely v. Rolland, an action as a correct one by their Lordsbips, wbile under the for malicious prosecution, Williams, J., observes-, circumstances of the case, reversing the judgment for • The reasonableness of belief was admitted by the de. the defendant. Some test of this sort ought, in our fendant to be a question for the jury, but he contended opinion, be applied, for otherwise the mere fact of the that in the present case there was no dispute at all as honesty of the belief would justify an obstinate and to the facts, or as to inferences of facts, as all the evivindictive person, who sincerely believed in some de- dence was adduced by the plaintiff, and there was no lusion, in persecuting a perfectly innocent person. In conflict of evidence. It seems to me that although the such a case as this, the protection afforded to a witness facts are undisputed, yet there may be various infermight easily be made a method of injustice.

ences from these facts, and that such inforences were These views will be found, to some extent, endorsed rightly left to the jury.” It may be questioned in the judgment of Lord Justice Brett in the other whether this decision is sustainable in point of law. case to which we have alluded, which is reported in The true doctriue, in our opinion, as to the province the same number of the criminal cases. Clark v. of a jury in cases of this nature will be found decided Molyneux, 14 C. C.C., p. 10. The general result of in a recent American case, reported in the April numthat case may be shortly stated as follows: In an ac- ber of the Virginia Law Reporter, Vol. II, p. 217. tion for libel and slander, the judge ruled that the In that case, Womack v. Circle, Burks, J., says—"The occasions of publication were privileged, and left the question of probable cause is a mixed proposition of question to the jury whether the defendant honestly law and fact. The existence of the facts and circumand reasonably believed his statement to be true. It stances is a question of fact for the jury, their sufliwas held by the Court of Appeal, reversing the de- ciency a question of law for the court. It was so held cision of the Queen's Bench Division, that this was a by Lord Mansfield and Lord Loughborough in the misdirection, and that there must be a new trial; be- celebrated case of Johnston v. Sutton, 1 Term R. 510." cause it had not been explained to the jury that the This, in our opinion, is the correct statement of the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, and because the law. The New Zealand case, if followed, would place reasonableness of the defendant's belief was imma- the jury in a position which trenches too closely on the terial. It is, however, chiefly for the observations of province of the judge. Lord Chelmsford's dictum in Lord Justice Brett that the case is valuable in the pres- Lister v. Perryman (p. 535) is—“No definite rule can

cate with the plaintiff's wood,” etc., negligence in permitting the spread of the fire constituted the gist of the action, and the failure to charge such negligence rendered the complaint insufficient on demurrer. Opinion by NIBLACK, C. J.-P. C. & St. L. R. R. Co v. Culver.

be laid down for the exercise of the judge's judgment. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances, and the result is a conclusion drawn by each judge for himself, whether the facts found by the jury, in his opinion, constitute a defence to the action. The verdict in cases of this description is only nominally the verdict of a jury." In conclusion, we may observe that in Coulter v. The Dublin and Belfast Junction Railway Company, 9 I. L. T. Rep. 212, Barry, J. has very lucidly pointed out the distinction between the evidence of malice supplied in an action for malicious prosecution by the absence of probable cause, and that supplied in an action for libel by the unexcused publication of defamatory matter; showing that, in the former, if the judge decides that there is a want of probable cause, that want is merely evidence from which the jury may infer malice, while, in the latter, if the judge decides that there was no lawful excuse for the publication, the jury must, from its defamatory nature, infer that the defendant was actuated by a malicious motive.—[ Irish Law Times.

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PARTITION-FINAL DECREE APPEAL.-A decree in partition which declares the rights of the several parties in lands, and orders partition accordingly, with a reference to the commissioner to examine and report the situation of the premises, and whether they can be partitioned without injury to the owners, is a final decree, from which an appeal must be taken, or the merits of the controversy are settled. Opinion by Mars. TON, J.-Shephard v. Rice.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE WITHOUT ACTUAL CONSIDERATION-RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE. Where a chattel mortgage not securing negotiable paper is given for a sum named, but really to secure future advances, and none have been made, an assignee, though taking it for value and in good faith, supposing it to have been given for an actual indebtedness, has no rights superior to those of the mortgagee. Opinion by COOLEY, J.Judge v. Vogel.

REMOVAL OF FENCE – SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARIES-DEDICATIOX.- - In an action against highway commissioners for removing plaintiff's fence, evidence that a survey had been made with plaintiff's consent to fix the line of the highway, and that plaintiff promised to remove his fence accordingly is admissible as showing not a dedication by parol, but one by unequivocal present conduct, involving the concurrent action of the land owner and the highway authorities in determining the lines by a survey made for the express purpose. Opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J.-McMillan 0. Mc Cor. mick.

ABSTRACT OF DECISIONS OF SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

March Term, 1878.

POLICY OF INSURANCE -VOIDABLE--CONTRACT.A policy of insurance provided that on the failure of the assured to pay an installment of the premium note, the policy should be void during the continuance of such non-payment: Held, the policy was not rendered void by such non-payment, but simply voidable by the company, and the premium note was not void nor voidable by the payee thereof, and the company might maintain its suit upon the note. By the terms of the policy, if the assured paid the note without suit, such payment restored the suspended animation of the pol. icy, and if he paid it at the end of an execution the payment would have the same effect. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-American Insurance Co. v. Henley.

TENDER SUFFICIENCY OF — REFUSAL.-Tenders are to be considered strictly, and if they are not legal in every respect, even a court of equity will not support them nor supply defects. The refusal of a tender must be absolute, and a refusal “ till I consult my attorney," does not amount to a refusal in law. It is the duty of the debtor who owes money to seek his creditor and pay bis debt wherever the creditor may be found in the state. Where the note upon which a tender was made was deposited in bank, in a sealed envelope: Held, that the bank had no authority to break the envelope, and was not authorized to receive the money due upon the note, and a tender to the bank was therefore insufficient. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.King o. Finch.

RAILROADS–NEGLIGENCE, PLEADING.-It is well settled that a person may set a ftre on his own premises for any lawful purpose, and is not liable for the injury such fire may inflict upon the property of others, unless he is guilty of negligence in permitting the fire to escape; that is, in keeping, taking care of and controlling such fire. 107 Mass. 494; 44 Barb. 424. Hence, where the charge was that the defendant " set fire to rubbish and trash along and upon the grounds which the defendant used for the purpose of operating trains of cars upon its road, which fire did communi

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CONTEMPT OF COURT FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.-1. The conveyance and transfer of his proper. ty, by a husband, in anticipation of his wife's filing a libel against him for a divorce and alimony, and with intent to prevent the execution of any decree for ali. money that she might obtain, are a fraud upon her for which she might in proper form bave redress. Bur. rows v. Purple, 107 Mass. 428, 433. 2. But such acts could not of themselves constitute a contempt of court, because a person can not be in contempt of court for disobedience of an order not yet passed, and of which therefore he can not have had notice. Thompson v

Basillkew, 3 Ch. Rep. 114; Winslow v. Nayson, 113 Mass. 411; In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 169. Opinion by GRAY, C.J.-Stuart v. Stuart.

INSURANCE-EVIDENCE - DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.-In an action upon a policy of insurance covering the "fixed and movable machinery, engine, lathes and tools," of the plaintiffs, who were manufacturers of machinery made of cast iron, it was Held (1), that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the parties intended to include wooden patterns which were necessary to make the castings for the machinery, under the general term of “tools,” there being no ambiguity in the terms of the policy, and no claim that its meaning was modified by any understood or established usage. 2. That the term “ tools" may be interpreted as covering all patterns which from their size and shape admit of being applied and managed by the hands of one man. Opinion by AMES, J.-Lovewell. 0. Relief Ins. Co.

CHECK-CONSIDERATION- INSTRUCTION. – In an action of contract by the indorsee of a check drawn by defendant in favor of one C, in payment of a balance of account claimed by him and supposed by the defendant to be due him for services, it appeared that the plaintiff held the check merely for collection for C, and that C was to be paid a specified sum per month. The defendant claimed and offered evidence tending to show that C did not render the service; that if he rendered any service he had been paid in full for it when the check was given, and that, if not, the services were of less value above the amount already paid him than the amount of the check. The court instructs the jury that the same defense was open to the defendant against the plaintiff as against C; that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show a sufficient consideration for the check; that it C had broken bis contract for services with the defendant, the defendant was entitled to have damages for such breach set off against the check by way of recoupment or defense in whole or in part. Held, that this instruction was not open to exception. Opinion by SOULE, J.-Magen Furnace Co. v. Boston Soapstone F. Co.

know that the maker was dead is no excuse; and the neglect of the presentment to the administrator releases the indorser. The fact that the administrator had no legal authority to pay the note until duly allowed against the estate, does not relieve the holder from the obligation of making demand. Affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J. - Frayser's Ad’mx, v. Dameron.

INSURANCE-"OTHER INSURANCE"-MISREPRESENTATION.-1. The stipulations in a policy against other insurance are not violated by “other insurance” which is not legal insurance. The true issue is whether the policy which is said to violate the stipulation was really binding on the insurer. 2. When the insured signs a printed form of application filled up by the agent of the company which he was not asked to read, and which he is not given time to read intelligently, the fact that such form contains a misrepresentation of a material fact will not necessarily defeat a recovery where the insured appears to have acted in good faith, and to have answered truly and frankly all inquiries made of him by the agents of the company at the time of the insurance. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Dahlberg 0. St. Louis F. & M. Ins.

ADMINISTRATION-SURETIES–LIABILITY-SETTLEMENT.-1, In a proceeding under the statute (Wag. p. 81, sec. 67), to ascertain the amount in the hands of an administrator when his term expires, and to order the rendition of the same to his successor and to enforce the order against bis sureties, where there are two successive bonds, and the sureties on each bond a re liable for the total defalcation, the sureties on both bonds are properly made parties to the proceeding, and judg. ment may be rendered against all for the amount found due. 2. Where money is paid on the general liability by one who is a surety on both bonds, in the absence of any directions, it will be applied on his liability on the oldest bond. 3. The annual sworn settlement of the administrator is competent, in such a proceeding, as an admission, though it is not conclusive. Statements in it may be contradicted by the party by whom it is offered. Affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Levis v. Gambs et al.

ABSTRACT OF DECISIONS OF THE ST.

LOUIS COURT OF APPEALS.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

|Filed June 4, 1878.]

HON. EDWARD A. LEWIS, Presiding Justice.
ROBERT A. BAKEWELL,

Associate Justices.
CHAS. S. HAYDEN,

[In response to many requests from lawyers in all parts of the country, we have decided to commence again the publication of questions of law sent to us by subscribers. We propose to make this essentially a subscriber's depart. ment-i.e., we shall depend, to a large extent, upon them to edit this column. Queries will be numbered consecu tively during the year, and correspondents are requested to bear this in mind when sending answers.)

QUERIES.

ADMISSIONS--ESTOPPEL-PARTITION AGAINST MINOR DEFENDANT8.-1. Admissions made in ignorance of one's legal rights, without any intention of influencing the conduct of another, and which are not sbown to have had that effect, do not estop the person making the incautious admission afterwards to assert the truth. 2. Proceedings in partition against minor defendants who were not served with process are void, and could not be cured by any proceedings under the act of Nov. 21, 1857. Acts 1857, adj. sess. p. 52. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.Hall 0. Cavenaugh.

WHERE THE MAKER OF A NEGOTIABLE NOTE IS DEAD, the note should be presented at maturity to his administrator, if he can be found with reasonable exertion; and, if no effort be made to make demand upon the administrator, the fact that the notary to whom the note was given for presentment did not

37. SURETIES-CONTRIBUTION.— A B C & D were sureties on E's bond as administrator of an estate. D sold said administrator (E) real estate, the debts not yet baving been paid, receiving therefor moneys belonging to said estate. At the time there was in the hands of the administrator assets in the shape of notes amply sufficient to pay all indebtedness of the estate, which were subsequently converted by the administrator to his own use. A judgment was taken on the bond for the remaining debts, and execution paid by each of the suret:es--the administrator being insolvent. Can the sureties, A B & C, recover of D, their co-surety, the money received by him to the amount they paid.

F.

BOOK NOTICE.

night for the Covent Garden Journal, while the printer's boy is asleep in the passage."

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL AND EXECU

TION SALES. By David RORER, of the Iowa Bar.

Second Edition. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1878. ? It seems more proper to speak of this as a new work than as a second edition of the author's treatise on judicial and execution sales, published several years ago. The first edition has had such a complete revision as to render it hard to recognize. The principles stated have been re-examined and more thoroughly discussed. A large number of new cases have been added. Its size is increased by over two hundred pages. Much of it has been re-arranged, and most of it re-written. Its index has been made more complete than ever. Under these circumstances it can not be doubted that the favor which was extended to this work on its first appearance will be doubled in the reception of the present edition. The profession are indebted to the author for a book on a branch of the law which other treatises on the shelves of a lawyer's library do not fully enter into. The matter of this treatise is of daily concern to the practitioner, and we know of no other work which can take its place.

NOTES.

In the case of State ex rel. Circuit Attorney 0. Citizens Benefit Association, published in this issue, the Court of Appeals rendered a verbal decision on the 18th inst. The defendant applied for an appeal to the Supreme Court. The application was resisted on the ground that a judgment of ouster against a corporation for usurpation of a franchise was not within any of the causes or cases enumerated in sec. 12, art. 6, of the Constitution granting appeals or writs of error. The court held the point well taken and refused an appeal.

The Law Times, of a recent date, contains a short sketch of the history of the law as to admitting evidence touching the disposition, motives and character of witness and prisoners. It has, during the last few years, undergone considerable changes. In Queen Caroline's case, 2 Br. & B. 284, the common law judges having been summoned by the House of Lords, laid down the following rule, which touches but does not decide the point in question: “If, on the trial of an action or indictment, a witness, examined on the part of the plaintiff or prosecutor, upon crossexamination by defendant's counsel, state that at a time specified he told A that he was one of the wit. nesses against the defendant, and, being re-examined by the plaintiff's or prosecutors counsel, states what induced him to mention that to A, the plaintiff's or prosecutor's counsel can not further re-examine the witness as to such conversation, even so far only as it relates to his being one of the witnesses.” The ruling of eight judges against one (Best, J., dissenting), was confirmed by the house. In the eighth year of William II), Sir John Friend was indicted for treason. A Capt. Blair, who had received some kindnesses from the accused, was the chief witness against him. Another witness was called who knew nothing against the accused personally, but was able to confirm the statements of the first, so far as to prove that the statements were not a recent invention. 13 Howell's State Trials, 32 Gilbert & Buller, are conflicting authorities on the rule as to whether, in answer to proofs of statements made by a witness in variance with his testimony at the trial, evidence may be given by the party who called the witness that he confirmed the same thing on other occasions, and is still consistent with himself. Russell, Vol. 3, p. 593, holds that the better opinion seems to be that evidence is not admissible, except in cases where counsel on the other side impute a design to misrepresent from some motive of interest or relationship. Even during the Stuart State Trials it was allowed to discredit a witness by proving subornation or corruption. Thus, on his trial for high treason, A. D. 1679, Richard Lang. horne, after arguing that Oates and Bedlow, having received pardons, were to be treated as approvers, continued: “I desire to know whether they have not received any rewards or gratifications for the discovery they have made, and the service they have done." Mr. Justice Pemberton replied: “Do you think, Mr. Langhorne, that the King will bribe his witnesses ?” But Lord Chief Justice Scroggs put the first part of the question to Oates, who, however, evaded it; and Lord Chief Justice North told the prisoner, if he could suppose there was any subornation or corruption, to call his witnesses and prove it. R. v. Langhorne, 7 Howell, 446. In Lord Stafford's case, evidence was admitted to show that a witness had offered a bribe, the object being to show that he was so affected towards the party accused as to be willing to adopt any corrupt course in order to carry out his purpose. 7 Howell, $. T. 1400. Even the turbulence of the Popish plots and the highhanded proceedings of Chief Justice Jefferies and Scroggs did not upset the practice of calling witnesses to character. One Benjamin Harris, a book seller, was indicted for causing to be printed and sold a libel, entitled “An appeal from the country to the

In an address before the Iowa Bar Association, delivered last month, and which has since been published in pamphlet form (Mills & Co., Des Moines, Ia.), Judge Dillon gave an interesting historical sketch and description of Westminister Hall and the English Inns of Court. It is there where the Judges of England have sat and the lawyers have been trained for centuries, and to the American lawyer there is an interest attaching to these places which makes Judge Dillon's sketch highly entertaining and not uninstructive. As Thackeray says of them: “These venerable Inns which have the Lamb and Flag and the Winged Horse for their signs, have attractions for the persons who inhabit them, and a share of rough comfort and freedom, which men always remember with pleasure. I don't know whether the student of law permits himself the refreshment of enthusiasm, or indulges in poetical reminiscences as he passes by historical chambers, and says, 'Yonder Eldon lived-upon this side Coke mused upon Lyttleton-here Chitty toiledhere Barnwell and Alderson joined in their famous labors--here Byles composed bis great work upon Bills, and Smith compiled his immortal Leading Cases -here Gustavus still toils, with Solomon to aid him'; but the man of letters can't but love the place which has been inhabited by so many of brethren, or peopled by their creations as real to us at this day as the authors whose children they were—and Sir Roger de Coverly walking in the Temple Garden, and discoursing with Mr. Spectator about the beauties in hoops and patches who are sauntering over the grass, is just as lively a figure to me as old Samuel Johnson rolling through the fog with the Scotch gentleman at his heels on their way to Dr. Goldsmith's chambers in Brick Court; or Henry Fielding, with inked ruffles, and a wet towel around his head, dashing ott articles at mid

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liberty, property and the Protestant religion." One neighbor was called who looked upon him as a fair conditioned, quiet, peaceable man, and so reputed among his neighbors. Another neighbor had never heard of him that he was wont to oppose or scandalize the king or government.

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